Sunday, September 21, 2008

उपलब्धि होइन, जिम्मेवारी

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

जुनसुकै कोणबाट नियाले पनि अन्ततः प्रधानमन्त्री पुष्पकमल दाहालको भारत भ्रमणको उपलब्धिलाई उनले नेकपा माओवादीको सत्तारोहणले त्यहां उब्जाएका प्रश्नहरूका बारे कत्ति आश्वस्त बनाउन सके भन्ने कुराले नै नाप्नेछ ।
भारतीय हैकमवादविरुद्ध शङ्खनाद गरी जनयुद्धमा होमिएका विद्रोही नेताकै हैसियतमा प्रधानमन्त्री दाहाल प्रस्तुत हुन त कूटनीतिको आधारभूत मान्यताले नै दिंदैनथ्यो । न त सरकारप्रमुखका हैसियतमा दाहाललाई भूमिगत जीवनबाट सार्वजनिक भएलगत्तै दिल्ली गएका बेला दर्शाएको उन्मुक्त शाब्दिक उदारता दोहोर्‍याउने छूट मिल्थ्यो । तर पनि आफ्नो सौम्यता प्रयोग गरी सबै विचारधाराका भारतीय नेताहरूको मन जित्ने प्रयासमा दाहाल निकै अगाडि रहे । यसलाई नै उपलब्धि ठान्नु कति घातक सिद्ध हुन सक्नेछ भन्ने बोध प्रधानमन्त्री र उनको दललाई नभएको पक्कै होइन ।
भ्रमणपछि जारी संयुक्त विज्ञप्तिमा नियमित र निर्दिष्ट प्रतिबद्धताहरूको सम्मिश्रण भए तापनि नेपाल-भारत सम्बन्धका पृष्ठभूमिमा त्यसलाई निरन्तरता नै मान्नुपर्ने हुन्छ । सन् १९५० को शान्ति र मैत्री सन्धिको पुनरावलोकन, नवीकरण र समायोजन गर्न व्यापार र पारवहनमा सहुलित बढाउन, जलस्रोतको व्यापकतम् विकास गर्न गरिएका प्रतिबद्धतालाई साकार पार्न संयन्त्रहरूले आफ्नै गति तय गर्लान् ।
कोसीपीडितको राहत, राजमार्ग मर्मतका लागि सहायता, खाद्यान्न र पेट्रोलियम पदार्थको निर्बिघ्न आपूर्तिजस्ता विषयहरूले राष्ट्रको तात्कालिक ध्यान खिच्नेछ । प्यूठानस्थित राप्ती नदीमा नौमुरे जलविद्युत् निर्माणमा सहयोग गर्ने भारतीय प्रतिबद्धता झट्ट हर्दा नौलो देखिए पनि प्रधानमन्त्रीको भ्रमणको उपलब्धि भनेर मान्नुपर्ने कारण छैन । त्यसको चर्चा कुनै न कुनै रूपमा भइरहेकै थियो ।
भ्रमणको उपलब्धिभन्दा पनि त्यसले दिएको जिम्मेवारी महत्त्वपूर्ण बनेको छ । २०४६ सालको परविर्तनपछि प्रधानमन्त्री कृष्णप्रसाद भट्टर्राई, गिरिजप्रसाद कोइराला र मनमोहन अधिकारीको भारत भ्रमणपछि जारी विज्ञप्तिहरू निकै भद्र शब्दावलीमा रचिएका थिए । झट्ट हर्दा तिनले आसन्न विवादहरूको पूर्वाभास दिएका थिएनन् । 'साझा नदी'को दलदलमा फस्न गए पनि अन्तरिम प्रधानमन्त्री भट्टर्राईले निर्वाचित सरकारलाई दीर्घकालीन महत्त्वका विषयहरू छोड्न पाएका थिए । कोइरालाको भ्रमणकालमा जनाइएका कति प्रतिबद्धताहरू साकार भए पनि टनकपुरमा तटबन्ध बनाउने कुरा नेपाललाई बाढीबाट जोगाउने उपकारवादी आवरणमा सिंगारिएको थियो ।
टनकपुर काण्डले नेपाली राजनीतिलाई रन्थनाएपछि त्यसका गल्तीलाई सुधार्ने प्रणका साथ बृहत् महाकाली पुलिन्दा प्रधानमन्त्री अधिकारीको भ्रमणपछि आयो । शेरबहादुर देउवाको संयुक्त सरकारले संसद्बाट सन्धिको अनुमोदन गराई छ महिनामा निस्कने भनिएको विस्तृत परियोजना प्रतिवेदनको नाक-मुख देख्न अहिलेसम्म पाइएको छैन ।
त्यसमाथि सरोकारवाला भारतीय राज्य उत्तर प्रदेशबाट उत्तराखण्ड चोइटियो । ती राज्यहरू प्राकृतिक स्रोत र सम्पदाको बांडफांटको खिचातानीमा लिप्त भइरहंदा हामीहरू विद्युत् बेच्ने सपना देख्न छाडेका छैनौै । महाकाली भने अविरल बगिरहेको छ । अझ ताजा कुरा गर्ने हो भने शाही सरकारको पतनपछि दिल्ली पुग्दा एसियाकै राजनेता भनी सम्मानित प्रधानमन्त्री कोइरालाको भ्रमणपश्चात् घोषित 'हिमालयन मार्सल प्लान' त पग्लेर कता बिलायो कता ।
हर्र्दै जाउं, अहिले पेट्रोलियम पदार्थको आपूर्तिलाई निरन्तरता दिनका लागि छुट्याइएको ऋणले कत्तिको त्राण देला । भारतीय आयल निगमले बक्यौताको खिचलो निकाल्दा यो कुरा मिलाउन नयां दिल्लीले सकेको भए अहिलेको प्रतिबद्धतालाई आसन्न सुपुर्दगी सन्धिसंग जोडेर हेर्ेन नेपालीहरू विवश हुनुपर्ने थिएनन् ।
१९५० को सन्धिको पुनरावलोकन हुनुपर्ने नेपाली चाहनालाई तत्कालीन प्रधानमन्त्री मनमोहन अधिकारीले उठाउंदा नयां दिल्ली केही सहिष्णु बनिदिएको भए अहिलेको हृदय परविर्तनलाई हामीले ग्रेटर नेपाल र गोर्खाल्यान्ड प्रसङ्गसित जोडेर शङ्कालु बन्नु पर्ने थिएन ।
सो सन्धिमा हामीलाई अहितकर लागेका सामरकि, सुरक्षा र राजनीतिक पाटालाई परिवर्तन गर्दा नेपालको भूपरिवेष्ठित अवस्थितिसित प्रत्यक्ष रूपले सरोकार राख्ने आर्थिक पाटा सुनिश्चित गर्ने बखतमा त ०४६ सालकै अनुभवले पिरोल्ला । भारतले जनान्दोलन उर्त्र्सगमा पुग्न लाग्दा राजा वीरेन्द्रतर्फ तेर्साएको एकीकृत मस्यौदा सन्धिकै संस्करण प्रधानमन्त्री भट्टर्राईसमक्ष प्रस्तुत गरेको थियो ।
छुच्चो भएर नेपालले भारतसंग सधै सबै कुरा लिन मात्र खोजेको आक्षेप नलागोस् । हामीसंग दिने कुराहरू नै पनि त सीमित छन् । भारतीय सुरक्षाप्रति संवेदनशील हुंदाहुदै पनि छाती खोल्न परिस्थितिले दिंदोरहेनछ । भारतसंग नेपालको खुला सीमालाई हाम्रो उत्तरी छिमेकीले आफ्नो राष्ट्रिय सुरक्षासंग गांसेर हर्न थालेको यथार्थ त नयां दिल्लीले बुझ्नुपर्ने हो ।
राजतन्त्रलाई मौका पाउनेबित्तिकै चिनिया तुरूप देखाएर आफूहरूलाई धम्काउन खोजेको भनेर उफ्रने मध्येकै केही प्रतिष्ठित भारतीय अध्येताहरू गणतन्त्रात्मक नेपाल चीनमुखी भयो भनेर टाउको ठटाउन छाडेका छैनन् । नेपाली रहर र बाध्यता छुट्याउन नखोजेर सुरक्षा संवेदनशीलतामा एकाधिकार खोज्ने प्रवृत्ति अरूमा रहुन्जेल हाम्रा आश्वासनले के नै गर्नसक्छ ।

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, असोज ५, २०६५)

Sunday, September 07, 2008

आशङ्का र अव्यवस्थाको चक्र

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

शान्ति प्रक्रियालाई छ महिनाभित्र तार्किक निष्कर्षमा पुर्‍याउने प्रधानमन्त्री पुष्पकमल दाहालले अठोट गरेलगत्तै उपप्रधानमन्त्रीले शान्तिसुरक्षाको स्थिति त्यही समयतालिकाभित्र सुधार्ने प्रण गरे । केही दिनपछि रक्षामन्त्रीले सेना समायोजन छ महिनाभित्र भइसक्ने बताए । त्यसपछि अर्थमन्त्रीले राजनीतिक क्रान्ति करबिकरबि सफल भइसकेको हुनाले मुलुकले अब आर्थिक क्रान्ति सुरु गर्नुपर्ने मनसाय व्यक्त गरे।
राज्यले सुनिश्चित गर्नुपर्ने दैनिक अमनचैनजस्तो आधारभूत वा सेना समायोजनजस्तो संवेदनशील विषयकै दायराभित्र शान्ति प्रक्रियालाई बांध्ने उद्देश्य हाम्रा सत्तासीन नेताहरूको पक्कै होइन । विभागीय मन्त्रीहरू त अझ जनताका सामु आफूहरूमा उत्तरदायित्वबोध प्रबल रहेको सन्देश दिन व्यग्र पनि होलान् ।
असहमतिहरूको समायोजन नै शान्ति प्रक्रियाका रूपमा देख्दै आएका आममानिसलाई त्यस्ता अभिव्यक्तिहरूले रनभुल्लमा पारिदिएको हुनुपर्छ । राजतन्त्रको समाप्तिबाहेक नयां नेपालको प्रारम्भिक स्वरूपभित्र पुरानो मुलुकका सबै गुण र विशेषता विद्यमान छन् । नयां सरकारको साझा न्यूनतम कार्यक्रममा गरिएका अधिकांश प्रतिबद्धताहरूसंग पञ्चायतकालदेखि नै परिचित रहंदै आएका नेपालीहरूको जमात हरक्षेत्रमा व्याप्त छ ।
नेपालको विशिष्ट परिवेशमाझ भूराजनीतिले दिएको झट्काले पृथक् विचारधारा भएका राजनीतिक शक्तिहरूलाई एकीकृत हुंदै परविर्तन तर्फ उन्मुख गरायो । त्यसले जन्माएको आशङ्का र अव्यवस्थाको विषम चक्र फनफनी घुमिरहेका बेला सत्तासीन जिम्मेवार तहबाट लोकप्रियताको मात्रै खोजी हुनु कति नै बुद्धिमानी ठहरिएला । उता मन्त्रिपरिषद्को गठनसंगै त्यसको आयुको अड्कलबाजी सुरु भइसकेको अवस्थामा सरकारको राजनीतिक एवम् प्रशासनिक चुस्तीमा ह्रास आउनु अस्वाभाविक भएन ।
बदलिएको परिस्थितिमा आ-आफ्नो अधिकतम् भूमिका र प्रभाव सुनिश्चित गर्नका लागि प्रमुख राजनीतिक दलहरू तत्पर छन् । सत्तासीन दलहरू सरकारमा सहभागिताको कुरालाई लिएर आन्तरकि विवादमा फस्नुका पछाडि सैद्धान्तिक र रणनीतिक पाटाहरू नभएका होइनन् । तर, झगडालाई सत्ताका लागि सौदाबाजी भनेर बुझ्नुपर्ने बाध्यता राजनीतिक दलहरूका विगतले नै बनाइदिएको छ ।
नेपाली काङ्ग्रेस प्रतिपक्षमा बसेर आफ्नो भविष्य बनाउनतिर लागेजस्तो पनि देखिन्छ । अनि, सरकारमा नरहेको व्यथा पनि बेलाबेला पोख्छ । आफूलाई सधैं राजतन्त्र र कम्युनिस्टविरुद्ध एकैसाथ लडिरहनुपरेको महसुस गर्ने दललाई गणतन्त्रको आगमनले केही राहत दिएको होला । तर, राजतन्त्रको समाप्तिले काङ्ग्रेसका सम्पूर्ण् प्रतिद्वन्द्वीहरूलाई पनि एउटै निसाना ताक्ने सुविधा प्रदान गरेको छ ।
नयांपनलाई अंगाल्दै अदालतले कुमारीको आधारभूत मानव अधिकार सुनिश्चित गरिनुुपर्छ भन्ने आदेश दिएझैं अन्य परम्परा र संस्कृतिसंग गांसिएका विषयहरूमा प्रवेश गर्ला । तर, राष्ट्रिय पुनःनिर्माणका लागि अत्यावश्यक राष्ट्रिय सदाचार सुनिश्चित गर्न उसले पनि के नै गर्न सक्ला र । सरकारद्वारा नियुक्त आयोगहरू, गैरसरकारी संस्थाहरू एवम् सञ्चारजगत्ले पनि खबरदारी गर्नेसम्म हो । तर, व्यक्तिगत र पेसागत स्वतन्त्रताजस्ता विषयहरूलाई छाड्ने हो भने उनीहरू पनि केका विरुद्ध खबरदारी गर्ने भन्ने अन्योलमा देखिन्छन् ।
केही गर्न सक्ने निकाय भनेको जनादेशप्राप्त संविधानसभा नै हो । सभाले अन्तरमि संसद्को काम गरे पनि त्यसको प्रमुख दायित्व नयां संविधान निर्माण गर्नु हो । अन्तरमि व्यवस्थापिकाको हैसियतमा सभाले सङ्क्रमणकालको व्यवस्थापन गर्ने हो । त्यसका दुइ आधार अन्तरिम संविधान र बृहत् शान्ति सम्झौता नै हुन् ।
अन्तरमि संविधानका शब्द र मर्मले पनि सम्बोधन गर्न नभ्याएका विषयहरूमा गतिरोध तोड्न त्यसमा आवश्यक संशोधन गर्ने परिपाटी बसिसकेको छ भने शान्ति सम्झौतालाई पनि पटकपटकका सहमतिहरूद्वारा पुनःभाषित गर्ने गरिएको छ । सभा अध्यक्ष र सदस्यहरूले पटकपटक संविधान निर्माण प्रक्रियामा प्रवेश गर्न भइरहेको ढिलाइ दोस्रो दर्जाको समाचार बनेको छ ।
नयां नेपालको संरचना र स्वरूप जेजस्तो भए पनि परविर्तन भनेको अविरल प्रक्रिया नै हो । आज उपेक्षित मानिएका समूहहरूको समावेशीकरणले प्रतिनिधित्वको मुद्दा समाप्त हुने छैन । गणतन्त्र आएकै भरमा परम्परागत रूपले राज्यबाट लाभान्वित समूहहरूबाट प्रतिक्षेपको सम्भावना समाप्त भएको छैन । प्रमुख दलहरूको नेतृत्व तहमै यस्ता वर्ग र समुदायको बाहुल्य छंदैछ । सबै दलमा नवप्रवेशीका रूपमा पनि यो समूह उपस्थित भएको छ ।
विगतसंग सम्बन्धबिच्छेद गर्नुभन्दा गाह्रो गन्तव्य पहिल्याउनु भएको कुरा मुलुक हांक्नेहरूलाई थाहा नभएको होइन । तर, सरकार प्रत्येक कदममा विवादित हुने अनि प्रतिपक्षले होच्याउने क्रम जारी रहंदासम्म राजनीति अल्पदृष्टिले ग्रस्त हुनुपर्नेछ । राष्ट्रको र्सार्वभौमिक अस्मिता एकातिर विदेशी शक्तिहरूका आग्रह र आकाङ्क्षाले सङ्कुचित गर्दैछन् भने अर्कोतर्फसरकारी रिक्ततामाझ मौलाएका आपराधिक समूहहरूले त्यसमा प्रहार गर्ने क्रम जारी छ ।
त्यसैले पनि होला, मुलुक यति अगाडि आइसक्दा पनि एकदलीय अधिनायकवाद, सैनिक शासन, राष्ट्रिय विखण्डन, राजतन्त्रको पुनःस्थापना र प्रत्यक्ष वैदेशिक हस्तक्षेपजस्ता नितान्त चरम सम्भावनाहरू राष्ट्रिय बहसका अभिन्न अङ्ग बनेका छन् ।

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, भदौ २२, २०६५)

Saturday, September 06, 2008

Birth Of A Republic: Stories Behind The Story

By Sanjay Upadhya
The idea that the deep unpopularity of Nepal’s last monarch became the greatest catalyst for republicanism has an alluring pithiness. But tight headlines and terse nut-graphs cannot tell what is, by any measure, a far more complex story. The Nepalese political discourse has been dominated by incessant criticism – justified as well as inflated – of the palace. This singular obsession with former king Gyanendra’s “excesses” and the monarchy’s inherently “anti-democratic” proclivities creates a warped picture of the past. More importantly, it obstructs the extrapolation of valuable pointers for an increasingly uncertain future.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the monarchy was not always the preponderant national institution during its 240-year existence. The death of Prithvi Narayan Shah, seven years after the founding of the Nepalese state, led to a weakening of the monarchy. A succession of minor kings left rival royal factions competing for power. The loss of a third of the nation’s territory in a debilitating war with the British only fueled the feuds. From the bloodletting rose the Ranas, who oversaw the eclipse of the monarchy for over a century.
Nepal’s foray into modernity in the 1950s revealed the new contradictions the monarchy would reign atop. The overthrow of the Rana regime, hailed as the dawn of democracy, ended up consolidating the monarchy. The inauguration of Nepal’s first elected government precipitated a battle of wills in which the palace prevailed over the Nepali Congress. Royal preponderance reached its zenith during the three decades following King Mahendra’s dismissal of Prime Minister B.P. Koirala’s government and abolition of multiparty democracy.
The incongruity of an impoverished nation having to finance an expensive institution was ideologically anathema to the communists. Yet the communists, whom the palace considered a counterweight to the Nepali Congress, prospered the most during 30 years of palace-led nonparty rule. The Nepali Congress, for its part, saw a constitutional monarchy as a bulwark against a preponderance of the left. Yet it made attempts on the lives of two kings.
The restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990 was expected to put Nepal irrevocably on the path of democratic modernity. Barely six years later, an avowedly republican Maoist insurgency helped the palace to gradually consolidate its position. International and regional powers, mindful of such internal contradictions, considered the palace the fulcrum of stability. India and the United States – the world’s two most prominent democratic republics – joined communist China to support the monarchy.
That compact was shaken – more internally than internationally – by the June 2001 Narayanhity massacre. The carnage dealt a grievous blow to the monarchy from multiple directions. It ended any halo of divinity surrounding the monarchy. The notion that the king was the guardian of the nation exploded with the bursts of gunfire. Nepalis were reminded of the history of bloodshed and machinations associated with palace politics.
The shady reputations of the new monarch and the heir apparent, coupled with swirling suspicions of their role in the palace massacre, could hardly provide a promising beginning. Yet the political parties lay discredited by their own performance and the Maoists had little to offer politically. A wary political class as well as public watched King Gyanendra’s moves to strengthen the palace’s role. Still, the royal interventions of October 2002 and February 2005 failed to rouse the people into vigorous opposition. Within Nepal, the two events were considered part of a continuum. Geopolitically, they were different. The contrast revealed an essential truism of Nepalese politics. International and regional powers, with their competing interests in and expectations from Nepal, have precipitated political changes.
When King Gyanendra dismissed an elected prime minister in 2002 for failing to hold elections on schedule, India and the United States seemed generally content. China maintained its characteristic silence. Over the preceding years, Western governments and international donors had been growing increasingly critical of the infighting, corruption and mismanagement that had gripped the polity. Their representatives in Kathmandu had become increasingly explicit in voicing those concerns.
The 2005 royal takeover, on the other hand, instantly infuriated the Indians and Americans, while the Chinese, again, professed non-interference. Yet Beijing’s anxiety was clear. A series of palace-appointed premiers had failed to quell the Maoist insurgency, prompting greater Indian as well as American military involvement. New Delhi’s own discomfort with American activism was palpable. Allowing the Maoists to triumph over the state would have grave implications for India’s Maoist insurgency.

Cautious China
Chinese apprehensions ran deeper. The Nepalese rebels’ wholesale discrediting of Mao Zedong’s reputation was intolerable enough, something Beijing expressed with great candor. It was not hard to fathom how a total Maoist triumph could energize restive populations in the Chinese hinterland deprived of a part of the post-Mao economic miracle. The prospect of Nepal’s inexorable drift toward the Indian-American camp carried grave implications for China’s soft underbelly, Tibet. On the eve of the 2005 royal takeover, Nepal shut down the local offices of the principal Tibet-related organizations. The event was thus cast as a pro-Chinese initiative.
Far from extending full support to the royal regime, however, the Chinese remained cautious. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao skipped Nepal during his South Asian tour, sending his foreign minister to Kathmandu instead. King Gyanendra’s anticipated visit to China to mark the 50th anniversary of bilateral ties did not materialize. The Indians succeeded in preventing the Americans from striking a separate deal with the palace. New Delhi, for its part, was negotiating with the king. It bailed out Nepal from massive censure at the UN Human Right Conference in Geneva and dangled the promise of a resumption of military – and perhaps even political –assistance.
A section of the Indian establishment always considered the monarchy the problem and found a conducive political alignment in New Delhi. The communist parties backing the ruling Indian coalition took the lead and moved swiftly to bring the Maoists and mainstream parties in an anti-palace alliance. The Indian army and internal security apparatus, insistent on helping the king and the Nepalese army, was not pleased, as a series of leaks in the Indian media showed. This conflict emboldened the royal government, which sought to internationalize its fight against the Maoists by linking it to the global war on terror. On the ground, it went after the mainstream parties without being able to dent the rebels. New Delhi checkmated the king by facilitating a ceasefire on the eve of his attempt to raise the insurgency at the United Nations General Assembly.
The monarch responded by spearheading a campaign to secure China’s position as an observer in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The move came amid China’s drive to block India from regional initiatives in East Asia. In New Delhi, the palace’s brazen flaunting of the “China card” hardened critics and alienated the remaining supporters of the king. The Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoist rebels hurriedly signed the 12-point pact to bring down the royal regime.
The collaboration energized the Nepalese masses. The opportunity for peace and stability after years of bloodletting and instability was too enticing to squander. As anti-palace demonstrations picked up speed, India sent a royal relative, Karan Singh, as an emissary. The king’s invitation to the SPA to form the next government won instant praise from New Delhi, Washington and London. It failed to quell the protests. For the republican camp within Nepal and outside, the public defiance served to expose the depth of anti-monarchism.
The collapse of the royal regime led to a swift and systematic clipping of the palace’s powers. Still, a republican Nepal was not a done deal. The next phase – the suspension of the monarchy after the enactment of the interim constitution – morphed in line with a careful power play. A precipitous de-monarchization of the nation was precluded by the imponderables involved. The true nature of Nepalese public opinion vis-à-vis the monarchy, the loyalty of the army and the Maoists’ real commitment to the democratic process remained unknown. What was obvious was not inspiring: the mainstream parties’ poor record of governance.
Yet for India, mainstreaming the Maoists had become a matter of national security. The insurgency launched by Indian Maoists, or Naxalites, was spreading fast. The Naxalites were in no position to overwhelm the state, but they risked exacerbating India’s already grave internal security challenge. Engaging the Nepalese Maoists in the peace process through incremental carrots was tied to India’s plan to tame the Naxalites.

Faith-based Initiative?
For influential international quarters, King Gyanendra became too much of a liability. He continued to insist that he had seized power in good faith, adding that the effort failed because of “several factors”. The caveat could not have been lost on India. For the democratic West, the monarch’s overt tilt toward China was inexcusable enough. His espousal of the Hinduism mantle, with a fervor surpassing that of any of his predecessors, was tantamount to insolence. While Christian organizations had not listed Nepal high on the list of persecutor nations, many called it one of the most unreached nations for the Gospel. A Hindu monarch in a secular nation was far from tenable.
There were scattered reports of contacts in Delhi between the Maoists and Christian groups – some suggesting financial transactions – but they mostly emanated from the Hindu nationalist spectrum of the Indian media. Given the Maoists’ record of successfully using secondary adversaries to accomplish their immediate ends, the convergence of interest was plausible.
Had Crown Prince Paras enjoyed a better public image, forcing King Gyanendra to abdicate in favor of his son might have been an option. Passing the crown to Paras’s son, Hridayendra, would have mollified royalists. For the country, it meant a return of regency. King Gyanendra, more than anyone else, understood what this would mean for the monarchy. He dismissed calls for abdication made by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and others.
Publicly, the international community shunned the monarch. Privately they maintained channels. One reason was China’s swift move to build ties with the Maoists. The arrival of a modern high-speed train to the Tibetan capital Lhasa had greatly improved China’s access to Nepal. Nepal’s open border to the south exposed the Indian heartland to what many analysts there considered an enhanced military threat from China. The Terai erupted in violence against centuries of injustices inflicted by the hillspeople. The specific assurances foreign governments sought from the palace in exchange for the retention of some form of monarch remains unknown.
Clearly, the second amendment to the interim constitution, which declared Nepal a republic subject to an elected assembly’s ratification, was intended as a carrot and a stick for the palace. The monarch found more time to reconsider his options. To pre-empt any royal assertiveness, the statute also provided for the removal of the monarchy by two-thirds majority of the interim parliament. This ultimatum failed to influence the king but vitiated the political climate for the palace.
Previously, the Maoists and the mainstream parties – for their own interests – had made a distinction between the institution of the monarchy and individual kings. If Mahendra and Gyanendra were denounced as autocrats, Birendra and Tribhuvan, in their estimation, fared better as liberals. But now statues of Prithvi Narayan Shah were being demolished. Paradoxically, those committed to preserving Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity viewed the state as the culmination of unjust wars of aggressions. Supporters of some form of monarchy in the Nepali Congress attempted to frame the discussion in different ways. The fear of being perceived as royalists in a ruling alliance heavily dominated by republicans dissuaded them. Moreover, royalist parties like the Rastriya Prajatantra Party and the Rastriya Janashakti Party had become monarchy neutral.
Opinion polls up to the run-up to the elections showed that half the country wanted to retain some form of monarchy. A referendum would have put the issue to rest. Victory would have permitted King Gyanendra to recreate the monarchy in his own image. A defeat would have allowed him to depart as a democrat.
Many expected the king to resist the republic declaration. The inability of the ruling alliance to agree on the precise structure of the presidency as well as power sharing up to the first meeting of constituent assembly suggested as much. Whether royal defiance would have succeeded is a different thing altogether. Ultimately, the ex-king saw the overwhelming assembly vote in favor of a republic as the best expression of the popular will under the circumstances which he and his predecessors always invoked.
The monarchy had been central to the policies of the three major international stakeholders in Nepal. The Maoists took in royalists reportedly on the advice of the Chinese to bolster a nationalist front. A Maoist-UML alliance could go a far way toward mollifying Beijing. For New Delhi, the Nepali Congress and the three Madhesi parties could provide succor. Washington, which began its own rapprochement with the Maoists after their electoral success, perhaps sees the military as the backbone of a non-communist front.
The presence of the ex-monarch within the country would probably help stabilize politics in the same way the return of Zahir Shah, Afghanistan former king, helped the Hamid Karzai government find its footing. With the end of the monarchy, a new quest for internal and regional equilibrium has begun.

(A version of this article appeared in the August 2008 inaugural issue of Global Nepali)