Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya
1. Why are most South Asian states sceptical of India’s primacy in their own ways?
At a concrete level, India’s involvement in the domestic affairs of smaller South Asian states has left a legacy of profound bitterness and resentment. The content and form have differed in individual countries, ranging from outright military involvement in Sri Lanka in the name of peacekeeping to an economic blockade of Nepal to force constitutional changes. Most smaller South Asian states have experienced what they consider flagrant instances of Indian micromanagement of their internal affairs.
These nations fiercely value their independence and sovereignty. They fervently guard their right to make their own decisions based on their perceived national interest. There also is a pronounced sentiment that New Delhi is unable to recognize that India’s adversaries are not automatically adversaries of its neighbours. Broadly speaking, the smaller South Asian states urge India to cease confusing regional leadership with regional policing.
In response, India has employed a combination of traditional diplomatic tools and more novel initiatives. New Delhi has recently been working on integrating the region economically for mutual cooperation to foster collective self-reliance. It is doing so by, among other things, enhancing connectivity through strong physical and digital infrastructure links.
In building strong bilateral ties, India is using its cultural heritage and values to strengthen goodwill and cooperation with its neighbours. The success of such endeavours would depend critically on the extent to which the region manages to overcome the underlying history of distrust.
As India seeks its ‘rightful place’ in its extended neighbourhood, concerns continue to be voiced. Commentators – Indian and foreign alike – have suggested that what New Delhi considers its rightful place, others can consider a hegemonistic threat. Nevertheless, the concept has become part of a new national consensus in foreign policy traversing the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Indian National Congress.
The invitations to leaders of neighboring states to Mr. Modi’s three oath-taking ceremonies are a manifestation of this approach. However, the practice has also been criticized. Smaller neighbours could perceive the invitations as a demonstration of India’s imperiousness and sense of predominance, akin to Emperor George V’s 1911 Delhi Durbar.
The smaller states assert that there are better ways to underscore good neighbourliness, such as greater Indian eagerness to resolve long-running divisive issues such as border disputes and water sharing. They continue to be concerned about Indian interference in neighbours’ domestic affairs under various guises. New Delhi needs to correct this contradiction in the neighbourhood before it can hope to play a more effective and influential role in the broader global arena.
Still, Pakistan’s strategic importance persists amid new geopolitical realignments. The country is situated at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and shares frontiers with Afghanistan, China, India, and Iran. This makes it a central actor in regional stability, trade routes, and global power dynamics, especially in security and energy.
India’s push to promote the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) over the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as the primary neighborhood platform – in a palpable effort to shun Pakistan – has met with disgruntlement from many smaller states. Moreover, New Delhi’s effort to isolate Pakistan diplomatically has had to contend with a resurgence of Islamabad’s importance to countries such as Russia and Iran, with which New Delhi enjoys close ties.