Can a national government really live up to its name?
By Sanjay Upadhya
After the perilous posturing precipitated by the fall of the Maoist-led government, there is a palpable acknowledgment of the urgency of rebuilding consensus. While this certainly bodes well for the beleaguered peace process, the recognition is more of a reaction to the growing international clamor for ending the dangerous drift than a direct response to the gravity of the situation.
The Indian government, as the prime facilitator of the peace, has become increasingly apprehensive in public over the fraying of consensus, a sentiment broadly shared by other key governments. The Carter Center, one of the international nongovernmental institutions with a longstanding role in the process, has echoed the anxiety of the wider global community. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stepped forth with incredible frankness on the roadblocks that have emerged.
With less than a year remaining for the parties to draft and promulgate the new constitution – the culmination of a peace process inaugurated amid much optimism – the all-round apprehension is entirely reasonable. A popularly drafted constitution remains Nepal’s best hope of acquiring the political stability central to the sustenance of a ‘new’ Nepal. Having averaged one basic law per decade, Nepalis have paid a heavy cumulative price for political improvisation.
Previous calls for a broader democratic alliance or a united communist front to bolster the peace process resonated more as threats from competing ends of the ideological spectrum. The current predilection of the principal political parties for a national or consensus government represents a refreshing change in the tenor of the national conversation.
Flawed Process
Still, the unpleasantness of our reality must be confronted. While consensus and cooperation have become the operative word across the ideological spectrum, the key protagonists are digging in their heels deeper. Each instance of Maoist obstructionism has prompted a degree of disdain from the Nepali Congress and the Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML), which, in turn, has ratcheted up tensions. Every utterance in favor of amity is invariably accompanied by the word ‘accident’.
Part of the reason is that the peace process remains deeply flawed. After the collapse of royal rule, the Nepali Congress, and, specifically, then-prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala, made all-out efforts to accede to every demand the Maoists made. Since it was crucial to keep the Maoists tied deep into the process, ambiguities and outright prevarications underpinned what essentially became periodic adjustments of disagreements. The goal posts were shifted every step of the way, but the players ultimately were able to accept the rules.
Once the Maoists scored an upset electoral triumph, the peace process entered the next phase. With the monarchy out of the way, the political parties were generally expected to turn against one other. But the rivalries have turned far worse than repulsive. The Nepali Congress and the UML still seem incapable of confronting the central fact that the Maoists emerged as the largest party in largely free and fair elections. The Maoists, for their part, have been flaunting their striking albeit uncertain mandate as almost a divine right to rule.
The political class’s inability to figure out who nudged whom along the path toward a ‘new’ Nepal has been troubling enough. The geopolitical maneuverings precipitated by the vacuum left behind by the monarchy have exacerbated matters. The palace, for all the internal calumnies it drew, at least enjoyed enough confidence of the principal external stakeholders to guarantee stability on that vital front.
Once in power, the Maoists overplayed their hand by seeking to shift Nepal’s geopolitical locus northward to the point of utter defiance. Clearly, this, more than anything else, hastened their fall from power. If not the sacking and subsequent reinstatement of the chief of the army staff, then some other controversy would have exposed the impossible strains that government straddled.
The precise circumstances surrounding the resignation of prime minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal remain in the province of speculation. The hubbub over the fall of the mighty ex-rebels eclipsed another pernicious oddity: the preponderance of people defeated in the elections in the new cabinet in terms of stature and influence. The idea of fostering peace at all costs, regardless of its nobility, will exact its own price. Each blow the credibility of the political process receives will have consequences far beyond the vicinity of the protagonists.
The Maoists, once more, have been the first to detect room for maneuver here. There is little to suggest any popular nostalgia for the ex-rebels’ nine-month rule. They are thus relying on popular disenchantment with the current administration. Having failed in their crusade for “civilian supremacy”, the Maoists made a tactical shift in demanding a national government under their leadership. Appeasing the base through the revolt option contradicts the ex-rebels’ professed commitment to democracy. But, then, the Maoists have prospered on their longstanding ability to juggle such stark contradictions.
In the name of promoting nationalism, the Maoists have carefully positioned themselves for a place in the government. By relaxing their stalling tactics in the constituent assembly, they have exhibited some signs of flexibility. As the Nepali Congress and the UML rejoice in what they see as the Maoists’ capitulation after months of swagger, the ex-rebels insist on their right to lead the government. Their ability to do so would depend more on the internal dynamics of the current coalition partners. Should the Maoists achieve their objective, it would merely place them in a wider berth of parties. Logically, this would make consensus on any subject all that more difficult. How they would expect to fare any better than their last stint in power does not seem to have baffled them.
For now, the ex-rebels have zeroed in on their rivals. The Maoists are relishing the influx of cadres from the UML, almost oblivious to the reality that they themselves are hemorrhaging to rival factions. The deep rifts within the UML seem too delicious an opportunity for the Maoists to ignore. Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, for his part, has been more outspoken about the lack of cooperation from the UML than from the ex-rebels.
The Nepali Congress, too, is in a state of malaise. Koirala’s decision to send daughter Sujata as the leader of the party’s team in the cabinet and Ram Chandra Poudel’s defeat of Sher Bahadur Deuba in the parliamentary party elections, among other things, have set off a realignment process inherently different from the one that had characterized much of the post-1990 Nepali Congress. How events actually play out would become clearer after further spasms. The Maoists are no doubt keen to exploit rifts across the board. By accusing the Nepali Congress and the UML of having engineered the split in the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), the ex-rebels have cleverly picked sides in an organization that did much to erode its base in the Terai.
Stark Truth
Amid all this gloom, the central truth of our political evolution has come out starker. Every political turn has been touted as a triumph but has left the country progressively weaker. The triumph of the people has been hailed, only to pave the way for recognition that change has been incomplete. Yet internally, in our effort to elaborate our group grievances, there is a real danger of unleashing a process of fragmentation in perpetuity. Whether a constellation of microstates can in any way sustain itself between our two giant neighbors is a concern that seems to have worried them more than us.
Our northern neighbor enjoys an ethnic homogeneity that allows for conformity on issues of national interest regardless of the polity in existence. To the south, a remarkably diverse array of states has been able to craft a union rooted in consensual national objectives and policies. The recent upsurge in the fiery rhetoric between the two confident giants can only bode ill for a country so precariously perched in the middle. The imponderables presented by farther flung powers – both in their official and non-government manifestations – has certainly complicated our internal dynamics.
As for the current flux, there is a clear divergence in the perceptions and expectation from peace process inside the country and outside. Even among external stakeholders, the struggle to carve spheres of influence is palpable. At this very crucial moment, unfortunately, our ability to articulate and safeguard our national interests is eroding the fastest.
In a moment of remarkable forthrightness, CPN-UML chairman Jhal Nath Khanal claimed the new constitution would be a “brochure of the agreements reached between the political parties, and thus incomplete.” Perhaps it might be prudent to wonder aloud whether we might have put the cart before the horse.
Nepaliness, regardless of its origin, growth and perceived as well as real iniquities, is a reality of our times. This recognition seems to have been able to sensitize Nepalis abroad more than those within the country. For a people caught between the desecration of the statues of Prithvi Narayan Shah and strident pledges of reclaiming territories lost in the Sugauli Treaty, reality has a particularly relative quality. A national government is undoubtedly appealing. But there is little to suggest it might really be able to live up to its name.
(A version of this article appeared in the July/August 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
NEPAL-INDIA TIES: No Roundabout Way
A teachable moment amid the basic ambiguity of the relationship
By Sanjay Upadhya
Three years after it jumpstarted a peace process predicated on the slow death of the monarchy, India has come full circle in Nepal. The motions have been an odd mixture of tentativeness, calibration, symbolism and intimidation. On the surface, New Delhi’s unease with the Maoists’ motives is palpable. But that anxiety merely covers its wider alarm over the departures from the script.
For many Nepalis, former king Gyanendra’s recent month-long visit to India epitomized the turnaround. The warm reception he received in powerful Indian quarters representing the two major political formations instantly sparked speculation on the possibility of a restoration of the monarchy. Regardless of the election outcome, New Delhi will most likely revise its Nepal policy in keeping with its broader national security imperatives.
The fact that the complexities surrounding an enthronement of a baby king – complexities undoubtedly crucial given Nepal’s own turbulent history of minor monarchs – have been largely ignored perhaps underscores the implausibility of an immediate reversion to royalism. Clearly, New Delhi’s immediate objective was to intimate Nepal’s political powers that it has permanent interests as well as the willingness to uphold them.
That, quite naturally, set off a chain of events. As the most aggrieved party, it was logical for the Maoists to play up the threat of “foreign interference”. Their initial ardor – rhetorical at best – for reinvestigating the royal palace massacre dissipated amid the shrugs from the ex-royals and the half-heartedness of the other political parties. The brinkmanship over the army might have acquired greater traction in the Maoists’ favor had the former rebels not been so perilously perched on the defensive on a host of issues. The active involvement of foreign ambassadors was perceived more as a response to the Maoists’ high-handedness.
The Maoists’ “China card” has stung India far deeper than any of the palace variants of the past. Ashok K. Mehta, a retired general of the Indian Army who does not represent his government’s official thinking but nevertheless retains the attention of audiences so attuned, conceded in a recent interview with BBC Nepali Service that no Nepali government had ever veered so close to China.
Could the “China card” have acquired such high stakes only at Nepal’s initiative? Beijing has provided a clear answer through the succession of political, military and a bevy of other delegations it has been dispatching to Nepal since the collapse of the royal regime. At times, this has led to some aberrant behavior, such as the Indian foreign secretary’s sudden arrival in Kathmandu earlier this year when his counterpart was in China for previously scheduled talks. Judging from its aftermath, the Chinese proposal for a new peace and friendship treaty with Nepal seems to have emerged outside of New Delhi’s much vaunted strategic dialogue with Beijing.
Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s decision to call off his visit to China may have slowed Nepal’s northward tilt. With coalition partners Unified Marxist-Leninists and the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum firmly within Beijing’s hospitality zone, matters have moved beyond the Maoists.
Not An Easy Question
The question of the monarchy was not an easy one for India. From the outset, republicanism has been a central element of India’s Nepal policy deliberations, gaining prominence during moments of bilateral strains. The precise geopolitical maneuverings surrounding King Gyanendra’s February 1, 2005 takeover and the nature of New Delhi’s deliberations with Kathmandu prior to his subsequent advocacy of China’s inclusion as an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation have not come to light. In that shadow, the configuration of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in New Delhi made republicanism quite expedient. The communists supporting the UPA government ratcheted up the pressure on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government, although New Delhi and Kathmandu were still exchanging ministerial visits.
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were equally energetic advocates of formalizing what had already become apparent for years: China’s growing presence in South Asia. Nepal alone was entirely vulnerable to Indian displeasure. Sitaram Yechuri, whom the Chinese could count on as an ally against the US-Indian nuclear deal, symbolized the opposition to the monarchy Beijing was supposedly supporting. Prime Minister Singh and his Congress party saw the imperative of mainstreaming the Nepali Maoists in an effort to weaken the Indian Naxalite movement. The resulting policy shift acquired a momentum of its own.
After the collapse of the royal regime amid massive protests and the onset of the peace process, the monarchy had been portrayed – and perceived – as so inherently anti-Indian that even the Bharatiya Janata Party could only muster enough courage to call for the restoration of a Hindu state.
New Delhi must have pondered the ramifications of a post-monarchical order. When they began their “People’s War”, the Maoists had ranked their anti-Indianism higher than their opposition to the monarchy. Once in the mainstream, the former rebels’ leadership could be coopted through blandishments and admonitions. But what about the rank and file energized by the 40-point charter? The sovereign Nepalese people would be worthy custodians of the new republic. Would that be reassurance enough?
The fact that India’s twin-pillar theory of stability had not lost its relevance was underscored by New Delhi’s zeal for the palace’s first announcement inviting the SPA to form a government. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s subsequent pullback from that commitment mirrored New Delhi’s reading of the popular mood in Kathmandu. The capriciousness of public opinion as well as the institutional amnesia of political parties could one day nullify a long-retired bureaucrat’s disavowal.
In the ebullience over the newness, the pivot of a tenuous peace process had to be addressed. Prime Minister Singh’s national security adviser openly voiced his country’s preference for the Nepali Congress in the run-up to the constituent assembly elections. Gen. Mehta, in his BBC interview, asserted far more candidly in impeccable Nepali New Delhi’s surprise at the Maoists’ success. In any case, New Delhi must have recognized that other newness of a new Nepal. Not only had too many external players entered the stage, India’s fragmented polity, with its disparate ideological and institutional interests and outlooks, had put New Delhi at some disadvantage.
Briefly, New Delhi’s public temptation to dismiss the Maoists’ “China card” as another desperate Nepalese ploy provided a cover to address its own struggles. Unlike during the monarchy, Beijing’s eggs are no longer in one basket. No one knows how many China has placed in each one. Nor do the Chinese seem inclined to reveal the extent of their ability or willingness to reallocate their eggs. And who can say for sure how many more baskets are likely to emerge.
Yet the central reality of Nepal-India relations persists. It is impossible for either country to envisage the relationship outside the framework of China. British India struggled with the dilemma before arriving at a tenuous arrangement with the Ranas. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru supposedly overruled Sardar Ballabh Bhai Patel’s hawkish interpretation of Beijing’s long-term intentions and opted for a middle course on Nepal. But Nehru differed only in style. Former prime minister Matrika Prasad Koirala’s posthumous memoirs contain letters from Nehru that leave little doubt as to independent India’s image of democratic Nepal.
The next four decades were propitious for Nepal in terms of expanding its international identity and options. Contrary to conventional wisdom, King Mahendra’s policy of diversification contained skepticism of north and south, which impelled him to widen contacts with the Soviets and the Americans, overtures both superpowers more than reciprocated. By 1990, however, the international and regional situation had transformed so fundamentally that New Delhi could feel unrestrained in paying back for the accumulation of “snubs,” which were merely actions and approaches any sovereign and independent nation would take in normal course.
It took a while for the rest of the world to realize that the fall of the Berlin Wall precipitated premature celebrations of the “end of history”. In Nepal, the supposedly discredited monarchy became an anchor of stability for India, even in the midst of the palace massacre, until the turbulence of the morning of February 1, 2005.
Beijing’s own notion of the Sino-Nepali relationship has been guided by the quality and content of its ties with New Delhi. During moments of thaw between the two Asian giants, China tends to advise Nepal to build closer ties with India, even describing them as natural. But when tensions resurface, China characterizes the India-Nepal open border as a threat to its national security. Pushed to the brink , Beijing has tended to step back, as in 1989-1990 and 2005-2006. Whether such diffidence will persist is anybody’s guess.
A Teachable Moment
The post-monarchy dispensation has certainly been a teachable moment for India-Nepal bilateralism. A future-looking partnership cannot proceed outside – for lack of a better term – the “anti-Indianism” in Nepal. The phenomenon is for real and can no longer be called one organization’s or individual’s passport to power. No amount of Indian aid or concessions is likely to be accepted as a gesture of good faith as long as this perceptual dissonance dominates. Complementarities cannot be expected to amount to much as long as the basic nature of the relationship remains ambiguous.
Even the most hawkish Indians probably recognize that their ability to “Sikkimize” or “Bhutanize” Nepal in the traditional sense has been eroding over the last three years. Their commitment to a final solution may have not. Intervention by invoking the right to self-defense remains a growing possibility as Nepal plunges deeper into instability. Yet the costs of such a venture are mounting by the minute.
Deliberate or otherwise, Kathmandu may have widened its options through this accumulation of external interests, but it has not overcome its basic geographical constraint which leaves it susceptible to overwhelming Indian punitive pressure. Nepal’s prevailing political culture has certainly not helped fortify ourselves. As political forces take turns courting and castigating India, it has become far easier for New Delhi to undermine Nepal’s real grievances.
In the battle of perceptions, moreover, the Indians seem to be counting on Chinese overreach. For two generations of Nepalis, China has been perceived as a benign influence. What pressures Beijing may have exerted in private in the past is best known to the palace. Should China’s public affirmations to uphold Nepali sovereignty and independence become more commonplace, Nepalis may be goaded toward skepticism in the opposite direction. Admittedly, this will not be enough to counteract the far deeper distrust of the south. Growing acknowledgment of Nepal’s strategic vulnerability, however, might make Nepalis more understanding of their own interests. In this hazy zone, a new regional shadow play has begun.
A year after its abolition, the monarchy maintains some psychological presence in Nepal. A restoration of the institution would be something for the people to decide. Much would depend on republican leadership’s conduct. Should political skirmishing block a new constitution, an unpredictable range of options could begin emerging. For now, the Indians seem to have recognized the salutary effect of the ex-monarch’s presence in his former kingdom. As for recasting the bilateral relationship, there can be no roundabout way for either country.
(A version of this article appeared in the May/June 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)
By Sanjay Upadhya
Three years after it jumpstarted a peace process predicated on the slow death of the monarchy, India has come full circle in Nepal. The motions have been an odd mixture of tentativeness, calibration, symbolism and intimidation. On the surface, New Delhi’s unease with the Maoists’ motives is palpable. But that anxiety merely covers its wider alarm over the departures from the script.
For many Nepalis, former king Gyanendra’s recent month-long visit to India epitomized the turnaround. The warm reception he received in powerful Indian quarters representing the two major political formations instantly sparked speculation on the possibility of a restoration of the monarchy. Regardless of the election outcome, New Delhi will most likely revise its Nepal policy in keeping with its broader national security imperatives.
The fact that the complexities surrounding an enthronement of a baby king – complexities undoubtedly crucial given Nepal’s own turbulent history of minor monarchs – have been largely ignored perhaps underscores the implausibility of an immediate reversion to royalism. Clearly, New Delhi’s immediate objective was to intimate Nepal’s political powers that it has permanent interests as well as the willingness to uphold them.
That, quite naturally, set off a chain of events. As the most aggrieved party, it was logical for the Maoists to play up the threat of “foreign interference”. Their initial ardor – rhetorical at best – for reinvestigating the royal palace massacre dissipated amid the shrugs from the ex-royals and the half-heartedness of the other political parties. The brinkmanship over the army might have acquired greater traction in the Maoists’ favor had the former rebels not been so perilously perched on the defensive on a host of issues. The active involvement of foreign ambassadors was perceived more as a response to the Maoists’ high-handedness.
The Maoists’ “China card” has stung India far deeper than any of the palace variants of the past. Ashok K. Mehta, a retired general of the Indian Army who does not represent his government’s official thinking but nevertheless retains the attention of audiences so attuned, conceded in a recent interview with BBC Nepali Service that no Nepali government had ever veered so close to China.
Could the “China card” have acquired such high stakes only at Nepal’s initiative? Beijing has provided a clear answer through the succession of political, military and a bevy of other delegations it has been dispatching to Nepal since the collapse of the royal regime. At times, this has led to some aberrant behavior, such as the Indian foreign secretary’s sudden arrival in Kathmandu earlier this year when his counterpart was in China for previously scheduled talks. Judging from its aftermath, the Chinese proposal for a new peace and friendship treaty with Nepal seems to have emerged outside of New Delhi’s much vaunted strategic dialogue with Beijing.
Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s decision to call off his visit to China may have slowed Nepal’s northward tilt. With coalition partners Unified Marxist-Leninists and the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum firmly within Beijing’s hospitality zone, matters have moved beyond the Maoists.
Not An Easy Question
The question of the monarchy was not an easy one for India. From the outset, republicanism has been a central element of India’s Nepal policy deliberations, gaining prominence during moments of bilateral strains. The precise geopolitical maneuverings surrounding King Gyanendra’s February 1, 2005 takeover and the nature of New Delhi’s deliberations with Kathmandu prior to his subsequent advocacy of China’s inclusion as an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation have not come to light. In that shadow, the configuration of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in New Delhi made republicanism quite expedient. The communists supporting the UPA government ratcheted up the pressure on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government, although New Delhi and Kathmandu were still exchanging ministerial visits.
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were equally energetic advocates of formalizing what had already become apparent for years: China’s growing presence in South Asia. Nepal alone was entirely vulnerable to Indian displeasure. Sitaram Yechuri, whom the Chinese could count on as an ally against the US-Indian nuclear deal, symbolized the opposition to the monarchy Beijing was supposedly supporting. Prime Minister Singh and his Congress party saw the imperative of mainstreaming the Nepali Maoists in an effort to weaken the Indian Naxalite movement. The resulting policy shift acquired a momentum of its own.
After the collapse of the royal regime amid massive protests and the onset of the peace process, the monarchy had been portrayed – and perceived – as so inherently anti-Indian that even the Bharatiya Janata Party could only muster enough courage to call for the restoration of a Hindu state.
New Delhi must have pondered the ramifications of a post-monarchical order. When they began their “People’s War”, the Maoists had ranked their anti-Indianism higher than their opposition to the monarchy. Once in the mainstream, the former rebels’ leadership could be coopted through blandishments and admonitions. But what about the rank and file energized by the 40-point charter? The sovereign Nepalese people would be worthy custodians of the new republic. Would that be reassurance enough?
The fact that India’s twin-pillar theory of stability had not lost its relevance was underscored by New Delhi’s zeal for the palace’s first announcement inviting the SPA to form a government. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s subsequent pullback from that commitment mirrored New Delhi’s reading of the popular mood in Kathmandu. The capriciousness of public opinion as well as the institutional amnesia of political parties could one day nullify a long-retired bureaucrat’s disavowal.
In the ebullience over the newness, the pivot of a tenuous peace process had to be addressed. Prime Minister Singh’s national security adviser openly voiced his country’s preference for the Nepali Congress in the run-up to the constituent assembly elections. Gen. Mehta, in his BBC interview, asserted far more candidly in impeccable Nepali New Delhi’s surprise at the Maoists’ success. In any case, New Delhi must have recognized that other newness of a new Nepal. Not only had too many external players entered the stage, India’s fragmented polity, with its disparate ideological and institutional interests and outlooks, had put New Delhi at some disadvantage.
Briefly, New Delhi’s public temptation to dismiss the Maoists’ “China card” as another desperate Nepalese ploy provided a cover to address its own struggles. Unlike during the monarchy, Beijing’s eggs are no longer in one basket. No one knows how many China has placed in each one. Nor do the Chinese seem inclined to reveal the extent of their ability or willingness to reallocate their eggs. And who can say for sure how many more baskets are likely to emerge.
Yet the central reality of Nepal-India relations persists. It is impossible for either country to envisage the relationship outside the framework of China. British India struggled with the dilemma before arriving at a tenuous arrangement with the Ranas. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru supposedly overruled Sardar Ballabh Bhai Patel’s hawkish interpretation of Beijing’s long-term intentions and opted for a middle course on Nepal. But Nehru differed only in style. Former prime minister Matrika Prasad Koirala’s posthumous memoirs contain letters from Nehru that leave little doubt as to independent India’s image of democratic Nepal.
The next four decades were propitious for Nepal in terms of expanding its international identity and options. Contrary to conventional wisdom, King Mahendra’s policy of diversification contained skepticism of north and south, which impelled him to widen contacts with the Soviets and the Americans, overtures both superpowers more than reciprocated. By 1990, however, the international and regional situation had transformed so fundamentally that New Delhi could feel unrestrained in paying back for the accumulation of “snubs,” which were merely actions and approaches any sovereign and independent nation would take in normal course.
It took a while for the rest of the world to realize that the fall of the Berlin Wall precipitated premature celebrations of the “end of history”. In Nepal, the supposedly discredited monarchy became an anchor of stability for India, even in the midst of the palace massacre, until the turbulence of the morning of February 1, 2005.
Beijing’s own notion of the Sino-Nepali relationship has been guided by the quality and content of its ties with New Delhi. During moments of thaw between the two Asian giants, China tends to advise Nepal to build closer ties with India, even describing them as natural. But when tensions resurface, China characterizes the India-Nepal open border as a threat to its national security. Pushed to the brink , Beijing has tended to step back, as in 1989-1990 and 2005-2006. Whether such diffidence will persist is anybody’s guess.
A Teachable Moment
The post-monarchy dispensation has certainly been a teachable moment for India-Nepal bilateralism. A future-looking partnership cannot proceed outside – for lack of a better term – the “anti-Indianism” in Nepal. The phenomenon is for real and can no longer be called one organization’s or individual’s passport to power. No amount of Indian aid or concessions is likely to be accepted as a gesture of good faith as long as this perceptual dissonance dominates. Complementarities cannot be expected to amount to much as long as the basic nature of the relationship remains ambiguous.
Even the most hawkish Indians probably recognize that their ability to “Sikkimize” or “Bhutanize” Nepal in the traditional sense has been eroding over the last three years. Their commitment to a final solution may have not. Intervention by invoking the right to self-defense remains a growing possibility as Nepal plunges deeper into instability. Yet the costs of such a venture are mounting by the minute.
Deliberate or otherwise, Kathmandu may have widened its options through this accumulation of external interests, but it has not overcome its basic geographical constraint which leaves it susceptible to overwhelming Indian punitive pressure. Nepal’s prevailing political culture has certainly not helped fortify ourselves. As political forces take turns courting and castigating India, it has become far easier for New Delhi to undermine Nepal’s real grievances.
In the battle of perceptions, moreover, the Indians seem to be counting on Chinese overreach. For two generations of Nepalis, China has been perceived as a benign influence. What pressures Beijing may have exerted in private in the past is best known to the palace. Should China’s public affirmations to uphold Nepali sovereignty and independence become more commonplace, Nepalis may be goaded toward skepticism in the opposite direction. Admittedly, this will not be enough to counteract the far deeper distrust of the south. Growing acknowledgment of Nepal’s strategic vulnerability, however, might make Nepalis more understanding of their own interests. In this hazy zone, a new regional shadow play has begun.
A year after its abolition, the monarchy maintains some psychological presence in Nepal. A restoration of the institution would be something for the people to decide. Much would depend on republican leadership’s conduct. Should political skirmishing block a new constitution, an unpredictable range of options could begin emerging. For now, the Indians seem to have recognized the salutary effect of the ex-monarch’s presence in his former kingdom. As for recasting the bilateral relationship, there can be no roundabout way for either country.
(A version of this article appeared in the May/June 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
Appeasement, Either Way
Any successor government would find itself preoccupied with placating the Maoists
By Sanjay Upadhya
True to tradition, the political class has begun plotting an alternative to the Maoist-led government six months after it rose to power. As usual, the opposition – which, not so bizarrely, includes elements within the ruling coalition – claims the future of the country is at stake. As he has always done when not in the hot seat, Nepali Congress President Girija Prasad Koirala is leading the charge. Other leaders across the ideological spectrum are blowing hot and cold on the wisdom of dislodging the Maoists based on their own partisan – and factional – interests.
On the surface, the urgency to act is palpable. The Maoists have flouted the basic commitments they had signed on to as part of the peace process. Once their interpretation of the series of accords laying down the roadmap to a new Nepal stopped resembling the texts, the former rebels gleefully started calling for a renegotiation of the 12-point agreement. When admonition begets that kind of defiance, the conventional wisdom goes, an alliance of democrats becomes imperative. The head of the country’s largest democratic party, regardless of age or interest, could not have remained indifferent.
During his last stint as premier, Koirala was something of an anomaly. He bowed over backwards with the agility of a master contortionist to appease the Maoists every step of the way, alienating many in his own party. In the name of advancing the peace process, he was prepared to pay any price to keep the former rebels onboard. It looked like the longest serving premier of the 1990-2002 experiment was expiating for its collapse. During moments of detachment, the oxygen mask came in handy for Koirala. At other times, his cryptic comments on the nature – and future – of the monarchy eased the way.
It was not unnatural for Koirala, as interim head of state, to see himself as the first president of Nepal. The former rebels, for their part, lavished praise on him. Still, it is hard to believe that such a seasoned veteran could have been so oblivious to the true intentions of the Maoists. Wounded pride can be ruled out as the root cause of his current disenchantment. Of course, hatred of the monarchy may have temporarily blindsided Koirala. But an interim period of two years was more than sufficient for any primary member of the Nepali Congress to make an educated assessment of the party’s prospects in an environment where the Maoists owned the republican agenda.
It is tempting, therefore, to see in Koirala’s anti-Maoist rants self-indictment of his own performance as interim premier. Yet obsession with his flaws is something best left for more tranquil times. Koirala may not be a credible custodian of democracy, but he is its most credible campaigner. If someone who started out as an agitator against the Ranas continues to be Nepal’s last hope for freedom almost six decades later, it surely says more about the nation than the individual.
Villains Galore
In our eternal search for villains, the Maoists were always on the weakest ground. During the campaign to oust the royal regime, it was convenient for the agitating parties and people to praise the Maoists for having raised arms in support of the masses. The Maoists basked in the adulation but were careful not to be carried away. They knew their battles would not end with the fall of the monarchy. The gruesome record of violence was always going to be an albatross on the Maoists. Their best hope lay in eroding the credibility with which their tactical allies could turn against them. As the Maoists kept describing war and peace as interchangeable elements of the revolution, the faith of the followers mattered more than the sneers of the skeptics.
When they faced the first sustained challenge in the form of the Gaur carnage, the Maoists exercised remarkable restraint. Was this a sign of weakness or a profession of their commitment to peaceful change? As the question hung in the air, the former insurgents expanded their power of obfuscation. Months before the anti-Chinese protests began in Kathmandu last year, the Young Communist League (YCL) warned Tibetans against abusing Nepalese soil. Yet when the protests began, the Maoists virtually disappeared from the scene. By this time, persuading Washington to withdraw the terror tag had become more important and expedient, especially when the Nepali Congress and the UML were ready to clamp down on the protests.
During the election campaign, the Nepali Congress was gloating over its success in bringing the Maoists to the mainstream and calculating the extent of the impending electoral reward. The CPN-UML was busy mocking Maoist supremo Pushpa Kamal Dahal as a “wall” president. Where the Maoists really excelled was not in cultivating the royalist vote but in courting former U.S. president Jimmy Carter. Mindful of his stature as the world’s most prominent peacemaker, our ex-rebels watched how Carter had associated with far more unsavory organizations around the world. Before their rivals could challenge the Maoists’ triumph, Carter certified the election as free and fair. Not even the Nepali Congress dared contradict the chief international observer.
Price of Power
Power, to be sure, has come at a heavy price for the Maoists. Dahal’s public acknowledgment of how different leading is from rebelling was only the beginning of a steep learning curve. Internally, malcontents of every stripe could enter the tent of the ideologically disgruntled to put pressure on the leadership. That mouthful of appellations called the People’s Federal Democratic National Republic was an outcome of internal appeasement. The compulsion of having to play to disparate constituencies has led Dahal to make outrageous statements. The ideological rigidity of the “people’s war” may have become untenable in the mainstream politics. But there is that hard strain of a hazy nationalism that allows people like Mohan Baidya and Chandra Prakash Gajurel to remind the faithful of the incompleteness of the revolution.
The Maoists would love to draw more people from the right and left to broaden a communist/nationalist front. The process, which seemed to have begun with the entry of some ex-royalists, progressed with the unification with the CPN-Unity Center. But lately the Unified Maoists have been hemorrhaging far worse, Matrika Yadav’s revolt being just an example.
With every new threat to their survival in power, the Maoists have become increasingly defiant. For quite some time, they have been claiming a veto on the new constitution. Their predilection for ruling through ordinances has confirmed the worst fears of their detractors. The ex-rebels continue to pack important state organizations with loyalists, while forming new ones in the non-government sector. Should pressures beyond his control become too burdensome, Prime Minister Dahal can always look the Nepalese people straight in the eye and resign, citing his refusal to make anti-national compromises. For a nation struggling for a collective identity, nationalism sure has a curious appeal.
What after Dahal’s ouster? It is tempting to believe that the Maoists have lost the initiative through their nonperformance. Their capitulation on the issue of the Pashupati bhattas and vacillation in the standoff with the Nepal Army are considered emblematic of their emaciation. Yet the Maoists are not the traditional adversary. Through the YCL and other avatars in the mainstream, the Maoists’ capacity to launch an urban revolt may not be so inconsistent with their bluster. Therein lies the supreme dilemma. Cornering the Maoists would merely hasten the state capture the opposition says it wants to forestall. Allowing them to retain power and dispense patronage, in a wider effort at moderation, smacks of appeasement. But the more important question is whether the other parties have the credibility and control to sustain a successor government.
The Maoists know how to have it both ways. They prospered on the perception that they were run by the palace. Yet without their participation, the monarchy would not have fallen. When the time came to lavish praise on Koirala, someone they had clubbed together with the former monarch in the aftermath of the Narayanhity massacre, they were more than generous. The Maoists started their rebellion on a charter that began with anti-Indian demands. Yet they took full advantage of Indian soil and perhaps official succor. They derided the Chinese leadership as deviants and endured Beijing’s wrath, but swiftly became its staunchest allies. After all, who can say for sure that Matrika Yadav’s revolt is not a carefully staged diversionary tactic? Or that the United Maoists lack the ability to profit from even the faintest of such perceptions?
For the former rebels, the ends have always justified the means. In full public glare, subterfuge is likely to acquire far greater flexibility and lethality. The Maoists have articulated their destination with chilling clarity even before laying the trajectory. The corollary can only mean an abundance of permutations and combinations. Their official stand still incorporates everything from supporting absolute monarchy (if the Nepalese people so desire) to fighting Indian troops in a final war of national liberation. When they bombard different people with different messages, the onus clearly falls on the listener.
Then there is that eternal truth of politics, which in Nepal’s case has had far greater relevance. Every government is perceived as being worse than the last. Juxtapose that with the perpetual effort any successor government would have to put in to placate the Maoists. No matter how you look at it, it is hard to avoid the sight of appeasement.
(A version of this article appeared in the March/April 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)
By Sanjay Upadhya
True to tradition, the political class has begun plotting an alternative to the Maoist-led government six months after it rose to power. As usual, the opposition – which, not so bizarrely, includes elements within the ruling coalition – claims the future of the country is at stake. As he has always done when not in the hot seat, Nepali Congress President Girija Prasad Koirala is leading the charge. Other leaders across the ideological spectrum are blowing hot and cold on the wisdom of dislodging the Maoists based on their own partisan – and factional – interests.
On the surface, the urgency to act is palpable. The Maoists have flouted the basic commitments they had signed on to as part of the peace process. Once their interpretation of the series of accords laying down the roadmap to a new Nepal stopped resembling the texts, the former rebels gleefully started calling for a renegotiation of the 12-point agreement. When admonition begets that kind of defiance, the conventional wisdom goes, an alliance of democrats becomes imperative. The head of the country’s largest democratic party, regardless of age or interest, could not have remained indifferent.
During his last stint as premier, Koirala was something of an anomaly. He bowed over backwards with the agility of a master contortionist to appease the Maoists every step of the way, alienating many in his own party. In the name of advancing the peace process, he was prepared to pay any price to keep the former rebels onboard. It looked like the longest serving premier of the 1990-2002 experiment was expiating for its collapse. During moments of detachment, the oxygen mask came in handy for Koirala. At other times, his cryptic comments on the nature – and future – of the monarchy eased the way.
It was not unnatural for Koirala, as interim head of state, to see himself as the first president of Nepal. The former rebels, for their part, lavished praise on him. Still, it is hard to believe that such a seasoned veteran could have been so oblivious to the true intentions of the Maoists. Wounded pride can be ruled out as the root cause of his current disenchantment. Of course, hatred of the monarchy may have temporarily blindsided Koirala. But an interim period of two years was more than sufficient for any primary member of the Nepali Congress to make an educated assessment of the party’s prospects in an environment where the Maoists owned the republican agenda.
It is tempting, therefore, to see in Koirala’s anti-Maoist rants self-indictment of his own performance as interim premier. Yet obsession with his flaws is something best left for more tranquil times. Koirala may not be a credible custodian of democracy, but he is its most credible campaigner. If someone who started out as an agitator against the Ranas continues to be Nepal’s last hope for freedom almost six decades later, it surely says more about the nation than the individual.
Villains Galore
In our eternal search for villains, the Maoists were always on the weakest ground. During the campaign to oust the royal regime, it was convenient for the agitating parties and people to praise the Maoists for having raised arms in support of the masses. The Maoists basked in the adulation but were careful not to be carried away. They knew their battles would not end with the fall of the monarchy. The gruesome record of violence was always going to be an albatross on the Maoists. Their best hope lay in eroding the credibility with which their tactical allies could turn against them. As the Maoists kept describing war and peace as interchangeable elements of the revolution, the faith of the followers mattered more than the sneers of the skeptics.
When they faced the first sustained challenge in the form of the Gaur carnage, the Maoists exercised remarkable restraint. Was this a sign of weakness or a profession of their commitment to peaceful change? As the question hung in the air, the former insurgents expanded their power of obfuscation. Months before the anti-Chinese protests began in Kathmandu last year, the Young Communist League (YCL) warned Tibetans against abusing Nepalese soil. Yet when the protests began, the Maoists virtually disappeared from the scene. By this time, persuading Washington to withdraw the terror tag had become more important and expedient, especially when the Nepali Congress and the UML were ready to clamp down on the protests.
During the election campaign, the Nepali Congress was gloating over its success in bringing the Maoists to the mainstream and calculating the extent of the impending electoral reward. The CPN-UML was busy mocking Maoist supremo Pushpa Kamal Dahal as a “wall” president. Where the Maoists really excelled was not in cultivating the royalist vote but in courting former U.S. president Jimmy Carter. Mindful of his stature as the world’s most prominent peacemaker, our ex-rebels watched how Carter had associated with far more unsavory organizations around the world. Before their rivals could challenge the Maoists’ triumph, Carter certified the election as free and fair. Not even the Nepali Congress dared contradict the chief international observer.
Price of Power
Power, to be sure, has come at a heavy price for the Maoists. Dahal’s public acknowledgment of how different leading is from rebelling was only the beginning of a steep learning curve. Internally, malcontents of every stripe could enter the tent of the ideologically disgruntled to put pressure on the leadership. That mouthful of appellations called the People’s Federal Democratic National Republic was an outcome of internal appeasement. The compulsion of having to play to disparate constituencies has led Dahal to make outrageous statements. The ideological rigidity of the “people’s war” may have become untenable in the mainstream politics. But there is that hard strain of a hazy nationalism that allows people like Mohan Baidya and Chandra Prakash Gajurel to remind the faithful of the incompleteness of the revolution.
The Maoists would love to draw more people from the right and left to broaden a communist/nationalist front. The process, which seemed to have begun with the entry of some ex-royalists, progressed with the unification with the CPN-Unity Center. But lately the Unified Maoists have been hemorrhaging far worse, Matrika Yadav’s revolt being just an example.
With every new threat to their survival in power, the Maoists have become increasingly defiant. For quite some time, they have been claiming a veto on the new constitution. Their predilection for ruling through ordinances has confirmed the worst fears of their detractors. The ex-rebels continue to pack important state organizations with loyalists, while forming new ones in the non-government sector. Should pressures beyond his control become too burdensome, Prime Minister Dahal can always look the Nepalese people straight in the eye and resign, citing his refusal to make anti-national compromises. For a nation struggling for a collective identity, nationalism sure has a curious appeal.
What after Dahal’s ouster? It is tempting to believe that the Maoists have lost the initiative through their nonperformance. Their capitulation on the issue of the Pashupati bhattas and vacillation in the standoff with the Nepal Army are considered emblematic of their emaciation. Yet the Maoists are not the traditional adversary. Through the YCL and other avatars in the mainstream, the Maoists’ capacity to launch an urban revolt may not be so inconsistent with their bluster. Therein lies the supreme dilemma. Cornering the Maoists would merely hasten the state capture the opposition says it wants to forestall. Allowing them to retain power and dispense patronage, in a wider effort at moderation, smacks of appeasement. But the more important question is whether the other parties have the credibility and control to sustain a successor government.
The Maoists know how to have it both ways. They prospered on the perception that they were run by the palace. Yet without their participation, the monarchy would not have fallen. When the time came to lavish praise on Koirala, someone they had clubbed together with the former monarch in the aftermath of the Narayanhity massacre, they were more than generous. The Maoists started their rebellion on a charter that began with anti-Indian demands. Yet they took full advantage of Indian soil and perhaps official succor. They derided the Chinese leadership as deviants and endured Beijing’s wrath, but swiftly became its staunchest allies. After all, who can say for sure that Matrika Yadav’s revolt is not a carefully staged diversionary tactic? Or that the United Maoists lack the ability to profit from even the faintest of such perceptions?
For the former rebels, the ends have always justified the means. In full public glare, subterfuge is likely to acquire far greater flexibility and lethality. The Maoists have articulated their destination with chilling clarity even before laying the trajectory. The corollary can only mean an abundance of permutations and combinations. Their official stand still incorporates everything from supporting absolute monarchy (if the Nepalese people so desire) to fighting Indian troops in a final war of national liberation. When they bombard different people with different messages, the onus clearly falls on the listener.
Then there is that eternal truth of politics, which in Nepal’s case has had far greater relevance. Every government is perceived as being worse than the last. Juxtapose that with the perpetual effort any successor government would have to put in to placate the Maoists. No matter how you look at it, it is hard to avoid the sight of appeasement.
(A version of this article appeared in the March/April 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)
Sunday, February 15, 2009
Sphere Pressure
Sino-Indian tug-of-war weighs down a wobbly republic
By Sanjay Upadhya
Nepal’s strategic vulnerability between Asia’s two giants has always risen and receded with the state of India-China relations and the external variables influencing them. In the past, the internal fundamentals, regardless of the political system of the day, were sturdy enough to cope with often-competing pressures emanating from the north and south. The improvisation that has become the defining feature of the contemporary Nepalese state has made today’s geopolitical spasms far more ominous.
For two years after the collapse of the royal regime in April 2006, India and the West were keenly attuned to the twists and turns of a peace process inaugurated amid deep contradictions. The monarchy, in virtual suspension, became the glue that held the signatories to a plethora of issue-specific agreements together. Clearly, New Delhi and Washington, among other world capitals, were anxious to see the monarchy continue in some ceremonial form in the interests of stability. The complicated internal and external dynamics involved in reinventing the state – an amorphous concept at best – left them with little else than awaiting the eventual verdict of the people.
Beijing, a longtime backer of the monarchy, used the period to build bridges with the newly empowered political parties. Ever the pragmatist, the Chinese reached out to Maoists, whom they had vigorously opposed politically. The former Nepalese rebels, who had long accused the post-Mao Zedong leadership of betraying the Great Helmsman, reciprocated with great alacrity. They virtually forgave Beijing for supplying arms to the royal regime in its effort to quell the rebellion.
Interesting Manifestations
The new northern dynamics surfaced in other interesting ways. At times, interim prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala – uncharacteristically enough, in view of his political record and reputation – warmed to Beijing, especially after the Indian Oil Corporation interrupted critical petroleum supplies on one pretext or the other. Although the Chinese ambassador had become the first foreign representative to present his credentials to Koirala, in his capacity as interim head of state, the symbolism had its limits.
Beijing declined Kathmandu’s request to revoke a contract the royal regime had signed for the purchase of two aircraft by the erstwhile Royal Nepalese Army. Still, when Koirala implicitly linked India to the unrest in the Terai, it was hard to separate that with repeated Chinese concerns over the region’s deepening instability.
By the time the Maoists rose to power, after their unexpected electoral triumph, Beijing had become increasingly candid in asserting its interests in Nepal. The persistence of the Free Tibet protests in Kathmandu hardened Chinese perceptions of Nepal’s open border with India as a threat to their own security. From describing the royal palace massacre as an external conspiracy aimed at scuttling closer Nepal-China ties to affirming Beijing’s commitment to prevent Nepal from becoming another Sikkim or Bhutan, voices from north became more abundant and unequivocal. Significantly, they seemed equally aimed at audiences in India. The arrival of a succession of Chinese civil and military delegations in Kathmandu underscored the fundamental transformation underway in Sino-Nepalese relations. The Indians appeared on the defensive, a role they were unaccustomed to in recent memory.
Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s visit to China, days after assuming the premiership, prompted many Indians to cry foul. The Maoists, in New Delhi’s view, had violated some unwritten code under which an incoming Nepalese leader always visited India first. During his subsequent visit to New Delhi, Dahal emphasized Nepal’s commitment to a policy of equidistance/equiproximity with both neighbors as a geopolitical compulsion. Although it initially won over key constituencies in India, Dahal’s charm offensive could not penetrate others. Defense Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa’s visit to China, days after Dahal returned from Delhi, left skeptics in India with a deep sense of vindication, but certainly not one they could not rejoice in.
The fact that Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee chose to visit Nepal as his country was holding crucial state elections served to underscore Delhi’s growing anxieties. On the eve of Mukherjee’s arrival, Deputy Prime Minister Bam Dev Gautam raised the regional stakes by urging Beijing’s involvement in the resolution of Nepal’s Kalapani dispute with India.
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi hit the headlines even before he landed in Kathmandu, simply because he was paying an official visit barely a week after Mukherjee’s departure. Urging Kathmandu to help check anti-China activities that could grow in 2009, the 50th year of the Dalai Lama’s flight into and self-exile in India, Yang pledged Beijing’s help to protect Nepal’s sovereignty and independence. He also asserted that China intended to develop relations with Nepal in a way that would serve as a role model for bilateral ties between big and small countries. Clearly, this double whammy could not have been lost on the Indians.
Two days after Yang’s departure, Beijing sent a military mission headed by the deputy chief of its army, Lieutenant General Ma Xiotian. During a meeting with Defense Minister Thapa, the Chinese general pledged to provide the Nepal army with some non-lethal equipment and training facilities. Gen. Ma’s visit succeeded another mission led by the Chinese military commander responsible for the areas bordering Nepal. As all this was going on, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Richard Boucher, who was expected to arrive in Kathmandu to, according to some reports, announce the withdrawal his government’s terrorist tag on the Maoists, put off his travel plans indefinitely. It became hard to see the events as unrelated.
The Nepali Congress took the China question to the constituent assembly, specifically asking Prime Minister Dahal whether Yang’s offer was made in response to any request he had placed before Beijing. Moreover, the party demanded to know where the threat to Nepal’s sovereignty emanated from. India-friendly media outlets in Nepal reacted with far greater stridency to what they almost universally considered Beijing’s gratuitous concern.
Despite having raised their overall profile so substantially, the Chinese have carefully calibrated their Nepal policy. They do not seem to have developed unqualified faith in the top leadership of the Maoists, especially considering their long-standing links in India during the decade-long bloody insurgency. In early 2008, the Maoist-affiliated Young Communist League (YCL) warned it would not allow Tibetans to hold anti-China protests. Once the demonstrations erupted, the YCL – and Maoist organizations in general – were almost invisible. If this was a gesture to the United States, which was in a watch-and-wait mood on the terrorism tag, it must have made some impression.
Indeed, China’s ambivalence on the Maoists has led to wider initiatives, the results of which have been no less ambiguous. Beijing’s interest in forging a wider communist front incorporating the Unified Marxist-Leninists has been stymied by the factionalism in that party. By raising the Yang issue in the legislature, the Nepali Congress pretty much distanced itself from this putative northern alliance.
The focus has thus fallen on the military, which, after the abolition of the monarchy, considers itself the last line of defense vis-├а-vis Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The reading here seems to be that the nationalism plank would be attractive enough to forge an alliance between the junior and middle ranks in the Nepal Army and the former rebels. Against this scenario, China’s purported interest in Maoist commanders taking up positions in the higher echelons becomes all the more understandable.
Southern Dynamics
During moments of warmth in Chinese-Indian relations, the dominant sentiment in Delhi has focused on some compact Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai had supposedly reached in 1954. Under that arrangement, whose existence Nehru himself had publicly affirmed at the time, Beijing would honor India’s claim of influence over Nepal while Delhi recognized total and irrevocable Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.
During times of bilateral strains, Indians have remained suspicious of Chinese motives but reasonably confident of the limits of Beijing’s options in Nepal. Lately, Indian fears of a Chinese strategic encirclement seem compounded by recognition of China’s enhanced willingness and ability to shape developments in Nepal. This, in turn, has been exacerbated by Delhi’s palpable unease over the fallout of possible Chinese responses to growing American assertiveness in Nepal.
Recent Indian initiatives to sound out former king Gyanendra may be less about drawing him into a democratic alliance than about preventing him from veering too close to a Maoist-led nationalist platform. On one plane, the fact that the restoration of the monarchy has become part of the mainstream national conversation barely a year after its abolition may be indicative of the fickleness of the Nepalese psyche. At an operational level, it is a backlash against the political flaws and flimsiness of the transformation process. Taken together, they do acquire additional import.
Should the constituent assembly fail to complete a new constitution amid constant political bickering, will all options have been foreclosed? The question would assume greater significance amid calls in India, in the aftermath of the Mumbai carnage, for the enshrinement of national security as the prime tenet of Delhi’s Nepal policy. It is not difficult, on the other hand, to recognize how seriously Beijing has perceived the Free Tibet movement to be a pivotal element of a wider American-led effort to contain its peaceful rise.
The logical question here is: how far would the Chinese go in supporting the Maoists? History does not provide much reassurance here. From imperial times, Beijing has made explicit pledges to defend Nepal from foreign threats. But the Chinese declined Nepalese pleas for aid during the 1814-16 war with British India. China refused to bail out King Birendra and King Gyanendra in 1990 and 2006 respectively, especially when the palace’s disputes with India had been directly related to Nepal’s growing defense and strategic ties to Beijing.
Since Beijing’s ongoing engagement increasingly appears to be predicated on reciprocal institutional and official obligations, the question of the future of the Maoists – or any other group – in power becomes immaterial. The geopolitical equations have been rewritten drastically, and perhaps irrevocably. Nepal’s challenge has been exacerbated by its growing inability to influence the intricate variables.
(A version of this article appeared in the January/February 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)
By Sanjay Upadhya
Nepal’s strategic vulnerability between Asia’s two giants has always risen and receded with the state of India-China relations and the external variables influencing them. In the past, the internal fundamentals, regardless of the political system of the day, were sturdy enough to cope with often-competing pressures emanating from the north and south. The improvisation that has become the defining feature of the contemporary Nepalese state has made today’s geopolitical spasms far more ominous.
For two years after the collapse of the royal regime in April 2006, India and the West were keenly attuned to the twists and turns of a peace process inaugurated amid deep contradictions. The monarchy, in virtual suspension, became the glue that held the signatories to a plethora of issue-specific agreements together. Clearly, New Delhi and Washington, among other world capitals, were anxious to see the monarchy continue in some ceremonial form in the interests of stability. The complicated internal and external dynamics involved in reinventing the state – an amorphous concept at best – left them with little else than awaiting the eventual verdict of the people.
Beijing, a longtime backer of the monarchy, used the period to build bridges with the newly empowered political parties. Ever the pragmatist, the Chinese reached out to Maoists, whom they had vigorously opposed politically. The former Nepalese rebels, who had long accused the post-Mao Zedong leadership of betraying the Great Helmsman, reciprocated with great alacrity. They virtually forgave Beijing for supplying arms to the royal regime in its effort to quell the rebellion.
Interesting Manifestations
The new northern dynamics surfaced in other interesting ways. At times, interim prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala – uncharacteristically enough, in view of his political record and reputation – warmed to Beijing, especially after the Indian Oil Corporation interrupted critical petroleum supplies on one pretext or the other. Although the Chinese ambassador had become the first foreign representative to present his credentials to Koirala, in his capacity as interim head of state, the symbolism had its limits.
Beijing declined Kathmandu’s request to revoke a contract the royal regime had signed for the purchase of two aircraft by the erstwhile Royal Nepalese Army. Still, when Koirala implicitly linked India to the unrest in the Terai, it was hard to separate that with repeated Chinese concerns over the region’s deepening instability.
By the time the Maoists rose to power, after their unexpected electoral triumph, Beijing had become increasingly candid in asserting its interests in Nepal. The persistence of the Free Tibet protests in Kathmandu hardened Chinese perceptions of Nepal’s open border with India as a threat to their own security. From describing the royal palace massacre as an external conspiracy aimed at scuttling closer Nepal-China ties to affirming Beijing’s commitment to prevent Nepal from becoming another Sikkim or Bhutan, voices from north became more abundant and unequivocal. Significantly, they seemed equally aimed at audiences in India. The arrival of a succession of Chinese civil and military delegations in Kathmandu underscored the fundamental transformation underway in Sino-Nepalese relations. The Indians appeared on the defensive, a role they were unaccustomed to in recent memory.
Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s visit to China, days after assuming the premiership, prompted many Indians to cry foul. The Maoists, in New Delhi’s view, had violated some unwritten code under which an incoming Nepalese leader always visited India first. During his subsequent visit to New Delhi, Dahal emphasized Nepal’s commitment to a policy of equidistance/equiproximity with both neighbors as a geopolitical compulsion. Although it initially won over key constituencies in India, Dahal’s charm offensive could not penetrate others. Defense Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa’s visit to China, days after Dahal returned from Delhi, left skeptics in India with a deep sense of vindication, but certainly not one they could not rejoice in.
The fact that Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee chose to visit Nepal as his country was holding crucial state elections served to underscore Delhi’s growing anxieties. On the eve of Mukherjee’s arrival, Deputy Prime Minister Bam Dev Gautam raised the regional stakes by urging Beijing’s involvement in the resolution of Nepal’s Kalapani dispute with India.
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi hit the headlines even before he landed in Kathmandu, simply because he was paying an official visit barely a week after Mukherjee’s departure. Urging Kathmandu to help check anti-China activities that could grow in 2009, the 50th year of the Dalai Lama’s flight into and self-exile in India, Yang pledged Beijing’s help to protect Nepal’s sovereignty and independence. He also asserted that China intended to develop relations with Nepal in a way that would serve as a role model for bilateral ties between big and small countries. Clearly, this double whammy could not have been lost on the Indians.
Two days after Yang’s departure, Beijing sent a military mission headed by the deputy chief of its army, Lieutenant General Ma Xiotian. During a meeting with Defense Minister Thapa, the Chinese general pledged to provide the Nepal army with some non-lethal equipment and training facilities. Gen. Ma’s visit succeeded another mission led by the Chinese military commander responsible for the areas bordering Nepal. As all this was going on, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Richard Boucher, who was expected to arrive in Kathmandu to, according to some reports, announce the withdrawal his government’s terrorist tag on the Maoists, put off his travel plans indefinitely. It became hard to see the events as unrelated.
The Nepali Congress took the China question to the constituent assembly, specifically asking Prime Minister Dahal whether Yang’s offer was made in response to any request he had placed before Beijing. Moreover, the party demanded to know where the threat to Nepal’s sovereignty emanated from. India-friendly media outlets in Nepal reacted with far greater stridency to what they almost universally considered Beijing’s gratuitous concern.
Despite having raised their overall profile so substantially, the Chinese have carefully calibrated their Nepal policy. They do not seem to have developed unqualified faith in the top leadership of the Maoists, especially considering their long-standing links in India during the decade-long bloody insurgency. In early 2008, the Maoist-affiliated Young Communist League (YCL) warned it would not allow Tibetans to hold anti-China protests. Once the demonstrations erupted, the YCL – and Maoist organizations in general – were almost invisible. If this was a gesture to the United States, which was in a watch-and-wait mood on the terrorism tag, it must have made some impression.
Indeed, China’s ambivalence on the Maoists has led to wider initiatives, the results of which have been no less ambiguous. Beijing’s interest in forging a wider communist front incorporating the Unified Marxist-Leninists has been stymied by the factionalism in that party. By raising the Yang issue in the legislature, the Nepali Congress pretty much distanced itself from this putative northern alliance.
The focus has thus fallen on the military, which, after the abolition of the monarchy, considers itself the last line of defense vis-├а-vis Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The reading here seems to be that the nationalism plank would be attractive enough to forge an alliance between the junior and middle ranks in the Nepal Army and the former rebels. Against this scenario, China’s purported interest in Maoist commanders taking up positions in the higher echelons becomes all the more understandable.
Southern Dynamics
During moments of warmth in Chinese-Indian relations, the dominant sentiment in Delhi has focused on some compact Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai had supposedly reached in 1954. Under that arrangement, whose existence Nehru himself had publicly affirmed at the time, Beijing would honor India’s claim of influence over Nepal while Delhi recognized total and irrevocable Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.
During times of bilateral strains, Indians have remained suspicious of Chinese motives but reasonably confident of the limits of Beijing’s options in Nepal. Lately, Indian fears of a Chinese strategic encirclement seem compounded by recognition of China’s enhanced willingness and ability to shape developments in Nepal. This, in turn, has been exacerbated by Delhi’s palpable unease over the fallout of possible Chinese responses to growing American assertiveness in Nepal.
Recent Indian initiatives to sound out former king Gyanendra may be less about drawing him into a democratic alliance than about preventing him from veering too close to a Maoist-led nationalist platform. On one plane, the fact that the restoration of the monarchy has become part of the mainstream national conversation barely a year after its abolition may be indicative of the fickleness of the Nepalese psyche. At an operational level, it is a backlash against the political flaws and flimsiness of the transformation process. Taken together, they do acquire additional import.
Should the constituent assembly fail to complete a new constitution amid constant political bickering, will all options have been foreclosed? The question would assume greater significance amid calls in India, in the aftermath of the Mumbai carnage, for the enshrinement of national security as the prime tenet of Delhi’s Nepal policy. It is not difficult, on the other hand, to recognize how seriously Beijing has perceived the Free Tibet movement to be a pivotal element of a wider American-led effort to contain its peaceful rise.
The logical question here is: how far would the Chinese go in supporting the Maoists? History does not provide much reassurance here. From imperial times, Beijing has made explicit pledges to defend Nepal from foreign threats. But the Chinese declined Nepalese pleas for aid during the 1814-16 war with British India. China refused to bail out King Birendra and King Gyanendra in 1990 and 2006 respectively, especially when the palace’s disputes with India had been directly related to Nepal’s growing defense and strategic ties to Beijing.
Since Beijing’s ongoing engagement increasingly appears to be predicated on reciprocal institutional and official obligations, the question of the future of the Maoists – or any other group – in power becomes immaterial. The geopolitical equations have been rewritten drastically, and perhaps irrevocably. Nepal’s challenge has been exacerbated by its growing inability to influence the intricate variables.
(A version of this article appeared in the January/February 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)
Thursday, January 22, 2009
рдУрдмाрдоाрдХो рд╕рдлрд▓рддा: рд╕рд░ोрдХाрд░ рд╕рдмैрдХो
рд╕рдЮ्рдЬрдп рдЙрдкाрдз्рдпाрдп
рдмाрд░ाрдХ рдУрдмाрдоा рд╕ंрдпुрдХ्рдд рд░ाрдЬ्рдп рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрдХो рекрекрдФ рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддि рдиिрд░्рд╡ाрдЪिрдд рднрдПрдкрдЫि рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рд▓े рдиिрдХै рд▓ाрдоो рд╕рди्рддोрд╖рдХो рд╢्рд╡ाрд╕ рдлेрд░ेрдХो рд╕ुрдиिрдпो। рд░ाрд╣рддрдХो рдЕрдиुрднूрддि рдЕрдирдкेрдХ्рд╖िрдд рдеिрдПрди рдиै। рдЪुрдиाрд╡ рдкрд╣िрд▓े рдмिрдмिрд╕ि рд░ рдИрдХोрдирдоिрд╖्рдЯ рд▓рдЧाрдпрддрдХा рдЕрди्рддрд░्рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╕рдоाрдЪाрд░ рд╕ंрд╕्рдеाрд▓े рдЧрд░ेрдХा рдордд рд╕рд░्рд╡ेрдХ्рд╖рдгрд╣рд░ुрд▓े рдЧैрд░рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХीрд╣рд░ु рдЕрдзिрдХ्рддрдо рдмрд╣ुрдорддрд▓े рдУрдмाрдоा рд╕рдорд░्рдердХ рд░рд╣ेрдХो рджेрдЦाрдПрдХा рдеिрдП।
рдЧोрд░ाрд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╕ंрдЦ्рдпाрдд्рдордХ рдмाрд╣ुрд▓्рдп рд░ рджрд░्рд╣ो рдк्рд░рднाрд╡ рд░рд╣िрд░рд╣ेрдХो рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рдХो рдПрдХ рдоाрдд्рд░ рдорд╣ाрд╢рдХ्рддिрдоा рдкрд╣िрд▓ो рдкрдЯрдХ рдЕрд▓्рдкрд╕ंрдЦ्рдпрдХ рдЬाрддिрдХा рдЙрдо्рдоेрдж्рдзाрд░рдХा рдкрдХ्рд╖рдоा рдкрд░िрдЪाрд▓िрдд рдм्рдпाрдкрдХ рдордиोрд╡िрдЬ्рдЮाрдирд▓े рдиिрд╢्рдЪिрдд рд░ुрдкрдоा рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рдмाрд╣िрд░ рдкрдиि рдЙрдд्рд╣ाрд╕ рдЬрдЧाрдПрдХो рдеिрдпो। рд╕рддाрд╡्рджीрдФ рджेрдЦिрдХो рджाрд╕рдд्рд╡рд╡ाрдЯ рдоुрдХ्рдд рдХाрд▓ा рдЬाрддिрдХा рдЙрдо्рдоेрдж्рдзाрд░ рд╕ंрд╕ाрд░рдХो рд╕рдмैрднрди्рджा рд╢рдХ्рддिрд╢ाрд▓ी рдоाрдиिрдПрдХो рдУрд╣ोрджाрдоा рдкрд╣िрд▓ो рдкрдЯрдХ рдкुрдЧ्рдиे рд╕рдо्рднाрд╡рдиा рдмрдв्рджै рдЬाрдиुрдХो рд╡ेрдЧ्рд▓ै рд░ोрдоाрди्рдЪ рдеिрдпो।
рддुрд▓рдиाрдд्рдордХ рд░ुрдкрд▓े рдпुрд╡ा рд░ рдоृрджुрднाрд╖ि рдУрдмाрдоाрдХो рдкрдХ्рд╖рдоा рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рднिрдд्рд░рдХो рд▓рд╣рд░рд▓े рдд्рдпрд╣ी рдкुрд╕्рддाрдХा рдЧैрд░рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХीрд╣рд░ुрд▓ाрдИ рдкрдиि рдЖрдХрд░्рд╖िрдд рдЧрд░्рдпो। рдЕрдиि рд╡िрдЧрдд् рдЖрда рд╡рд░्рд╖ рджेрдЦि рдЕрди्рддрд░्рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рдЬрдЧрддрдоा рдЬрд░्рдЬ рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓े рджेрдЦाрдПрдХो рд╣рдард▓े рд╕рдордЧ्рд░ рд░िрдкрдм्рд▓िрдХрди рдкाрд░्рдЯीрд▓ाрдИ рдиै рдЕрд▓ोрдХрдк्рд░ीрдп рдмрдиाрдЙрджै рд▓рдЧेрдХो рдеिрдпो। рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрдХो рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рднрд░ рдмिрдЧ्рд░ेрдХो рдЫрд╡ि рд╕ुрдзाрд░्рдиे рдУрдмाрдоाрдХो рдк्рд░рдгрд▓े рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд░ рдмिрджेрд╢ीрд╣рд░ु рджुрдмैрд▓ाрдИ рдЖрдХрд░्рд╖िрдд рдЧрд░्рдиु рд╕्рд╡рднाрд╡िрдХ рднрдпो।
рддрд░ рдХे рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдУрдмाрдоाрдХो рд╡िрдЬрдпрд▓े рдЖрдзाрд░рднूрдд рд░ुрдкрдоा рдЦाрд╕ै рдлрд░рдХ рдкाрд░्рд▓ा рдд? рдкрд░рдо्рдкрд░ाрдЧрдд् рд░ुрдкрд▓े рдмिрджेрд╢ рдиीрддिрдХा рд╡िрд╖рдпрдоा рдбेрдоोрдХ्рд░рдпाрдЯिрдХ рд░ рд░िрдкрдм्рд▓िрдХрди рдкाрд░्рдЯीрд╣рд░ुрдХा рд╡ीрдЪ рдЖрдзाрд░рднूрдд рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╕्рд╡ाрд░्рдерд╣рд░ुрдоा рд╕рд╣рдорддि рд╣ुрдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЫ। рддी рд╕्рд╡ाрд░्рде рд╣ाрд╕िрд▓ рдЧрд░्рдиे рдоाрдз्рдпрдордХा рдмाрд░े рджुрдИ рджрд▓рдХा рдмीрдЪ рднिрди्рдирддा рд░рд╣рдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЫ। рдЖрд░्рдеिрдХ, рд╕ाрдоाрдЬिрдХ рд░ рд╕ैрдиिрдХ рдоाрдорд▓ाрдоा рджेрдЦिрдПрдХा рдЖрди्рддрд░िрдХ рднिрди्рдирддाрдХै рдк्рд░рддिрд╡िрдо्рд╡ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдЕрди्рддрд░рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рдиीрддिрдоा рджेрдЦिрдиे рдЧрд░्рджрдЫ। рдХрд╣िрд▓ेрдХाрд╣ी рдд्рдпрд╕рд▓ाрдИ рдиै рджुрдИ рджрд▓ рдмीрдЪрдХो рдмैрдЪाрд░िрдХ рднिрди्рдирддा рднрдиि рдмुрдЭ्рдиे рдмाрдиी рдЕрди्рдп рдоुрд▓ुрдХрд▓ाрдИ рдкрд░ेрдХो рд╣ो। рдЪुрдиाрд╡ рдкूрд░्рд╡ рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рд╡्рдпाрдкी рд╡рд╣рд╕рд╣рд░ुрдХा рд╢्рд░ृрдЩ्рдЦрд▓ाрд▓े рджेрдЦाрдП рдЭै рдУрдмाрдоा рд░ рдЙрдирдХा рд░िрдкрдм्рд▓िрдХрди рдк्рд░рддिрдж्рдзрди्рджी рдЬрди рдордХैрди рд╡ीрдЪ рдЬрд▓्рджाрдмрд▓्рджा рдЕрди्рддрд░рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рдоुрдж्рджाрд╣рд░ुрдоा рдк्рд░рдХ्рд░िрдпाрдЧрдд् рдмिрдорддि рдиै рдеिрдпो।
рдиिрд░्рд╡ाрдЪрди рдЕрднिрдпाрдирдоा рдЙрдо्рдоेрдж्рдмाрд░рд▓े рдЧрд░्рдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХा рд╡ाрдЪाрд╣рд░ु рдкрдж рд╕рдо्рд╣ाрд▓े рдкрдЫि рддिрдирд▓े рдкрди्рдЫाрдЙрдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдк्рд░рд╢рд╕्рдд рдЗрддिрд╣ाрд╕ рдЫ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрдоा। рддुрд▓рдиाрдд्рдордХ рд░ुрдкрдоा рд▓ाрдоो рд░рд╣рдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЕрднिрдпाрдирдоा рдЕрдЧ्рд░рддा рдХाрдпрдо рдЧрд░ेрдХा рдк्рд░рдд्рдпाрд╕ीрд╣рд░ुрдХा рд╕ाрд░्рд╡рдЬрдиिрдХ рдЕрднिрд╡्рдпрдХ्рддिрд╣рд░ु рд╕ुрдХ्рд╖рдорддाрдХा рд╕ाрде рдХेрд▓ाрдЗрдиे рд╣ुрджा рд╡िрдкрдХ्рд╖ीрд╣рд░ुрд▓े рдд्рдпрд╕рд▓ाрдИ рдЖрдл्рдиै рдвंрдЧрд▓े рд╡्рдпाрдЦ्рдпा рдЧрд░्рдиे рдЫुрдЯ рд░рд╣рдиे рдЧрд░्рджрдЫ। рдоुрд▓ुрдХ рднिрдд्рд░рдХा рд╡िрд╡िрдз рдк्рд░рднाрд╡ рд╕рдоुрд╣рдХो рд╕рдорд░्рдерди рдЬुрдЯाрдЙрди рдкрд░्рдиे рд╡ाрдз्рдпрддाрдХा рдХाрд░рдг рдЙрдо्рдоेрдж्рдзाрд░рд▓े рдкрдиि рдмेрд▓ाрдмрдЦрдд рдд्рдпрд╕्рддा рдЕрд╕्рдкрд╖्рдЯрддाрд▓ाрдИ рдХाрдпрдо рд░ाрдЦ्рдиे рдЧрд░्рджрдЫрди्।
рд╕рдд्рддा рд╕рдо्рд╣ाрд▓े рдкрдЫि рдк्рд░рддिрдкрдХ्рд╖ीрдХो рдк्рд░рддिрд░ोрдз, рдШрдЯ्рдиाрдХ्рд░рдордХो рддрд░рд▓рддा рд░ рддрдд्рдХाрд▓िрди рд░ाрдЬрдиीрддिрдХ рд▓ाрднрд╣ाрдиीрдХो рддौрд▓ рдЬрд╕्рддा рдХाрд░рдгрд▓े рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддिрдХो рдХрдмुрд▓ рд░ рдХाрд░्рдпрдоा рднिрди्рдирддा рд▓्рдпाрдЙрдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЫ। рддрд░ рдкрдиि рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдмिрджेрд╢ рдиीрддिрдоा рдк्рд░рдЬाрддрди्рдд्рд░, рдоाрдирд╡рдЕрдзिрдХाрд░, рдЦुрд▓ा рдмрдЬाрд░ рдЕрд░्рдерддрди्рдд्рд░ рд░ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╡िрд╢िрд╖्рдЯрддा рд▓рдЧाрдпрддрдХा рдкрд░рдо्рдкрд░ाрдЧрдд् рдоुрд▓्рдп рдоाрди्рдпрддाрдХो рдЙрдкрд╕्рдеिрддि рд░рд╣рдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЫ। рддिрдиैрдХो рдЕрднिрд╡्рдпрдХ्рддि рдмोрд▓ी рд░ рдм्рдпрдмрд╣ाрд░ рдПрд╡ं рдиीрддि рд░ рдХाрд░्рдпрдХ्рд░рдоा рдиिрд░рди्рддрд░ рдкाрдИрди्рдЫ।
рд╕्рд╡ाрд░्рде рд░ рд╕рд╣рдХाрд░्рдп
рд╕ंрд╕ाрд░рдХो рдПрдХ рдоाрдд्рд░ рдорд╣ाрд╢рдХ्рддि рднрдПрдкрдиि рд╕्рдеिрд░ рд░ рд╕рд╡рд▓ рдЕрди्рддрд░рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╡्рдпрд╡рд╕्рдеा рд╕ुрдиिрд╢्рдЪिрдд рдЧрд░्рдиाрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓े рдЕрди्рдп рдк्рд░рднाрд╡рд╢ाрд▓ी рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧ рд╕рд╣рдХाрд░्рдп рдЧрд░्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдЖрд╡рд╢्рдпрдХ्рддा рдмрдв्рджै рдЧрдПрдХो рдЫ। рдпो рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдмрд╣ुрдЖрдпाрдоिрдХ рд╢рдХ्рддिрдоा рдХुрдиै рд╣्рд░ाрд╕ рдЖрдПрд░ рднрди्рджा рдкрдиि рд╕рдорд╕ाрдордпिрдХ рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рдоा рдЕрди्рдп рд╢рдХ्рддिрд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╡рд░्рдЪрд╕्рд╡ рдмрдвेрдХोрдХा рдХाрд░рдгрд▓े рдиै рд╣ो। рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рди рднрд░ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓े рдЧुрдоाрдПрдХो рдЕрди्рддрд░рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рд╕рдиीрдпрддा рдоाрдЭ рдУрдмाрдоाрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдпो рдЪूрдиौрддिрд▓ाрдИ рдЕрдЭ рдмрдв्рдиेрдЫ। рддрд░ рдЪुрдиाрд╡ рдЕрднिрдпाрдирдоा рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓ाрдИ рдЬрддि рджोрд╖ी рдмрдиाрдП рдкрдиि рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рдмिрд░ोрдзी рднाрд╡рдиाрдХो рдЬрд░ा рдЗрд░ाрдХ рдпुрдж्рдз рднрди्рджा рдзेрд░ै рдЧрд╣िрд░ो рд░рд╣ेрдХो рдпрдеाрд░्рдерд▓ाрдИ рд╕्рд╡ीрдХाрд░ी рдУрдмाрдоाрд▓ाрдИ рдЕрдШि рдмрдв्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдмाрдз्рдпрддा рдЫ।
рдЖрддंрдХрд╡ाрдж рд╡िрд░ुрдж्рдмрдХो рдЕрднिрдпाрди, рд╡्рдпाрдкрдХ рдХ्рд╖рддि рдЧрд░्рдиे рд╣ाрддрд╣рддिрдпाрд░рдХो рдЕрдк्рд░рд╕ाрд░, рд╕ांрдЧрдаिрдд рдЕрдкрд░ाрдз, рд╡ाрддाрд╡рд░рдгीрдп рдХ्рд╖рддि, рдЪрд░рдо рдЧрд░िрд╡ी рдиिрд╡ाрд░рдг, рд░ рдорд╣ाрд░ोрдЧ рдк्рд░рддिрд░ोрдз рдЬрд╕्рддा рд╡िрд╖рдпрд╣рд░ुрд▓े рдЕрди्рддрд░рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╕्рд╡рд░ुрдк рд▓िрдПрдХा рдЫрди्। рдпुрд░ोрдкेрд▓ी рд╕ंрдШ, рд░ुрд╕, рдЪीрди, рднाрд░рдд, рдЬाрдкाрди, рд░ рдм्рд░्рдпाрдЬिрд▓ рдЬрд╕्рддा рдоुрд▓ुрдХрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧрдХो рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдзрдоा рдЖрдл्рдиै рдкृрдердХ рдЪрд░िрдд्рд░ рд░ рдЬрдЯिрд▓рддाрд╣рд░ु рд░рд╣ेрдХा рдЫрди्। рдж्рдзैрдкрдХ्рд╖िрдХ рдЕрд╕рд╣рдорддिрдХा рдмाрдмрдЬूрдж рд╢ाрди्рддि рд░ рд╕्рдеाрдпिрдд्рд╡рдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдЙрдиीрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧ рдк्рд░рдд्рдпрдХ्рд╖ рд╕рд░ोрдХाрд░ рд░ाрдЦ्рдиे рднौрдЧौрд▓िрдХ рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░рд╣рд░ुрдоा рд╕рд╣рдХाрд░्рдп рдЧрд░्рдиुрдХो рд╡िрдХрд▓्рдк рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓ाрдИ рдЫैрди्। рд╕ंрдпुрдХ्рдд рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░ рд╕ंрдШ рд╕ुрд░рдХ्рд╖ा рдкрд░िрд╖рджрдХा рд╕्рдеाрдпी рд╕рджрд╕्рдпрдХा рд╣ैрд╕िрдпрддрд▓े рдпुрд░ोрдкेрд▓ी рд╕ंрдШ (рд╡ेрд▓ाрдпрдд рд░ рдл्рд░ाрди्рд╕), рд░ुрд╕ рд░ рдЪीрдирд▓ाрдИ рдк्рд░ाрдк्рдд рднिрдЯो рд╢рдХ्рддिрдХा рдХाрд░рдг рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓े рддिрдирд▓ाрдИ рд╡िрд╢्рд╡ाрд╕рдоा рд▓िрдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдЪूрдиौрддि рдЫ। рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░िрдп рдоुрдж्рджाрд╣рд░ुрдоा рдд्рдпрд╣ांрдХा рдк्рд░рднाрд╡рд╢ाрд▓ी рдоुрд▓ुрдХрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧрдХो рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдзрд▓े рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдХाрд░्рдпрдХ्рд╖рдорддाрд▓ाрдИ рдиिрд░्рджेрд╢िрдд рдЧрд░्рдиे рдЫ।
рдордз्рдпрдкूрд░्рд╡рдоा рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓े рдорд╣рдд्рд╡рдкूрд░्рдг рдиीрддिрдЧрдд् рднिрди्рдирддा рд▓्рдпाрдПрдХो рдеिрдпो। рддेрд▓рдХो рд╕рд░рд▓ рдмिрддрд░рдгрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдд्рдпрд╕ рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░рдХा рдЕрдк्рд░рдЬाрддाрди्рдд्рд░िрдХ рд╕рд░рдХाрд░рд╣рд░ुрд▓ाрдИ рджрд╢рдХौ рджेрдЦि рд╡ाрд╢िрдЩ्рдЯрдирд▓े рдЕрдЯूрдЯ рд╕рдорд░्рдерди рджिрджै рдЖрдПрдХो рдеिрдпो। рддिрдиै рджेрд╢рд╣рд░ु рдордз्рдпेрдХै рд╕рдЙрджी рдЕрд░ेрдмिрдпा рд░ рдЗрдЬिрдк्рдЯрдмाрдЯ рд╕ेрдк्рдЯेрдо्рдмрд░ резрез рдХा рдЕрдзिрдХांрд╢ рдЖрддंрдХрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ु рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рд╡िрд░ुрдж्рдз рдЙрдд्рд░ेрдХाрд▓े рдд्рдпो рдиीрддिрдЧрдд् рдкрд░िрд╡рд░्рддрди рдЖрдпो। рддрд░ рдк्рд░рдЬाрддाрди्рдд्рд░िрдХрд░рдгрд▓ाрдИ рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╕ुрд░рдХ्рд╖ा рд╕ंрдЧ рдЧांрд╕ेрд░ рдХेрд╣ी рдХाрд░्рдпрдХ्рд░рдордХो рдШोрд╖рдгा рдЧрд░्рджा рдирдЧрд░्рджै рд╡ाрд╢िрдЩ्рдЯрди рдЗрд░ाрдХрдХो рдпुрдж्рдзрдХो рджрд▓рджрд▓рдоा рдлрд╕्рди рдкुрдЧ्рдпो। рдд्рдпो рдмिрдмाрджिрдд рдм्рдпрд╕्рддрддाрдХा рдХाрд░рдг рдпрддा рдЖрдПрд░ рдЕрдл्рдЧाрдиिрд╕्рддाрдирдоा рд╕्рдеिрддि рд╡िрдЧ्рд░िрди рдЧрдпो।
рдпुрдж्рдз рдкूрд░्рд╡рдХो рд╕ूрдЪрдиा рд╕рдЩ्рдХрд▓рдирдХा рдХрдо्рдЬोрд░ी, рдЕрди्рддрд░्рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рдХूрдЯрдиीрддि рдЬुрдЯाрдЙрдиे рдХ्рд░рдордХा рд╢िрдеिрд▓рддा, рдпुрдж्рдз рдкрдЫिрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдЕрдкрд░्рдпाрдк्рдд рдпोрдЬрдиा рдЖрджिрд▓े рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рд╕рдиीрдпрддाрдоा рд╣्рд░ाрд╕ рд▓्рдпाрдЙрди рдордж्рджрдд рдкुрд░्рдпाрдпो। рдм्рдпाрдкрдХ рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░рдоै рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдк्рд░рдпाрд╕рд╣рд░ु рдиिрд╕्рддेрдЬ рд╣ुрдиुрдоा рдЗрдЬрд░ाрдпрд▓-рдк्рдпाрд▓ेрд╖्рдЯाрдЗрдирдХो рд░рдХ्рддрдкाрддрдкूрд░्рдг рдЧрддिрд░ोрдзрдХा рд╕ाрде рд╕ाрдеै рдЗрд░ाрдирд▓ाрдИ рдЖрдгрд╡िрдХ рд╣рддिрдпाрд░ рдк्рд░ाрдк्рдд рдЧрд░्рдирдмाрдЯ рд░ोрдХ्рдиे, рдоिрдд्рд░рд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╕рд╣рдпोрдЧ рдЬुрдЯाрдЗрд░рд╣рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे, рдЖрддंрдХрд╡ाрдж рдмिрд░ुрдж्рдзрдХो рдЕрднिрдпाрдирдХा рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдЬрди्рдп рд╡िрд╢ेрд╖рддाрд▓ाрдИ рдз्рдпाрди рдкुрд░्рдпाрдЙрди рдкрд░्рдиे рдЬрд╕्рддा рдмाрдз्рдпрддाрд╣рд░ुрдХो рднूрдоिрдХा рдЫ।
рдЗрд░ाрдХ рдпुрдж्рдз рдд्рдпрд╕ рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░рдоा рджрд╢рдХौ рджेрдЦि рдЪुрд▓िрдПрдХा рдмिрднिрди्рди рдоुрдж्рджाрд╣рд░ुрдХो рдХेрди्рдж्рд░рд╡िрди्рджु рдмрдиेрдХो рдЫ। рдЦाрдбी рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░, рдЕрдл्рдЧाрдиिрд╕्рддाрди рд░ рдкाрдХिрд╕्рддाрдирдХा рдм्рдпाрдкрдХ рдЬрдЯिрд▓рддाрд▓े рдордз्рдп рдПрд╢िрдпाрд▓ाрдИ рдк्рд░рднाрд╡ рдкाрд░ेрдХाрд▓े рд░ुрд╕, рдЪीрди, рднाрд░рдд рд░ рдЯрд░्рдХी рд╕рдоेрддрдХो рдк्рд░рдд्рдпрдХ्рд╖ рдк्рд░рднाрд╡ рдпрд╕ рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░рдоा рдкрд░्рджै рдЧрдПрдХोрдЫ। рдЗрд░ाрдХрдмाрдЯ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕ेрдиा рдлिрд░्рддा рдЧрд░्рдиे рдУрдмाрдоाрд▓े рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдк्рд░рдгрдХा рдмाрдмрдЬुрдж рдд्рдпрд╕рдХो рдм्рдпाрдкрдХ рдк्рд░рднाрд╡рдХो рдЖंрдХрд▓рди рдЧрд░्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдЪूрдиौрддि рдирдпां рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддिрд▓ाрдИ рд╣ुрдиेрдЫ। рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рд╡्рдпाрдкी рд░ुрдкрдоै рдЗрд░ाрдХ рдпुрдж्рдзрдж्рдзाрд░ा рд╕ृрдЬिрдд рдирдХрд░ाрдд्рдордХ рджрдмाрдмрд▓े рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓ाрдИ рдЖрдл्рдиो рдмैрджेрд╢िрдХ рдиीрддिрдоा рдирд░рдорддा рдЕрдк्рдиाрдЙрди рд▓рдЧाрдпो। рдЗрд░ाрди рд░ рдЙрддрд░ рдХोрд░िрдпा рдЬрд╕्рддा рдоुрд▓ुрдХрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧ рдкрдиि рддрд▓्рд▓ो рд╕्рддрд░рдоै рднрдПрдкрдиि рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓ाрдИ рд╡ाрд░्рддा рдЧрд░्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рд╕्рдеिрддि рдмрдиाрдпो।
рдЪुрдиाрд╡рдХो рдоुрдЦैрдоा рдЖрдЗрдкрд░ेрдХो рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рд╡्рдпाрдкी рдЖрд░्рдеिрдХ рдмिрдкрдд्рддिрд▓े рдирдпां рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддिрдХो рдЖрди्рддрд░िрдХ рдПрд╡ं рдмैрджेрд╢िрдХ рдиीрддिрдХो рдаूрд▓ो рд╣िрд╕्рд╕ा рдУрдЧрдЯ्рдиे рдиिрд╢्рдЪिрдд рдЫ। рддрд░ рд░ाрдЬрдиीрддिрдХ рдХूрдЯрдиीрддिрдХ рд╕ैрдиिрдХ рд░ рд╕ाрдорд░िрдХ рд╕рдорд╕्рдпाрд╣рд░ु рдЕрдЭ рдЬрдЯिрд▓ рдмрди्рдиे рд╕рдо्рднाрд╡рдиा рдкрдиि рдЙрдд्рддिрдХै рдЫ। рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рдХा рд╕рдорд╕्рдпा рдиिрд╡ाрд░рдгाрд░्рде рдЕрди्рдп рд╢рдХ्рддि рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╕рд╣рдпोрдЧ рдЬुрдЯाрдЙрдиे рд░ рд╕्рдеाрдиीрдп рд╕рдо्рд╡ेрджрд╢िрд▓рддाрд╣рд░ु рдк्рд░рддि рдз्рдпाрди рдкुрд░्рдпाрдЙрдиे рдУрдмाрдоाрдХो рдк्рд░рддिрд╡рдж्рдзрддा рдоाрдЭ рдЕрди्рддрд░्рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд░ुрдкрд▓े рдкुрдирд░्рдд्рдеाрди рднрдПрдХो рд░ुрд╕ рд░ рдиिрдпрди्рдд्рд░िрдд рд░ाрдЬрдиीрддिрдоै рд╢рдХ्рддि рд╕рдЮ्рдЪрдп рдЧрд░्рджै рдЧрдПрдХो рдЪीрдирд▓े рдЧрд░्рдиे рдк्рд░рддिрд░ोрдзрдХो рд╕ाрдордиा рдирдпां рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддिрд▓े рдЧрд░्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиेрдЫ। рдирдпां рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддि рдЖрдЙрджैрдоा рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рдк्рд░рддिрдХो рд╢ंрдХा рд░ рд╕ंрд╢рдпрдХो рдЕрди्рдд्рдп рд╣ुрдиेрд╡ाрд▓ा рдЫैрди।
рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рдЕрд╕рд░
рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рдирдпां рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓ाрдИ рдЪाрд▓्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдПрдЙрдЯा рдорд╣рдд्рд╡рдкूрд░्рдг рдХрджрдордХो рдеाрд▓рдиी рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддि рдмुрд╢рд▓े рдиै рдЧрд░िрджिрдП। рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд▓ाрдИ рдЖрддрдЩ्рдХрдХाрд░ी рд╕рдоूрд╣ рдШोрд╖िрдд рдЧрд░ी рддिрдиिрд╣рд░ु рд╡िрд░ुрдж्рдз рдк्рд░рдЬाрддाрди्рдд्рд░िрдХ рд╕рд░рдХाрд░ рд░ рджрд░рдмाрд░рд▓ाрдИ рд░ाрдЬрдиीрддिрдХ рд░ рд╕ैрдиिрдХ рд╕рд╣рдпोрдЧ рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рди рдоाрдШ резреп, реирежремрез рдХो рдЪीрди рдоुрдЦी рджेрдЦिрдПрдХो рд╢ाрд╣ी рдХрджрдо рдкрдЫि рд░ाрдЬрддрди्рдд्рд░ рд╕ंрдЧ рдЪिрдвिрди рдкुрдЧ्рдпो। рднाрд░рдд рд╕ंрдЧрдХो рд╕ाрдорд░िрдХ рд╕рд╣рдХाрд░्рдпрд▓ाрдИ рдиिрдХै рдЕрдЧाрдбि рдмрдвाрдПрдХो рд╡ाрд╢िрдЩ्рдЧрдЯрдирд▓े рдирдпां рджिрд▓्рд▓ीрдХै рдкрд░ाрдорд░्рд╢рдоा рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ुрдХो рдЪुрдиाрд╡ी рд╡िрдЬрдп, рд░ाрдЬрддрди्рдд्рд░ рдХो рдЕрди्рдд्рдп, рд░ рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╕рдд्рддाрд░ोрд╣рдг рдк्рд░рддि рд╕рд╣िрд╖्рдгु рдмрди्рдпो।
рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рд░рдХाрд░рдХो рдПрдЙрдЯा рдЫुрдЯ्рдЯै рдЖрддрдЩ्рдХрдХाрд░ीрд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╕ूрдЪिрдоा рд░рд╣ेрдХो рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ुрд▓ाрдИ рдЕрд▓рдХाрдЗрджा рд╕ंрдЧ рддुрд▓рдиा рдЧрд░्рди рдирдоिрд▓्рдиे рдЬिрдХिрд░ рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рд░рдХाрд░рд▓े рдкрд░्рдЦ рд░ рд╣ेрд░ рдХो рдиीрддि рд▓िрдПрдХो рдЫ। рдиेрдХрдкा рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрдХा рдЕрдз्рдпрдХ्рд╖ рдк्рд░рдзाрдирдорди्рдд्рд░ी рдкुрд╖्рдкрдХрдорд▓ рджाрд╣ाрд▓ рд╕ंрдЧ рдмुрд╢рд▓े рдиिрддाрди्рдд рдЫोрдЯो рд░ рд╕ाрдоुрд╣िрдХ рд╕рди्рджрд░्рднрдоा рднेрдЯ рдЧрд░े। рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓े рдирд░ुрдЪाрдПрдХा рд╕рд░рдХाрд░ рдк्рд░рдоुрдЦрд▓ाрдИ рдд्рдпрд╕्рддो рднेрдЯрдШाрдЯрдмाрдЯ рдмрди्рдЪिрдд рдЧрд░िрдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдкрд░рдо्рдкрд░ा рдоाрдЭ рд╕ो рднेрдЯрд▓ाрдИ рдХрдо рднрди्рди рдоिрд▓्рджैрди।
рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рд╣ाрдпрдХ рд╡िрджेрд╢ рдорди्рдд्рд░ीрд▓े рдк्рд░рдзाрдирдорди्рдд्рд░ी рджाрд╣ाрд▓ рд░ рдкрдЫि рдЕрд░्рдердорди्рдд्рд░ी рдмाрдмुрд░ाрдо рднрдЯ्рдЯрд░ाрдИ рд╕ंрдЧ рд╡ाрд░्рддा рдЧрд░ी рдирдпां рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдзрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдмाрдЯो рдЦोрд▓ेрдХा рдЫрди्। рдпो рдШрдЯ्рдиाрдХ्рд░рдорд▓ाрдИ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рд░рдХाрд░рд▓े рдиेрдкाрд▓ी рдЬрдирддाрдХो рдЬрдиाрджेрд╢рдХो рдХрджрд░ рдЧрд░ी рдиेрдкाрд▓ рд╕рд░рдХाрд░ рд╕ंрдЧ рд╣ाрдд рдмрдвाрдПрдХो рднрдиेрд░ рдоाрдд्рд░ рдмुрдЭ्рди рд╕рдХिрди्рди। рдПрд╢िрдпाрдХा рджुрдИ рд╢рдХ्рддि рдмीрдЪ рдЕрдмрд╕्рдеिрдд рдиेрдкाрд▓рдХो рднूрд░ाрдЬрдиीрддिрдХ рдорд╣рдд्рд╡ рдоाрдЭ рдирдпां рджिрд▓्рд▓ी рд╕ंрдЧрдХो рдкрд░ाрдорд░्рд╢ рдХै рдЖрдзाрд░рдоा рдиेрдкाрд▓ рдиीрддि рддрдп рдЧрд░्рдиे рдкрд░рдо्рдкрд░ा рдУрдмाрдоा рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓े рддोрдб्рдиे рджेрдЦिрджैрди।
рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рдХा рджुрдИ рдк्рд░рдоुрдЦ рдк्рд░рдЬाрддाрди्рдд्рд░िрдХ рд╢рдХ्рддि рд╡ीрдЪ рдпрд╕्рддो рд╕ाрдЭा рджृрд╖्рдЯि рд░рд╣ेрдХो рдмाрд░рдо्рдмाрд░рдХो рд╕ाрд░्рдмрдЬрдиिрдХ рдЕрдаोрдЯрд▓ाрдИ рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рд▓ोрдХрддрди्рдд्рд░рдХो рд╕ुрдиिрд╢्рдЪिрддрддाрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рд╕ुрдЦрдж рд╕ंрдХेрдд рднрдиि рдмुрдЭ्рди рд╕рдХिрдПрд▓ा। рдЪीрдирдоा рднрдиे рдд्рдпрд╕рд▓े рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рд░ рднाрд░рдд рдмीрдЪрдХो рдм्рдпाрдкрдХ рдЧрдардмрди्рдзрдирдХै рдЕрд░्рде рд▓िрдПрдХो рдмुрдЭ्рди рдЧाрд╣्рд░ो рдкрд░्рджैрди। рдЖрдл्рдиो рд╢ाрди्рддिрдкूрд░्рдг рдЙрджрдпрдХो рдк्рд░рддिрдХाрд░ рдЧрд░्рди рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рдмрдвाрдЗрд░рд╣ेрдХो рдЕрди्рддрд░्рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рдЧрдардмрди्рдзрдирдХै рдХрдбीрдХो рд░ुрдкрдоा рдЪीрдирд▓े рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рднाрд░рдд-рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рд╣рдХाрд░्рдпрд▓ाрдИ рд▓िрдПрдХो рдЫ। рд╕्рд╡рддрди्рдд्рд░ рддिрдм्рдмрдд рдЖрди्рджोрд▓рдирд▓ाрдИ рдпрд╕्рддो рдк्рд░рддिрд░ोрдзрдХो рдПрдЙрдЯा рдкाрдЯोрдХा рд░ुрдкрдоा рдЪीрдирд▓े рдорд╣рд╕ूрд╕ рдЧрд░ेрдХो рд░ рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рд╕ो рдЖрди्рджोрд▓рдирд▓े рдпрд╕ै рд╡рд░्рд╖ рд╕рд╢рдХ्рдд рднрдПрд░ рдмрдвेрдХो рд╕рди्рджрд░्рднрдоा рдирдпां рджिрд▓्рд▓ीрдХो рднूрдоिрдХाрдмाрд░े рдмेрдЗрдЬिрдЩ्рдЧрдХो рд╢ंрдХाрдХो рдЕрд╕рд░ рдХाрдардоाрдг्рдбौрд▓े рднोрдЧ्рдиे рд▓рдХ्рд╖рдг рджेрдЦाрдкрд░्рди рдеाрд▓िрд╕рдХेрдХो рдЫ।
рдкрд░рдо्рдкрд░ाрдЧрдд् рдоिрдд्рд░ рд╢рдХ्рддि рд░ाрдЬрддрди्рдд्рд░рдХो рдЕрд╡рд╢ाрди рдкрдЫि рдЪीрдирд▓े рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧ рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдз рд╕ुрджृрдв рдЧрд░्рдиे рдк्рд░рдХ्рд░िрдпा рдиिрдХै рдЦुрд▓ेрд░ै рдЕрдШि рдмрдвाрдПрдХो рдмाрд╕्рддрд╡िрдХ्рддा рдк्рд░рддि рднाрд░рддीрдпрд╣рд░ु рдЪिрди्рддिрдд рджेрдЦिрдПрдХा рдЫрди्। рддрд░ рдЬрдирдпुрдж्рдз рдХाрд▓рдоा рднाрд░рдд рдоै рдЖрд╕ृрдд рдПрд╡ं рднाрд░рддीрдп рдиेрддाрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧ рдирдЬिрдХрдХो рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдз рдХाрдпрдо рдЧрд░ेрдХा рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ुрд▓ाрдИ рдЪीрдирд▓े рдмिрд╢्рд╡ाрд╕ рдЧрд░े рдирдЧрд░ेрдХो рднेрдЙ рдЕрд░ुрд▓े рдд рдХे рдоाрдУрдмाрджी рд╕्рд╡рдпрдорд▓े рдкाрдЙрди рд╕рдХेрдХो рджेрдЦिрджैрди। рддрдд्рдХाрд▓рдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдпो рдЕрд╕्рдкрд╖्рдЯрддा рдХाрдпрдо рд░ाрдЦ्рдиुрдоा рдиै рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ुрд▓ाрдИ рд▓ाрдн рд╣ुрдиे рджेрдЦिрди्рдЫ।
рдЙрддा рднाрд░рдд рд╕्рдеिрдд рдиेрдкाрд▓ рд╡िрдЬ्рдЮрд╣рд░ुрдХो рдПрдХ рд╕рдоुрд╣рд▓े рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХीрд╣рд░ुрдХो рдмрдв्рджो рдк्рд░рднाрд╡рдХै рдк्рд░рддिрдХ्рд░िрдпा рд╕्рд╡рд░ुрдк рдЪीрдирд▓े рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рд╕рдХ्рд░िрдпрддा рдмрдвाрдПрдХो рдк्рд░рддि рд╕рдЪेрдд рджेрдЦिрди्рдЫрди्। рдд्рдпो рднрдиाрдИрд▓ाрдИ рдЪीрди-рднाрд░рдд рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдзрдоा рд╣ाрд▓ै рджेрдЦिрдПрдХो рдЪिрд╕ोрдкрдирд▓े рдУрдЭेрд▓рдоा рдкाрд░िрджिрдПрдХो рдЫ। рднाрд░рддीрдп рд╡िрджेрд╢ рдорди्рдд्рд░ी рдк्рд░рдгрд╡ рдоुрдЦрд░्рдЬीрд▓े рдЦुрд▓ेрд░ै рдЪीрди рдЖрдл्рдиो рдоुрд▓ुрдХрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рд╕ाрдорд░िрдХ рдЪुрдиौрддि рд░рд╣ेрдХो рднрди्рдиे рд╕ाрд░्рд╡рдЬрдиिрдХ рдЕрднिрд╡्рдпрдХ्рддि рджिрдПрд░ рдж्рдзिрдкрдХ्рд╖ीрдп рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдз рд╡ाрд░ेрдХो рд╡рд╣рд╕рд▓ाрдИ рдирдпां рдЙрд░्рдЬा рджिрдПрдХा рдЫрди्।
рджрдХ्рд╖िрдг рдПрд╢िрдпाрдХा рдиेрдкाрд▓ рд▓рдЧाрдпрддрдХा рд╕ाрдиा рдоुрд▓ुрдХрдоा рдк्рд░рднाрд╡ рдмрдвाрдПрд░ рдЪीрдирд▓े рднाрд░рдд рд╡िрд░ुрдж्рдз рдШेрд░ाрд╡рди्рджी рдХрд╕ेрдХो рднрди्рдиे рдЖрдХ्рд╖ेрдк рд▓рдЧाрдЙрджै рдЖрдПрдХो рдирдпां рджिрд▓्рд▓ीрд▓े рдпрддा рдЖрдПрд░ рдмेрдЗрдЬिрдЩ्рдЧрд▓े рдЙрдд्рддрд░рдкूрд░्рд╡ी рднाрд░рддीрдп рд░ाрдЬ्рдпрд╣рд░ुрдоा рдЖрддрдЩ्рдХрд╡ाрджрд▓ाрдИ рдк्рд░рд╢्рд░рдп рджिрдПрдХो рднрди्рдиे рд╕рдо्рдордХा рдЖрд░ोрдк рд▓рдЧाрдЙрди рдеाрд▓ेрдХा рдЫрди्।
рдУрдмाрдоा рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓े рдиेрдкाрд▓ рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдзि рдиीрддिрдоा рдХुрдиै рдк्рд░рдд्рдпрдХ्рд╖ рдкрд░िрд╡рд░्рддрди рдирд▓्рдпाрдП рдкрдиि рдиेрдкाрд▓ीрд╣рд░ु рд╕рдЪेрдд рдмрди्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдЕрд╡рд╕्рдеा рдмिрдж्рдпрдоाрди рдЫ। рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрдХो рднाрд░рдд рд░ рдЪीрди рд╕ंрдЧрдХो рд╕्рд╡рддрди्рдд्рд░ рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдз рд░ рднाрд░рдд-рдЪीрдирдХो рдж्рдзैрдкрдХ्рд╖िрдХ рдЙрддाрд░рдЪрдвाрд╡рд▓े рд▓्рдпाрдЙрдиे рдирдпां рдЯрдХ्рдХрд░ рд░ рддрдиाрд╡ рдиेрдкाрд▓ीрд╣рд░ुрд▓े рдм्рдпрд╣ोрд░्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рд╕्рдеिрддि рдмрди्рджै рдЧрдПрдХो рджेрдЦिрди्рдЫ।
рдмाрд░ाрдХ рдУрдмाрдоा рд╕ंрдпुрдХ्рдд рд░ाрдЬ्рдп рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрдХो рекрекрдФ рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддि рдиिрд░्рд╡ाрдЪिрдд рднрдПрдкрдЫि рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рд▓े рдиिрдХै рд▓ाрдоो рд╕рди्рддोрд╖рдХो рд╢्рд╡ाрд╕ рдлेрд░ेрдХो рд╕ुрдиिрдпो। рд░ाрд╣рддрдХो рдЕрдиुрднूрддि рдЕрдирдкेрдХ्рд╖िрдд рдеिрдПрди рдиै। рдЪुрдиाрд╡ рдкрд╣िрд▓े рдмिрдмिрд╕ि рд░ рдИрдХोрдирдоिрд╖्рдЯ рд▓рдЧाрдпрддрдХा рдЕрди्рддрд░्рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╕рдоाрдЪाрд░ рд╕ंрд╕्рдеाрд▓े рдЧрд░ेрдХा рдордд рд╕рд░्рд╡ेрдХ्рд╖рдгрд╣рд░ुрд▓े рдЧैрд░рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХीрд╣рд░ु рдЕрдзिрдХ्рддрдо рдмрд╣ुрдорддрд▓े рдУрдмाрдоा рд╕рдорд░्рдердХ рд░рд╣ेрдХो рджेрдЦाрдПрдХा рдеिрдП।
рдЧोрд░ाрд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╕ंрдЦ्рдпाрдд्рдордХ рдмाрд╣ुрд▓्рдп рд░ рджрд░्рд╣ो рдк्рд░рднाрд╡ рд░рд╣िрд░рд╣ेрдХो рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рдХो рдПрдХ рдоाрдд्рд░ рдорд╣ाрд╢рдХ्рддिрдоा рдкрд╣िрд▓ो рдкрдЯрдХ рдЕрд▓्рдкрд╕ंрдЦ्рдпрдХ рдЬाрддिрдХा рдЙрдо्рдоेрдж्рдзाрд░рдХा рдкрдХ्рд╖рдоा рдкрд░िрдЪाрд▓िрдд рдм्рдпाрдкрдХ рдордиोрд╡िрдЬ्рдЮाрдирд▓े рдиिрд╢्рдЪिрдд рд░ुрдкрдоा рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рдмाрд╣िрд░ рдкрдиि рдЙрдд्рд╣ाрд╕ рдЬрдЧाрдПрдХो рдеिрдпो। рд╕рддाрд╡्рджीрдФ рджेрдЦिрдХो рджाрд╕рдд्рд╡рд╡ाрдЯ рдоुрдХ्рдд рдХाрд▓ा рдЬाрддिрдХा рдЙрдо्рдоेрдж्рдзाрд░ рд╕ंрд╕ाрд░рдХो рд╕рдмैрднрди्рджा рд╢рдХ्рддिрд╢ाрд▓ी рдоाрдиिрдПрдХो рдУрд╣ोрджाрдоा рдкрд╣िрд▓ो рдкрдЯрдХ рдкुрдЧ्рдиे рд╕рдо्рднाрд╡рдиा рдмрдв्рджै рдЬाрдиुрдХो рд╡ेрдЧ्рд▓ै рд░ोрдоाрди्рдЪ рдеिрдпो।
рддुрд▓рдиाрдд्рдордХ рд░ुрдкрд▓े рдпुрд╡ा рд░ рдоृрджुрднाрд╖ि рдУрдмाрдоाрдХो рдкрдХ्рд╖рдоा рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рднिрдд्рд░рдХो рд▓рд╣рд░рд▓े рдд्рдпрд╣ी рдкुрд╕्рддाрдХा рдЧैрд░рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХीрд╣рд░ुрд▓ाрдИ рдкрдиि рдЖрдХрд░्рд╖िрдд рдЧрд░्рдпो। рдЕрдиि рд╡िрдЧрдд् рдЖрда рд╡рд░्рд╖ рджेрдЦि рдЕрди्рддрд░्рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рдЬрдЧрддрдоा рдЬрд░्рдЬ рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓े рджेрдЦाрдПрдХो рд╣рдард▓े рд╕рдордЧ्рд░ рд░िрдкрдм्рд▓िрдХрди рдкाрд░्рдЯीрд▓ाрдИ рдиै рдЕрд▓ोрдХрдк्рд░ीрдп рдмрдиाрдЙрджै рд▓рдЧेрдХो рдеिрдпो। рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрдХो рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рднрд░ рдмिрдЧ्рд░ेрдХो рдЫрд╡ि рд╕ुрдзाрд░्рдиे рдУрдмाрдоाрдХो рдк्рд░рдгрд▓े рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд░ рдмिрджेрд╢ीрд╣рд░ु рджुрдмैрд▓ाрдИ рдЖрдХрд░्рд╖िрдд рдЧрд░्рдиु рд╕्рд╡рднाрд╡िрдХ рднрдпो।
рддрд░ рдХे рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдУрдмाрдоाрдХो рд╡िрдЬрдпрд▓े рдЖрдзाрд░рднूрдд рд░ुрдкрдоा рдЦाрд╕ै рдлрд░рдХ рдкाрд░्рд▓ा рдд? рдкрд░рдо्рдкрд░ाрдЧрдд् рд░ुрдкрд▓े рдмिрджेрд╢ рдиीрддिрдХा рд╡िрд╖рдпрдоा рдбेрдоोрдХ्рд░рдпाрдЯिрдХ рд░ рд░िрдкрдм्рд▓िрдХрди рдкाрд░्рдЯीрд╣рд░ुрдХा рд╡ीрдЪ рдЖрдзाрд░рднूрдд рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╕्рд╡ाрд░्рдерд╣рд░ुрдоा рд╕рд╣рдорддि рд╣ुрдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЫ। рддी рд╕्рд╡ाрд░्рде рд╣ाрд╕िрд▓ рдЧрд░्рдиे рдоाрдз्рдпрдордХा рдмाрд░े рджुрдИ рджрд▓рдХा рдмीрдЪ рднिрди्рдирддा рд░рд╣рдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЫ। рдЖрд░्рдеिрдХ, рд╕ाрдоाрдЬिрдХ рд░ рд╕ैрдиिрдХ рдоाрдорд▓ाрдоा рджेрдЦिрдПрдХा рдЖрди्рддрд░िрдХ рднिрди्рдирддाрдХै рдк्рд░рддिрд╡िрдо्рд╡ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдЕрди्рддрд░рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рдиीрддिрдоा рджेрдЦिрдиे рдЧрд░्рджрдЫ। рдХрд╣िрд▓ेрдХाрд╣ी рдд्рдпрд╕рд▓ाрдИ рдиै рджुрдИ рджрд▓ рдмीрдЪрдХो рдмैрдЪाрд░िрдХ рднिрди्рдирддा рднрдиि рдмुрдЭ्рдиे рдмाрдиी рдЕрди्рдп рдоुрд▓ुрдХрд▓ाрдИ рдкрд░ेрдХो рд╣ो। рдЪुрдиाрд╡ рдкूрд░्рд╡ рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рд╡्рдпाрдкी рд╡рд╣рд╕рд╣рд░ुрдХा рд╢्рд░ृрдЩ्рдЦрд▓ाрд▓े рджेрдЦाрдП рдЭै рдУрдмाрдоा рд░ рдЙрдирдХा рд░िрдкрдм्рд▓िрдХрди рдк्рд░рддिрдж्рдзрди्рджी рдЬрди рдордХैрди рд╡ीрдЪ рдЬрд▓्рджाрдмрд▓्рджा рдЕрди्рддрд░рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рдоुрдж्рджाрд╣рд░ुрдоा рдк्рд░рдХ्рд░िрдпाрдЧрдд् рдмिрдорддि рдиै рдеिрдпो।
рдиिрд░्рд╡ाрдЪрди рдЕрднिрдпाрдирдоा рдЙрдо्рдоेрдж्рдмाрд░рд▓े рдЧрд░्рдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХा рд╡ाрдЪाрд╣рд░ु рдкрдж рд╕рдо्рд╣ाрд▓े рдкрдЫि рддिрдирд▓े рдкрди्рдЫाрдЙрдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдк्рд░рд╢рд╕्рдд рдЗрддिрд╣ाрд╕ рдЫ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрдоा। рддुрд▓рдиाрдд्рдордХ рд░ुрдкрдоा рд▓ाрдоो рд░рд╣рдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЕрднिрдпाрдирдоा рдЕрдЧ्рд░рддा рдХाрдпрдо рдЧрд░ेрдХा рдк्рд░рдд्рдпाрд╕ीрд╣рд░ुрдХा рд╕ाрд░्рд╡рдЬрдиिрдХ рдЕрднिрд╡्рдпрдХ्рддिрд╣рд░ु рд╕ुрдХ्рд╖рдорддाрдХा рд╕ाрде рдХेрд▓ाрдЗрдиे рд╣ुрджा рд╡िрдкрдХ्рд╖ीрд╣рд░ुрд▓े рдд्рдпрд╕рд▓ाрдИ рдЖрдл्рдиै рдвंрдЧрд▓े рд╡्рдпाрдЦ्рдпा рдЧрд░्рдиे рдЫुрдЯ рд░рд╣рдиे рдЧрд░्рджрдЫ। рдоुрд▓ुрдХ рднिрдд्рд░рдХा рд╡िрд╡िрдз рдк्рд░рднाрд╡ рд╕рдоुрд╣рдХो рд╕рдорд░्рдерди рдЬुрдЯाрдЙрди рдкрд░्рдиे рд╡ाрдз्рдпрддाрдХा рдХाрд░рдг рдЙрдо्рдоेрдж्рдзाрд░рд▓े рдкрдиि рдмेрд▓ाрдмрдЦрдд рдд्рдпрд╕्рддा рдЕрд╕्рдкрд╖्рдЯрддाрд▓ाрдИ рдХाрдпрдо рд░ाрдЦ्рдиे рдЧрд░्рджрдЫрди्।
рд╕рдд्рддा рд╕рдо्рд╣ाрд▓े рдкрдЫि рдк्рд░рддिрдкрдХ्рд╖ीрдХो рдк्рд░рддिрд░ोрдз, рдШрдЯ्рдиाрдХ्рд░рдордХो рддрд░рд▓рддा рд░ рддрдд्рдХाрд▓िрди рд░ाрдЬрдиीрддिрдХ рд▓ाрднрд╣ाрдиीрдХो рддौрд▓ рдЬрд╕्рддा рдХाрд░рдгрд▓े рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддिрдХो рдХрдмुрд▓ рд░ рдХाрд░्рдпрдоा рднिрди्рдирддा рд▓्рдпाрдЙрдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЫ। рддрд░ рдкрдиि рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдмिрджेрд╢ рдиीрддिрдоा рдк्рд░рдЬाрддрди्рдд्рд░, рдоाрдирд╡рдЕрдзिрдХाрд░, рдЦुрд▓ा рдмрдЬाрд░ рдЕрд░्рдерддрди्рдд्рд░ рд░ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╡िрд╢िрд╖्рдЯрддा рд▓рдЧाрдпрддрдХा рдкрд░рдо्рдкрд░ाрдЧрдд् рдоुрд▓्рдп рдоाрди्рдпрддाрдХो рдЙрдкрд╕्рдеिрддि рд░рд╣рдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЫ। рддिрдиैрдХो рдЕрднिрд╡्рдпрдХ्рддि рдмोрд▓ी рд░ рдм्рдпрдмрд╣ाрд░ рдПрд╡ं рдиीрддि рд░ рдХाрд░्рдпрдХ्рд░рдоा рдиिрд░рди्рддрд░ рдкाрдИрди्рдЫ।
рд╕्рд╡ाрд░्рде рд░ рд╕рд╣рдХाрд░्рдп
рд╕ंрд╕ाрд░рдХो рдПрдХ рдоाрдд्рд░ рдорд╣ाрд╢рдХ्рддि рднрдПрдкрдиि рд╕्рдеिрд░ рд░ рд╕рд╡рд▓ рдЕрди्рддрд░рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╡्рдпрд╡рд╕्рдеा рд╕ुрдиिрд╢्рдЪिрдд рдЧрд░्рдиाрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓े рдЕрди्рдп рдк्рд░рднाрд╡рд╢ाрд▓ी рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧ рд╕рд╣рдХाрд░्рдп рдЧрд░्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдЖрд╡рд╢्рдпрдХ्рддा рдмрдв्рджै рдЧрдПрдХो рдЫ। рдпो рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдмрд╣ुрдЖрдпाрдоिрдХ рд╢рдХ्рддिрдоा рдХुрдиै рд╣्рд░ाрд╕ рдЖрдПрд░ рднрди्рджा рдкрдиि рд╕рдорд╕ाрдордпिрдХ рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рдоा рдЕрди्рдп рд╢рдХ्рддिрд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╡рд░्рдЪрд╕्рд╡ рдмрдвेрдХोрдХा рдХाрд░рдгрд▓े рдиै рд╣ो। рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рди рднрд░ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓े рдЧुрдоाрдПрдХो рдЕрди्рддрд░рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рд╕рдиीрдпрддा рдоाрдЭ рдУрдмाрдоाрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдпो рдЪूрдиौрддिрд▓ाрдИ рдЕрдЭ рдмрдв्рдиेрдЫ। рддрд░ рдЪुрдиाрд╡ рдЕрднिрдпाрдирдоा рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓ाрдИ рдЬрддि рджोрд╖ी рдмрдиाрдП рдкрдиि рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рдмिрд░ोрдзी рднाрд╡рдиाрдХो рдЬрд░ा рдЗрд░ाрдХ рдпुрдж्рдз рднрди्рджा рдзेрд░ै рдЧрд╣िрд░ो рд░рд╣ेрдХो рдпрдеाрд░्рдерд▓ाрдИ рд╕्рд╡ीрдХाрд░ी рдУрдмाрдоाрд▓ाрдИ рдЕрдШि рдмрдв्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдмाрдз्рдпрддा рдЫ।
рдЖрддंрдХрд╡ाрдж рд╡िрд░ुрдж्рдмрдХो рдЕрднिрдпाрди, рд╡्рдпाрдкрдХ рдХ्рд╖рддि рдЧрд░्рдиे рд╣ाрддрд╣рддिрдпाрд░рдХो рдЕрдк्рд░рд╕ाрд░, рд╕ांрдЧрдаिрдд рдЕрдкрд░ाрдз, рд╡ाрддाрд╡рд░рдгीрдп рдХ्рд╖рддि, рдЪрд░рдо рдЧрд░िрд╡ी рдиिрд╡ाрд░рдг, рд░ рдорд╣ाрд░ोрдЧ рдк्рд░рддिрд░ोрдз рдЬрд╕्рддा рд╡िрд╖рдпрд╣рд░ुрд▓े рдЕрди्рддрд░рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╕्рд╡рд░ुрдк рд▓िрдПрдХा рдЫрди्। рдпुрд░ोрдкेрд▓ी рд╕ंрдШ, рд░ुрд╕, рдЪीрди, рднाрд░рдд, рдЬाрдкाрди, рд░ рдм्рд░्рдпाрдЬिрд▓ рдЬрд╕्рддा рдоुрд▓ुрдХрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧрдХो рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдзрдоा рдЖрдл्рдиै рдкृрдердХ рдЪрд░िрдд्рд░ рд░ рдЬрдЯिрд▓рддाрд╣рд░ु рд░рд╣ेрдХा рдЫрди्। рдж्рдзैрдкрдХ्рд╖िрдХ рдЕрд╕рд╣рдорддिрдХा рдмाрдмрдЬूрдж рд╢ाрди्рддि рд░ рд╕्рдеाрдпिрдд्рд╡рдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдЙрдиीрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧ рдк्рд░рдд्рдпрдХ्рд╖ рд╕рд░ोрдХाрд░ рд░ाрдЦ्рдиे рднौрдЧौрд▓िрдХ рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░рд╣рд░ुрдоा рд╕рд╣рдХाрд░्рдп рдЧрд░्рдиुрдХो рд╡िрдХрд▓्рдк рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓ाрдИ рдЫैрди्। рд╕ंрдпुрдХ्рдд рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░ рд╕ंрдШ рд╕ुрд░рдХ्рд╖ा рдкрд░िрд╖рджрдХा рд╕्рдеाрдпी рд╕рджрд╕्рдпрдХा рд╣ैрд╕िрдпрддрд▓े рдпुрд░ोрдкेрд▓ी рд╕ंрдШ (рд╡ेрд▓ाрдпрдд рд░ рдл्рд░ाрди्рд╕), рд░ुрд╕ рд░ рдЪीрдирд▓ाрдИ рдк्рд░ाрдк्рдд рднिрдЯो рд╢рдХ्рддिрдХा рдХाрд░рдг рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓े рддिрдирд▓ाрдИ рд╡िрд╢्рд╡ाрд╕рдоा рд▓िрдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдЪूрдиौрддि рдЫ। рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░िрдп рдоुрдж्рджाрд╣рд░ुрдоा рдд्рдпрд╣ांрдХा рдк्рд░рднाрд╡рд╢ाрд▓ी рдоुрд▓ुрдХрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧрдХो рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдзрд▓े рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдХाрд░्рдпрдХ्рд╖рдорддाрд▓ाрдИ рдиिрд░्рджेрд╢िрдд рдЧрд░्рдиे рдЫ।
рдордз्рдпрдкूрд░्рд╡рдоा рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓े рдорд╣рдд्рд╡рдкूрд░्рдг рдиीрддिрдЧрдд् рднिрди्рдирддा рд▓्рдпाрдПрдХो рдеिрдпो। рддेрд▓рдХो рд╕рд░рд▓ рдмिрддрд░рдгрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдд्рдпрд╕ рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░рдХा рдЕрдк्рд░рдЬाрддाрди्рдд्рд░िрдХ рд╕рд░рдХाрд░рд╣рд░ुрд▓ाрдИ рджрд╢рдХौ рджेрдЦि рд╡ाрд╢िрдЩ्рдЯрдирд▓े рдЕрдЯूрдЯ рд╕рдорд░्рдерди рджिрджै рдЖрдПрдХो рдеिрдпो। рддिрдиै рджेрд╢рд╣рд░ु рдордз्рдпेрдХै рд╕рдЙрджी рдЕрд░ेрдмिрдпा рд░ рдЗрдЬिрдк्рдЯрдмाрдЯ рд╕ेрдк्рдЯेрдо्рдмрд░ резрез рдХा рдЕрдзिрдХांрд╢ рдЖрддंрдХрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ु рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рд╡िрд░ुрдж्рдз рдЙрдд्рд░ेрдХाрд▓े рдд्рдпो рдиीрддिрдЧрдд् рдкрд░िрд╡рд░्рддрди рдЖрдпो। рддрд░ рдк्рд░рдЬाрддाрди्рдд्рд░िрдХрд░рдгрд▓ाрдИ рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд╕ुрд░рдХ्рд╖ा рд╕ंрдЧ рдЧांрд╕ेрд░ рдХेрд╣ी рдХाрд░्рдпрдХ्рд░рдордХो рдШोрд╖рдгा рдЧрд░्рджा рдирдЧрд░्рджै рд╡ाрд╢िрдЩ्рдЯрди рдЗрд░ाрдХрдХो рдпुрдж्рдзрдХो рджрд▓рджрд▓рдоा рдлрд╕्рди рдкुрдЧ्рдпो। рдд्рдпो рдмिрдмाрджिрдд рдм्рдпрд╕्рддрддाрдХा рдХाрд░рдг рдпрддा рдЖрдПрд░ рдЕрдл्рдЧाрдиिрд╕्рддाрдирдоा рд╕्рдеिрддि рд╡िрдЧ्рд░िрди рдЧрдпो।
рдпुрдж्рдз рдкूрд░्рд╡рдХो рд╕ूрдЪрдиा рд╕рдЩ्рдХрд▓рдирдХा рдХрдо्рдЬोрд░ी, рдЕрди्рддрд░्рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рдХूрдЯрдиीрддि рдЬुрдЯाрдЙрдиे рдХ्рд░рдордХा рд╢िрдеिрд▓рддा, рдпुрдж्рдз рдкрдЫिрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдЕрдкрд░्рдпाрдк्рдд рдпोрдЬрдиा рдЖрджिрд▓े рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рд╕рдиीрдпрддाрдоा рд╣्рд░ाрд╕ рд▓्рдпाрдЙрди рдордж्рджрдд рдкुрд░्рдпाрдпो। рдм्рдпाрдкрдХ рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░рдоै рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдк्рд░рдпाрд╕рд╣рд░ु рдиिрд╕्рддेрдЬ рд╣ुрдиुрдоा рдЗрдЬрд░ाрдпрд▓-рдк्рдпाрд▓ेрд╖्рдЯाрдЗрдирдХो рд░рдХ्рддрдкाрддрдкूрд░्рдг рдЧрддिрд░ोрдзрдХा рд╕ाрде рд╕ाрдеै рдЗрд░ाрдирд▓ाрдИ рдЖрдгрд╡िрдХ рд╣рддिрдпाрд░ рдк्рд░ाрдк्рдд рдЧрд░्рдирдмाрдЯ рд░ोрдХ्рдиे, рдоिрдд्рд░рд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╕рд╣рдпोрдЧ рдЬुрдЯाрдЗрд░рд╣рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे, рдЖрддंрдХрд╡ाрдж рдмिрд░ुрдж्рдзрдХो рдЕрднिрдпाрдирдХा рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдЬрди्рдп рд╡िрд╢ेрд╖рддाрд▓ाрдИ рдз्рдпाрди рдкुрд░्рдпाрдЙрди рдкрд░्рдиे рдЬрд╕्рддा рдмाрдз्рдпрддाрд╣рд░ुрдХो рднूрдоिрдХा рдЫ।
рдЗрд░ाрдХ рдпुрдж्рдз рдд्рдпрд╕ рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░рдоा рджрд╢рдХौ рджेрдЦि рдЪुрд▓िрдПрдХा рдмिрднिрди्рди рдоुрдж्рджाрд╣рд░ुрдХो рдХेрди्рдж्рд░рд╡िрди्рджु рдмрдиेрдХो рдЫ। рдЦाрдбी рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░, рдЕрдл्рдЧाрдиिрд╕्рддाрди рд░ рдкाрдХिрд╕्рддाрдирдХा рдм्рдпाрдкрдХ рдЬрдЯिрд▓рддाрд▓े рдордз्рдп рдПрд╢िрдпाрд▓ाрдИ рдк्рд░рднाрд╡ рдкाрд░ेрдХाрд▓े рд░ुрд╕, рдЪीрди, рднाрд░рдд рд░ рдЯрд░्рдХी рд╕рдоेрддрдХो рдк्рд░рдд्рдпрдХ्рд╖ рдк्рд░рднाрд╡ рдпрд╕ рдХ्рд╖ेрдд्рд░рдоा рдкрд░्рджै рдЧрдПрдХोрдЫ। рдЗрд░ाрдХрдмाрдЯ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕ेрдиा рдлिрд░्рддा рдЧрд░्рдиे рдУрдмाрдоाрд▓े рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдк्рд░рдгрдХा рдмाрдмрдЬुрдж рдд्рдпрд╕рдХो рдм्рдпाрдкрдХ рдк्рд░рднाрд╡рдХो рдЖंрдХрд▓рди рдЧрд░्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдЪूрдиौрддि рдирдпां рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддिрд▓ाрдИ рд╣ुрдиेрдЫ। рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рд╡्рдпाрдкी рд░ुрдкрдоै рдЗрд░ाрдХ рдпुрдж्рдзрдж्рдзाрд░ा рд╕ृрдЬिрдд рдирдХрд░ाрдд्рдордХ рджрдмाрдмрд▓े рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓ाрдИ рдЖрдл्рдиो рдмैрджेрд╢िрдХ рдиीрддिрдоा рдирд░рдорддा рдЕрдк्рдиाрдЙрди рд▓рдЧाрдпो। рдЗрд░ाрди рд░ рдЙрддрд░ рдХोрд░िрдпा рдЬрд╕्рддा рдоुрд▓ुрдХрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧ рдкрдиि рддрд▓्рд▓ो рд╕्рддрд░рдоै рднрдПрдкрдиि рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓ाрдИ рд╡ाрд░्рддा рдЧрд░्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рд╕्рдеिрддि рдмрдиाрдпो।
рдЪुрдиाрд╡рдХो рдоुрдЦैрдоा рдЖрдЗрдкрд░ेрдХो рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рд╡्рдпाрдкी рдЖрд░्рдеिрдХ рдмिрдкрдд्рддिрд▓े рдирдпां рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддिрдХो рдЖрди्рддрд░िрдХ рдПрд╡ं рдмैрджेрд╢िрдХ рдиीрддिрдХो рдаूрд▓ो рд╣िрд╕्рд╕ा рдУрдЧрдЯ्рдиे рдиिрд╢्рдЪिрдд рдЫ। рддрд░ рд░ाрдЬрдиीрддिрдХ рдХूрдЯрдиीрддिрдХ рд╕ैрдиिрдХ рд░ рд╕ाрдорд░िрдХ рд╕рдорд╕्рдпाрд╣рд░ु рдЕрдЭ рдЬрдЯिрд▓ рдмрди्рдиे рд╕рдо्рднाрд╡рдиा рдкрдиि рдЙрдд्рддिрдХै рдЫ। рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рдХा рд╕рдорд╕्рдпा рдиिрд╡ाрд░рдгाрд░्рде рдЕрди्рдп рд╢рдХ्рддि рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╕рд╣рдпोрдЧ рдЬुрдЯाрдЙрдиे рд░ рд╕्рдеाрдиीрдп рд╕рдо्рд╡ेрджрд╢िрд▓рддाрд╣рд░ु рдк्рд░рддि рдз्рдпाрди рдкुрд░्рдпाрдЙрдиे рдУрдмाрдоाрдХो рдк्рд░рддिрд╡рдж्рдзрддा рдоाрдЭ рдЕрди्рддрд░्рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рд░ुрдкрд▓े рдкुрдирд░्рдд्рдеाрди рднрдПрдХो рд░ुрд╕ рд░ рдиिрдпрди्рдд्рд░िрдд рд░ाрдЬрдиीрддिрдоै рд╢рдХ्рддि рд╕рдЮ्рдЪрдп рдЧрд░्рджै рдЧрдПрдХो рдЪीрдирд▓े рдЧрд░्рдиे рдк्рд░рддिрд░ोрдзрдХो рд╕ाрдордиा рдирдпां рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддिрд▓े рдЧрд░्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиेрдЫ। рдирдпां рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддि рдЖрдЙрджैрдоा рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рдк्рд░рддिрдХो рд╢ंрдХा рд░ рд╕ंрд╢рдпрдХो рдЕрди्рдд्рдп рд╣ुрдиेрд╡ाрд▓ा рдЫैрди।
рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рдЕрд╕рд░
рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рдирдпां рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓ाрдИ рдЪाрд▓्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдПрдЙрдЯा рдорд╣рдд्рд╡рдкूрд░्рдг рдХрджрдордХो рдеाрд▓рдиी рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░рдкрддि рдмुрд╢рд▓े рдиै рдЧрд░िрджिрдП। рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд▓ाрдИ рдЖрддрдЩ्рдХрдХाрд░ी рд╕рдоूрд╣ рдШोрд╖िрдд рдЧрд░ी рддिрдиिрд╣рд░ु рд╡िрд░ुрдж्рдз рдк्рд░рдЬाрддाрди्рдд्рд░िрдХ рд╕рд░рдХाрд░ рд░ рджрд░рдмाрд░рд▓ाрдИ рд░ाрдЬрдиीрддिрдХ рд░ рд╕ैрдиिрдХ рд╕рд╣рдпोрдЧ рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдмुрд╢ рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рди рдоाрдШ резреп, реирежремрез рдХो рдЪीрди рдоुрдЦी рджेрдЦिрдПрдХो рд╢ाрд╣ी рдХрджрдо рдкрдЫि рд░ाрдЬрддрди्рдд्рд░ рд╕ंрдЧ рдЪिрдвिрди рдкुрдЧ्рдпो। рднाрд░рдд рд╕ंрдЧрдХो рд╕ाрдорд░िрдХ рд╕рд╣рдХाрд░्рдпрд▓ाрдИ рдиिрдХै рдЕрдЧाрдбि рдмрдвाрдПрдХो рд╡ाрд╢िрдЩ्рдЧрдЯрдирд▓े рдирдпां рджिрд▓्рд▓ीрдХै рдкрд░ाрдорд░्рд╢рдоा рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ुрдХो рдЪुрдиाрд╡ी рд╡िрдЬрдп, рд░ाрдЬрддрди्рдд्рд░ рдХो рдЕрди्рдд्рдп, рд░ рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╕рдд्рддाрд░ोрд╣рдг рдк्рд░рддि рд╕рд╣िрд╖्рдгु рдмрди्рдпो।
рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рд░рдХाрд░рдХो рдПрдЙрдЯा рдЫुрдЯ्рдЯै рдЖрддрдЩ्рдХрдХाрд░ीрд╣рд░ुрдХो рд╕ूрдЪिрдоा рд░рд╣ेрдХो рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ुрд▓ाрдИ рдЕрд▓рдХाрдЗрджा рд╕ंрдЧ рддुрд▓рдиा рдЧрд░्рди рдирдоिрд▓्рдиे рдЬिрдХिрд░ рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рд░рдХाрд░рд▓े рдкрд░्рдЦ рд░ рд╣ेрд░ рдХो рдиीрддि рд▓िрдПрдХो рдЫ। рдиेрдХрдкा рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрдХा рдЕрдз्рдпрдХ्рд╖ рдк्рд░рдзाрдирдорди्рдд्рд░ी рдкुрд╖्рдкрдХрдорд▓ рджाрд╣ाрд▓ рд╕ंрдЧ рдмुрд╢рд▓े рдиिрддाрди्рдд рдЫोрдЯो рд░ рд╕ाрдоुрд╣िрдХ рд╕рди्рджрд░्рднрдоा рднेрдЯ рдЧрд░े। рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрд▓े рдирд░ुрдЪाрдПрдХा рд╕рд░рдХाрд░ рдк्рд░рдоुрдЦрд▓ाрдИ рдд्рдпрд╕्рддो рднेрдЯрдШाрдЯрдмाрдЯ рдмрди्рдЪिрдд рдЧрд░िрдиे рдЧрд░ेрдХो рдкрд░рдо्рдкрд░ा рдоाрдЭ рд╕ो рднेрдЯрд▓ाрдИ рдХрдо рднрди्рди рдоिрд▓्рджैрди।
рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рд╣ाрдпрдХ рд╡िрджेрд╢ рдорди्рдд्рд░ीрд▓े рдк्рд░рдзाрдирдорди्рдд्рд░ी рджाрд╣ाрд▓ рд░ рдкрдЫि рдЕрд░्рдердорди्рдд्рд░ी рдмाрдмुрд░ाрдо рднрдЯ्рдЯрд░ाрдИ рд╕ंрдЧ рд╡ाрд░्рддा рдЧрд░ी рдирдпां рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдзрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдмाрдЯो рдЦोрд▓ेрдХा рдЫрди्। рдпो рдШрдЯ्рдиाрдХ्рд░рдорд▓ाрдИ рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рд░рдХाрд░рд▓े рдиेрдкाрд▓ी рдЬрдирддाрдХो рдЬрдиाрджेрд╢рдХो рдХрджрд░ рдЧрд░ी рдиेрдкाрд▓ рд╕рд░рдХाрд░ рд╕ंрдЧ рд╣ाрдд рдмрдвाрдПрдХो рднрдиेрд░ рдоाрдд्рд░ рдмुрдЭ्рди рд╕рдХिрди्рди। рдПрд╢िрдпाрдХा рджुрдИ рд╢рдХ्рддि рдмीрдЪ рдЕрдмрд╕्рдеिрдд рдиेрдкाрд▓рдХो рднूрд░ाрдЬрдиीрддिрдХ рдорд╣рдд्рд╡ рдоाрдЭ рдирдпां рджिрд▓्рд▓ी рд╕ंрдЧрдХो рдкрд░ाрдорд░्рд╢ рдХै рдЖрдзाрд░рдоा рдиेрдкाрд▓ рдиीрддि рддрдп рдЧрд░्рдиे рдкрд░рдо्рдкрд░ा рдУрдмाрдоा рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓े рддोрдб्рдиे рджेрдЦिрджैрди।
рд╡िрд╢्рд╡рдХा рджुрдИ рдк्рд░рдоुрдЦ рдк्рд░рдЬाрддाрди्рдд्рд░िрдХ рд╢рдХ्рддि рд╡ीрдЪ рдпрд╕्рддो рд╕ाрдЭा рджृрд╖्рдЯि рд░рд╣ेрдХो рдмाрд░рдо्рдмाрд░рдХो рд╕ाрд░्рдмрдЬрдиिрдХ рдЕрдаोрдЯрд▓ाрдИ рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рд▓ोрдХрддрди्рдд्рд░рдХो рд╕ुрдиिрд╢्рдЪिрддрддाрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рд╕ुрдЦрдж рд╕ंрдХेрдд рднрдиि рдмुрдЭ्рди рд╕рдХिрдПрд▓ा। рдЪीрдирдоा рднрдиे рдд्рдпрд╕рд▓े рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рд░ рднाрд░рдд рдмीрдЪрдХो рдм्рдпाрдкрдХ рдЧрдардмрди्рдзрдирдХै рдЕрд░्рде рд▓िрдПрдХो рдмुрдЭ्рди рдЧाрд╣्рд░ो рдкрд░्рджैрди। рдЖрдл्рдиो рд╢ाрди्рддिрдкूрд░्рдг рдЙрджрдпрдХो рдк्рд░рддिрдХाрд░ рдЧрд░्рди рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХा рдмрдвाрдЗрд░рд╣ेрдХो рдЕрди्рддрд░्рд░ाрд╖्рдЯ्рд░िрдп рдЧрдардмрди्рдзрдирдХै рдХрдбीрдХो рд░ुрдкрдоा рдЪीрдирд▓े рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рднाрд░рдд-рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХी рд╕рд╣рдХाрд░्рдпрд▓ाрдИ рд▓िрдПрдХो рдЫ। рд╕्рд╡рддрди्рдд्рд░ рддिрдм्рдмрдд рдЖрди्рджोрд▓рдирд▓ाрдИ рдпрд╕्рддो рдк्рд░рддिрд░ोрдзрдХो рдПрдЙрдЯा рдкाрдЯोрдХा рд░ुрдкрдоा рдЪीрдирд▓े рдорд╣рд╕ूрд╕ рдЧрд░ेрдХो рд░ рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рд╕ो рдЖрди्рджोрд▓рдирд▓े рдпрд╕ै рд╡рд░्рд╖ рд╕рд╢рдХ्рдд рднрдПрд░ рдмрдвेрдХो рд╕рди्рджрд░्рднрдоा рдирдпां рджिрд▓्рд▓ीрдХो рднूрдоिрдХाрдмाрд░े рдмेрдЗрдЬिрдЩ्рдЧрдХो рд╢ंрдХाрдХो рдЕрд╕рд░ рдХाрдардоाрдг्рдбौрд▓े рднोрдЧ्рдиे рд▓рдХ्рд╖рдг рджेрдЦाрдкрд░्рди рдеाрд▓िрд╕рдХेрдХो рдЫ।
рдкрд░рдо्рдкрд░ाрдЧрдд् рдоिрдд्рд░ рд╢рдХ्рддि рд░ाрдЬрддрди्рдд्рд░рдХो рдЕрд╡рд╢ाрди рдкрдЫि рдЪीрдирд▓े рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧ рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдз рд╕ुрджृрдв рдЧрд░्рдиे рдк्рд░рдХ्рд░िрдпा рдиिрдХै рдЦुрд▓ेрд░ै рдЕрдШि рдмрдвाрдПрдХो рдмाрд╕्рддрд╡िрдХ्рддा рдк्рд░рддि рднाрд░рддीрдпрд╣рд░ु рдЪिрди्рддिрдд рджेрдЦिрдПрдХा рдЫрди्। рддрд░ рдЬрдирдпुрдж्рдз рдХाрд▓рдоा рднाрд░рдд рдоै рдЖрд╕ृрдд рдПрд╡ं рднाрд░рддीрдп рдиेрддाрд╣рд░ु рд╕ंрдЧ рдирдЬिрдХрдХो рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдз рдХाрдпрдо рдЧрд░ेрдХा рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ुрд▓ाрдИ рдЪीрдирд▓े рдмिрд╢्рд╡ाрд╕ рдЧрд░े рдирдЧрд░ेрдХो рднेрдЙ рдЕрд░ुрд▓े рдд рдХे рдоाрдУрдмाрджी рд╕्рд╡рдпрдорд▓े рдкाрдЙрди рд╕рдХेрдХो рджेрдЦिрджैрди। рддрдд्рдХाрд▓рдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рдпो рдЕрд╕्рдкрд╖्рдЯрддा рдХाрдпрдо рд░ाрдЦ्рдиुрдоा рдиै рдоाрдУрд╡ाрджीрд╣рд░ुрд▓ाрдИ рд▓ाрдн рд╣ुрдиे рджेрдЦिрди्рдЫ।
рдЙрддा рднाрд░рдд рд╕्рдеिрдд рдиेрдкाрд▓ рд╡िрдЬ्рдЮрд╣рд░ुрдХो рдПрдХ рд╕рдоुрд╣рд▓े рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХीрд╣рд░ुрдХो рдмрдв्рджो рдк्рд░рднाрд╡рдХै рдк्рд░рддिрдХ्рд░िрдпा рд╕्рд╡рд░ुрдк рдЪीрдирд▓े рдиेрдкाрд▓рдоा рд╕рдХ्рд░िрдпрддा рдмрдвाрдПрдХो рдк्рд░рддि рд╕рдЪेрдд рджेрдЦिрди्рдЫрди्। рдд्рдпो рднрдиाрдИрд▓ाрдИ рдЪीрди-рднाрд░рдд рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдзрдоा рд╣ाрд▓ै рджेрдЦिрдПрдХो рдЪिрд╕ोрдкрдирд▓े рдУрдЭेрд▓рдоा рдкाрд░िрджिрдПрдХो рдЫ। рднाрд░рддीрдп рд╡िрджेрд╢ рдорди्рдд्рд░ी рдк्рд░рдгрд╡ рдоुрдЦрд░्рдЬीрд▓े рдЦुрд▓ेрд░ै рдЪीрди рдЖрдл्рдиो рдоुрд▓ुрдХрдХा рд▓ाрдЧि рд╕ाрдорд░िрдХ рдЪुрдиौрддि рд░рд╣ेрдХो рднрди्рдиे рд╕ाрд░्рд╡рдЬрдиिрдХ рдЕрднिрд╡्рдпрдХ्рддि рджिрдПрд░ рдж्рдзिрдкрдХ्рд╖ीрдп рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдз рд╡ाрд░ेрдХो рд╡рд╣рд╕рд▓ाрдИ рдирдпां рдЙрд░्рдЬा рджिрдПрдХा рдЫрди्।
рджрдХ्рд╖िрдг рдПрд╢िрдпाрдХा рдиेрдкाрд▓ рд▓рдЧाрдпрддрдХा рд╕ाрдиा рдоुрд▓ुрдХрдоा рдк्рд░рднाрд╡ рдмрдвाрдПрд░ рдЪीрдирд▓े рднाрд░рдд рд╡िрд░ुрдж्рдз рдШेрд░ाрд╡рди्рджी рдХрд╕ेрдХो рднрди्рдиे рдЖрдХ्рд╖ेрдк рд▓рдЧाрдЙрджै рдЖрдПрдХो рдирдпां рджिрд▓्рд▓ीрд▓े рдпрддा рдЖрдПрд░ рдмेрдЗрдЬिрдЩ्рдЧрд▓े рдЙрдд्рддрд░рдкूрд░्рд╡ी рднाрд░рддीрдп рд░ाрдЬ्рдпрд╣рд░ुрдоा рдЖрддрдЩ्рдХрд╡ाрджрд▓ाрдИ рдк्рд░рд╢्рд░рдп рджिрдПрдХो рднрди्рдиे рд╕рдо्рдордХा рдЖрд░ोрдк рд▓рдЧाрдЙрди рдеाрд▓ेрдХा рдЫрди्।
рдУрдмाрдоा рдк्рд░рд╢ाрд╕рдирд▓े рдиेрдкाрд▓ рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдзि рдиीрддिрдоा рдХुрдиै рдк्рд░рдд्рдпрдХ्рд╖ рдкрд░िрд╡рд░्рддрди рдирд▓्рдпाрдП рдкрдиि рдиेрдкाрд▓ीрд╣рд░ु рд╕рдЪेрдд рдмрди्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рдЕрд╡рд╕्рдеा рдмिрдж्рдпрдоाрди рдЫ। рдЕрдоेрд░िрдХाрдХो рднाрд░рдд рд░ рдЪीрди рд╕ंрдЧрдХो рд╕्рд╡рддрди्рдд्рд░ рд╕рдо्рд╡рди्рдз рд░ рднाрд░рдд-рдЪीрдирдХो рдж्рдзैрдкрдХ्рд╖िрдХ рдЙрддाрд░рдЪрдвाрд╡рд▓े рд▓्рдпाрдЙрдиे рдирдпां рдЯрдХ्рдХрд░ рд░ рддрдиाрд╡ рдиेрдкाрд▓ीрд╣рд░ुрд▓े рдм्рдпрд╣ोрд░्рдиु рдкрд░्рдиे рд╕्рдеिрддि рдмрди्рджै рдЧрдПрдХो рджेрдЦिрди्рдЫ।
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