NEPAL: Foreign Policy Challenges of New Government

Iran-India Relations

Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya

 1) How do you look at 12U2 in the context of India-Iran Relations? Is India abandoning Iran for a Western Quad?

The I2U2 was formed to deepen technological and private sector collaboration in the region and tackle transnational challenges in six focus areas: water, energy, transportation, space, health and food security. Despite the lack of an explicit geopolitical focus, the grouping, given the other members’ policy orientations, does pose a challenge to India’s relationship with Iran.
Yet as a bilateral relationship that has its own history, logic and convergences, New Delhi recognizes the folly of brinkmanship. The national interest generally has dissuaded India from approaching diplomacy as a zero-sum game. Still, India has been grappling with the challenge of balancing its relationship with Iran with its other bilateral and multilateral engagements. The I2U2 adds to that challenge.

2) Do you believe like a third wheel, the US complicates India-Iran Relations?

Amid the United States’ four-decade campaign to isolate Iran, New Delhi’s drive for a robust relationship with Tehran was always bound to generate pressures from Washington. However, like in its relationship with Russia, India has been able to press its case on the merits of national interest.
So far, the United States, too, has demonstrated some tolerance of New Delhi-Tehran relations, although it would be imprudent on the part of India to take this posture for granted. Still, New Delhi can be expected to pursue this balancing act with appreciable success in the period ahead through deft diplomacy.

3) How should India approach Iran, responding to the growing Chinese involvement in the country (Iran-China 25-year Agreement)?

The bilateral tensions between India and China or the Iran-China bonhomie need not necessarily constrain New Delhi’s ties with Tehran. This is especially so given the fact that Iran, too, recognizes the imperative of the broadest based international engagement it can manage under the adverse circumstances it confronts.
More broadly, when it comes to their national interest, India and China have been able to rise above their bilateral tensions to cooperate on specific matters on the international stage. Iran provides space for both Asian giants to maintain vibrant bilateral relationships as long as they possess the ability to approach their contradictions with prudence and consideration.

4) How do major powers look at Iran’s nuclear impasse? Is an international consensus still possible on this issue?

Despite the growing international frustration with Iran on the nuclear issue, the consensus on stopping that country from acquiring nuclear weapons remains firm. After the initial enthusiasm it generated in 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JCPOA) suffered a blow when the Trump administration withdrew from the deal three years later, citing Tehran’s noncompliance.
Upon assuming office, the Biden administrated signaled its intention to reverse its predecessor’s action, but negotiations by the other JCPOA signatories to bring both the United States and Iran back to the original agreement have stalled on a variety of disagreements. Furthermore, every new detail that Tehran may have advanced further ahead along the nuclear-weapons path complicates any breakthrough.

5) The relationship of Iran with both Russia and India shows a dual approach of both "rapprochement and constraint.” Do you agree with the view India and Iran could well play a major part in giving INSTC the required boost to reap benefits of resultant trade.

Behind this ‘rapprochement and constraint’ approach, the three countries appreciate their wider economic and commercial compatibilities. With Iran and Russia under U.S. sanctions, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) provides them a much-needed geostrategic alternative.
This is in addition to the fact that the route is more cost-effective and saves a significant amount of travel time for the countries involved. Long-term plans to integrate Iran’s Chabahar Port with the INSTC to expand trade beyond the region provide an incentive to both India and Iran to give the transport corridor a boost.

FPRC Journal 51

घोषणापत्रमा वाचा गरेजस्तै नेपाली दलहरूले भारत र चीनसँग ‘सन्तुलित सम्बन्ध’ राख्न सक्लान्?

नेपालको अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सम्बन्ध बारेका विभिन्न पुस्तकका लेखक सञ्जय उपाध्याय भन्छन्, “नेपालले कूटनीतिक कौशलका माध्यमबाट भारत र चीन दुवैबाट सहयोग पाउन सक्छ जुन एउटाको प्रभाव रोक्न अर्को (देश)ले चाल्ने कदममा निर्भर हुन्छ।”
“जोखिम के छ भने त्यस्तो सहयोग मुद्दा केन्द्रित र लेनदेनमा आधारित हुन्छ। उदाहरणका लागि एउटा छिमेकीले राष्ट्रिय स्वाधीनता प्रवर्द्धन गर्ने हाम्रो अभियानमा सघाउने र अर्कोले लोकतान्त्रीकरणमा पूर्ण रूपमा जोड दिने अवस्थामा हामी रहन सक्दैनौँ। हामीलाई दुवैमा सबैको सहयोग चाहिन्छ।”
उपाध्याय भन्छन्, “चीनलाई जोड दिएको हालैको अमेरिकी राष्ट्रिय सुरक्षा रणनीति र शासन व्यवस्थाको सुरक्षामा केन्द्रित रहेको चिनियाँ कम्युनिष्ट पार्टीको राष्ट्रिय कांग्रेसले नेपालले अबको पाँच वर्षमा भोग्ने मूल चुनौतीबारे स्पष्ट सन्देश दिएको छ। हाम्रो बृहत् विदेश नीति यी अवधारणाभित्र पर्नेछ जसको अर्थ नेपालले (कसैको) पक्ष लिनुपर्ने हुन्छ।”
गम्भीर राजनीतिक अस्थिरता बेहोरिरहेको नेपालका लागि आधारभूत भूराजनीतिक चुनौतीको सामना गर्न गाह्रो हुने उल्लेख गर्दै उनले त्यसो भएमा आर्थिक विकास, सामाजिक समावेशीकरण र अरू महत्त्वपूर्ण अत्यावश्यक मुद्दालाई ओझेलमा पार्ने बताए। 

https://www.bbc.com/nepali/articles/clwqpye5vdqo

Expect Stiffer US-China Contestation in Nepal

SANJAY UPADHYA, a US-based foreign policy expert, says the new US National Security Strategy describes China as the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to advance that objective.
“Clearly, this assertion takes the US-China rivalry to a new level. As Washington would have the prerogative of defining what behavior on the part of Beijing is ‘coercive’, Nepal could expect further US assertiveness vis-à-vis our general foreign policy in the period ahead,” he says.
The ongoing National People’s Congress of China has indicated how regime security would be an even more categorical concern for Beijing going forward.
“In such a situation,” says Upadhya, “Nepal can be expected to experience a stiffer tug-of-war between the two global powers.”

Expect stiffer US-China contestation in Nepal - The Annapurna Express

Sphere Pressure: When Politics Contends with Geopolitics

Nepal's strategic vulnerability owing to its location between two giants of Asia has risen and fallen with the status of India and China relations, the quality of their bilateral relations, and the principal external variables influencing them. 

In recent years, Nepal's boisterous domestic politics has emerged as an additional source of instability, SANJAY UPADHYA writes in Kathmandu-based Journal of Foreign Affairs. 

In the past, the internal fundamentals, regardless of the political system of the day, were sturdy enough to cope with often-competing pressures emanating from the north and south, the author states in ‘Sphere Pressure: When Politics Contends With Geopolitics’. 

The improvisation that has become the defining feature of the contemporary Nepali state, has made today's geopolitical spasms far more ominous. 

While it may be outlandish to suggest that Nepal's politics and geopolitics have become antithetical, there is sufficient basis for probing that question, UPADHYA states.

Upadhya, S. (2022) Sphere pressure: When Politics Contends with Geopolitics: Journal of Foreign Affairs (JoFA), Volume 2, Issue 1

DOI: https //doi.org/10.3126/iofa.v2i01.44007

Russia’s Pivot to China

Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya

1. Are China and Russia becoming allies? Driven by opposition to perceived US hegemony, Putin and Xi meet frequently, stimulating cooperation on a range of international policy and security issues. Joint military exercises have become a regular occurrence. “Axis of collusion/connivance” may be a more appropriate description of the relationship. Do you agree?

Although they have not created a full and formal alliance, China and Russia have embarked on a major strategic alignment. During their summit in Beijing, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have reaffirmed that the new inter-state relations between Russia and China are superior to the political and military alliances of the Cold War era. They asserted that friendship between the two States has no limits, and there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation. The strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.

Beyond the lofty rhetoric, it remains to be seen how strongly they can collaborate. One thing is becoming increasingly clear: as the bilateral relationship expands, they are also becoming more asymmetric in China’s favour, from trade to the economy to politics. Yet the two nations see a major window of opportunity to challenge the Western-constructed and -dominated international order. If collusion/connivance can be contextualized within each country’s commitment to preserving and promoting its core national interests, then yes, the characterization is apt.

2. How does the US look at Russia’s pivot to China? Can the US counter this alliance?

Opinion, as expected, is divided in the United States. At one end are the alarmists who see this development as a strategic failure over successive US administrations. At the other end are pragmatists who tend to see less coherence in the pivot than the parties advertise. This latter group notes that Russia has a GDP per capita less than half that of the United States and China less than a third. Moreover, the pragmatists assert, both Russia and China have major regime legitimacy and succession issues as well as daunting demographic and economic challenges. These pragmatists contend that any panicked or frenzied response is unwarranted.

Both groups of American analysts agree that the way to lessen the threat of the partnership between Russia and China is to make them less valuable to each other. In their view, Russia only has two tools of influence, its military force and energy resources. In response, NATO needs to strengthen its conventional and strategic deterrence by, among other things, ensuring that each member state contributes its fair share. The U.S., at the same time, should augment its contribution to forward presence. The American response to the Ukraine conflict broadly fits into this pattern.

Furthermore, Washington would be called upon to stand with its allies to confront Beijing’s misadventures in the South and East China Seas and in the Taiwan Strait, tighten Chinese access to American technology, and continue to campaign against China’s violations of human rights. At the same time, the West would need to become more serious against overreliance on gas and oil from Russia. All this, of course, represents a broad mixture of initiatives with a lot of uncertainties involved.

3. Indian perspective on Russia’s rapprochement with China:

A) Russia-India relations have come a long way despite the turbulent journey. However, the question now arises, where does this relationship stand in this highly volatile global order? Is the bond still strong, or can one witness the chunks in the armor? Steps like (QUAD, Malabar Exercise) have made communist China annoyed and made Russia displeased. Moreover, India’s alignment with the US and its allies to counter China is a cause of concern for the Russians.

B) How do you explain Russia’s “NEW ERA RELATION EXPERIMENT” with Pakistan? Is Russia trying to balance its ties between India and Pakistan?

C) Do you agree with the view that Russia regards China as being far more important than India when thinking about issues in the EAEU, Eurasia and the World?

As ardent advocates of multipolarity, India and Russia still have broad convergences in their global outlook that continue to sustain a strong relationship. Admittedly, developments such as the Quad and Malabar exercise have displeased Russia and China. Additionally, India’s perceived alignment with the US and its allies to counter China is a cause of concern for the Russians. Yet in crude world of realpolitik, Moscow might not mind so much another Asian power vigilant on the Chinese flank.

As for Moscow’s new-era relation experiment with Pakistan, it is hard to separate the development from Russia-China relations in general and, in particular, China’s own ‘all-weather’ relations with Pakistan. This development is much more an outcome of Moscow’s global realignment more than an effort to balance ties between New Delhi and Islamabad.

It would defy common sense to argue that Russia would rank India above China in terms of EAEU, Eurasia and its world view. That does not mean Russia has subordinated India in its worldview. History and strategy have provided Moscow enough prudence not to put all its eggs exclusively in the Chinese or Indian basket. India hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin for the annual bilateral summit in December 2021, despite the growing tensions between the West and Moscow. India and Russia also held their first-ever 2+2 Ministerial dialogue in December. Over the threat of American sanctions through CAATSA, India decided to go ahead with the S-400 missile defence systems deal signed in 2018. Furthermore, New Delhi finalised a new deal for the manufacture of 750,000 AK-203 rifles. Although India’s trade with Russia pales compared to that with the United States, New Delhi’s defence and energy partnership with Moscow remains significant.

4. Russia-China-India Trilateral: 

Russia maintained neutrality on the India-China border dispute. “In fact, Russia remains a key stakeholder in resolving the India-China border conflict, since normal relations between Beijing and New Delhi are a vital condition for the realization of Moscow’s vision of Greater Eurasia, which is in essence the project for creating a concert of Eurasian powers.” Do you agree?

Evidently, Moscow has been viewing the India-China border dispute within its vision of a Greater Eurasia. Amid India’s own vision of robust relationships with different parts of Asia, there are bound to be critical areas of competition and cooperation as the major Asian powers rise on the vast continent. 

The perception of a reduction of India’s room for manoeuvre in the midst of the Russia-China strategic alignment would enhance calls for New Delhi to seek other ways of preventing a Chinese-dominated Asia. Furthermore, India would be under pressure to engage with the other major powers in the region facing a similar predicament. 

Much would depend on how successfully India preserves its strategic autonomy in such engagements. New Delhi’s votes in the UN Security Council and General Assembly on the Ukraine conflict suggest it reserves its options based on the merits of the case. As to China, New Delhi has opted for prudence and patience despite calls for bandwagoning onto the United States to contain that neighbour. Adventurism, on the other hand, could bring major imponderables into sharper focus along with their attendant costs.

FPRC Journal 49

The Aftereffects of Wang Yi’s Nepal Visit

US-based foreign policy expert SANJAY UPADHYA says Wang sought to impress upon Nepali leaders “the imperative of creating the necessary domestic conditions” that would discourage Nepal from becoming a geopolitical playground against China. 

He believes Wang was interested primarily in gauging Nepal’s continued commitment to its traditional foreign policy tenets amid shifting global geostrategic contours. 

“In particular, Beijing sought to determine whether Kathmandu was adjusting its outlook and—if so—whether it was doing so under unwarranted influence of third countries,” Upadhya says. As the Nepali side stated its case, he adds, Beijing must have sought fresh assurances from Kathmandu on One-China and other specific issues of Chinese concern.

(Quoted in Annapurna Express)

The aftereffects of Wang Yi’s Nepal visit

नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्धमा नै अब सिंहावलोकन गर्नुपर्ने अवस्था छ – सञ्जय उपाध्याय

एमसीसीबाहेक पनि कैयौँ समस्याका कारण नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्ध गिजोलिन थालेको भन्दै एक विज्ञले यसको समाधान खोजिनुपर्ने बताएका छन्।
"जग्गा जमिनको विवाद, कतिपय अपराधका कुराहरू छन्। अनि अघोषित नाकाबन्दी जस्तो र त्यसमा तिमीहरू यसो नगर अनि हामी अड्कलेर दिऊँला भन्ने चीनले बताउने गरेको जस्तो देखिन्छ। चीनतर्फ असन्तुष्टि छ भन्ने जस्तो देखिन्छ," नेपालको परराष्ट्र मामिलाबारे विभिन्न पुस्तकका लेखक सञ्जय उपाध्यायले भने।
उनले परापूर्वकालदेखि नेपाल र चीनबीच सम्बन्ध रहेको बेइजिङले स्वीकार गर्दै आएको उल्लेख गर्दै आपसी अविश्वासलाई सम्बोधन गरिनुपर्ने बताए।
उनले थपे, "चीनले कतिपय गतिविधि प्रायोजित रूपले भइरहेको छ भन्छ। तर सीमा विवादको बारेमा जुलुस नै निस्किने जस्तो हुन थालेपछि थोरै समयमा आफ्नो छविमा धक्का पुगेको महसुस गर्न थालेको हो कि भन्ने भान हुन्छ। त्यही भएर द्विपक्षीय सम्बन्धमा नै अब एक किसिमको सिंहावलोकन गर्नुपर्ने अवस्था छ। यो भ्रमण त्यसका लागि एउटा प्रस्थानबिन्दु बन्न सक्छ।"
उनले शक्तिराष्ट्रको आपसी होडबाजीमा आफूलाई नतान्न नेपालले चिनियाँपक्षलाई भन्नुपर्ने पनि बताए।

नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्ध: चिनियाँ विदेशमन्त्री वाङको भ्रमण यसरी बन्न सक्छ सम्बन्ध सुधारको प्रस्थानबिन्दु

'चीनसँग अब टालटुले कुरा नगरौँ' – सञ्जय उपाध्याय

नेपालको परराष्ट्र मामिलाबारे विभिन्न पुस्तकका लेखक सञ्जय उपाध्याय एमसीसी प्रकरणलाई चीनले प्रतिष्ठाको विषय बनाएको र त्यसले सम्बन्धमा चिसोपन निम्त्याएको भन्दै वाङको भ्रमणमा त्यसलाई सम्बोधन गरिनुपर्ने बताउँछन्।
उनले भने, "एमसीसीको सन्दर्भमा चीनको अमेरिकासँगको हानथाप हो। उनीहरूको प्रेस या सरकारी तवरले नै हामीलाई मुछ्नेगरी तिमीहरूको सरकार पश्चिमा समर्थक भयौँ वा तिमीहरू बिक्यौ भन्ने गरी चिनियाँ भाषामा अलिकति कडा टिप्पणी गरिएको देख्दा नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्धमा असन्तुष्टि व्याप्त रहेको देखेको छु।"
उनले नेपालका नेताहरूले चिनियाँ विदेशमन्त्रीलाई एकमतले आफूहरूले सार्वभौम देशका हिसाबले निर्णय गरेको धारणा सुनाउनुपर्ने उल्लेख गरे।
उपाध्याय भन्छन्, "चिनियाँ विदेशमन्त्रीले सरकार र त्यसबाहेक दुई भूतपूर्व प्रधानमन्त्री भेट्दैछन्। त्यो बेलामा नेपालका तर्फबाट हामीले सशक्त रूपमा एमसीसीका बारेमा हामीले एउटा स्वाधीन र सार्वभौमसत्ता सम्पन्न देशले गरेको निर्णय हो भनेर उनीहरूलाई बताउन सकेको खण्डमा मलाई लाग्छ त्यो एउटा सुरुवात हुन्छ।"
उनले नेपालमा एकता नहुँदा "भावनात्मक रूपमा" बाह्य शक्तिहरूले खेल्न पाइरहेको भन्दै त्यस्तो अवसर दिन नहुने बताए।
एमसीसी अनुमोदनबारे चीनले भन्यो, 'जबरजस्तीपूर्ण कूटनीतिको हामी विरोध गर्छौँ'
नेपालमा के चाहन्छ चीन?
उपाध्याय थप्छन्, "हामीहरूले यो कारणले यसरी भएको हो भनेर बताउन सक्नुपर्‍यो। तिमीहरूको जे लडाइँ हो वा असहमति हो तिमीहरू आफैँ सुल्झाऊ किनभने हामीहरू यसमा पर्न चाहँदैनौँ भन्नुपर्‍यो। जसरी सानो मुलुक हामी, भारत वा अमेरिकासँग पर्न चाहँदैनौँ त्यसरी हामी चीनसँग पनि पर्न चाहँदैनौँ भन्ने एउटा सीमारेखा कोरेर अघि नबढेसम्म सम्बन्ध अघि बढ्न आधार तयार हुँदैन। नत्र फेरी टालटुले कुरा मात्रै हुन्छ।"

नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्ध: चिनियाँ परराष्ट्रमन्त्री वाङको भ्रमणमा एमसीसीप्रति अभिव्यक्त चिनियाँ असन्तोषको सम्बोधन कसरी

‘Maila Baje’ is Sanjay Upadhya

Nepali blogger who wrote under a pseudonym finally comes out of the shadows in new book 

 

Maila Baje is No More a Mystery Now

By Our Reporter

Finally, Sanjay Upadhya, currently residing in the US, has revealed that he is Maila Baje who wrote contemporary articles on the blog “Nepali Netbook” since 2005.

When People’s Review chose to reproduce Maila Baje’s pieces picked up from the Nepali Netbook blog, the editorial team was frequently asked a question, “Who is this Maila Baje?”

People’s Review regularly published Maila Baje’s pieces since the team found the write-ups were excellent, well qualified with the political chronology, strong arguments on Nepali civilization, deep study on the contemporary developments, more than that, strong presentation on Nepal’s perspectives.

Sanjay Upadhya writes:

It feels good to finally come out. I’ve been tempted to do so several times over the last decade and a half. The shades just seemed too soothing. I chose this nom de guerre before I’d decided what I’d call my blog. Relatively new, the blogosphere beckoned with all its breeziness.

King Gyanendra’s royal rule was at its toughest. The Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists had signed the 12-Point Understanding but so much was unclear. Geopolitics, public opinion, hope, despair—the imponderables were too many. Powerful as the royal regression narrative was, I never bought it—and still don’t.

Our triangular fight had become too drawn out for anyone’s good. I don’t think King Gyanendra had any specific plan when he took over on February 1, 2005. He wanted a realignment of forces into a bipolar one, and thought he could pull it off. If not, well, others were free to try. They did and here we are.

I’d been defending the royal takeover in that spirit, drawing all the venom I expected to. There seemed so much going on that seemed so unreal. Yet, a lot of what seemed to be going on seemed too real to discount.

I had used this genre as Puskar Bhusal in the Nepali Times. Yes, Kunda Dixit soon found out I was somewhere in Nepal. And Kanak Dixit, although still burdened by my indolence to his years of prompting, asked me to contribute an essay to his superb volume ‘State of Nepal’—in my real name.

Over the years, People’s Review weekly carried my pieces under the bylines of Krishna Singh Bam, Madan Prasad Khanal and Rabindra Adhikari. (Frankly, I can’t recall the other names.) My inspiration was my father, Devendra Raj Upadhya, who would write as ‘Jatayu’, ‘Sampati’ and a bevy of other beings in an assortment of Nepali weeklies.

I recognised the disadvantages going in. I’d be called a coward for shooting from the shadows. A propagandist who could sell his soul but not show his face. An agent for this, an agent provocateur for that. I’m still called all that, although I was careful to disable the comments function on Nepali Netbook. What surprised me was the positive interest my posts also began generating early on. The guessing game began.

Top on the list was King Gyanendra. My mentor—and cousin—Dipak Gyawali, having worked with the monarch both in the King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation and as his minister, detected similarities in style and some of the expressions used. During a one-to-one talk of over an hour in Narayanhity palace in August 2007, I only recently learned, Dipak daju asked the monarch directly: he just waved his hand dismissively!

Bhola Bikram Rana, another mentor, had also asked the monarch in a formal interview. Again, his denial didn’t seem to matter. Others said it had to be a former biggie out to cash in on the regime change. Still, others said it couldn’t be a Nepali because a royalist couldn’t write in English.

Gen. Rookmangad Katawal, given his public past with pseudonyms, was another candidate. My first boss and great teacher, Mana Ranjan Josse, conceding his status as a middle son and a Bahun, came out with a full denial more than once.

Was Maila Baje young or old? In Nepal or abroad? A Nepali or a foreigner? Male or female posing as one? Heck, was I even one person or a composite? When, to my surprise, Janabhawana weekly started translating my posts and publishing it as a weekly column, everything took a whole new form.

Dipak daju later told me that while he did suspect me, he was also skeptical. Maila Baje was writing about events, the news of which had not even crossed the Ring Road in Kathmandu. Anyone not living in Kathmandu and in the thick of it all could not even be aware of these events let alone comment on them. On Twitter, he recently offered anyone who correctly identified me a nice recommendation for the world’s top investigative journalism award. (Thank you, Dipak daju, for the deflection).

My good friend Rabindra Mishra once asked me point blank. I gave him a flat denial. He couldn’t believe it. I couldn’t see his facial expression because he was on the phone line from BBC Nepali Service in London explaining my assignment for the morning. My lie must have infuriated him. I’m sorry, Rabindra ji. But I believed I had a good reason.

The blogosphere had already given me enough space to wander at will. Pseudonymity added to its appeal. As time flew, Maila Baje acquired a personality of its own. Coming out of the shadows would stifle him. Any time I had any inhibition, I would shut my eyes and imagine Nepal’s map and its position on a slowly revolving globe. It always felt like I was doing something good.

Nepal has never ceased to amaze me. Being squeezed between giant opposites India and China provided the element of space. Time, too, was of essence. I grew up as Indian parliamentarism and Chinese communism contended with American capitalism and Soviet collectivism. Born into a family that allowed me varying levels of proximity with royals, the Nepali Congress and communists of all hues, curiosity abounded as the same story differed with the teller.

My profession afforded me contact with foreigners who had something to do with Nepal or knew a lot about the country in ways a Nepali did not. The more I looked around Nepal, the more I saw so much to uncover. That’s when I began understanding something I was once told by King Mahendra. A nine-year-old standing on the line waiting to welcome the monarch during his visit to Thailand—where my father was posted—I bowed a respectful namaste when my turn came.

As my father introduced me, the king glared at me for a few seconds before saying: ‘Consider yourself very fortunate here. Study well and use your education in the service of Nepal, no matter where you may be.’

Condescending and even royally conceited? Not at all. Years later, when I happened to meet B.P. Koirala in New Delhi, I began introducing myself. He remembered meeting me a few years back and wondered where I was in my engineering studies. Stunned, I told him I had changed disciplines. ‘Whatever you study, study it well and be of use to Nepal, wherever you may be.’

Only if these two great men had been able to work together. I refuse to believe that politicians really resemble their caricature. They are not in the game to intentionally harm the country and people. There is something up there that’s just different. Compulsions, compromises, enticements, intimidations all end up taking their toll. Sure, some individuals are more vulnerable and vicious than others. By and large, though, it’s the nature of the beast.

Nepal, somehow fertile ground for initiatives and experiments fair and foul, is perhaps more susceptible to superfluous influences, alien and local. Things just don’t just happen here in a vacuum. Trying to make sense of it all is strenuous but still fun. Conspiracy theories instantly run wild. But that doesn’t necessarily make them irrelevant. Pulling these seemingly disparate strands together into a coherent 600 words every week or so has value. ‘If you can’t solve things, at least expose the problems you see’ seems to be a good motto.

One afternoon an uncle visiting from New York asked whether I read Maila Baje’s blog. When I said I did, he asked whether I knew who he or she was, and began naming names others had suggested to him. Maili Bajai sitting next to me told him the truth. She turned to me to say the time had long come.

Actually, it hadn’t. It took two more years, when my good friend Ajit Baral of Fine Print shot me an email asking me what I thought about a compilation. When I ‘outed’ myself to Dipak daju and sheepishly sought his suggestions on bringing out the book, he promptly gave the structure a new vibrancy and direction, for which I am indebted.

With this selection before you, all I can say now is, gee, it’s so bright out here.

Sanjay Upadhya

(aka Maila Baje)

Published in People’s Review, January 27, 2022

‘Maila Baje’ is Sanjay Upadhya

Nepali blogger who wrote under a pseudonym finally comes out of the shadows in new book

This the Foreword and concluding chapter of Empowered and Imperiled: Nepal’s Peace Puzzle in Bits and Pieces in which US-based Nepali writer Sanjay Upadhya confesses that he is the Maila Baje who wrote the Nepali Netbook blog. The new book is a collection of his entries over the years.

Sanjay Upadhya also wrote a column on current affairs for Nepali Times between 2001-2003 under the pen name Puskar Bhusal, which are in this paper’s online archives. It includes this piece on Sher Bahadur Deuba’s second tenure as prime minister which is as relevant today is it was in 2002: Consensus Charade.

Out of the Shadows, Finally

It feels good to finally come out. I’ve been tempted to do so several times over the last decade and a half. The shades just seemed too soothing. I chose this nom de guerre before I’d decided what I’d call my blog. Relatively new, the blogosphere beckoned with all its breeziness. A notebook on Nepal on the net. Bingo.

King Gyanendra’s royal rule was at its toughest. The Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists had signed the 12-Point Understanding but so much was unclear. Geopolitics, public opinion, hope, despair—the imponderables were too many. Powerful as the royal regression narrative was, I never bought it—and still don’t. 

Our triangular fight had become too drawn out for anyone’s good. I don’t think King Gyanendra had any specific plan when he took over on February 1, 2005. He wanted a realignment of forces into a bipolar one, and thought he could pull it off. If not, well, others were free to try. They did and here we are.

I’d been defending the royal takeover in that spirit, drawing all the venom I expected to. There seemed so much going on that seemed so unreal. Yet, a lot of what seemed to be going on seemed too real to discount. (Read more at nepalitimes.com)