Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya
A combination of perceptual and contextual reasons has driven most South Asian states’ scepticism of India’s regional primacy. India’s geographical and demographic heft and preponderance of diplomatic, economic and military power have contributed to an underlying sense of vulnerability among its comparatively smaller and weaker neighbours.
At a concrete level, India’s involvement in the domestic affairs of smaller South Asian states has left a legacy of profound bitterness and resentment. The content and form have differed in individual countries, ranging from outright military involvement in Sri Lanka in the name of peacekeeping to an economic blockade of Nepal to force constitutional changes. Most smaller South Asian states have experienced what they consider flagrant instances of Indian micromanagement of their internal affairs.
These nations fiercely value their independence and sovereignty. They fervently guard their right to make their own decisions based on their perceived national interest. There also is a pronounced sentiment that New Delhi is unable to recognize that India’s adversaries are not automatically adversaries of its neighbours. Broadly speaking, the smaller South Asian states urge India to cease confusing regional leadership with regional policing.
At a concrete level, India’s involvement in the domestic affairs of smaller South Asian states has left a legacy of profound bitterness and resentment. The content and form have differed in individual countries, ranging from outright military involvement in Sri Lanka in the name of peacekeeping to an economic blockade of Nepal to force constitutional changes. Most smaller South Asian states have experienced what they consider flagrant instances of Indian micromanagement of their internal affairs.
These nations fiercely value their independence and sovereignty. They fervently guard their right to make their own decisions based on their perceived national interest. There also is a pronounced sentiment that New Delhi is unable to recognize that India’s adversaries are not automatically adversaries of its neighbours. Broadly speaking, the smaller South Asian states urge India to cease confusing regional leadership with regional policing.
2. Besides China’s assertive behaviour, political and economic instability in “turbulent neighbourhood” is a cause for concern for India. Do you agree?
China’s growing assertiveness in South Asia in recent years has raised India’s concern owing to, among other things, the deep-running Delhi-Beijing rivalry and its regional fallout. Political and economic instability in the smaller South Asian states has compounded that concern. India feels such instability can harm its security interests and vitiate the regional environment to New Delhi’s detriment.
In response, India has employed a combination of traditional diplomatic tools and more novel initiatives. New Delhi has recently been working on integrating the region economically for mutual cooperation to foster collective self-reliance. It is doing so by, among other things, enhancing connectivity through strong physical and digital infrastructure links.
In building strong bilateral ties, India is using its cultural heritage and values to strengthen goodwill and cooperation with its neighbours. The success of such endeavours would depend critically on the extent to which the region manages to overcome the underlying history of distrust.
In response, India has employed a combination of traditional diplomatic tools and more novel initiatives. New Delhi has recently been working on integrating the region economically for mutual cooperation to foster collective self-reliance. It is doing so by, among other things, enhancing connectivity through strong physical and digital infrastructure links.
In building strong bilateral ties, India is using its cultural heritage and values to strengthen goodwill and cooperation with its neighbours. The success of such endeavours would depend critically on the extent to which the region manages to overcome the underlying history of distrust.
3. Why is India working on developing an “extended neighbourhood” that involves islands in the Indian Ocean, Gulf countries and nations in South-East Asia.? Is it for a bigger, influential and ambitious India?
With India’s great power ambitions on the ascendant, it is natural for New Delhi to find ways to project its aspirations beyond its immediate vicinity. One way of doing so is by extending what India considers to be its neighbourhood. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has asserted that neighbours are not only those with whom one shares geographical boundaries but also those with whom hearts meet. Beyond such rhetorical flourish, trade, energy, security, and military imperatives underpin India’s extended neighbourhood framework. India’s contests with Pakistan and China – and their wider ramifications – have given added momentum to this approach.
As India seeks its ‘rightful place’ in its extended neighbourhood, concerns continue to be voiced. Commentators – Indian and foreign alike – have suggested that what New Delhi considers its rightful place, others can consider a hegemonistic threat. Nevertheless, the concept has become part of a new national consensus in foreign policy traversing the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Indian National Congress.
As India seeks its ‘rightful place’ in its extended neighbourhood, concerns continue to be voiced. Commentators – Indian and foreign alike – have suggested that what New Delhi considers its rightful place, others can consider a hegemonistic threat. Nevertheless, the concept has become part of a new national consensus in foreign policy traversing the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Indian National Congress.
4. New Delhi’s ability to deal with Washington and Beijing can be significantly enhanced if India achieves greater strategic confidence in South Asian geopolitics. Do you agree?
Winning the trust of its South Asian neighbours and reflecting that confidence in its policies and pronouncements would certainly enhance India’s ability to deal with the United States and China. Mr. Modi’s Neighborhood First policy, enunciated with his rise to power in 2014, lays the basis for generating such strategic confidence. Under the policy, New Delhi has affirmed the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual respect and sensitivity; non-interference in internal affairs; shared prosperity; connectivity for regional integration; and people-to-people exchanges.
The invitations to leaders of neighboring states to Mr. Modi’s three oath-taking ceremonies are a manifestation of this approach. However, the practice has also been criticized. Smaller neighbours could perceive the invitations as a demonstration of India’s imperiousness and sense of predominance, akin to Emperor George V’s 1911 Delhi Durbar.
The smaller states assert that there are better ways to underscore good neighbourliness, such as greater Indian eagerness to resolve long-running divisive issues such as border disputes and water sharing. They continue to be concerned about Indian interference in neighbours’ domestic affairs under various guises. New Delhi needs to correct this contradiction in the neighbourhood before it can hope to play a more effective and influential role in the broader global arena.
The invitations to leaders of neighboring states to Mr. Modi’s three oath-taking ceremonies are a manifestation of this approach. However, the practice has also been criticized. Smaller neighbours could perceive the invitations as a demonstration of India’s imperiousness and sense of predominance, akin to Emperor George V’s 1911 Delhi Durbar.
The smaller states assert that there are better ways to underscore good neighbourliness, such as greater Indian eagerness to resolve long-running divisive issues such as border disputes and water sharing. They continue to be concerned about Indian interference in neighbours’ domestic affairs under various guises. New Delhi needs to correct this contradiction in the neighbourhood before it can hope to play a more effective and influential role in the broader global arena.
5. The Indian government’s policy of diplomatically isolating Pakistan does not seem to be succeeding as Islamabad has stepped up its diplomatic efforts to engage Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran. How far is it true?
During the Cold War, Pakistan acquired its own strategic significance, which has not diminished substantially in the aftermath. To be sure, Pakistan faces multiple sources of internal and external conflict. Extremism, intolerance of diversity, and dissent have grown, threatening the country’s social cohesion and stability prospects. From India’s perspective, a nuclear-armed inimical state where good-faith engagement has repeatedly failed deserves to be diplomatically isolated.
Still, Pakistan’s strategic importance persists amid new geopolitical realignments. The country is situated at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and shares frontiers with Afghanistan, China, India, and Iran. This makes it a central actor in regional stability, trade routes, and global power dynamics, especially in security and energy.
India’s push to promote the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) over the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as the primary neighborhood platform – in a palpable effort to shun Pakistan – has met with disgruntlement from many smaller states. Moreover, New Delhi’s effort to isolate Pakistan diplomatically has had to contend with a resurgence of Islamabad’s importance to countries such as Russia and Iran, with which New Delhi enjoys close ties.
Still, Pakistan’s strategic importance persists amid new geopolitical realignments. The country is situated at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and shares frontiers with Afghanistan, China, India, and Iran. This makes it a central actor in regional stability, trade routes, and global power dynamics, especially in security and energy.
India’s push to promote the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) over the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as the primary neighborhood platform – in a palpable effort to shun Pakistan – has met with disgruntlement from many smaller states. Moreover, New Delhi’s effort to isolate Pakistan diplomatically has had to contend with a resurgence of Islamabad’s importance to countries such as Russia and Iran, with which New Delhi enjoys close ties.
