Birth Of A Republic: Stories Behind The Story

By Sanjay Upadhya
The idea that the deep unpopularity of Nepal’s last monarch became the greatest catalyst for republicanism has an alluring pithiness. But tight headlines and terse nut-graphs cannot tell what is, by any measure, a far more complex story. The Nepalese political discourse has been dominated by incessant criticism – justified as well as inflated – of the palace. This singular obsession with former king Gyanendra’s “excesses” and the monarchy’s inherently “anti-democratic” proclivities creates a warped picture of the past. More importantly, it obstructs the extrapolation of valuable pointers for an increasingly uncertain future.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the monarchy was not always the preponderant national institution during its 240-year existence. The death of Prithvi Narayan Shah, seven years after the founding of the Nepalese state, led to a weakening of the monarchy. A succession of minor kings left rival royal factions competing for power. The loss of a third of the nation’s territory in a debilitating war with the British only fueled the feuds. From the bloodletting rose the Ranas, who oversaw the eclipse of the monarchy for over a century.
Nepal’s foray into modernity in the 1950s revealed the new contradictions the monarchy would reign atop. The overthrow of the Rana regime, hailed as the dawn of democracy, ended up consolidating the monarchy. The inauguration of Nepal’s first elected government precipitated a battle of wills in which the palace prevailed over the Nepali Congress. Royal preponderance reached its zenith during the three decades following King Mahendra’s dismissal of Prime Minister B.P. Koirala’s government and abolition of multiparty democracy.
The incongruity of an impoverished nation having to finance an expensive institution was ideologically anathema to the communists. Yet the communists, whom the palace considered a counterweight to the Nepali Congress, prospered the most during 30 years of palace-led nonparty rule. The Nepali Congress, for its part, saw a constitutional monarchy as a bulwark against a preponderance of the left. Yet it made attempts on the lives of two kings.
The restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990 was expected to put Nepal irrevocably on the path of democratic modernity. Barely six years later, an avowedly republican Maoist insurgency helped the palace to gradually consolidate its position. International and regional powers, mindful of such internal contradictions, considered the palace the fulcrum of stability. India and the United States – the world’s two most prominent democratic republics – joined communist China to support the monarchy.
That compact was shaken – more internally than internationally – by the June 2001 Narayanhity massacre. The carnage dealt a grievous blow to the monarchy from multiple directions. It ended any halo of divinity surrounding the monarchy. The notion that the king was the guardian of the nation exploded with the bursts of gunfire. Nepalis were reminded of the history of bloodshed and machinations associated with palace politics.
The shady reputations of the new monarch and the heir apparent, coupled with swirling suspicions of their role in the palace massacre, could hardly provide a promising beginning. Yet the political parties lay discredited by their own performance and the Maoists had little to offer politically. A wary political class as well as public watched King Gyanendra’s moves to strengthen the palace’s role. Still, the royal interventions of October 2002 and February 2005 failed to rouse the people into vigorous opposition. Within Nepal, the two events were considered part of a continuum. Geopolitically, they were different. The contrast revealed an essential truism of Nepalese politics. International and regional powers, with their competing interests in and expectations from Nepal, have precipitated political changes.
When King Gyanendra dismissed an elected prime minister in 2002 for failing to hold elections on schedule, India and the United States seemed generally content. China maintained its characteristic silence. Over the preceding years, Western governments and international donors had been growing increasingly critical of the infighting, corruption and mismanagement that had gripped the polity. Their representatives in Kathmandu had become increasingly explicit in voicing those concerns.
The 2005 royal takeover, on the other hand, instantly infuriated the Indians and Americans, while the Chinese, again, professed non-interference. Yet Beijing’s anxiety was clear. A series of palace-appointed premiers had failed to quell the Maoist insurgency, prompting greater Indian as well as American military involvement. New Delhi’s own discomfort with American activism was palpable. Allowing the Maoists to triumph over the state would have grave implications for India’s Maoist insurgency.

Cautious China
Chinese apprehensions ran deeper. The Nepalese rebels’ wholesale discrediting of Mao Zedong’s reputation was intolerable enough, something Beijing expressed with great candor. It was not hard to fathom how a total Maoist triumph could energize restive populations in the Chinese hinterland deprived of a part of the post-Mao economic miracle. The prospect of Nepal’s inexorable drift toward the Indian-American camp carried grave implications for China’s soft underbelly, Tibet. On the eve of the 2005 royal takeover, Nepal shut down the local offices of the principal Tibet-related organizations. The event was thus cast as a pro-Chinese initiative.
Far from extending full support to the royal regime, however, the Chinese remained cautious. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao skipped Nepal during his South Asian tour, sending his foreign minister to Kathmandu instead. King Gyanendra’s anticipated visit to China to mark the 50th anniversary of bilateral ties did not materialize. The Indians succeeded in preventing the Americans from striking a separate deal with the palace. New Delhi, for its part, was negotiating with the king. It bailed out Nepal from massive censure at the UN Human Right Conference in Geneva and dangled the promise of a resumption of military – and perhaps even political –assistance.
A section of the Indian establishment always considered the monarchy the problem and found a conducive political alignment in New Delhi. The communist parties backing the ruling Indian coalition took the lead and moved swiftly to bring the Maoists and mainstream parties in an anti-palace alliance. The Indian army and internal security apparatus, insistent on helping the king and the Nepalese army, was not pleased, as a series of leaks in the Indian media showed. This conflict emboldened the royal government, which sought to internationalize its fight against the Maoists by linking it to the global war on terror. On the ground, it went after the mainstream parties without being able to dent the rebels. New Delhi checkmated the king by facilitating a ceasefire on the eve of his attempt to raise the insurgency at the United Nations General Assembly.
The monarch responded by spearheading a campaign to secure China’s position as an observer in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The move came amid China’s drive to block India from regional initiatives in East Asia. In New Delhi, the palace’s brazen flaunting of the “China card” hardened critics and alienated the remaining supporters of the king. The Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoist rebels hurriedly signed the 12-point pact to bring down the royal regime.
The collaboration energized the Nepalese masses. The opportunity for peace and stability after years of bloodletting and instability was too enticing to squander. As anti-palace demonstrations picked up speed, India sent a royal relative, Karan Singh, as an emissary. The king’s invitation to the SPA to form the next government won instant praise from New Delhi, Washington and London. It failed to quell the protests. For the republican camp within Nepal and outside, the public defiance served to expose the depth of anti-monarchism.
The collapse of the royal regime led to a swift and systematic clipping of the palace’s powers. Still, a republican Nepal was not a done deal. The next phase – the suspension of the monarchy after the enactment of the interim constitution – morphed in line with a careful power play. A precipitous de-monarchization of the nation was precluded by the imponderables involved. The true nature of Nepalese public opinion vis-à-vis the monarchy, the loyalty of the army and the Maoists’ real commitment to the democratic process remained unknown. What was obvious was not inspiring: the mainstream parties’ poor record of governance.
Yet for India, mainstreaming the Maoists had become a matter of national security. The insurgency launched by Indian Maoists, or Naxalites, was spreading fast. The Naxalites were in no position to overwhelm the state, but they risked exacerbating India’s already grave internal security challenge. Engaging the Nepalese Maoists in the peace process through incremental carrots was tied to India’s plan to tame the Naxalites.

Faith-based Initiative?
For influential international quarters, King Gyanendra became too much of a liability. He continued to insist that he had seized power in good faith, adding that the effort failed because of “several factors”. The caveat could not have been lost on India. For the democratic West, the monarch’s overt tilt toward China was inexcusable enough. His espousal of the Hinduism mantle, with a fervor surpassing that of any of his predecessors, was tantamount to insolence. While Christian organizations had not listed Nepal high on the list of persecutor nations, many called it one of the most unreached nations for the Gospel. A Hindu monarch in a secular nation was far from tenable.
There were scattered reports of contacts in Delhi between the Maoists and Christian groups – some suggesting financial transactions – but they mostly emanated from the Hindu nationalist spectrum of the Indian media. Given the Maoists’ record of successfully using secondary adversaries to accomplish their immediate ends, the convergence of interest was plausible.
Had Crown Prince Paras enjoyed a better public image, forcing King Gyanendra to abdicate in favor of his son might have been an option. Passing the crown to Paras’s son, Hridayendra, would have mollified royalists. For the country, it meant a return of regency. King Gyanendra, more than anyone else, understood what this would mean for the monarchy. He dismissed calls for abdication made by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and others.
Publicly, the international community shunned the monarch. Privately they maintained channels. One reason was China’s swift move to build ties with the Maoists. The arrival of a modern high-speed train to the Tibetan capital Lhasa had greatly improved China’s access to Nepal. Nepal’s open border to the south exposed the Indian heartland to what many analysts there considered an enhanced military threat from China. The Terai erupted in violence against centuries of injustices inflicted by the hillspeople. The specific assurances foreign governments sought from the palace in exchange for the retention of some form of monarch remains unknown.
Clearly, the second amendment to the interim constitution, which declared Nepal a republic subject to an elected assembly’s ratification, was intended as a carrot and a stick for the palace. The monarch found more time to reconsider his options. To pre-empt any royal assertiveness, the statute also provided for the removal of the monarchy by two-thirds majority of the interim parliament. This ultimatum failed to influence the king but vitiated the political climate for the palace.
Previously, the Maoists and the mainstream parties – for their own interests – had made a distinction between the institution of the monarchy and individual kings. If Mahendra and Gyanendra were denounced as autocrats, Birendra and Tribhuvan, in their estimation, fared better as liberals. But now statues of Prithvi Narayan Shah were being demolished. Paradoxically, those committed to preserving Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity viewed the state as the culmination of unjust wars of aggressions. Supporters of some form of monarchy in the Nepali Congress attempted to frame the discussion in different ways. The fear of being perceived as royalists in a ruling alliance heavily dominated by republicans dissuaded them. Moreover, royalist parties like the Rastriya Prajatantra Party and the Rastriya Janashakti Party had become monarchy neutral.
Opinion polls up to the run-up to the elections showed that half the country wanted to retain some form of monarchy. A referendum would have put the issue to rest. Victory would have permitted King Gyanendra to recreate the monarchy in his own image. A defeat would have allowed him to depart as a democrat.
Many expected the king to resist the republic declaration. The inability of the ruling alliance to agree on the precise structure of the presidency as well as power sharing up to the first meeting of constituent assembly suggested as much. Whether royal defiance would have succeeded is a different thing altogether. Ultimately, the ex-king saw the overwhelming assembly vote in favor of a republic as the best expression of the popular will under the circumstances which he and his predecessors always invoked.
The monarchy had been central to the policies of the three major international stakeholders in Nepal. The Maoists took in royalists reportedly on the advice of the Chinese to bolster a nationalist front. A Maoist-UML alliance could go a far way toward mollifying Beijing. For New Delhi, the Nepali Congress and the three Madhesi parties could provide succor. Washington, which began its own rapprochement with the Maoists after their electoral success, perhaps sees the military as the backbone of a non-communist front.
The presence of the ex-monarch within the country would probably help stabilize politics in the same way the return of Zahir Shah, Afghanistan former king, helped the Hamid Karzai government find its footing. With the end of the monarchy, a new quest for internal and regional equilibrium has begun.

(A version of this article appeared in the August 2008 inaugural issue of Global Nepali)

नयां चरणका नौला चुनौती

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

जनमतद्वारा स्थापित प्रमुख चार राजनीतिक दलहरूबीच राज्यका महत्त्वपूर्ण पदहरूको बांडफांट भइसकेपछि नेपालीहरूलाई अन्योलपूर्ण यात्राको नयां चरणमा हिंड्नुको विकल्प रहेन । मन्त्रालयहरूको बांडफांट गरी सरकारलाई पूर्णता दिनसकेपछि पनि शङ्का र असमझदारीमा लिप्त सत्तारुढ नेकपा माओवादी, नेकपा एमाले र मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमका बीच हानथाप जारी रहला नै ।
जनमानसमा भने अघि बढ्नु अपरिहार्य र निर्विकल्प दुवै रहेको ज्ञानले बेग्लै खालको कौतूहल बढाएको छ । विशेष गरी १० वर्षो भीषण 'जनयुद्ध'को समाप्तिपछि पनि उद्दण्ड देखिन नछाडेका माओवादीहरूले नेतृत्व गरेको सरकारले कस्तो व्यवहार गर्ला भन्ने सर्वत्र उत्सुकता बढेको छ ।
निर्वाचित सभामा कुनै पनि दलको बहुमत नहुंदा खेलिने खेलका बारे कमै नेपाली अनभिज्ञ छन् । तीतो विगतको आंशिक पुनरावृत्ति राष्ट्रपति र प्रधानमन्त्री निर्वाचनका समयमा मुलुकले देख्यो र भोग्यो । तर, वर्तमान सभाको संविधान पनि लेख्नुपर्ने अभिभारा भएकाले र्सवसाधारणले केही न केही नौलोपनको अपेक्षा पनि गरेका छन् ।
सरोकारवालाहरूका बीच सहमति बनेको र टुटेकामा जति चर्चा-परचिर्चा रहने गरे पनि समग्र मुलुकका सामु अर्कै यथार्थ छ । टुटेको गठबन्धनकै अर्को पाटो हुने गरेको छ नया“ समीकरण । यहां अन्तरमि सरकार र संसद्का बेला नेपालीहरूले बटुलेका अनुभवले भन्दा पनि आधारभूत वास्तविकता मुखरति भएको छ । राजतन्त्रको उन्मूलनको साझा कार्यक्रममा एकीकृत भएका दलहरू गणतन्त्रको आगमनसंगै आ-आफ्नो बाटो लाग्नु एक हदसम्म स्वाभाविक थियो । नयां नेपालका बारेमा एउटै दलभित्र क्षेत्र, वर्ग र पुस्ताबीच मतैक्य नभएको अवस्थामा सहमतिको नाराको कति नै मूल्य रहला - त्यसमाथि बहुदलीय प्रतिस्पर्धाका आधारमा चल्ने पद्धतिमा सहमति एउटा परिणाम हुनसक्छ, पूर्वसर्त होइन ।
अहिलेसम्म सरकारमा सहभागी भएर माओवादीहरूले पृथक् पहिचान बनाएको देख्न नपाएका जनसमुदायका लागि नयां सरकारका हरेक क्रियाकलाप बढी चाखलाग्दा हुनेछन् । आफ्नै दलभित्रका केही पक्षको खपतका लागि माओवादी नेताहरूले जनगणतन्त्र नै अन्तिम लक्ष्य रहेको प्रतिबद्धता बेलाबखत दोहोर्‍याउने गर्लान् । यसलाई एकदलीय तानाशाही लाद्ने दुष्प्रयासका रूपमा भन्दा पनि माओवादीहरूको लोकतान्त्रिक रूपान्तरणको जटिलताका रूपमा बुझ्नुपर्ने सल्लाह बांकी मुलुकले पाउला ।
आफूहरूद्वारा नै चित्रित अर्धसामन्ती र अर्धऔपनिवेशिक मुलुकका सीमितताहरूभित्रका सम्भावनाहरू पहिल्याउने जिम्मेदारी माओवादीहरूका कांधमा आइपरेको छ । मुलुकले आर्थिक रूपले धान्नै नसक्ने तर राजनीतिक रूपले आकर्ष कार्यक्रमहरूको घोषणा गरेर प्रधानमन्त्री पुष्पकमल दाहाललाई लोकप्रियता आर्जन गर्न सजिलो पर्ला । तर, माओवादीहरू स्वयम्लाई सरकारको नेतृत्व सम्हालिसकेपछि अपजसजति अरूमाथि थोपर्ने विलासिता रहने छैन भन्ने कुराको पूर्ण ज्ञान छ । सत्तारुढ अन्य दलहरूबाट हुनसक्ने असहयोग खप्ने उत्तरदायित्व पनि प्रधानमन्त्रीकै हुने यथार्थ माओवादीहरूलाई कोइराला सरकारमा रहंदा नै अनुभव भएको हुनुपर्दछ । अन्य दलहरू पनि एकपल्ट त्यसरी हतियार उठाइसकेको दललाई चेपुवामा पार्दा त्यसले लिने रक्षात्मक अडानका सम्भावित परिणामका बारेमा सतर्क छन् ।
नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले अरूलाई भन्दा बढी आफूलाई माओवादीको असली नियतको जानकारी र चिन्ता भएको सन्देश दिन खोजेको देखिन्छ । काङ्ग्रेसले आफू सत्ता संरचनाभन्दा बाहिर रहेकामा दुखेसो नपोख्दा नै मुलुकलाई भलो हुने थियो । संवैधानिक र कानुनी दृष्टिले राष्ट्रपति रामवरण यादवको काङ्ग्रेससंग कुनै औपचारकि सम्बन्ध नहोला । तर, उनी लामो समयसम्म नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसका एक जुझारु नेता थिए भन्ने कुरा बिर्सन मिल्दैन । त्यही हैसियतमा उनले तत्कालीन राजतन्त्रदेखि अन्य दलहरूका बारे खरो धारणा बनाएका थिए । कतिपय प्रसङ्गमा त्यस्ता धारणाहरू सार्वजनिक रूपमै अघि सार्ने गरेका थिए । काङ्ग्रेसकै महामन्त्रीका रूपमा यादव राष्ट्रपतीय उम्मेदवार बनेका थिए । गणतान्त्रिक अभ्यासमा खारिएका मुलुकहरूमा यो राजनीतिक पक्ष त्यति महत्त्वपूर्णहुने थिएन होला । तर, राज्यका सम्पूर्ण अङ्गको राजनीतीकरण भइहाल्ने हाम्रो परम्परा एकातिर छ भने निर्वाचित राष्ट्रप्रमुखको अनुभव पनि हामीसंग छंदै छैन ।
अप्रसन्नतालाई जति सैद्धान्तिक आवरण दिन खोजे पनि पुरानो पार्टी भएकै नाताले काङ्ग्रेसलाई धेरैले नजिकबाट चिन्न पाएका छन् । नयां नेपालतर्फको यात्रामा लागिएको छ भन्दैमा अतीतलाई बिर्सन सक्ने क्षमता कमैमा होला । सत्ताबाहिर रहदा आदर्शका कुरा गर्ने अनि सत्तामा छंदा आफ्नै सरकार गिराउन पनि पछि नपर्ने काङ्ग्रेसी प्रवृत्ति धेरैले भुलेका छैनन् । बहुमतप्राप्त सरकार अन्तर्गत एउटै मन्त्रालयका मन्त्री र राज्यमन्त्रीले सार्वजनिक रूपमा भ्रष्टाचारको आक्षेप साटासाट गरेर राजीनामा गर्नुपरेको प्रसङ्गले पनि जनतालाई स्वतन्त्र मूल्याङ्कन गर्न प्रशस्त आधार दिएको छ ।
आफूलाई मात्र नेपालको पूर्ण लोकतान्त्रिक शक्ति भएको दाबी गर्दै सरकारको आयु यति र उति हुनेछ भनेर रट लगाउनुभन्दा नयां संविधान बनाउने काममा लागेर नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले त्यसलाई प्रमाणित गर्न खोज्नु मुलुकका लागि बढी हितकारी हुनेछ ।

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, भदौ ८, २०६५)

From The Jungles To Geopolitics

By Sanjay Upadhya
After becoming the world’s first democratically elected Maoist leader, Nepali Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal has moved swiftly to show how it will no longer be business as usual for the Himalayan nation.
Hours after taking the oath of office on August 18, Dahal announced he would visit China for the closing ceremonies of the Olympic Games. This may not sound like a revolutionary move, until you consider that no Nepali leader has ever visited China before visiting India, the traditionally influential neighbor to the south. When President Ram Baran Yadav cancelled plans earlier this month to attend the opening ceremonies, citing domestic preoccupation, some Nepalis saw New Delhi’s hand. Some Indian newspapers characterized the cancellation as a snub to China.
Nepal anticipated renewed geopolitical pressures ever since the Maoists, who entered the peace process after a decade-long bloody insurgency against the monarchy, surprised pundits and pollsters by winning the largest number of seats in the constitutional assembly. That body abolished the 240-year-old monarchy in May, sparking a struggle for power among key political parties. Nepal’s international partners, meanwhile, have been scrambling to adjust their policies.
The United States, which still considers the Maoists a terrorist organization, has softened its stance. After the election results were announced, U.S. Ambassador Nancy Powell met with Dahal, opening Washington’s formal contact with the ex-rebels. The Bush administration subsequently clarified that the Maoists were on a separate list of terrorist organizations, implying they could not be equated with, say, Al Qaeda. Withdrawal of the terrorist tag, according to Washington, would depend on the Maoists’ behavior in power.
India, which once considered the Maoists terrorists but also gave them sanctuary, has mixed feelings. The Congress party government, which helped to create the alliance between mainstream parties and the Maoists that toppled royal rule two years ago, hopes Nepal’s experience would encourage its own Maoist insurgents to renounce violence and enter the mainstream.
The opposition Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, tipped to win the general elections expected next year, was a supporter of the monarchy and remains virulently anti-Maoist. It has urged the Nepali government to recognize Hindi as one of the official languages. That suggestion is likely to alienate many Nepalis, who organized days of protest against Vice-President Parmananda Jha’s decision to take the oath in Hindi.
Both major Indian parties are apprehensive of the Maoists’ growing ties with China. A traditional supporter of the monarchy, Beijing had provided arms to the royal government to crush an insurgency that the Chinese said had tarnished the reputation of Mao Zedong. Following the collapse of the royal government, the Chinese moved swiftly to build ties with the former rebels. Several senior Maoist leaders have visited Beijing, as Chinese delegations continue to arrive in Nepal.
The pro-Tibet demonstrations gripping Kathmandu almost daily since March has heightened Beijing’s sensitivities on what it has long considered a volatile frontier. International human rights groups have attributed Nepal’s crackdown on those protests to sustained pressure from the Chinese. Rejecting those charges, Beijing blames non-Tibetan supporters of the Dalai Lama for fanning the unrest.
Prime Minister Dahal, who emerged in public only two years ago from decades in hiding, has little foreign policy experience. After the elections, he diluted his party’s earlier threats to abrogate a controversial peace and friendship treaty with India, ban Indian films and stop recruitment of Gurkha soldiers into the Indian and British armies. C.P. Gajurel, chief of the party’s international division, said the ex-insurgents would stop calling the Americans “imperialists” and the Indians “expansionists”.
Dahal insists he wants to maintain “equidistance” between China and India. That statement may have pleased the Chinese, but it has raised skepticism in New Delhi, which believes it shares “special relations” with Nepal based on a common religious and cultural heritage. Many in India, which has long asserted its own version of the Monroe Doctrine in South Asia, remain apprehensive of Chinese motives against the wider backdrop of their border dispute dating from the 1962 war. They tend to see Beijing’s activity in Nepal, as well as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, as part of a long-term strategy to encircle their country and limit its influence.
In seeking to strike the right balance between the two regional giants, the Maoists inherit a challenge every ruler has confronted since the mid-18th century monarch Prithvi Narayan Shah united dozens of principalities into the modern Nepali state.

माओवादीसंग जोडिएको भविष्य

सञ्जय उपाध्याय
नेपाली राजनीतिले सोझो बाटो समाउला भनी आशा गर्नु अब व्यर्थ झै भएको छ। महत्त्वपूर्ण निर्णयहरु मुलुकले लिने गरेको त छ तर धेरै अनिश्चय र असमन्जसपछि मात्र। यसलाई कुनै दल वा पात्रविशेषको आग्रह-पूर्वाग्रहको उपज नभएर शान्ति प्रक्रियाको जराबाटै निःसृत यथार्थ भनी बुझ्न उपयुक्त हुन्छ।
नयां दिल्लीमा हस्ताक्षरति १२ बुंदे समझदारीको प्रमुख दुइ लक्ष्य दरबारको 'दम्भ' तोड्नु र माओवादीहरूको दांत फुकाल्नु रहेको उतिबेलै प्रस्ट थियो। लोकतन्त्रको स्थापना कुन तहको प्राथमिकतामा परेको रहेछ भनी बुझ्न त हस्ताक्षरकर्ताहरूलाई आफ्नै अनुभवले सहज बनाइदिएको थियो।
२०५९ असोज १८ पछि सशक्त आन्दोलनमा उत्रन सबभन्दा सक्षम नेकपा एमालेले बेमौसमको महाधिवेशनतिर लाग्न दक्षिणतिरबाट आएको दबाब खेप्न सकेन। अहिले भारतद्वारा दक्षिण एसियाकै सम्मानित राजनेता भनी विभूषित गिरजाप्रसाद कोइराला र उनको नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले दरबारलाई नै सघाउनु भन्ने पटक-पटकको सल्लाह उतैबाट पाएका थिए।
राजनीतिक दलहरूलाई छलेर दरबारसंग लगनगांठो कस्न हौसिएका माओवादीहरूको सपना भङ्ग हुन पनि खासै समय लागेको थिएन। भारतीय अधिकारीहरूले आफूहरूसंग तत्कालीन शान्ति वार्ताका सम्बन्धमा कुनै पनि पक्षले पर्याप्त परामर्श नगरेको भनी पोख्ने गरेको गुनासोमाझ विद्रोहीहरूलाई आफ्नो अभिलाषा पूरा नहुने ठहर गर्न गाह्रो परेको थिएन।
०६१ माघ १९ पछि बदलिएको भूराजनीतिक स्वार्थहरूसमक्ष सातदलीय गठबन्धन एवम् माओवादीहरूलाई संगसंगै अघि बढ्ने बाध्यता त आइलाग्यो नै। सबै घटकलाई आ-आफ्नै सम्भावनाहरू विस्तार गर्ने अवसर पनि प्राप्त भयो। जनआन्दोलन-२ ले दरबारलाई उठ्नै नसक्ने गरी ढालेपछि नयां दिल्लीका लागि माओवादीहरूका नङ्ग्रा उखेल्नु अहम् मुद्दा बन्यो।
शान्ति प्रक्रियाले प्रत्येक गम्भीर मोड नाघ्नासाथ माओवादीहरूले गर्ने गरेको विजयोल्लासका पछाडि आफूहरूलाई खोक्र्याउन भइरहेको प्रयत्नका बारे पूर्व विद्रोहीहरू सतर्क नै देखिए। बेलाबखत आफ्नो अवमूल्यन हुने काममा आफूहरू नै सहयोगी बनेकामा माओवादी नेतृत्वले कहीं कतै पश्चात्ताप गर्ने गरेको भए पनि सार्वजनिक रूपमा उनीहरू दृढ नै देखिन्थे।
त्यसो त विश्वका प्रमुख प्रभावशाली मुलुकहरूले साम्यवादको पराजयलाई गत शताब्दीको ऐतिहासिक घटनामध्येको एक मान्दै आएको परिप्रेक्ष्यमा नेपालमा शास्त्रीय साम्यवादको उदय उनीहरूका लागि स्वीकार्य पक्कै थिएन। गरिबी र पछौटेपनमा चुर्लुम्म डुबेको मुलुकमा भने अन्यायपूर्ण यथास्थितिका विरुद्ध घन्किने चर्का नाराहरू आकर्ष छंदै थिए। बहुसङ्ख्यक साम्यवादी मुलुकहरूमा जनताले नै सो व्यवस्थाको उन्मूलन गरेको यथार्थले पनि खासै माने राखेन। नेपालका सन्दर्भमा उत्तरतिर माओकै मुलुकले साम्यवादको व्यापारकि संस्करण आविष्कार गरेर सफलता हासिल गरेको छ। चिनियांहरूमा बढ्दै गएको आर्थिक असमानतामाझ त कत्तिले माओ विचारधारालाई अस्थिरताको कारकका रूपमा पनि देख्न पुगे।
उता भारतमा आन्तरिक विद्रोहको शृङ्खलामा नक्सलवादीहरू त्यहांका १४ राज्यमा कुनै न कुनै रूपले सक्रिय रहनु एउटा गम्भीर कुरा बन्यो। भारतका प्रधानमन्त्रीले नक्सलवादलाई मुलुकको आन्तरकि सुरक्षाका लागि प्रमुख खतरा भनी बताए। त्यसको निराकरणका लागि नेपाली माओवादीहरूलाई राजनीतिक मूलधारमा पुर्‍याउनु एउटा नीतिगत प्राथमिकता बन्यो। त्यस्तो अभ्यासले नक्सलवादलाई परास्त गर्न कसरी सहयोग गर्ला भन्ने कुरामा खासै ध्यान दिन जरुरी भएन। राजनीतिक रूपले सदैव त्रिकोणीय शक्ति सङ्र्घर्षमा लिप्त नेपालमा राजतन्त्रले छोड्न लागेको भूमिका लिने पात्रको खोजी अहम् बन्यो।
युद्धकाल होस् वा शान्तिका बेला, नेपालका माओवादीहरू वैदेशिक शक्तिहरूलाई आफ्ना सामरिक र भूराजनीतिक लक्ष्य प्राप्तिको अस्त्र बनेका छन्। यसै त भारतको पुर्ण विश्वास जित्न नसकिरहेका माओवादीहरूसंग चीनले बढाएको हातले नयां दिल्लीमा र्सतर्कता बढायो। घटनाक्रम नियाल्दा पुर्वविद्रोहीहरूले चीनको ढृढ समर्थन पनि आर्जन गर्न नसकेको देखिन्छ। आतङ्कवादीको बिल्ला उतार्ने आश्वासन दिएको अमेरिकाको पर्ख र हेरको नीतिपछाडि केही न केही अपेक्षा होलान्।
शत्रुहरूको वर्गीकरण गर्न र तिनका अन्तरविरोधबाट फाइदा लिनमा माहिर माओवादीहरू लोकतान्त्रिक व्यवस्थाको केन्द्रविन्दुमा त पुगे तर त्यहां उनीहरूले आफ्नो सर्वसत्तावादी सोचमा परविर्तन ल्याउन सकेको नेपाली जनताले देख्न पाएका छैनन्। हतियारबिनाको राजनीतिमा अरूलाई पनि माओवादीभित्रको अन्तरविरोधबाट फाइदा लिने कत्तिको छूट हुदोरहेछ भन्ने कुरा बेलाबेला नाटकीय रूपले बन्ने र बिग्रने सहमतिहरूले देखाएकै छन्।
अपरीक्षित भएकै कारण कतिलाई माओवादीहरूले आकषिर्त गरेका हुन्। तर, अन्य दलहरूभन्दा उनीहरू पृथक् रहेको आभास आमजनताले पाउन सकेका छैनन्। राजतन्त्रको उन्मूलनलाई नै यथास्थितिमाथिको विजय ठान्न तयार नभएको जमातलाई राष्ट्रपति निर्वाचन प्रकरणले झस्काउन नै पुग्यो। त्यहां भोगेको पराजयपछि माओवादीहरूले सरकार नबनाउने भनी देखाएको घुर्की र त्यसपछि सरकार बनाउनका लागि अघि सारेका सर्तजस्ता विषयले उनीहरूको परपिक्वतामा प्रश्न उठायो। गठबन्धन बनाउने र बिगार्ने लगायतका दाउपेचमा त अन्य दलहरू पनि उत्तिकै सहभागी छन्। तर, माओवादीहरूको शैलीसमक्ष उनीहरू शालीनजस्तो देखिन पुगे।
शान्ति प्रक्रियाको उद्गम जहां र जसरी भए पनि त्यो नेपालको जीवन्त यथार्थ बनिसकेको छ र माओवादीहरू त्यसको अभिन्न अङ्ग हुन्। उनीहरूको राजनीतिक भविष्य उनीहरूकै लोकतान्त्रिक रूपान्तरणसंग गांसिएको छंदैछ। महत्त्वपूर्ण कुरा त सिङ्गो मुलुककै भाग्य त्यो रूपान्तरण संग जोडिएको छ।


(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, साउन २६, २०६५)

संयमको सहारा

सञ्जय उपाध्याय
शान्ति प्रक्रियाको आवरणमा सञ्चालित सहमतिको राजनीति नबुझेका नेपालीलाई राष्ट्रपतीय निर्वाचनको पूर्वसन्ध्यामा नाटकीय रूपले जन्मेको नयाँ समीकरणले एकपल्ट फेरि झस्कायो । जसरी भए पनि मुलुकलाई एउटा निकास चाहिएको थियो र तीन प्रमुख दलले उपाय पनि निकालिहाले । नवीनतातर्फो यात्रामा देशले एउटा अर्को कोसेढुङ्गा पार गर्नुलाई सुखद उपलब्धि नमान्ने नेपाली विरलै होलान् ।
राष्ट्रपति रामवरण यादवको प्रतिष्ठा र पृष्ठभूमि एवम् उनले शपथ लिनुअघि र पछि राष्ट्र र राष्ट्रियताका पक्षमा दोहोर्‍याएका प्रतिबद्धताहरू निकै सकारात्मक र प्रेरणादायी रहे पनि तिनलाई व्यापक राजनीतिक पटलमा देखिएको तिक्तताले ढाक्न पुगेको छ ।
नवीनतम विघ्न खेपेपछि नेकपा माओवादीका नेताहरूको भनाइ सुन्दा र पढ्दा प्रतिशोधको राजनीतिले प्रश्रय पाउने संशय बढेको छ । उता तीनतिर फर्केका नेपाली काङ्ग्रेस, नेकपा एमाले र मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमबीच एक्कासि बढेको सामीप्य माओवादीहरूको सेखी झार्न नै भएको आभास नयाँ समीकरणबाट आइरहेका स्वरहरूले दिन्छन् ।
विदेशी शक्तिहरूको बढ्दो चासोको सशक्त प्रतिविम्ब अनमिनको म्याद बढाउने सर्न्दर्भमा संयुक्त राष्ट्रसङ्घ सुरक्षा परिषदमा देखियो । भारतका स्थायी प्रतिनिधिले महासचिव बान की मुनको प्रतिवेदनबारे उठाएका तिखा प्रश्नहरूले हाम्रो शान्ति प्रक्रियाका सम्बन्धमा नयाँदिल्लीको रक्षात्मक उत्कन्ठा देखाएका छन् । भारतबाट राष्ट्रपति यादवलाई औपचारकि बधाई ढिलो गरी आउनुले पनि केही न केही सन्देश दिएको छ ।
जनआन्दोलन-२ र खासगरी तिब्बत प्रदर्शनका सर्न्दर्भमा स्पष्ट र सक्रिय बनेको चीनले आफ्नो बृहत् आकाङ्क्षा र अपेक्षालाई कसरी प्रस्तुत गर्ला, त्यो त बेइजिङ् ओलम्पिकपछि खुल्दै जाला । विश्वमा उदीयमान दुई एसियाली शक्ति राष्ट्रहरूका बीचमा अवस्थित नेपाललाई तिनीहरूको आपसी सम्बन्धले पार्न सक्ने प्रभावको लेखाजोखा गररिहनु नै पूर्णकालीन काम हुन जान्छ । त्यसमाथि सैनिक/सामरकि गतिशीलता, अर्थबजार, ऊर्जा र वातावरणजस्ता विषयमा चीन र भारतलाई नियालिरहेका अमेरिका र युरोपेली सङ्घका साथै अन्‍तराष्‍ट्रिय रूपमा नै दृढ निश्चयी बन्दै गएको अर्को एसियाली शक्ति जापान नेपालको तरलतामाझ कसरी प्रस्तुत हुँदै जाला भन्नेतिर सचेत हुनुपर्ने अवस्था छ ।
यसरी नयाँ नेपालको खाका आफू अनुकूल बनाउन पृथक् विदेशी कोणहरूबाट चालिने प्रत्यक्ष र परोक्ष कदमहरू महत्त्वपूर्ण बहसका छुट्टै विषय हुन् । राष्ट्रहितविपरीत हुनसक्ने सबै खाले प्रयासहरूको प्रतिरोध गर्ने क्षमता नेपालको नहोला । तर, राष्ट्रिय नेतृत्वले सुझबुझ देखाउन सकेमा विदेशी सरोकारवालाहरूको प्रचुरताले पनि एक प्रकारको अवसर दिनेछ । हाम्रा राजनीतिक दलहरूले भने आफ्नो सुविधा अनुसार वैदेशिक 'हस्तक्षेप'बारे कहिले उग्र बन्दा र कहिले मौनता साँध्दा खुला र र्सार्थक राष्ट्रिय बहस सुरु हुन दिएकै छैनन् ।
त्यसो त, राजतन्त्रको विरोधले गर्दा मात्र एकीकृत भएका राजनीतिक शक्तिहरूबीचको सहमतिको स्वरूप गणतन्त्रको आगमनसँगै समाप्त हुनु थियो र भयो । त्यसलाई जीवित राख्न सक्नु उदारताको परिचायक हुने थियो । तर, जनताले दलहरूको हैसियत निर्धारण गरिदिइसकेपछि त्यो कत्तिको सम्भव हुन्थ्यो - त्यसमाथि प्रतिस्पर्धात्मक प्रकृतिको राजनीतिक व्यवस्थाका लागि त्यस्तो सहमति कत्तिको वाञ्छनीय हुने थियो भन्ने प्रश्न छँदैछ ।
निर्वाचन परिणामले प्रमुख दलहरूबीच ऐतिहासिक परविर्तन संस्थागत बनाउनका लागि महत्त्वपूर्ण पदहरूको भागबन्डा हुनुपर्ने बाध्यता खडा गरिदियो । तर, फरक विचारधारा बोकेका दलहरूबीच चुनाव नतिजा अनुसार अन्तरमि संविधानमा आफू अनुकूल संशोधन खोज्ने उत्सुकताले अविश्वास पनि बढायो । दोहोरो भूमिका दिइएको संविधानसभाले पनि महिनौँ बित्दासम्म पनि अन्तरमि व्यवस्थापिकाको आकारभन्दा माथि उठ्न सकेन । सरकार गठनपछि पनि आग्रह-पूर्वाग्रहद्वारा प्रेरति तीतोपन कायम रहने हो भने संविधान निर्माण प्रक्रियामा मुलुक कहिले र कसरी प्रवेश गर्ला ?
नयाँ नेपालको मुहार हेर्न जतिसुकै आतुर रहे तापनि जनताले राजनीतिक दलहरूको इतिहास बिर्सन सक्ने कुरै भएन । खुला राजनीतिक दलका हैसियतमा माओवादीहरूले पनि खासै पृथक् पहिचान बनाउन सकेनन् । विगतमा मूलधारका राजनीतिक दलहरूको विश्वसनीयता गुम्दै जाँदा वैकल्पिक आग्रह र आह्वानहरूले श्रोता पाए ।
संसदीय प्रजातन्त्रका नाममा भ्रष्टाचार, कुशासन र राजनीतिक अस्थिरता फैलियो भनेर विदेशी राजदूतहरू र अन्‍तराष्‍ट्रिय दातृसंस्थाका प्रमुखहरू कराउँदै गए तर त्यो गुञ्जनले तत्कालीन व्यवस्थामा सकारात्मक परविर्तन ल्याउनभन्दा पनि मुलुकलाई विकल्पहरूको खोजीतर्फउन्मुख गरायो । बदलिँदो अन्‍तराष्‍ट्रिय र क्षेत्रीय पृष्ठभूमिमा विदेशी स्वार्थहरूको टक्करमाझ खलनायक पनि नेपालीहरू नै बन्न गए अनि बहुमूल्य समय पनि नेपालीहरूले नै खेर फाल्न पुगे । त्यसैले, अहिलेको बाक्लिँदो राजनीतिक अविश्वास एक दलले अर्काको मानमर्दन गर्ने अस्त्र मात्र नबनोस्, जनताले आफ्ना नेताहरूको खिल्ली उडाउने आधार पनि नबनोस् ।

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, साउन १२, २०६५)

सन्तुलनको सङ्र्घर्ष

सञ्जय उपाध्याय
गणतन्त्रात्मक नेपालले आफ्नो सन्तुलन खोज्ने क्रममा बेहोर्नुपरेका राजनीतिक जटिलताहरू जति उदेकलाग्दा भए पनि तिनलाई हाम्रा नयाँ यथार्थका उपज नै मान्नुपर्दछ । आधुनिक नेपाल स्थापना भएदेखि राजतन्त्रले ओगटेको स्थानमा आएको रिक्तता भर्न भइरहेका आन्तरकि र बाहिरी अभ्यासहरू कहिले सहयोगात्मक छन् त कहिले द्वन्द्वात्मक । सिद्धान्त र सुविधाको पारस्परकि प्रभावले स्थितिलाई झनै कठिन बनाएको छ ।संविधानसभा निर्वाचन र गणतन्त्रको घोषणापछि जनसाधारणमा नयाँ नेपालको प्रारम्भिक खाका हेर्न उत्सुकता बढ्नु स्वाभाविक नै थियो । प्रमुख राजनीतिक दलहरूको कार्यसूचीमा भने आ-आफ्नो अधिकतम प्रभाव कायम रहने गरी राज्य संरचनामा पकड जमाउनु प्राथमिकता बनेको छ ।आठतिर फर्केका राजनीतिक दलहरू राजतन्त्रविरुद्ध एकीकृत भएको अवस्थामा सहमतिको एउटा विशेष महत्त्व थियो । नयाँ परिवेशमा दलहरूको धर्म आ-आफ्ना नीति र कार्यक्रमका आधारमा प्रतिस्पर्धा गर्नु नै हुन जान्छ । यसलाई फोहरी खेल वा पदलोलुपताका रूपमा नहेरिदिन नेताहरूलाई जनसमक्ष आग्रह गर्न कति मन लाग्दो हो । तर, उनीहरूको विगतले नै विश्वसनीयता घटाएको छ । उता खुला राजनीत्रि्रति माओवादीहरूको प्रतिबद्धतामै शङ्का-उपशङ्का चलिरहेका बेला उनीहरूले दिने स्पष्टीकरणको खासै मूल्य नरहला । त्यसो त वर्तमान अन्योल अनपेक्षित थिएन । सुरुमा माओवादीहरूले संविधानसभाको माग गर्दा अन्य दलहरूले त्यसले 'पेन्डोराको बाकस' खोल्ने छ भनेर करबिकरबि एकै स्वरले विरोध गरेका थिए । अहिले प्रस्फुटन भएका अधिकार, प्रतिनिधित्व, समावेशीकरण र सम्मानका मागहरू सम्बोधन गर्न कोभन्दा को कति पीडित र पिछडिएका रहेछन् भन्ने कुराको छिनोफानो हुन सकेको भए सजिलो हुन्थ्यो होला । त्यसको मापन जात, धर्म, वर्ण, वर्गले मात्र गर्न नसक्ने हुनाले नै सङ्कट राष्ट्रिय राजनीतिको मुटुमै यसरी गहिरिँदै गएको प्रस्ट छ । मधेसकै कुरा गर्दा त्यसको भौगोलिक र भावनात्मक अवधारणाबीचको दूरीलाई आँक्ने फुर्सद मुलुकलाई भएन । देशभित्र र बाहिर प्रतिष्ठाको विषय बनेको निर्वाचन सम्पन्न गर्नका लागि नै गत फागुनमा सम्झौता गरिएको कुरा जिम्मेवार नेताहरूले बिनासङ्कोच स्वीकारेका छन् ।दलहरूका पृथक् प्रकृति र स्वभावले पनि गतिरोधलाई निरन्तरता दिइरहेका छन् । सम्झौतालाई क्रान्तिप्रति धोका ठान्ने माओवादीहरूले शान्ति प्रक्रियाका नाममा मूलधारका दलहरूसँग एकपछि अर्को सुविधा लिँदै गए । निर्वाचनपछि जब आफूहरूले त्याग गर्नुपर्ने बेला आयो, माओवादीहरूलाई आफूहरू क्रान्तिकारी भइरहेको भ्रमजालले छाडेन ।नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसलाई प्रतिपक्षमै बस्न गाह्रो लाग्ने थिएन होला । तर, ऊ अहिले अस्तित्वको लडाइँ लडिरहेको छ । वयोवृद्ध सभापतिपछि नेतृत्वका लागि कोइराला परविारभित्रका दाबेदारहरूको लडाइँलाई अन्य नयाँ पुस्ताका नेताहरूबीचको हानथापले जटिल बनाएको छ । प्रेरणादायी नीति र नेतृत्वबाट मात्र अब आफ्नो भविष्य सुनिश्चित हुने निष्कर्षा पुगेका कार्यकर्ता र र्समर्थकहरू ती दुवैको खडेरी लम्बिरहने भयले ग्रस्त देखिन्छन् । काङ्ग्रेस मात्र लोकतन्त्रको पर्याय भएको दाबीद्वारा बढाइने आत्मविश्वासले कति समय थेग्ला ?नेकपा एमालेको प्राथमिकता नेपाली वामशक्तिको अग्रस्थानमा आफूलाई पुनःस्थापित गर्नमा रहेको कुरा विभिन्न नेताहरूले फरक शब्द र शैलीमा बताइरहेका छन् । 'युथ फोर्स'को स्थापना र क्रियाकलाप हेर्दा एमालेले यसका लागि उग्रताको अस्त्र प्रयोग गर्न खोजेको भान हुन्छ । सत्ता र प्रतिपक्षको अनुभवमा खारिएको मध्यमार्गी परचिय मेटेर एमालेले क्रान्तिकारी बाटोमा हिँड्न खोज्नु मुलुकका लागि कति नै अग्रगामी होला र ? यति सशक्त रूपमा मधेसी दलहरूको उपस्थिति नेपालीहरूका लागि नौलो भएको छ । अन्य दलबाट छुट्टिएर गएका तर एउटै छातामुनि आबद्ध हुन सकेका परिचित नेताहरूको मूल्याङ्कन गर्ने क्षमता जनसाधारणसँग छ । साना दलहरूको हैसियत त मतदाताहरूले तय गरसिकेका छन् ।यस्तो आन्तरकि अस्तव्यस्ततामाथि नेपालमा विशेष प्रभाव राख्दै आएका विदेशी शक्तिहरूको आकाङ्क्षा र अपेक्षा थपिएका छन् । भारत, चीन र अमेअमेरिका लागि राजतन्त्र स्थायित्वको आधार रहँदै आएको थियो । त्यसको ठाउँ लिने र्सवस्वीकार्य निकायको अभावमा नै विभिन्न गठबन्धन बन्दै र बिग्रदै गरेको बुझ्न गाह्रो पर्दैन ।नेपाली काङ्ग्रेस र मधेसी दलहरूको तादात्म्यले भारतलाई केही आश्वस्त तुलाउन सक्ला । चीनको चाख वामशक्तिहरूको व्यापक मोर्चालाई पूर्वराजावादीहरूले दिने टेवाप्रति नै रहेको हुनुपर्दछ । भारतभन्दा एक कदम अघि सरेर अमेरिकाले सेनालाई गैरवामपन्थी मोर्चाको मेरुदण्डका रूपमा देखेको होला ।एउटाको आधारभूमिमा अर्कोले अतिक्रमण नगर्ला भनेर कसरी भन्ने । चीन र भारत दुवैले पछ्याएको माओवादीलाई अमेरिकाले आतङ्ककारी भन्दाभन्दै निर्वाचन परिणाम आएलगत्तै अल कायदासँग तुलना गर्न नमिल्ने स्पष्टीकरण दिई नै सकेको छ । तर्राईमा अहिले सक्रिय भएका र जन्मन सक्ने समूहहरूसँग चीन नजिकिने अवस्था नै नआउला र ? दलहरूका लागि विदेशीहरूको कृपापात्र बन्नु र कोपभाजनमा पर्नु दुवै अभिशाप भएको स्थितिमा सन्तुलनको खोजी कतै अनन्त हुने त होइन ?
(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, असार २९, २०६५)

हस्तक्षेप र हितको हल्कापन

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

नेपाल-भारत सम्बन्धको गाथामा हालै एउटा रोचक पक्ष गांसिन पुग्यो । केही भारतीय नेताहरूले एक र्सार्वजनिक भेलामा नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले अविलम्ब नेकपा माओवादीलाई सत्ता हस्तान्तरण गर्नुपर्ने कुरामा निकै जोड दिए । काङ्ग्रेसको अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय विभागले सो भनाइलाई हस्तक्षेपको संज्ञा दिंदै त्यसको चर्को विरोध गर्‍यो ।
बेलाबखत नेपालबाट आउने यस्ता रोषयुक्त प्रतिक्रियासमक्ष भारतीयहरू विभिन्न रूपले प्रस्तुत हुने गरेका छन् । नीतिगत विषयमा कुनै व्यक्ति वा संस्थाको विवादास्पद भनाइ आउंदा त्यससित आफ्नो कुनै संलग्नता नरहेको भारत सरकारले औपचारकि स्पष्टीकरण दिने गरेको छ । कहिलेकाही त्यस्ता विचार व्यक्त गर्नेले नै स्पष्टोक्ति दिएर माफीसमेत मागेका छन् । अनि, नेपाली भावनामा पुगेको चोटलाई कुनै वर्गविशेषको पूर्वाग्रह ठानी उपेक्षा पनि गरिएको छ ।
भारतीय राष्ट्रवादी काङ्ग्रेसका महासचिव डीपी त्रिपाठीले त आफ्नै बाटो समाए । नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसको वक्तव्यलाई 'कृतघ्नताको परचिय' भन्दै उनले सो फिर्ता लिइनुपर्ने मागसमेत गरे । अनि, सुरुकै भनाइ दोहोर्‍याउंदै नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसलाई जनादेशको पाठ पढाए ।
नेपाली काङ्ग्रेस हाम्रो मुलुकमा भारतको सबैभन्दा नजिकको राजनीतिक मित्रका रूपमा चिनिन्छ । त्यस बुझाइको फाइदा र बेफाइदा विभिन्न पुस्ताका काङ्ग्रेसी नेताहरूले देखेका र भोगेका छन् । वर्तमान सभापति गिरिजाप्रसाद कोइरालाले त छ दशकदेखि भारतलाई विभिन्न हैसियतमा रहेर नियालेका छन् । प्रधानमन्त्रीको चार कार्यकालमध्ये अहिले आएर मात्र कोइरालाले आफ्नो अनुभवलाई केही आकार दिन खोजेको देखिन्छ ।
भारतको सहयोग रहेमा तर्राईको सुरक्षा स्थितिमा तुरुन्त सुधार आउन सक्ने अभिव्यक्ति दिएर कोइरालाले आफ्नो अप्रसन्नतालाई शालीन भएर प्रस्तुत गरे । आफ्नो आत्मकथा सुनाउने क्रममा कोइरालाले आफू भारतमा रहंदा गरेका र गराएका केही 'अवाञ्छनीय' क्रियाकलापहरू त्यहांको सरकारको जानकारीमा रहेको खुलासा गरे । परिवार एवम् निकटस्थहरूको जमघटमा उनले भारतविरुद्ध बोलेको भनिएका शब्दहरू छापामा अविरल आउंदा पनि कोइराला खण्डन गर्न उत्सुक देखिंदैनन् ।
जनआन्दोलन-२ सफल भएलगत्तै भारतीय प्रधानमन्त्री मनमोहन सिंहले दिल्लीमा प्रधानमन्त्री कोइरालालाई दक्षिण एसियाकै सम्मानित नेता भनेर स्वागत गरे । कोइरालालाई भने असोज १८, २०५९ र माघ १९, ०६१ बीच भारत सरकारको ध्यान नेपाली प्रजातन्त्रको भविष्यप्रति जान नसकेको पीडाले पोलिरहेको हुंदो हो । अझ टनकपुरको दलदलमा आफू फस्दै जांदा भारतबाट सहानुभूतिको सट्टा सतर्कता बढेको अनुभव पनि उनमा ताजै हुंदो हो ।
नेपालको राजनीतिक उतारचढावका विभिन्न चरणमा नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले भारतबाट भोग्नुपरेका असुविधाका पुलिन्दा यति भारी हुंदाहुंदै पनि जनताले आफूहरूलाई भारतपरस्त भनेर नै चिन्दा कति नेता-कार्यकर्ताको मन दुखेको होला ?
यसै पनि हस्तक्षेपकर्ता र हितैषी छुट्याउन त्यत्ति सजिलो छैन । उता व्याख्याताको नैतिक धरातलमा पनि धेरै कुरा भर पर्छ, मूलधारका राजनीतिक दलहरू र माओवादीबीच सहकार्यको अभावमा शाही सरकार ढल्ने सम्भावना क्षीण रहेको अवस्थामा भारतीय राजनीतिक संस्थापनका केही पक्षले व्रिद्रोहीहरूलाई सहयोग गर्नुपर्ने नीति अगाडि सारे । भारत सरकारभित्र त्यस्तो उत्कट नीति परविर्तनप्रति मतैक्य हुन सकेको थिएन । सिंह सरकारलाई बाहिरबाट र्समर्थन गररिहेका वामपन्थीहरूको प्रयास सफल हुने देखिएपछि भारतीय जनता पार्टी बाहेक अन्य सबै प्रभावशाली दलहरू त्यसको हिमायती हुन पुगे ।
ती दलहरू आ-आफ्नै स्वार्थबाट प्रेरति भएको बुझ्न गाह्रो थिएन । शाही सरकारकै केही विरोधीहरूले पनि उतिबेलै यसलाई हस्तक्षेपका रूपमा देखेका थिए । तर, नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसलगायतका दलहरूले यस प्रयासलाई असल छिमेकीको सराहनीय चासो भनेर परिभाषित गरे । यस अवस्थामा भारतीय नेताहरूले आफूहरूलाई नेपालको शान्ति प्रक्रियाका महत्त्वपूर्ण लगानीकर्ता ठान्न अस्वाभाविक थिएन । अहिले आएर आफूलाई अनुकूल हुने गरी तिनीहरू प्रस्तुत नभएकै कारण त्यस चासोलाई हस्तक्षेप ठान्ने नैतिक आधार नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले त्यतिबेलै गुमाएको थियो ।
त्रिपाठीको प्रतिक्रियाले ओझेलमा पारेको अर्को वक्तव्य यहां स्मरण गर्नु उचित हुन्छ । भारतीय जनता पार्टीले वैचारिक प्रेरणाको स्रोत मानिंदै आएको राष्ट्रिय स्वयम्सेवक सङ्घका अध्यक्ष केएस सुदर्शनले नेपालको अस्थिरताले भारतलाई पुर्‍याएको खतराका लागि जवाहरलाल नेहरूलाई दोष दिए । नेहरूले भारतमा विलय हुने नेपाली प्रस्ताव मानिदिएको भए आज यो समस्या रहने थिएन भन्ने एक र्सार्वजनिक समारोहमा सुदर्शनले गुनासो पोखे ।
यो कुरा भाजपालगायत अन्य भारतीय दलका नेताहरूले भन्दै आइरहेका हुन् । तर, अन्य भारतीय नेताहरूले झै सुदर्शनले प्रस्तावक भनेर तत्कालीन राजा त्रिभुवनलाई औंल्याएनन् । उनले प्रधानमन्त्री मातृकाप्रसाद कोइरालाबाट त्यो प्रस्ताव आएको बताए । त्रिभुवनले कहिले र कुन सर्न्दर्भमा विलयको प्रस्ताव गरेका थिए भनेर भारतीयहरूले नखुलाएजस्तै मातृका कोइरालाका बारेमा पनि सुदर्शनले थप केही भनेनन् । मातृका कोइरालाका सम्बन्धमा आजका काङ्ग्रेसीहरूले जे-जस्तो धारणा राखे पनि उनी ००७ सालको आन्दोलनका सर्वोच्च कमान्डर थिए भन्ने कुरा सबैले स्मरण गरेकै हुनुपर्छ ।
विदेशीहरूले आफ्नो सुविधा अनुसार विगतका घटना र प्रवृत्तिको व्याख्या गर्दा मरसिकेका प्रमुख पात्रहरू न आफ्नो सफाइ दिन सक्छन्, न त त्यससम्बन्धी थप विवरण नै । बांचेकाहरूले हस्तक्षेपकर्ता र हितैषीका बारे यसरी हल्का नभइदिए राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थ सशक्त ढङ्गले अघि बढाउन सकिन्थ्यो कि !

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, असार १५, २०६५)

राष्ट्रियताः चांदीको घेरा

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

राजतन्त्रको अवसानपछि प्रमुख दलहरूबीच चुलिएको शक्तिसंघर्ष जति अप्रिय लागे पनि नयां नेपालतर्फको यात्रामा त्यसलाई स्वाभाविक मान्नुपर्ने स्थिति देखापर्दैछ। यसलाई पराजयवाद वा निराशावाद नभई हाम्रो विशिष्ट अनुभवबाट निसृत यथार्थका आधारमा बुझ्नुपर्ने भएको छ। असहमतिहरूकै समायोजनका रूपमा दुइ वर्षेखि अघि बढिरहेको शान्ति प्रक्रिया अर्न्तर्गत गन्तव्यको खोजीमा उदेकलाग्दा राजनीतिक गतिरोधहरू कहां बाट कसरी आउलान् भन्न सकिदैन।
संविधान निर्माण प्रक्रियामा ठूला दलहरूले भावी राज्य संरचना र त्यसका संस्थाहरूमा आफ्नो अधिकतम लाभ हुने गरी अघि बढ्न खोज्नु अस्वाभाविक हुने छैन। संविधानसभामा उपस्थित साना दलहरूले त अहिले नै आफूहरू उपेक्षित भएको गुनासो गर्न थालेका छन्। सभाबाहिर रहेका र उपस्थित हुनसक्ने समूहहरूको प्रभाव आकलन गर्नुपर्ने चुनौतीका बारे समसामयिक नेपाली इतिहासले उजागर गरिदिएको छ। मुलुकले समातिसकेको बाटोबाट विमुख हुने विलासिता कसैलाई नहुने भएकाले यस प्रक्रियालाई सहज बनाउन यथार्थवादी नबनी सुखै छैन।
यहां राजनीतिक टक्करको एउटा आयामको चर्चा गर्न खोजिएको छ। राजतन्त्रको विधिवत् समाप्तिपछि विभिन्न दलका नेताहरू प्रत्यक्ष र परोक्ष रूपमा आफूहरूलाई लोकतन्त्रका साथै राष्ट्रियताका संरक्षकका रूपमा प्रस्तुत गर्न आतुर देखिएका छन्। यसलाई उनीहरूको दरबार नै विगतमा राष्ट्रियताको संरक्षक भएको स्वीकारोक्तिकै रूपमा बुझ्न गाह्रो पर्ला। कथित 'मण्डले राष्ट्रवाद'का चर्का आलोचकलाई पनि र्सार्वभौमसत्ता, राष्ट्रिय अखण्डता, प्राकृतिक सम्पदा र साधनलगायत नेपाली प्रतिष्ठासंग जोडिएका सम्पूर्ण विषयहरूको प्रवर्द्धन गर्नुपर्ने उतरदायित्वबोध भएको मान्नुपर्दछ। जुन स्वाभिमानी नेपालीका लागि सन्तोषको विषय भएको छ।
तर, राष्ट्रियताका प्रश्नमा ठूला दलहरू आ-आफ्नै कोणबाट सक्रिय हुने हुंदा त्यसको सम्वर्द्धन प्रक्रिया सहज हुने देखिदैन। लोकतन्त्र/प्रजातन्त्र भन्ने शब्द र शैलीमा एकाधिकार जमाउन तल्लीन नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले अन्तर्राष्टिय समर्थन जुटाएर राष्ट्रियताको प्रवर्द्धन गर्नसक्ने एक मात्र भरपर्दो शक्ति आफूलाई नै देखेको छ। विगतले भने उसलाई पूर्ण साथ दिएको छैन। तीनवटै कोइराला दाजुभाइका प्रधानमन्त्रित्वसंग जोडिएका तीन नदी सम्झौतासम्बन्धी तथ्य-सत्य जेजस्ता भए पनि ती हाम्रो इतिहासका विवादास्पद प्रसङ्ग बनिसकेका छन्।
सन् ५० को सन्धिको पुनरावलोकनको मुद्दालाई पहिलोपल्ट सशक्त र औपचारकि रूपमा उठाएको श्रेय नेकपा एमालेलाई जान्छ। टनकपुरको मुद्दालाई राष्ट्रिय बहसमा ल्याएर राष्ट्रवादी छवि बनाएको एमाले सरकारमा पुगेपछि महाकाली प्याकेजको दलदलमा फस्न पुग्यो। सत्ताच्यूत भइसकेपछि उक्त सन्धिको अनुमोदनमा मतियार बनेको आरोप एमालेले बोकिरहेको छ। सो सन्धिप्रतिका आन्तरकि असहमति नै पार्टी विभाजनको एउटा कारक बन्न पुगेको कुरा अहिले आएर अप्रासङ्गिक भएको छ। त्यस्तै पीडाबोधले पनि होला, एमालेको एक भ्रातृसङ्गठन नै नयां भारतीय राजदूतको हस्तक्षेपकारी भूमिकाको सबैभन्दा सशक्त विरोधी बन्न पुग्यो।
जनयुद्ध सुरु गर्दा गणतन्त्रभन्दा माथि राष्ट्रियतासम्बन्धी मुद्दाहरू राखी ४० बुदे मागपत्र प्रस्तुत गरेका माओवादीहरूलाई उनीहरूले पछिल्लो समयमा भारतीय भूमिमा पाएको आश्रयले केही धक्का पुर्‍यायो। अन्तरिम संसद् र सरकारसम्म आइपुग्दा उनीहरूलाई नागरकिता कानुनले गलायो। दरबारका वरिपरि बसेका केही मानिसहरूको देशभक्तिको बखान गाउदै आएका माओवादी अध्यक्ष अहिले आएर भूतपुर्व राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रलाई नै राष्ट्रवादी मोर्चामा आमन्त्रित गर्न पुगेका छन्।
मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरम जन्मिएको पृष्ठभूमिले नै उसलाई राष्ट्रियताको विषयमा अरूभन्दा खरो बन्नुपर्ने बाध्यता छ। करिबकरिब त्यही स्थिति तराई मधेस लोकतान्त्रिक पार्टीको पनि छ। एउटै क्षेत्रमा ती दुइ पार्टी वीीचको प्रतिस्पर्धाले राष्ट्रियताको बहसलाई कसरी निर्देशित गर्नेछ, त्यो हेर्न बांकी छ। मुद्दाविशेषमा साना दलहरूका बीच बन्ने समीकरण र त्यसलाई आ-आफ्नो सुविधा अनुसार परिचालन गर्न ठूला दलहरूको उत्सुकताले पनि भावी राजनीतिलाई प्रभाव पार्नेछ।
सरकारको नेतृत्व सम्हालिसकेको अवस्थामा नेकपा माओवादीले पनि व्यावहारकि बाध्यता सामना गर्नैपर्ने हुन्छ। जनमानसमाझ लचकताले कति सजिलै आत्मर्समर्पणको पनि रूप धारण गर्न सक्दो रहेछ भन्ने त माओवादीहरूले एमालेको अनुभवबाटै बुझिसकेको हुनुपर्दछ। एमाले क्रान्तिकारी बन्न पुगेको अवस्थामा सत्ता सञ्चालन गर्न माओवादीहरूलाई थप चुनौती पर्ला नै।
रह्यो नेपालमा हावी हुदै आएका तीन प्रमुख विदेशी शक्तिका आकाङ्क्षा र अपेक्षा। दुइ चरणको शाही शासनका अवधिमा प्रभाव विस्तार गरेका अमेरिका र चीन लोकतन्त्र बहालीपछि निकै अगाडि बढेका छन्। आउदा दिनहरूमा तिनको प्रभाव आकलन गर्न उनीहरूको भारतसंगको नीतिगत समन्वय र टक्करका सम्भावनाप्रति सजग रहनुपर्ने हुन जान्छ। तिब्बत प्रदर्शनका सन्दर्भमा चीनद्वारा अपनाइएको सक्रिय सतर्कताले नेपालीहरूलाई दुवै छिमेकीहरूको चासो र क्षमताबारे झन् चनाखो बनाइदिएको छ।
अस्पष्ट बादलहरूका बीच चांदीको घेरा पनि छ। राष्ट्रियतासम्बन्धी मुद्दाहरूमा राजनीतिक दलहरूले लिने इमानदारीपूर्ण अडानलाई सामन्ती निरङ्कुशताको कृत्रिम चीत्कार भनेर निस्तेज पार्ने सुविधा अब विदेशी शक्तिहरूलाई हुने छैन।

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, असार १, २०६५)

व्यावहारिकताकै वर्चस्व

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

नेकपा माओवादीको चुनावी सफलतापछि आफूले आतङ्ककारी घोषित गरेको समूहप्रति 'पर्ख र हेर'को नीतिमा पुगेको अमेरिकालाई भूराजनीतिले अझ यथार्थवादी बन्न कर लगाएको छ। नेपाली जनमतको नवीनतम् अभिव्यक्तिलाई हाम्रा दुइ विशाल छिमेकीहरूले आ-आफ्नै ढङ्गले आत्मसात् गरेको सर्न्दर्भमा तेस्रो प्रभावशाली वैदेशिक शक्तिले समय खेर फाल्न सक्ने कुरै थिएन।
माओवादीहरूसंग औपचारिक सम्पर्क कायम गरी परामर्शका लागि वासिङ्टनतर्फलागेकी अमेरिकी राजदूत न्यान्सी पावेलले स्थितिको गम्भीरताबारे आफ्नो सरकारलाई सशक्त ढङ्गले अवगत गराउन सकेको प्रतीत हुन्छ। पावेल वासिङ्टनमै छंदा एक अमेरिकी अधिकारीले माओवादीहरूलाई 'आतङ्ककारी बहिष्करण सूची'मा राखेको स्पष्टीकरण दिदै आफ्नो सरकारले तिनलाई अल कायदाकै समकक्षी नठानेको भनाइ सार्वजनिक गरे।
पावेल नेपाल फर्केलगत्तै दक्षिण एसियाली मामिलासम्बन्धी उपसहायक विदेशमन्त्री इभान फैगनबउम काठमाडौ आइपुगे। माओवादी अध्यक्ष प्रचण्डलाई भेटी फैगनबउमले उनको दलको सरकारलाई अमेरिकी सहयोग रहने आश्वासन दिए। भलै त्यसको खुलासा माओवादी पक्षलाई गर्न लगाए।
व्यावहारकिताको सम्बन्ध कायम गर्नमा माहिर चीनले शान्ति प्रक्रियाको आरम्भसंगै माओवादीहरूलाई पूर्ण राजनीतिक दलका रूपमा स्वीकार गरसिकेको थियो। नेपालभन्दा पहिले आफूले आतङ्ककारी भन्दै आएको समूहलाई राजतन्त्रविरुद्ध मूलधारका राजनीतिक दलहरूसंग १२ बुदे सम्झौता गराउन भारतलाई व्यावहारकिताले नै अभिप्रेरित गरेको थियो। पूर्वविद्रोहीहरू सरकारमा संलग्न भएपछि नयां दिल्लीलाई राजनीतिक सम्बन्ध बढाउन सजिलो भयो। यस्तो अवस्थामा अमेरिकालाई पुरानै कठोरतामा रहिरहन सम्भव थिएन।
त्यसो त माओवादीहरूलाई आतङ्ककारीको सूचीमा राख्न अमेरिकालाई राष्ट्रिय सुरक्षाभन्दा राजनीतिले नै अभिप्रेरित गरेको थियो। अघिल्लो शताब्दीमै साम्यवादलाई विश्वव्यापी रूपमै परास्त गरेकामा गर्व गर्ने अमेरिकालाई संसारको एउटा कुनाबाट त्यसको पुनरुत्थान हुनसक्ने सम्भावना ग्राह्य भएन। २००१ सेप्टेम्बर ११ को आक्रमणपछि त अमेरिकीहरूलाई राजनीतिक प्रकृतिको हत्या र हिंसा अभियानलाई आतङ्कवादकै स्वरूपमा देख्ने वातावरण बन्यो। अमेरिकी राजदूतावासमा कार्यरत दूइ नेपाली नागरकिको हत्या एवम् कोकाकोलाजस्तो अमेरिकी स्वामित्वमा रहेको व्यापारकि प्रतीकमाथिको माओवादी आक्रमण निश्चय पनि अल कायदाले गरेजस्तो गतिविधिको कोटीमा पर्दैनथे।
उता माओवादीहरू दोस्रो शान्तिवार्तामा बसेका बेला कार्यकारी निर्णयद्धारा बुस प्रशासनले उनीहरूमाथि आतङ्ककारीको बिल्ला लगाएको थियो। त्यसको खास अर्थ र तात्पर्यका बारेमा नेपालीहरूलाई जानकारी गराउन राजनीतिक रूपले अमेरिकालाई चासो भएन। परविर्तित सर्न्दर्भमा त्यो राजनीतिक दृष्टि अप्रासाङ्गिक भयो नै।
राजनीति, संस्कृति, अर्थ, सुरक्षा, प्रविधि र वातावरणजस्ता कोणहरूबाट एसियाका दुइ शक्तिहरूलाई नियालिरहेको अमेरिकाले काठमाडौमा अत्याधुनिक दूतावास बनाएर यहां आफ्नो दीर्घकालीन चासो रहने जनाउ दिइसकेको थियो। भारत र चीनले जस्तै अमेरिकालाई पनि आफ्नो नेपाल नीतिलाई र्सार्वजनिक रूपमै समायोजन गर्नु अपरिहार्य भइसकेको थियो।
घटनाक्रमले माओवादीहरूसंग हात बढाउन अमेरिकीहरू नै बढी आतुर भएजस्तो देखिए पनि धरातलीय यथार्थका सूक्ष्म अध्ययनकर्ता हाम्रा पुर्वविद्रोहीहरू पनि कम उत्सुक छैनन्। आफूहरूलाई दमन गर्न विभिन्न समयका सरकारहरूलाई भारत र चीनले सैनिक सहयोग दिएको विगतप्रति आंखा चिम्लन सक्ने माओवादीहरूले अमेरिकालाई मात्र अपवादका रूपमा लिने कुरै थिएन।
यी तीनवटै प्रभावशाली मुलुकहरूले केही सतर्कताका साथ आफूहरूलाई हेररिहेको अवस्थामा माओवादीहरूलाई पुरानै सूत्र समातेर तिनका अन्तरविरोधहरूबाट हुन सक्ने लाभको आकलन गर्न मौका मिल्यो। राष्ट्रियताको नाराद्वारा चीनलाई आकर्षण गर्न खोजेका माओवादीहरूले भारतको समर्थनबिना सत्तामा पुग्न अनि रहिरहन नसक्ने कुरा बुझेकै थिए।
राजतन्त्रको विरोध गर्दागर्दै पनि दरबारले आफूलाई भूराजनीतिक सन्तुलनको प्रतीकका रूपमा उभ्याउन सकेको कुरा परोक्ष रूपमा माओवादीहरूले सुरुदेखि नै स्वीकारेका थिए। आन्तरकि भन्दा पनि बाह्य आकाङ्क्षा र अपेक्षाले यहांको राजनीतिलाई जटिल बनाउने गरेको यथार्थ त जनयुद्धको इतिहासको एउटा पाटो नै बनिसकेको थियो।
नेपालको राजनीतिक अस्थिरताको सम्पूर्ण दोष राजनीतिक संस्थापन एवम् सम्बन्धित विदेशी शक्तिहरूले राजतन्त्रलाई बोकाउन सफल भए पनि माओवादीहरूले सत्ता सञ्चालन गर्दा आफूहरूले बेहोर्नुपर्ने चुनौती राम्ररी बुझेको देखिन्छ। चुनावी परिणामपछि माओवादी नेतृत्वभित्र चुलिएको भनिएको शक्ति-संघर्षलाई उनीहरूको भारत र चीनबीच समदूरीको नीति अपनाउने सार्वजनिक उदघोषबाट अलग राखेर हेर्न मिल्दैन।
दुइ ठूला छिमेकीका स्वार्थहरूमाझ अलिकति पनि असन्तुलन आउनेबित्तिकै माओवादीहरूलाई पर्ने सङ्कट तल्लो पङ्क्तिमा व्याप्त क्रान्तिकारिताले बढाउनेछ। त्यस अवस्थामा भौगोलिक दूरीले मात्र विश्वको एक मात्र महाशक्तिलाई बाटो छेक्ने छैन। अमेरिकाको दह्रो समर्थन पाउन नसकिहाले पनि सशक्त विरोध खेप्न नपरे स्थिति माओवादीहरूलाई केही सहज बन्नेछ। काठमाडौमा भएका तिब्बती प्रदर्शनहरूका सन्दर्भमा वाईसीएलको निस्कृयतालाई माओवादीहरूले आफ्ना विकल्पहरू खुला राखेको भनी बुझ्नुपर्ला कि ?

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, जेठ १९, २०६५)

Nepali Congress: Between Haughtiness and Humility

By Sanjay Upadhya
May 18, 2008

Presumptuous as it may seem, the Nepali Congress’ posture after the Constituent Assembly elections is quite understandable. The imperative of handing power to the Maoists, who won the largest bloc of seats, as well as the reluctance to cede the political field to the former rebels both stem from the party’s unique position in the country’s politics.
The Nepali Congress’ predilection for equating itself with democracy must be unnerving to its rivals. Still, there is an element of truth in the claim. If non-Nepali Congress parties – meaning communists in Nepal’s context – had spearheaded the democratic movements of 1950-51, 1990 and 2006, it is debatable whether they would have won the same level of international support, more so in view of Nepal’s sensitive geopolitical realities. Moreover, the government of the day would have found it far easier to resist the challenge.
Then there is that other bitter truth. The Nepali Congress was at the center of the political accidents of 1960 and 2002 (which set the stage for the 2005 royal takeover). No matter how much you berate the palace’s “autocratic tendencies”, the sequence of events does not absolve the Nepali Congress. A party that could endure profound odds to ensure the triumph of democracy was simply ineffective when it came to preserving it. The Nepali Congress’ visceral ability to alienate its political rivals, compounded by bitter internal feuds, eventually subverted democracy on both occasions.
In an organization where ideology has served more as an adhesive for disparate factions rather than a living ideal, you would expect leaders to be more vigilant. Instead, the party always equated the triumph of democracy with its eternalness, forcing the country to pay the price.
Despite winning the second largest number of seats in the Constituent Assembly elections, many Nepali Congress leaders are still smarting from what they consider a humiliation. The party’s failure to benefit from the split in the communist vote must have been painful enough. The fact that the Maoists surged despite the fact that the Nepali Congress controlled the premiership as well as the principal ministries must have exacerbated the soreness.
During previous setbacks, Nepali Congress members have routinely faulted, among other things, extreme nepotism and favoritism, allegations of corruption swirling around senior leaders and the party’s tendency to forget the tenets of democracy once in power for its woes. This time the party was mired in a deeper mess.
In the name of preserving the peace process at all costs, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala systematically rebuffed party members to accommodate the Maoists. Within the Koirala family, rival claimants to the leadership mantle veered closer to the palace and the Maoists respectively. Senior party leaders effortlessly conceded that reunification had not really brought the two factions closer emotionally.
In their quest to reinterpret B.P. Koirala’s national reconciliation policy, the dominant faction discredited people like former premier Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and former speaker Taranath Ranabhat as “royalists”. The post-election hand-wringing over how the royalist vote could go to the Maoists became meaningless.
The Constituent Assembly, republic, an inclusive state structure and other major slogans of contemporary Nepal clearly belonged to the Maoists. Despite having broken with the monarchy, the Nepali Congress could still have built a platform based on religious, social and cultural coexistence. By outlook, temperament and record, Nepali Congress leaders were ill suited for challenging the status quo. There was no way the party could have outdone its rivals in the race for the most revolutionary visage.
The major parties worked hard to project the Constituent Assembly elections as one-in-an-epoch opportunity. Still the people turned out in number barely larger than in the three parliamentary elections after the 1990 change. If the Maoists really triumphed solely on intimidation, as their rivals continue to claim, then the ex-rebels were sophisticated enough to have perpetrated fear under the gaze of international observers. Surely, the Maoists cannot be expected to take responsibility for the Nepali Congress’ failure to recognize that.
The imperative of ceding power to the largest bloc in the new assembly is inherently democratic. Yet it is hard to describe as undemocratic the reluctance to do so to a party that has done precious little to assure the people of its democratic intentions. If any other party had refused to respect the people’s mandate in such a way, the international community would have been outraged long ago.
Whatever the reasons for the Nepali Congress’ setback, it is far from fatal. The party will continue to monopolize the halo of democracy until, at least, the Unified Marxist-Leninists change their name and flag. This is reality is something the Nepal Congress can approach with either humility or haughtiness. The choice will determine its future.

Maoists Confront The Price Of Power

By Sanjay Upadhya

Electoral success has begun to soften Nepal’s former Maoist rebels. The leader of the once-feared organization, Pushpa Kamal Dahal – who still goes by his nom de guerre “Prachanda” (The Fierce One) – is calling for political consensus as the Himalayan nation prepares to abolish the monarchy and write a new constitution.
On foreign policy, too, Prachanda has diluted his party’s earlier threats to abrogate a controversial treaty with India, ban Indian films and stop recruitment of Gurkha soldiers into the Indian and British armies. C.P. Gajurel, chief of the party’s international division, has said the ex-insurgents would stop calling the Americans “imperialists” and the Indians “expansionists”.
Even on the question of the monarchy, the Maoists have been speaking of a “graceful exit” for King Gyanendra. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the party’s chief ideologue, had broached the idea of keeping a “cultural king” who would preside over the predominantly Hindu nation’s myriad festivals and rituals, before coming under criticism from the party. Still, Prachanda has sought a meeting with the monarch to ask him personally to leave the royal palace. The Maoists have said that Gyanendra, as a commoner, could run his businesses and perhaps even enter politics.
At one level, this mellowing stems from sheer expediency. Defying most predictions, the Maoists emerged as the principal force in the April 10 elections. Still, they lack a majority in the 600-plus assembly. The Nepali Congress and the other main communist faction, the Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML), are still licking their electoral wounds. Both are divided on whether to join a Maoist-led government.
Prachanda has said he would give Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala a “respectable” position in a new government. Some have taken this to mean the presidency, after King Gyanendra is formally ousted by the assembly. Dr. Bhattarai, however, insists that Koirala must join the monarch in exiting the national stage.
Koirala, for his part, has come under growing criticism from his Nepali Congress for ceding too much to the Maoists in the name of boosting the peace process that formally ended the decade-long insurgency that claimed at least 13,000 lives. The prime minister, who had said he would resign after the elections, is holding consultations with other political parties on forming the next government.
Some Maoist leaders suspect something sinister behind the maneuvering. They believe the Nepali Congress and the UML are colluding with the Nepali Army and “foreign power centers” to prevent the ex-rebels from heading the new government. And not without reason. Nepali Congress leaders insist the Maoists must first disband their fighting force, currently sequestered in U.N.-supervised camps. The UML, like the Nepali Congress, wants the former rebels to stop attacks on political rivals, end their kangaroo courts and return property confiscated during the insurgency.
The three major external stakeholders, too, are adjusting to the Maoists’ unexpected triumph. The United States, which still considers the Maoists a terrorist organization, has softened its stance after the election. U.S. Ambassador Nancy Powell met with Prachanda, opening Washington’s formal contact with the ex-rebels, before flying to Washington for consultations. It is unclear, though, whether the U.S. government would immediately withdraw the terrorist tag from the Maoists.
India, Nepal’s traditionally influential neighbor to the south, organized a conference on strengthening bilateral relations. The Maoists’ call to renegotiate the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, a demand enjoying wider political support in Nepal, received a patient hearing. Still, India has its own priority and a new ambassador has assumed charge. New Delhi hopes the election in Nepal would encourage its own Maoist insurgents to renounce violence and enter the mainstream. The Indian Maoists, however, seem to be in defiant mood. In a statement, they described Nepalis’ electoral verdict as a defeat for “Indian expansionism.”
Nepal’s northern neighbor China, which had opposed the Maoist insurgency, has steadily built ties with the former rebels. The regularity of pro-Tibet demonstrations in Kathmandu over the past two months has heightened Beijing’s sensitivities on what it has long considered a volatile frontier. Prachanda’s assertion that his party would maintain “equidistance” between Nepal’s two giant neighbors will have placated Beijing somewhat. In New Delhi, it has intensified concern, especially among sections skeptical of the Maoists’ real motives. One veteran analyst, B. Raman, recently wrote that India may have no alternative to backing a military takeover to prevent the Maoists from gaining strength.
Surely, those offering such an extreme prescription have an eye on the turmoil within the Maoist party. Before the election, the former rebels had projected Prachanda as their presidential candidate. Now they have nominated him as the next prime minister, effectively edging out the more articulate Dr. Bhattarai. Although the change has not resulted in any public split in Maoist ranks, the two men do share a history of rivalry.
Immediately, though, the Maoists must contend with the expectations of the rank and file. The Maoists put 23,500 fighters into the camps. As part of the peace agreement, they are to be integrated into the national army. However, the generals do not want to accept the fighters right away, saying they are still politically indoctrinated.
The Maoists have sent women and members of traditionally marginalized groups to the assembly in numbers unprecedented for Nepal. Still, there are rumblings of discontent. Last week, Prachanda faced the first organized protest from within the party over the choice of legislators under the proportional representation category.
Such discord is not new in Nepali politics. The Nepali Congress and the UML suffered damaging splits after having failed to reconcile internal differences. Unlike the Maoists, however, they had already led the government.

आफ्नै कांधको भार

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

संविधानसभामा सबैभन्दा ठूलो दल बनेको नेकपा माओवादीलाई सरकारको नेतृत्व नसुम्पनका लागि केही पक्षले अघि सारेका तर्कहरू वैदेशिक आडमा लोकतन्त्रका आधारभूत मान्यतामाथिको ठाडो अतिक्रमण हुन् वा शक्ति बांडफाटका लागि एउटा दबाबसूत्र मात्र, त्यो त प्रस्टिदै जाला । समग्र बहसको स्तरले भने राजनीतिक असमझदारी गहिरिदै जाने पूर्वाभास भएको छ ।
प्रबुद्ध अन्तर्राष्ट्रय पर्यवेक्षकहरूले निर्वाचन सामान्यतः स्वतन्त्र र निष्पक्ष भएको ठोकुवा उत्तिखेरी नगरिदिएका भए सायद सडकमा अहिले टायर जलिरहेका हुन्थे र ढुङ्गामुढा बर्सिरहेका हुन्थे । भित्रभित्रै भने आगो सल्किरहेकै छ । मतदाताद्वारा निर्दिष्ट आ-आफ्नो हैसियत अनुसार नयां संविधान बनाउन तर्फ कसरी लाग्ने भन्नुको साटो अन्य दलका केही नेताहरू माओवादीलाई कसरी अर्को चुनावमा तह लगाउने भन्नेमै तल्लीन देखिन्छन् ।
यहां २०५२ सालको त्रिशङ्कु संसद्को अनुभव सम्झनुको कुनै तुक रहेन । उतिबेलाको संयुक्त वा अल्पमत सरकार बनाउने प्रस्ट संवैधानिक प्रावधान एवम् त्यसलाई क्रियाशील बनाउन प्रत्यक्ष राजनीतिभन्दा माथि रहेका राष्ट्राध्यक्ष छैनन् । असाधारण परिस्थितिले असाधारण प्रयोजन खोज्ने नै भयो ।
चुनावभन्दा धेरैअघि नै सत्तासीन दलहरूले आफूहरूबीचकै सहमतिका आधारमा राज्यव्यवस्था चलाउने प्रतिबद्धता अन्तरिम संविधानमै जनाइसकेका थिए । नयां शक्तिका रूपमा उदाएको मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमका साथै सभामा उपस्थित अन्य साना दलहरूलाई कसरी प्रभावकारी संयन्त्रमा समावेश गर्ने भन्ने कुराले प्रमुखता पाउनुपर्ने थियो । प्राथमिक विद्यालयको चौरमा सुनिने धमास र घुर्र्कीको स्तरमा पो त बहस झर्‍यो ।
माओवादी अध्यक्ष प्रचण्डले आफूलाई राष्ट्राध्यक्ष पदको उम्मेदवारका रूपमा प्रस्तुत गर्दा र उनलाई 'भित्ते राष्ट्रपति' भनेर अन्य दलका नेताहरूले ठट्टा गर्दा अन्तरिम संविधान सबैका छेउमै थियो । जनताले त्यसमा अन्तरमि राष्ट्रपतिको प्रावधान नभएको कुरा बुझ्न फुर्ुसद पाएनन् होला । नेता र दलहरूले उनीहरूलाई बुझाउन नखोज्नु वा नसक्नुको परिणाम मुलुकले कतिसम्म भोग्दै जाने। प्रचण्डको सैनिक ओहदा र वाईसीएलको उद्दण्डतालाई उनको प्रधानमन्त्री बन्ने अभियानको बाटोमा तगारो देख्नेहरू चुनावअघि दृष्टिविहीन पक्कै थिएनन् । उता वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई शान्ति प्रक्रिया यहां सम्म पुर्‍याएकै आधारमा निरन्तरता दिनु वाञ्छनीय हुने हो भने किन उनलाई आजीवन सरकारप्रमुखको पदवीले विभूषित नगर्ने।
सुरुबाटै शान्ति प्रक्रियालाई जसरी पनि कायम राखिनुपर्ने बाध्यताले आफ्नै प्रकारका तनावहरू सिर्जना गरेको थियो । असहमतिहरूको समायोजन गर्नका लागि सहभागीहरूले पनि आफ्नै नियम बनाए । कहिले राजनीतिक त कहिले संवैधानिक अनि कहिले व्यावहारकि अनिवार्यताद्वारा निर्देशित प्रक्रियामा हचुवा र हल्का निर्णयहरूसमेत अनिवार्य बन्न पुगे । पुराना प्रतिबद्धताहरू नै सबैतिर अलपत्र पररिहेका बेला तिनको पुनःव्याख्या गर्नु सजिलो जुक्ति थियो । सङ्घात्मक गणतन्त्रको ऐनामा नयां नेपालको अनुहार देखियो ।
नयां समस्या र र्सत आइलाग्नासाथ अन्तरिम संविधान संशोधन गरिहाले पुग्ने परम्परालाई अहिले आएर तोड्न सजिलो हुने कुरै भएन । सरकार बनाउन र खसाउन यदि दुइतिहाइ समर्थनको सर्त समस्या बनेको हो भने त्यो फेर्न खोज्नु नै प्राथमिकता भयो । तर, सहमतिका नाममा अस्थायी प्रकृतिको विधान आफू अनुकूल संशोधन मात्र गररिहने हो भने मूल काममा कसले, कहिले र कसरी ध्यान दिने।
विदेशी अनुगमनकर्ताहरू ल्याप्चे लगाएर गइहाले पनि नेपालले उनीहरूको सदासय पाइरहला । भूतपूर्व अमेरिकी राष्ट्रपति जिम्मी कार्टर माओवादीमाथि आफ्नो देशले लगाएको आतङ्ककारीको बिल्ला उतार्न सफल हुन् भन्ने कामना गरौला । तर, यथार्थपरक रहनु नै श्रेयस्कर होला । नेपालपछि सिरिया पुगेर कार्टर वासिङ्टनद्वारा आतङ्ककारी घोषित अर्को सङ्गठन हमासका नेतालाई भेटेर विवादमा परे । अमेरिका फर्केपछि कार्टरले लेखेका र बोलेका शब्दहरू केलाउदा त उनले माओवादी र हमासलाई वर्तमान अमेरिकी विदेश नीतिविरुद्ध उनको बृहत् अभियानमा समाहित गरेको देखियो । यस्तो समायोजनले राख्न सक्ने अर्थका बारेमा माओवादीहरू नै सबभन्दा पहिले चनाखो बनेका होलान् ।
अनमिनमा रहेका विदेशी शुभचिन्तकहरू नेपालले शान्ति प्रक्रियाको अहम् खुड्किलो पार गरेकामा खुसी छन् । हामीकहां विशिष्ट र सीमित राजनीतिक लक्ष्य लिएर संयुक्त राष्ट्रसङ्घ आउनुमा हाम्रै अनुरोधका साथै हाम्रा दुइ विशाल छिमेकीहरूका संवेदनशीलताले काम गरेका थिए । अनमिन राष्ट्रसङ्घ मुख्यालयमा राजनीतिक विभागले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय स्तरमै द्वन्द्व निरोध र व्यवस्थापनमा लिन खोजेको बढ्दो भूमिकाकै उपज पनि थियो । यस प्रसङ्गलाई निश्चय पनि गौण मान्न सकिन्न ।
हाम्रो शान्ति प्रयासमा संलग्न अन्य अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सङ्घसंस्थाहरू पछिसम्म पनि नेपालबारे र्सतर्क रहिरहलान् । उनीहरूलाई संसारभर कार्यक्षेत्रको कुनै कमी रहने छैन । समय र स्रोतका अभावले उनीहरूको उत्सुकतालाई सीमाङ्कन गर्नेछ । जहां सम्म हाम्रा पारस्परकि अविश्वासकै कारण विदेशीहरूलाई निम्त्याइएको यथार्थ छ, त्यसको पर्याप्त सुनुवाइ त चुनावअघि नै हुनसकेको थिएन । कमजोरै भए पनि समझदारी बढाउने अभिभारा हाम्रै कांधमा रहिरहनेछ ।

(नेपाल राष्ट्रिय साप्ताहिक, बैशाख २२, २०६५)

सत्ताको अभिशाप

सञ्जय उपाध्याय
नेकपा माओवादीको अनपेक्षित चुनावी सफलतालाई सबैले आ-आफ्नै ढङ्गले व्याख्या गर्ने क्रमको तीव्रतालाई हर्दा मुलुकले सर्वस्वीकार्य स्पष्टीकरण पाउन गाह्रो पर्ने देखिन्छ। त्यसैले त्यतातिर समय खर्चनुभन्दा भविष्यप्रति उन्मुख हुनुमै बुद्धिमानी ठहरिनेछ । स्पष्टै भन्नुपर्दा माओवादीहरूको सफलतालाई स्वीकार गर्दागर्दै पनि त्यसले निम्त्याउन सक्ने प्रतिक्रिया, प्रभाव र प्रवृत्तिको आकलन गर्नु अत्यावश्यक छ।
उत्कृष्ट वैज्ञानिक दर्शनका अनुयायी भएकोमा गौरव गर्दै आएको माओवादी नेतृत्वले नतिजाको बराबर र विपरीत प्रतिक्रियाको अपेक्षा गररिहेकै होला। नयां राजनीतिक दललाई नवीनताले नै केही न केही फाइदा पुर्‍याउने गर्छ। माओवादीहरूको हकमा त उनीहरू रूपान्तरति भएर आएका हुन्, त्यो पनि एक दशकसम्म हत्या र हिंसाका प्रतीक बनेर।
बन्दुक र बमका साथसाथै उनीहरूले राज्यविरुद्ध शब्दजालको सशक्त प्रयोग गरे। जनयुद्धभरि आफूहरूलाई जसले जसरी हेरेको भए पनि ती विविध बुझाइको तुंवालो पछाडि बसेर नेतृत्वले सङ्गठनलाई यहां सम्म पुर्‍याउन सफल भयो।
निर्दोष नागरकिमाथि भएका जघन्य अपराधपश्चात् माओवादी नेताहरूले कतिपटक आत्मालोचना गरे। राज्यले त्यस्ता घटनाहरू हुदै जानुलाई नेतृत्वले तल्लो पङ्क्तिमाथि पकड गुमाएको भनी अर्थ्यायो। माओवादीहरूले सो बुझाइको प्रतिवाद गर्न उति आवश्यक ठानेनन्। कारण खुल्दै पनि गयो। आफ्ना मूल्य, मान्यता, भाव, आवश्यकता र अपेक्षाका बारेमा आमजनतामा जति भ्रम बाक्लियो, त्यति नै उनीहरूलाई फाइदा पुग्ने भयो।
राजतन्त्र उन्मूलनको अभियानमा चुर्लुम्म डुब्दा पनि दरबारसंगको कार्यगत एकता रहेको स्वीकारोक्ति त एउटा कडी मात्र थियो। दरबार हत्याकाण्डपछि गद्दीनसिन भएको घडीदेखि आफूहरूले खेद्दै आएका राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रको सरकारसंग दुुइपटक वार्तामा बस्न माओवादीहरूलाई असहज भएन। त्यसभन्दा पहिले नारायणहिटी काण्डमा संलग्न रहेको आरोप लगाउदै बहुमतप्राप्त प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई गैरप्रजातान्त्रिक प्रक्रियाबाट पदच्यूत गराउन विद्रोहीहरूले मूलधारका प्रतिपक्षीहरूलाई मद्दत गरेका थिए। पांच वर्ष नबित्दै माओवादीहरू तिनै वयोवृद्ध व्यक्तिको पछि लागेर सिंहदरबार छिर्दा देशले गाह्रो मान्न पाएन।
वार्ता र युद्धलाई पर्यायवाची धरातलीय यथार्थ बताएर नेपाली मनमस्तिष्क रन्थनाउने माओवादीहरूले शान्ति प्रक्रिया अंगालेपछि आफ्नो कुटिलतालाई पनि परिस्कृत गरे। वाईसीएलको उदय र उद्दण्डता एवम् राज्यसत्ता जसरी पनि कब्जा गर्ने चेतावनीजस्ता कुराले माओवादीहरूको अन्तिम लक्ष्यलाई झनै अस्पष्ट बनायो। शाब्दिक चालबाजीको चलन त व्यापकै रहेछ । मूलधारमा समाहित हुन लागेर नेतृत्वले जनयुद्धलाई धोका दिए भनेर कटु आलोचना गर्दै आएका रवीन्द्र श्रेष्ठ त तुलनात्मक रूपले दक्षिणपन्थी एमालेमा छिर्न गए।
नकारात्मक धरातलमै उभिएका शक्तिहरूमध्येबाट र्सार्वभौम नेपाली जनताले माओवादीलाई रोजेका छन्। संविधानसभा निर्वाचन अभियानलाई सबै दलले संसदीय चुनावभन्दा पृथक् नबनाइदिएकाले माओवादीहरूलाई पनि नयां नेपालको खाकामा अल्झिरहनु परेन। तर, अब शासनभार आई नै सकेपछि राष्ट्रको मूल कानुन निर्माण गर्ने प्रमुख जिम्मा माओवादीहरूले नलिई सुखै छैन।
सरकार र सभामा रहने अन्य दलहरूको पनि दायित्व उत्तिकै रहनेछ। तर, उनीहरू मूल रूपले आ-आफ्ना दीर्घकालीन हित सुरक्षित गर्ने खालको संविधान बनाउन प्रयत्नरत हुने हुंदा प्रक्रिया सहज हुने छैन। त्यसमाथि श्रोताका अनुहार र अपेक्षा हेरेर आफ्ना मूल्य र मान्यता व्याख्या गर्ने माओवादीहरूको पुरानो बानीको स्मरण गराइरहने काममा विपक्षी चुक्ने छैनन्। सरकारमा रहने अन्य दलहरूले अपजस जति माओवादीका थाप्लामा थोपर्न खोज्नु अस्वाभाविक हुने छैन। उता काङ्ग्रेस र एमालेमा चुनाव हारेका हस्तीहरूको प्रभाव र प्रवृत्ति सभाबाहिर सवल हुने नै देखिन्छ।
सत्ताको अभिशापले माओवादीहरूलाई व्यापक सहमतिका लागि सहिष्णु बन्न कर लगाउला पनि। तर, जतिसुकै इमानदारीका साथ अन्य दलतर्फ बढ्न खोजे पनि उनीहरूलाई आफैले बुनेको अविश्वासको जालबाट उम्कन सजिलो हुने छैन। उता राज्यसत्तामाथि एकाधिकारको मनोविज्ञानबाट अभ्रिप्रेरित माओवादीहरूको तल्लो पङ्क्तिले नेतृत्वले अन्य दलहरूसंग गर्नसक्ने सम्झौताको दायरा सङ्कुचित बनाउने सामर्थ्य राख्नेछन्। सत्ताबाहिर रहेका र उब्जन सक्ने समूहहरूका असन्तोषका बारेमा त माओवादी नेतृत्वलाई केही भनिरहनुपरेन। असन्तोषको आगो सल्केपछि त्यसमा आ-आफ्नै स्वार्थका लागि घिउ थप्नेहरूको अभाव देशभित्र वा बाहिर रहने छैन।
सुरक्षाको कवचका लागि माओवादीहरूले पनि अन्ततः विदेशीहरूलाई नै समाउन पुगे भने त्यो उनीहरूलाई समस्या बन्ने देखिन्छ। जङ्गलबाट राजधानी पसेको वर्षदन नपुग्दै सङ्गठनमा कुन गुट उत्तर र कुन दक्षिणतिर ढल्केको भन्ने र्सार्वजनिक चर्चाको विषय बनिसकेको थियो। बाह्य शक्ति संगको सामीप्यको मूल्य कति चर्को पर्ने हो एवम् त्यो आफूहरूले नै बेहोर्नपर्ने यथार्थ बुझ्न त माओवादीहरूले काङ्ग्रेस र एमालेलाई हेरे पुग्छ। यस ऐतिहासिक क्षणमा आशङ्का र असमझदारी चिर्दै सबै राजनीतिक शक्तिहरू अघि बढ्न सकून् भन्ने कामना गरौ।

जनमत जगेर्नाको जिम्मेवारी

सञ्जय उपाध्याय
संविधानसभा निर्वाचन होला कि नहोला भन्ने आशङ्कापछि सुनिने गरिएको अर्को प्रश्न अहिले आएर गहन बन्दैछ । चुनाव भइहाले नेकपा माओवादीले आफूप्रतिकूल नतिजालाई स्वीकार्ला - राजतन्त्र र संसदीय व्यवस्था दुवैविरुद्ध हत्या र विध्वंसमा उत्रेको समूह बहुदलीय मूलधारमा आउनुलाई त्यसै पनि स्वाभाविक मानिएको थिएन । त्यसमाथि दसवर्षे 'जनयुद्ध'द्वारा राज्यलाई घु“डा टेकाउन नसके पनि उनीहरू पराजित नभएको यथार्थ सबैका सामु छदै थियो ।
घटना, प्रवृत्ति र पात्रबीचका अन्तरद्वन्द्व चर्काएर त्यसबाट भरपूर फाइदा लिदै आएका माओवादी नेताहरू अहिले आएर कहिले जनमतको आदर गर्ने प्रण गर्छन् त कहिले षड्यन्त्रद्वारा रचिने पराजयको प्रतिकार गर्ने चेतावनी दिन्छन् । के लाई षड्यन्त्र मान्ने र कस्तो प्रतिकार गर्ने भन्ने कुरा उनीहरूले आफैमा सुरक्षित राख्न खोज्नु अनौठो होइन ।
आममतदाताको स्थिति भने दयनीय बनेको छ । दलहरूभित्र कसैलाई संविधानसभा चुनाव राष्ट्रपति बन्ने माध्यम बनेको छ भने कसैले त्यसलाई प्रधानमन्त्री बन्ने अवसरका रूपमा लिएका छन् । जनप्रतिनिधिको त्यत्रो झुन्डले कसरी, कहिलेसम्म र कस्तो संविधान बनाउलान् भन्नेतर्फध्यान पुर्‍याउन नपाउदै कतै माओवादीलाई हराए तिनीहरूले देशलाई पुनः हिंसाको चक्रमा फसाउलान् भन्ने डर आइलागेको छ ।
बाकी सबै दलहरूलाई मौका दिइसकेर निरास भएकाहरूमध्ये कतिलाई माओवादीको पक्ष्मा मत खसाल्न त्यति गाह्रो नपर्ला । तर, यो समूहलाई पनि विजय-पराजयपश्चात् माओवादीहरूले एकदलीय अधिनायकवाद लादे भने कसरी उम्कने भन्ने प्रश्नले कतै न कतै पिरोलेको हुनुपर्दछ ।
समसामयिक विश्व परिस्थतिमा साम्यवादी अधिनायकवाद टिक्न नसक्ने विश्वास लिएर बसेकाहरूलाई नेपालको भूराजनीतिक अवस्थितिले अझ उत्साहित बनाएको होला । माओवादीहरू स्वयम्ले सत्ता कब्जा गर्न सके पनि त्यसलाई टिकाइरहन गाह्रो पर्ने कुरा राम्ररी बुझेकाले त्यस्तो कुनै दुस्साहस नगर्लान् भन्न सकिएला । तर, आधारभूत रूपले सदैव आफ्नै स्वार्थबाट अभप्रेरित रहने हाम्रा दुुइ छिमेकीहरूले अन्य बाह्य शक्तिहरूलाई विस्थापित गर्नैका लागि कतै माओवादीहरूलाई नै स्वीकार त नगर्लान् ।
जनमतका बारेमा शङ्का निवारण गर्ने जिम्मा माओवादीहरूले लेलान् भनेर सोच्न उनीहरूकै पृष्ठभूमिले दिदैन । सत्तासीन साना दलहरू सरकारकै कतिपय निर्णयो खरो आलोचना गर्न पछि पर्दैनन् तर सरकार पनि छोड्न सक्दैनन् । अन्तरिम संसद भित्र र बाहिर पञ्चायती पृष्ठभूमि भएकाहरूले केही बोले प्रतिगमनको प्रतिविम्ब देखिने भइहाल्यो । मधेसका नया दलहरू सरकारसंगको सम्झौतापछि आफै रनभुल्लमा छन् । राजा त शान्ति प्रक्रियाको हकमा निलम्बित अवस्थामै रहेका छन् । अझै पनि दरबारप्रति बफादार भनिएको सेनालाई गुहार्ने हो भने पहिले देशले दुइ वर्ष देखि बुझेको लोकतन्त्रको पुनःव्याख्या नै गर्नुपर्ने हुन्छ ।
नेपालीहरूको आपसी अविश्वासकै कारण शान्ति प्रक्रियालाई सहज बनाउन आएको संयुक्त राष्ट्रसङ्घ अहिले स्थिति सुध्रिएको छैन है भनेर खुलेरै भन्छ । बारम्बारको त्यस्तो खबरदारीमा उसले आफ्नै जिम्मेवारी पूरा गर्न नसकेको स्वीकारोक्ति देख्न सकेको छैन । लोकतन्त्र, मानव अधिकार र समावेशीकरणप्रति प्रतिबद्ध अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय गैरसरकारी सङ्घसंस्थाहरूले केही गर्न सक्ने थिए । तर, अहिले उनीहरू नेपाल सरकारले तिब्बती प्रदर्शनकारीमाथि गररिहेको दुर्र्व्यवहारले स्तब्ध छन् ।
त्यसैले जनमतको कदर हुने प्रत्याभूति दिने दायित्व सत्तँसीन अन्य दुइ ठूला दलहरूको नै हुन जान्छ । त्यहा पनि कुरा सरल छैन । तीनवटा प्रजातान्त्रिक निर्वाचनमार्फ परीक्षित भइसकेको नेकपा एमाले अझै पनि साम्यवादी बिल्ला भिररिहेकै कारण शङ्काको घेराबाट पूर्ण रूपले बाहिरनि सकेको छैन । अन्ततः नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले नै त्यो जिम्मा लिनुपर्ने भएको छ । त्यो बुझेर उत्साहित बनेका सो दलका नेता, कार्यकर्ता र र्समर्थकहरू आफूहरूले मात्र लोकतन्त्रको रक्षा गर्न सक्ने नाराका साथ पो त जनतामाझ जान थाले । दायित्वबोध दम्भमा परिणत हुन बेरै लागेन ।
निश्चय पनि काङ्ग्रेस तीन-तीनवटा प्रजातान्त्रिक आन्दोलन नेतृत्व गरेको पार्टी हो । तर, बिर्सन नसकिने कुरा के पनि हो भने दुवैपल्ट प्रजातन्त्र अवरुद्ध हुदा काङ्ग्रेस नै सत्तामा थियो । दरबारको कथित अधिनायकवादी संस्कारलाई जतिसुकै दोष दिन खोजे पनि काङ्ग्रेसले आफूलाई पानीमाथिको ओभानो ठान्न मिल्दैन । बहुमतको अहङ्कार र पार्टी अन्तरद्वन्द्वकै सम्मिश्रणले २०१७ र ०५९ का राजनीतिक दुर्घटनाहरूलाई निम्त्याएको प्रस्टै छ ।
हो, यसपटक आन्दोलन सफल भइहाल्यो भनेर काङ्ग्रेस अन्यत्र लम्कन त्यति आतुर भएको देखिएन । तर पनि पुराना रोगहरू बल्झिएकै छन् । चुनावी मनोनयन नपाएकाहरूले विद्रोही उम्मेदवारको लामो पङ्क्ति बनाएका छन् । शाही शासनका दूइ चरणभर भौतिक असुविधा खपेकाहरूमध्येकै केही नेताहरू अहिले राजावादी कित्तामा दर्ज भएकामा खासै असन्तुष्ट देखिदैनन् ।
उता बीपी कोइरालाको मेलमिलाप नीतिको र्सार्वजनिक दुहाई दिनेहरूलाई राष्ट्रपतिको दायित्वबोध भन्दा पनि संस्थापन पक्षप्रतिको असन्तुष्टिले अभिप्रेरित गरेको छैन भन्न सकिने स्थिति छैन । सरकार र राष्ट्रप्रमुखसमेत रहेका काङ्ग्रेस सभापतिले नै सम्भावित राजनीतिक दुर्घटनाको चर्चा गर्न थालेपछि के नै पो गर्ने ।

Tibet Unrest Squeezes an Unstable Nepal

Sanjay Upadhya
April 1, 2008
World Politics Review

From the TV footage coming out of Nepal these days, it is easy to forget that the Himalayan nation is struggling to build a viable democracy. Almost every day since mid-March, when anti-Chinese protests erupted in Tibet and other countries, images of Nepali police beating Tibetan demonstrators have been beamed around the world.
Nepal's major political parties and former Maoist rebels have promised to build an open and inclusive state after years of turmoil. The people are preparing to vote April 10 for a new assembly that would write a new constitution embodying a federal democratic republic. Yet barely two years after having defied King Gyanendra's direct rule, Nepali parties seem to have emulated the palace in cracking down on another group of pro-democracy protesters.
With China limiting international access to Tibet, the most conspicuous images of the anti-Beijing protests are coming out of the Nepali capital, Katmandu. The demonstrations and the strong government response have forced many ordinary Nepalis to ponder their geographical vulnerability.
Prithvi Narayan Shah, the monarch who established the modern Nepali state over two centuries ago from dozens of petty principalities, described his new realm as a "yam between two boulders." His successors fought two wars with the Tibetans, the last resulting in a Chinese retaliation, as British India, Nepal's southern neighbor, rebuffed the kingdom's pleas for assistance. In 1816, the British defeated Nepal in a war that cost the kingdom a third of its territory. After that, each giant saw Nepal as a useful buffer against the other. Amid the enclosement, Nepal's rulers were left struggling to strike the right balance in foreign policy.
The triumph of China's communists in 1949 raised fears of Nepal becoming the next domino. After Chinese troops overran Tibet the following year, India, newly independent, crafted a compromise that empowered Nepal's political parties under an assertive monarchy. Geopolitics continued to weigh heavily on Nepali politics.
In 1960, King Mahendra, father of the current monarch, dismissed Nepal's first democratically elected government and banned political parties in the shadow of growing Sino-Indian tensions. China moved swiftly to build ties with the palace, while India tacitly encouraged an anti-monarchy insurgency. India's defeat in a brief but bloody border war with China two years later encouraged New Delhi to engage the palace.
A decade later, the Nepali military crushed a U.S-backed Tibetan insurgency, as Washington opened ties with Beijing. The monarchy-led regime lasted until 1990, when it was swept away by the global democratic wave that the collapse of the Berlin Wall unleashed. Even so, change in Nepal would not have come so swiftly without improvements in Sino-Indian relations.
Until the mid-1990s, Beijing seemed to acquiesce in Nepal's close relations with India, buttressed by a shared religion and culture. When a group of radical Nepali communists revolted against the king and parliament in 1996 under the banner of Maoism, China grew uneasy. The instability bred by the Maoist insurgency renewed Chinese sensitivities over the 20,000 Tibetan refugees in Nepal.
Successive elected governments in Katmandu maintained a close watch on Tibetan exiles, in line with the country's "one China" policy. Days before King Gyanendra seized power in 2005, the multiparty government had shut down the Tibetan welfare center. After the restoration of democracy, Nepal continues to arrest escapees and deport them to China. The communist factions that dominate the current ruling alliance have criticized the anti-Chinese demonstrations. The Nepali Congress, which heads the coalition, has maintained a studious silence. The government recently announced it would close its side of Mount Everest during China's Olympic Torch relay to the summit in early May. The United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other organizations have deplored Katmandu's crackdown in language reminiscent of their toughness against royal rule.
While India, together with the United States and the European Union, has been actively pushing Nepal's peace process, China has considerably stepped up its overall role. Beijing has become unusually candid in asserting its interests. In public remarks, Zheng Xialing, the Chinese ambassador in Katmandu, has insisted that his country would not tolerate what he calls "foreign interference" in Nepal. Wang Hongwei, a leading Chinese expert on Nepal, has been more candid. In a widely read interview last year, Wang said his government felt "some foreign countries were trying to turn Nepal into the second largest base [after India] for Dalai Lama-led anti-Chinese activities."
Nepal did not figure on the official agenda during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's wide-ranging talks in China earlier this year. Although the visit was billed a success by both governments, Indian news media continue to voice concern about Beijing's growing influence on India's South Asian neighbors. Last month, the Indian Express newspaper, known to reflect official opinion, reported that China Study Centers had mushroomed along Nepal's border with India.
As Tibetans stepped up protests in Katmandu, photographs and video purportedly showing Chinese officials directing Nepali police circulated. Last week, the Times of India, reporting on what it called China's snub in summoning India's ambassador at 2 a.m. on a Saturday to protest against Tibetan activists breaking into the Chinese Embassy in Delhi, lamented how the Indian government was silent on the reported deployment of Chinese troops in Nepal.
That story prompted a sharp response from China's Global Times newspaper, which accused the Indian media of joining the West in an "anti-China chorus." Days later, the official Chinese news service Xinhua released what it called a signed confession from a participant claiming that the Dalai Lama's supporters planned to smuggle weapons into Tibet through Nepal.
In the midst of continuing domestic strife, Nepalis in general are looking forward to building a democratic and inclusive state. Many are also now wondering how much power over their fate really lies in their own hands.

नयां नेपालमा पुरानै अभिभारा

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

तिब्बत प्रकरणले नयां पुस्ताका नेपालीहरूलाई आफ्नो मुलुकको जोखिमपूर्ण भौगोलिक अवस्थितिका बारेमा सशक्त परचिय दियो । सार्वभौभ भनिएका जनताकै हातमा नेपालको भविष्य सुरक्षित रहने हो वा होइन भन्ने प्रश्नले त मुलुकलाई दक्षिणतिरबाट च्याप्दै आएको थियो । उत्तरतर्फका बाध्यताहरूको सार्वजनिक स्वरूपले उक्त बहसलाई व्यापकता दिएको छ ।
भूगोलले नै नेपाली राजनीतिलाई सदैव निर्देशित गररिहेको कुरा हाम्रा लागि प्रँज्ञिक मात्र नभएर एउटा जीवन्त यथार्थ बनिसकेको छ । आधुनिक इतिहासलाई मात्र केलाउने हो भने पनि २००७ सालको प्रजातान्त्रिक सफलता चीनको तिब्बत आगमनसंग कति नजिक जोडिएको थियो भन्ने प्रत्यक्ष अनुभव वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्री र उहांका समवयीहरूलाई छंदैछ ।
०१७ सालमा बहुदलीय व्यवस्थाको समाप्ति र निर्दलीय पञ्चायती व्यवस्थाको दशकौको निरन्तरतामा भारत र चीनबीचको कटुताले निर्वाह गरेको भूमिकासित परिचित नेपालीहरूको सङ्ख्या त अझ धेरै छ । निश्चय पनि ०४७ सालको जनआन्दोलनको सफलताका लागि बर्लिन पर्खाल भत्कनु र भारत-चीन सम्बन्ध सुध्रनुले मद्धत पुर्‍याएको थिए ।
तथापि, त्यस समय चीन आफै तियाननमेन कान्डपछिको तीव्र अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय विरोध नखेपिरहेको भए घटनाक्रमले अर्कै मोड पो लिने थियो कि भन्ने प्रश्न एउटा बौद्धिक विलासिता मात्र हुन सक्दैन । शाही सरकारको अल्पायु नेपाली आन्तरकि राजनीति प्रति चीनको औपचारिक निरपेक्षताका अभावमा अझ कति छोटिन्थ्यो होला ।
भूराजनीतिक यथार्थलाई समसामयिक अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सम्बन्धका मान्यताहरूसंग राख्दा देखिने विडम्बनाले नेपाललाई अहिले पोलिरहेको छ । पटकपटकका आन्दोलनपश्चात् नेपालीहरू दिगो र समावेशी प्रजातन्त्र तर्फ लम्किरहेको कुरालाई अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय समुदायले सराहना गररिहेको थियो । काठमाडौका सडकमा आफ्ना लागि त्यस्तै स्वतन्त्रता खोजिरहेका तिब्बती प्रदर्शनकारीहरूका टाउकामा बज्रिएका लट्ठीहरूका कारण रक्ताम्य दृश्य अहिले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय समाचार बन्न पुगे ।
नेपालको शान्ति प्रक्रियामा सम्मिलित विभिन्न अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सङ्गठन र व्यक्तित्वहरूलाई त यस विरोधाभासले झनै घोचेको हुनुर्पर्छ । द्वन्द्वपश्चात्को राज्य पुनःनिर्माणसम्बन्धी प्रयोगशालाका रूपमा नेपाललाई सदासय साथ हेररिहेकाहरूमध्ये कतिले त अहिले मुन्टो बटाररिहेका होलान् ।
त्यसो त तिब्बत प्रकरणले भारतको छविमा पनि धक्का नपुर्‍याएको होइन । विश्वको सबैभन्दा ठूलो प्रजातन्त्र हाक्ने सरकारले तिब्बतीहरूको स्वतन्त्रताको आकाङ्क्षाको अभिव्यक्ति कुण्ठित पार्न पुग्नुका पछाडि उसको पनि राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थ नै थियो । त्यसपछि दलाई लामाको नेतृत्वमा निर्वासनमा रहेको तिब्बती सरकारलाई आश्रय दिएको मुलुकले तिनैका र्समर्थकविरुद्ध बल प्रयोग गरेर दोह्रो मापदण्ड दर्शायो ।
निश्चय पनि भारतझै नेपाल नकारात्मक अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय जनमत थेग्न सक्ने अवस्थामा छैन । नेपालको बाध्यतालाई नेपालको संलग्नताका रूपमा नलिन अरूलाई कतिसम्म अनुनय गर्ने - सायद त्यो र्व्यर्थ हुनेछ । महत्त्वपूर्ण त हामीलाई अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय छविभन्दा पनि दुइ छिमेकी मुलुकहरूको सदासय नै रहनेछ ।
शान्ति प्रक्रियाका नाममा भित्रिएका केही तत्त्व र प्रवृति प्रति चीनको आफ्नो असन्तुष्टि असाधारण स्पष्टताका साथ व्यक्त गर्दै आएको धेरै भइसक्यो । विगत दुइ वर्षमा चिनिया सरकारी टोलीका लस्करबाट विभिन्नस्तरमा नेपाली अधिकारीहरूले यो सन्देश अझ विस्तृत रूपले पाएका होलान् । हामीकहां शान्ति स्थापना गर्न आएकामध्ये कसैले स्वतन्त्र तिब्बत अभियानलाई सहयोग गररिहेको भए-नभए पनि चीनलाई आश्वस्त पार्ने दायित्व हाम्रै हो ।
उता तिब्बती विरोध प्रदर्शन नियन्त्रण गर्ने काममा नेपाली प्रशासनिक एवम् सुरक्षा संयन्त्रसंग चीनको प्रत्यक्ष संलग्नता रहेको समाचारहरूप्रति भारतले कुनै दरिलो नकारात्मक प्रक्रिया नजनाइहाले पनि उसले त्यस्तै खाले चिन्ता सधै विभिन्न प्रसङ्गमा व्यक्त गर्दै आइरहेको जगजाहेरै छ ।
हो, शीतयुद्धकालको तुलनामा एसियाका यी महाशक्तिहरूको पारस्परकि सम्बन्धमा निकै न्यानोपन आएको छ । राजनीतिक स्तरमा भ्रमणको आदानप्रदानमा आएको तीव्रता, सैनिक र सुरक्षा मामलामा बढ्दै गएको समझदारी, व्यापारमा भएको गुणात्मक वृद्धि आदि त्यही सौहाद्रताका परिचायक हुन् । तर पनि सहयोग, प्रतिस्पर्धा एवम् होडबाजीसमेतको सम्मिश्रणमा आधारित यस सम्बन्धले नेपाललाई स्वाभाविक र अनपेक्षित असर पाररिहनेछ ।
यति हुदाहुदै पनि चीन र भारत दुवै आफ्ना द्विपक्षीय सम्बन्धभित्रका असहजताबाट तेस्रो वैदेशिक शक्तिले लिन सक्ने लाभप्रति सचेत छन् । यस्तो संवेदनशील अवस्थामा नेपाली नेतृत्व पङ्क्तिको सामूहिक विवेकमा आउने सानोभन्दा सानो ह्रासले पनि भयङ्कर परिणाम निम्त्याउने निश्चित छ । विदेशी चलखेल बढ्यो मात्र भनेर टाउको ठटाउनुको कुनै उपयोगिता छैन । सङ्क्रमणकाल भनेर छिमेकीलगायत कसैले छुट देलान् भन्ठान्नु त मूर्खताको पराकाष्ठा ठहरिनेछ ।
अग्रगामी परविर्तनका लागि राजतन्त्र वा गणतन्त्र एवम् एकात्मक वा सङ्घीय राज्य संरचनाजस्ता विषयहरू छिनोफानो गर्न तल्लीन नयां नेपालका निर्माताहरूका सामु दुइ ढुङ्गाबीचको तरुललाई सग्लो राख्नुपर्ने पुरानै अभिभारा कायम छ ।

Republicanism’s Recalcitrant Ripples

By Sanjay Upadhya
September 16, 2007

The Nepali Congress’ headlong plunge into republicanism has spawned some unruly ripples. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai emerged from seclusion to disapprove of the decision. He underscored his displeasure by visiting Crown Prince Paras in the hospital. This dismantling of the ruling alliance’s sustained boycott of the monarchy may have been symbolic, but it was no less significant.
Bhattarai’s stand was immediately ridiculed as a monumental irrelevance. One-time loyalists suddenly saw the sole surviving founding member of the Nepali Congress as a symbol of senility. They resurrected the dead, too. B.P. Koirala’s plea for reconciliation between democrats and the palace had lost its validity, the refrain went. Were B.P. alive, prominent Nepali Congress thinker Pradip Giri asserted, Nepal would have become a republic four years ago. What was more fascinating here was that so many quarters across the political spectrum spent so many sentences on exemplifying an irrelevance.
Whether Bhattarai’s view represented those of the more reticent Nepali Congress members in both factions is unclear. What it does show is that there are still those who see the party’s survival closely tethered to the monarchy’s.
Across the board, the euphoria did not last long among republicans. In retrospect, what the Nepali Congress leadership did was refer the republican agenda to its general convention. The impression is that the body would eventually rubber stamp the decision. Yet other parties do not seem so sanguine. Maoist chairman Prachanda, among others, has pondered in some detail over whether the Nepali Congress would go into the constituent assembly elections with a republican agenda and then vote for the retention of the monarchy.
So far, Prime Minister Koirala has adroitly played off the Maoists and monarchy against each other in an effort to maintain a tenuous peace. That strategy may be running its course. The Maoists have been able to push their 22 preconditions for the constituent assembly elections primarily on the strength of the second amendment to the interim statute.
The eight parties in power had empowered the interim legislature to abolish the monarchy if the palace were found to be obstructing the polls. The argument that the Maoists are somehow shifting the goalposts is, therefore, specious. The only way the other constituents in power can now rebut the ex-rebels is by certifying that the palace has done no such thing – something the maligned Bhattarai seemed to have grasped.
Koirala is keeping his principal card – if he has one, that is – close to his chest. Rooting for the monarchy may be the best route for daughter Sujata to win the succession struggle in the party and perpetuate the Koirala dynasty. The premier may have helped her by asserting that the country’s independence was at stake.
Having discharged the duties – spiritual as well as secular – of head of state over the months, Koirala may now covet the real job. But, surely, he knows that becoming the first president of Nepal would require much more than Prachanda’s consent. The ruling parties would need to persuade internal and external constituencies of their ability to sustain a republic. And reconciling India’s aspirations for a democratic Nepal with China’s desire for a stable one is the easy part.
The postponement of the constituent assembly elections was a thinly guised affirmation of Nepal’s failure to attain political equilibrium. If the elections are delayed once more, it will be because of this factor. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the government’s agreements with the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum and Chure-Bhawar Ekta Samaj have been unable to lift the national mood.
No one – within the country or outside – wants to be blamed for derailing the tenuous peace process. Yet everyone is aware of another fragility: Koirala’s age and ailments. Deep inside, the premier probably considers himself no less vulnerable to the S slur than Bhattarai.

The Koiralas’ Crown Compulsions

By Sanjay Upadhya
May 21, 2007

Contrary to all outward appearances of ambivalence, the Nepali Congress appears to have cemented the centrality of the monarchy to its identity. Each new reiteration by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala of the inevitability of a republic has encouraged some of his closest associates in the party to articulate the crown’s continued relevance with greater clarity.
This affinity, to be sure, does not stem from an underlying affection. Shared class characteristics, as the Maoists like to point out, may be responsible to some degree. If anything, political pragmatism is the prime compulsion for the Nepali Congress.
The precise details of the April 24, 2006 compromise between the Seven-Party Alliance and King Gyanendra – if there was one in the first place – remain under wraps. For Prime Minister Koirala, seizing that middle ground between the monarchy and the Maoists became the first order of business. By playing off the palace and the Maoists against each other, Koirala succeeded in bringing the former rebels into government.
In formalizing the postponement of the constituent assembly elections after roping in the Maoists, Koirala exhibited, more than anything else, his vaunted party-building skills. Maoist chief Prachanda saw where things were headed. Sensing a trap, key associates began to feel they might be better off staying out power. In retrospect, the feverish bargaining over rank and portfolios right up to Koirala’s departure for the SAARC summit in New Delhi provided a convenient cover for all the protagonists.
Prachanda has been making obligatory allegations of betrayal to fortify his flank within. The Maoist chief understands how perilous the peace front of his “people’s war” can be. Despite all the other good things his Young Communist League is doing, the bad ones are hogging the headlines. For the country, it no longer matters how deep the internal split in the Maoists really runs. The nationalism and revolutionary planks in their platform have decayed the fastest.
In the legacy-building stage of his political career, Prime Minister Koirala may have grasped Nepal’s broader options. Vignettes from his previous stints in power must be swirling around him. Facing massive street protests against the Tanakpur accord in 1992-94, Koirala certainly did not relish those pleas by some normally sympathetic Indians for New Delhi to distance itself from the man. The escalation of the Maoist insurgency, the political instability preceding the Narayanhity Massacre and the wider convulsions it created must have encouraged deeper introspection.
After King Gyanendra took over full executive powers in October 2002, Koirala and the Nepali Congress, like much of the mainstream, were at the nadir of their popularity. While other leaders geared up for the looming collision with the palace, Koirala considered his own vulnerabilities. When the palace-appointed government purportedly agreed with Maoist negotiators to limit the army to a five kilometer radius of the barracks, Koirala became the first leader to criticize this infringement of state sovereignty.
That statement became part of a wider dynamic that ultimately shut the door on a palace-Maoist deal that would have bypassed the parties. The bonus Koirala sought – and may have succeeded in getting – lay in plugging that vulnerable hole Tanakpur exposed.
Last year, when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh welcomed him to New Delhi as a South Asian statesman, Koirala must have found it hard to suppress that chuckle inside. For someone who had a hard time scheduling meetings with then-premier Atal Behari Vajpayee during the early years of the anti-palace movement, this was quite a leap – and illusory.
Koirala was too close to his illustrious brother not to have experienced the exasperation B.P. Koirala felt in the late 1960s before abandoning efforts to renew relations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. During the eight years B.P. was imprisoned at Sundarijal, time had not stood still.
B.P.’s subsequent years in exile must have occasioned ample review of his brief tenure as Nepal’s first elected premier. When Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared in parliament in November 1959 that any external aggression on Nepal and Bhutan would be treated as an aggression on India, B.P. felt compelled to respond.
Speaking in the Nepali legislature, Koirala said he took Nehru’s statement as an expression of friendship, but added that Nepal, being a fully sovereign and independent nation, decided its external and home policies without ever referring to any external authority.
Over a week later, Nehru affirmed he agreed entirely with Koirala’s interpretation, but not without disclosing the secret letters that had been exchanged with the 1950 Treaty. Of course, B.P. did not have the benefit of hindsight to see how his battle with the palace would only set the stage for a larger phenomenon that would marginalize the Nepali Congress for three decades. If B.P. considered exile in Sarnath a lot like Sundarijal, who could have understood this better than his youngest brother.
In his current tenure, Prime Minister Koirala has become a changed man. He is an ardent champion of China’s entry into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation as a full member. The prime minister appeared unconstrained in seeking the new Chinese ambassador’s help on ensuring smooth petroleum supplies as the Indian Oil Corporation began tinkering with the taps.
In the cryptic maneuverings that pass for Nepali politics, these moves may be devoid of real substance. Yet coming from Koirala, the symbolism becomes starker. It was not too long ago, after all, that he flew straight into New Delhi from talks in China, left alone to battle the diplomatic fallout. Unlike B.P. Koirala, age has made this prime minister less susceptible to external “penalties” for flaunting his independence. This allows him greater leeway to build his legacy.
The logical question here is whether Koirala can impose his views on a party that largely considers itself the principal victim of the palace. Koirala is the Nepali Congress. Those who broke away under Sher Bahadur Deuba in mid-2002 had an opportunity to prove otherwise. The country recognizes how far anti-Koirala-ism has worked. For most of the younger Koiralas competing for the family mantle, the monarchy remains a pivot. Party members who disagree are most welcome to find another tent.
This brings us to another area where the Koiralas have proved particularly adroit. By allowing the communist factions monopolize the so-called “progressive/left” banner, the Nepali Congress can blur the distinction between the Unified Marxist Leninists and the Maoists, especially in those crucial western eyes.
When the Maoists relentlessly blame international power centers for conspiring to retain the monarchy, the Nepali Congress can afford to nod in affirmation and sit back. Prachanda and Co., by their own logic, have a long way to go toward establishing the scope and structures of republicanism as a viable alternative. Prime Minister Koirala, meanwhile, can continue uttering those obligatory republican sentiments.

Behind The Bombast And Bluster

By Sanjay Upadhya
May 2, 2007

For an organization that has flourished on ambiguity, obfuscation and even prevarication, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist’s latest internal commotions could be yet another subterfuge. Still, it is becoming difficult to view media reports on the ex-rebels’ growing disenchantment with India in isolation from their increasing assaults on Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, their determination consolidate the fiefdoms ministries they control have become, and their newfound eagerness to forge a broader republican front on the left.
Forest Minister Matrika Prasad Yadav’s altercation with Prime Minister Koirala on the military and the projectiles hurled at Peace and Reconstruction Minister Ram Chandra Poudel at the main mass meeting marking the first anniversary of the collapse of King Gyanendra’s regime, among other things, may not be entirely unrelated events. Some mid-ranking Maoist leaders have started reminding the country that Koirala holds the record of having had the greatest numbers of effigies burned. The peace process may not be in danger. But it will not become more tranquil or methodical.
Today’s Maoists barely resemble the group that declared war on the state 11 years ago with a manifesto top heavy with grievances against India. Indeed, Prachanda and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai were already articulating the urgency of toning down their anti-Indian rhetoric at the Lucknow talks with UML general secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal in 2003. Whatever the truth behind the Prachanda-Dr. Bhattarai split that came to the fore in mid-2005, the events leading up to the 12-point agreement with Seven Party Alliance in New Delhi underscored the centrality of India in the Maoists’ internal deliberations.
With enough sophistication, Prachanda’s very public turnaround in New Delhi could have helped the peace process. For a brief moment, it looked like the Maoists were actually capable of creating that vital mixture of nationalism and democracy Nepali politics has been oscillating between. The moment Prachanda felt compelled to criticize Pakistan in order to woo India, he forced many Nepalis into that awful disposition between laughter and lament.
Clearly, India’s immediate goal in securing the 12-point accord was to tame the palace, as evidenced by New Delhi’s enthusiastic albeit premature welcoming of King Gyanendra’s first address to the nation. Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai could not have been oblivious to New Delhi’s larger objective: the mainstreaming of the Maoists as a national security imperative. By subduing the inspirational fount of the Naxalites, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would be more comfortable in confronting what he has called greatest internal security threat since independence.
India’s duality on the Maoists has survived the royal regime. The security establishment, which was more amenable to engagement with King Gyanendra’s government, continues to uncover the Nepali ex-rebels’ purported wider links to terrorism. The political establishment, excluding the Hindu nationalist flank, is busy assuring Indians and the rest of the world that Nepal’s Maoists have little more than ideological ties with the Naxalites.
When the Maoists rail against India’s “trap”, they obviously have the former group in mind. But blaming Indian Hindu extremists and royalists for instigating madhesis, janjatis and other groups that still feel disenfranchised cannot help much. The amplification over the past year of traditional grievances the Maoists claimed to have articulated has questioned the premise of the “people’s war.” Prachanda’s frivolities have only reinforced the siege.
Prachanda’s purported retort at a recent central committee meeting that C.P. Gajurel and Mohan Baidya would still be languishing in Indian prisons without his overtures to India sounded pragmatic. The problem is, Baidya was among those criticizing the party supremo’s policy. If today’s Maoists are the same group of ideologically disciplined people credited with mounting the world’s most successful post-communist revolutionary movement, could they be expected to correct this drift? If so, in which ways? How would the Maoists’ sustained effort to build ties with China in light of Beijing’s policy of pragmatism fit into this drive? More importantly, how would New Delhi respond?
For the moment, the disgruntled Maoists have made renewed calls for unity between nationalist and democratic forces against Indian designs. In the past, that slogan allowed the Maoists to veer closer to the palace. What does “nationalist” imply in the republican context beyond the broader leftist front?
The Nepali Congress seems have grasped the implications of that question. The party continues to remind the Maoists of their undertaking to allow the first sitting of the constituent assembly to decide the fate of the monarch less out of scrupulous adherence to existing agreements than political pragmatism. It is hard to miss the murmurs within the Nepali Congress suggesting that the palace may actually constitute a lesser threat to democracy than the Maoists.
For now, though, the bombast and bluster over the wisdom of declaring a republic from the interim parliament, government and streets provides a convenient cover for all.

A Year On, King Still At The Center

By Sanjay Upadhya
April 16, 2007

A palpable paradox remains the defining feature of the year since the culmination of People’s Movement II. A king supposedly sidelined by his people is very much at the center of the nation.
Amid the inexorable cycle of hope and despair of the last 12 months of peacemaking, the uncertainty gripping the constituent assembly (CA) elections has cast a new pall of gloom for many. But it would be deceitful to cite the postponement of the polls as a setback to the peace process. And not just because large segments of Nepalis feel disenfranchised heading into the exercise. Writing the election schedule into an interim constitution that failed to materialize on time was just one manifestation of the legerdemain that sustains the polity.
As someone accustomed to far worse indictments, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala can shrug off the latest censure from his partners in power. His public pronouncements on the palace had turned sufficiently hostile to deflect charges of coddling the crown. Deep inside, though, Koirala rests confident in the recognition that no party wanted the elections in June.
The Maoists are in a slightly different league. As the owners of the CA agenda, they are entitled to make the loudest noises. Yet their abolish-the-monarchy-first clamor serves more as a cover for their internal churning process. This is a do-or-die situation for the Maoists in the literal as well as figurative sense. The ex-rebels’ claim to have represented the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and geographical grievances that were swept under the People’s Movement I carpet has been thoroughly debunked by, among other things, the madhesi and janjati movements.
Furthermore, as the Maoists were pressing the CA demand for much of the past decade, virtually every party argued that it would open a Pandora’s Box. Now that those parties have gone along, the Maoists are unwilling to acknowledge the steady discharge. In their pointless search for scapegoats, they have merely reinforced the centrality of the monarchy.
Prime Minister Koirala stiffened his stance on the palace only after having lined up a pro-monarchy constituency in his party under daughter Sujata. Even then, the premier’s option envisages placing King Gyanendra’s four-year-old grandson on the throne. It’s pointless to even begin wondering how such an antiquated vision could chart the course to a new Nepal.
That inanity pales in front of the proposal from other quarters to enthrone a granddaughter of King Birendra. The idea of tinkering with such a central element of royal succession when the future of the institution is hanging in the balance was wrong-headed enough. Long before that, the difficulty the female biological cycle would pose to the religious and cultural roles a ceremonial monarchy would have to confine itself to should have been apparent.
Those decrying such chauvinism would do well first to either redefine the rules of our rituals or the role of the monarchy – and possibly both. The rest are perhaps realistic enough to recognize that the monarchy, by definition, offers the least scope for the people to choose their head of state. (This debate has been complicated by the campaign, if only tepid, to create a republican Hindu state.)
The Maoists can claim the high ground here by calling for the outright abolition of the monarchy. Yet their rationale remains spurious. The ex-rebels’ detection of a royalist hand in the madhesi and janjati movements raises interesting questions. If the 238-year-old Shah Dynasty was indeed responsible – as the rebels have long claimed – for the systematic impoverishment of these groups, what might have led the aggrieved seek their salvation in their long-time tormentors?
The Maoists’ refrain that national and international forces are trying to save the monarchy raises its corollary. What might have impelled these forces – obviously the loudest critics of the royal takeover in February 2005 – do so? It’s one thing for the principal domestic actors to claim that Nepal can do without the monarchy. It’s quite another to persuade major international players increasingly driven by the imperative of defensive imperialism.
As for the principal external player, King Gyanendra’s attempt to tether his regime tightly to China was a greater sin than the nature of his regime. Prime Minister Koirala’s call in New Delhi earlier this month for China’s inclusion as a full member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation – from its current status as an observer – must have cast new light on Nepal’s much-maligned “China card.”
Juxtaposed with the “stability” school of thought resurgent in a section of the New Delhi establishment vis-à-vis the neighborhood, the wider dynamics of the preceding year do not necessarily conform to those being projected by the Nepali parties in power.
King Gyanendra’s critics succeeded in portraying the palace takeover as nothing more than a power grab. By directing public wrath to a handful of Panchayat-era individuals in power, Seven Party Alliance (SPA) leaders sidestepped the stark reality that many of their former colleagues were part of the royal regime. It became all the more convenient to ignore the technocrats and entrepreneurs who also underpinned King Gyanendra’s government.
A year later, as the peace process hobbles ahead, the royal regime’s role as a catalyst for the SPA-Maoist alliance has acquired greater clarity. This must have been among the successes King Gyanendra referred to in his much-criticized Democracy Day message in February.