Nepal and the Sino-Indian Rivalry

Wedged precariously between two giants, Nepal is likely to become an even more important theater

By Sanjay Upadhya

The inevitable passing of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the radicalization of the Tibetan diaspora and the fervor of the international campaign to free Tibet are bound to keep the Himalayan dispute on the world's front pages.
India, which has sheltered the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of his followers, today increasingly sees Tibet as a bargaining chip with China in its overall bilateral relationship. Home to some 20,000 Tibetan refugees and wedged precariously between the assertive Asian giants, Nepal is likely to become an even more important theater.
From Nepal's perspective, at least, the issue of Tibet goes beyond the freedom of a land, the liberation of a culture and a celebration of a way of life. The region always has been a conduit for major external protagonists to pursue wider objectives. The British Empire considered Tibet a critical part of the imperial chessboard, a legacy that lives on in today's geo-strategic milieu where China sees the region as a front rivals are intent on using to contain its rise.
The Tibet issue has a peculiar psychological subtext in Nepal. Some of the same people, who profess the greatest admiration for the Dalai Lama and his cause, also hope that Tibet remains under Chinese control. Many Nepalese recognize that an independent Tibet would leave their country without a border with China. They believe such a situation would allow India, which has long invoked its own version of the Monroe Doctrine in the land-locked nation, to tighten its grip.
Although Tibet has been central to the Sino-Nepalese relationship, Nepal's formal contacts with China did not originate through the region. It began with China's quest for Buddhist texts, artifacts and codes from the wider Gangetic heartland. In the mid-seventh century, a powerful Tibetan king extracted consorts from Chinese and Nepalese royal households on the principle of peace through kinship. The two wives helped bring Buddhism to Tibet and opened a direct Himalayan route between Nepal and China, bypassing the more arduous one across Central Asia.
As religion and trade began traversing the same Himalayan passes, peace and goodwill began losing ground. As the British sun rose higher over India, Nepal fought two wars with Tibet, precipitating a Chinese invasion. The Nepalese gained peace by entering into a tributary relationship with the Middle Kingdom, a duty they would discharge with utmost diligence. The Nepalese became the last foreigners to pay tribute to the Qing, as the arrangement helped maintain their independence as most of modern South Asia fell under the sway of the British Empire.
Nepal, which fought a third war with Tibet in 1855-56, refused to aid the Tibetans against a British invasion in 1904, but helped secure the withdrawal of the invaders. The diplomatic triumph was short-lived as the tottering Qing formally claimed suzerainty over Nepal. Seeking to preserve its interests in Tibet - and project its independence - Nepal mediated between Beijing and Lhasa in 1912, after which Tibet enjoyed a period of de facto independence.
For all their antipathy for the Qing and for each other, Chinese nationalists and communists pressed their country's claims on Nepal: Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong both included Nepal among territories China had lost to imperialism.
The Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 impelled the leaders of independent India to restore the monarchy at the top of a multiparty democracy in Nepal to forestall a communist advance southward.On the eve of Nepal's first democratic elections in 1959, Tibetans rose up in a failed revolt against Beijing, prompting the Dalai Lama's flight into exile in India.
Nepal's first elected prime minister, B.P. Koirala, sought unsuccessfully to consolidate democracy by asserting Nepalese independence from India and China. When King Mahendra dissolved parliament, jailed Koirala and most of the elected leadership, and abolished multiparty democracy, much more than royal ambition was at play.
Nepal had become a center of Cold War intrigue where the United States and India - the world's two largest democracies - were working to undermine each other as were the communist giants China and the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1960s, Sino-American rapprochement put the two nations on the same side in Nepal for the duration of the Cold War.
As the 1980s drew to a close, a new round of unrest in Tibet merged with student protests in Beijing, culminating in the bloody crackdown in Tiananmen Square. The fall of the Berlin Wall inspired the Nepalese to bring down the palace-led partyless Panchayat system, with Beijing a mere bystander.
With the kingdom's democracy turning rancorous, Nepalese disciples of Mao launched a bloody insurgency, a convulsion exacerbated by the assassinations of King Birendra and almost the entire royal family in a June 2001 palace massacre. India, like the United States and Britain, opposed King Gyanendra's February 2005 coup, widely perceived to have enjoyed Chinese backing. Beijing, which accused the Nepalese Maoists of soiling the Great Helmsman's memory, armed the palace against the rebels. Yet a year later, as the royal regime faced massive popular protests, Beijing distanced itself from the monarchy and befriended the Nepalese Maoists.
Chinese policy toward Nepal has been marked by much ambiguity, which both Beijing and Kathmandu have benefited from. One school of thought sees limited Chinese interest in Nepal, where phases of Beijing's assertiveness are the exception. In keeping with its foreign policy of unsentimental pragmatism, this school contends, China could easily concede Nepal as part of India's sphere of influence.
Chinese assertiveness, however, is likely to grow as its interests in Nepal go beyond the issue of Tibet to encompass its wider South Asian strategy. Nepal is only country that maintains diplomatic representation in Lhasa and Beijing reminds Kathmandu with ever greater regularity the responsibility that flows with the privilege. Enticing Nepal with promises of greater commercial benefits as part of its massive investments in Tibet, Beijing is intent on committing Nepal to firm political, security, economic and cultural agreements.
Should tradition become a more dominant part of Chinese regional diplomacy - as also seems likely - Nepal's status as a former tributary to the Middle Kingdom is likely to drive Beijing's policy. This is bound to raise anxiety levels in India, whose own relations with China sit uneasily atop planks of cooperation, competition and confrontation that are vulnerable to extra-regional pressures.

(Sanjay Upadhya is a U.S.-based Nepalese journalist and author. This essay was excerpted from his latest book, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry Between China and India (London and New York: Routledge, 2012, 228 pp).

This essay was first published by Global India Newswire

Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India

The importance of the Himalayan state of Nepal has been obscured by the international campaign to free Tibet and the vicissitudes of the Sino-Indian rivalry, I write in this new book.
This monograph presents the history of Nepal’s domestic politics and foreign relations from ancient to modern times. Analysing newly declassified reports from the United States and Britain, published memoirs, oral recollections and interviews, the book presents the historical interactions between Nepal, China, Tibet and India.
It discusses how the ageing and inevitable death of the 14th Dalai Lama, the radicalization of Tibetan diaspora and the ascendancy of the international campaign to free Tibet are of increasing importance to Nepal
With its position between China and India, the book notes how the focus could shift to Nepal, with it being home to some 20,000 Tibetan refugees and its chronic political turmoil, deepened by the Asian giants’ rivalry.
Using a chronological approach, the past and present of the rivalry between China and India are studied, and attempts to chart the future are made. The book contributes to a new understanding of the intricate relationship of Nepal with these neighbouring countries, and is of interest to students and scholars of South Asian studies, politics and international relations.

Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India
By Sanjay Upadhya
New York and London: Routledge
228 pages
Series: Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics
Published March 1st 2012

Perpetual Legislature And Political Legitimacy

By Sanjay Upadhya

With the monarch and the upper chamber out of parliament’s perimeter, Nepal is cruising on a legislative course with a third of the mass the current constitution contemplates.
Compare this with the much-maligned direct rule of King Gyanendra, when two-thirds of the legislative aggregation was alive. It’s a different matter that nobody thought of convening the upper house while the speaker of the dissolved lower chamber was busy attending international conferences in his official capacity.
But who is concerned about the constitution? Members of the reinstated House of Representatives (HoR), having monopolized the assembly, are operating on an open-ended tenure. In their frenzied fealty to the “historic mandate” of the April Uprising, MPs evidently feel comfortable with stretching their interpretation of popular aspirations and expanding their job description accordingly.
To be sure, much of what has passed for legislative deliberation over the last five weeks boils down to vendetta. But, then, expecting the newly empowered political class to desist from vengeance would be tantamount to rejecting basic human nature. The amalgamation of incarceration and humiliation the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) endured during the palace’s 15-month direct rule could not have been conducive to conciliation.
In the passions of the moment, it is easy to miss the bigger picture. The Nepali Congress and the Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML), as the principal drafters of the 1990 constitution, virtually claimed ownership of the subsequent 12-year political process. The sense of finality that set in from the outset impelled some to insist that the constitution did not need to be amended for another 30 years. When King Gyanendra began exercising his constitutional responsibilities in forms unpalatable to the political parties, governance assumed an exclusive political content.
The pendulum has swung in the other direction with the attendant kinetic energy. Having succeeded in casting the monarchy as the principal obstacle to “total democracy” – a convenient
euphemism for their predominance – SPA leaders have temporarily obscured their own role in precipitating the return of royal assertiveness.
The emasculation of the monarchy, in the SPA’s view, is the principal precondition of the moment. The wider political climate undoubtedly favors that interpretation, as the virtual silence
emanating from the royalist parties/factions in the legislature underscores.
Through the “landmark” HoR proclamation, the SPA has sought to tame the palace in the run-up to the constituent assembly elections, which would determine the future of the monarchy. The SPA and its opponents both recognize that the legality of current actions can be fought over another day. For now, the focus is on ensuring the supremacy of a parliament on life support. For how long?
SPA leaders insist that the legislature must remain active until an alternative is found. The Maoists want the HoR and the government dissolved in favor of a national conference and interim government. Despite his rhetoric, Maoist supremo Prachanda recognizes that the
SPA is carefully weighing its options. Among individual constituent parties and factions within, choosing between the Maoists and the monarchists requires careful deliberation and an abundance of time.
Having split the premiership and speakership between them, the Nepali Congress and the UML have consented to the existence of the breakaway Nepali Congress (Democratic) as an independent entity.
Mindful of the Maoists’ opposition and the political loss to the Nepali Congress, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala’s government has rejected the UML’s demand for the restoration of the local bodies. While announcing that civil servants would run those bodies, the government signaled its tentativeness by adding the “for the time being” proviso.
In seeking to bolster their public persona, legislators have overreached to address a “final status” issue like turning Nepal into a secular state. The argument that Nepal’s Hindu identity was
an appendage of active monarchy and therefore deserving of a democratic makeover has been rubbished by avowed critics of the king. Legitimacy acquires the greatest slipperiness where sincerity looks like smugness.
It took 15 months for King Gyanendra’s roadmap to be discredited. The SPA can consider its democratic character a cushion against such a swift and sharp reversal of perceptions. Their principal claim to the moral high ground – that errant politicians are always ready to face the wrath of the people – is already sounding hackneyed. And, lest we forget, we still have to figure out the kind of constituencies the assembly is going to represent.
There is a more immediate operational disadvantage for the SPA. In the spring of 1990, the parties had reclaimed power after three-decades of partyless direct rule by the palace. The 15-month interregnum this time – considering that the government King Gyanendra ousted on Feb. 1, 2005 before assuming direct control contained two of the three principal SPA constituents – has considerably constricted the alliance’s comfort zone.
The ideology-vs.-personality clashes within parties and their factions, the assertion of power by non-political actors, representational resentments that led to the squandering of political capital and the other factors that created an anguished electorate are all capable of returning to the forefront of the national consciousness – and with a vengeance.

Originally published on Wednesday, 7 June 2006

Tentativeness Behind Indian Triumphalism

By Sanjay Upadhya

During her recent three-day ‘goodwill’ visit, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao assured Nepalese leaders that New Delhi would support any government in Kathmandu. That the top Indian foreign policy bureaucrat spelled out in words what ordinarily is a given in state-to-state relations was telling enough. More so was the fact that important sections in Nepal, including outspoken critics of Indian ‘high-handedness’, accepted the remark as innocuous.
To be fair, Rao had arrived to allay apprehensions New Delhi itself had attributed to Ambassador Rakesh Sood’s diplomatic robustness, which has often climbed several notches above his pay grade. So Rao’s comment on Nepal’s new government could have been taken in the spirit of goodwill. But that became difficult considering the general obscurity of Madan Kumar Bhattarai, her official host.
Still, Rao’s visit served to embody a deeper message: behind India’s triumphalism over the exit of UNMIN lies a palpable ambivalence on the path ahead. New Delhi has deployed its ambiguity with daunting creativity. India is not meddling in Nepal. It is merely responding to requests by Nepalese players in the true of spirit of good-neighborliness. The throwback to the 1950s is unmistakable. But the perils to Nepal are far greater. India may still exert the dominant foreign influence in Nepal, but it does not enjoy the monopoly of the early Nehruvian era.
The advent of the new year, coinciding with New Delhi’s entry into the United Nations Security Council for a two-year term, saw a surge in Indian diplomatic reportage on how Nepal would figure higher on South Block’s neighborhood agenda. Then came that high-profile conference in the Indian capital, which, according to a top Indian expert, whose purpose was to allow Nepalese parties and players a candor deemed impossible inside their country.
How far such an exchange was achieved remains unclear. But the official Indian establishment took full advantage of the event by projecting Maoist leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai as a leading contender for power whom New Delhi could do business with. Regardless of whether Dr. Bhattarai actually becomes premier, the boost he received will have proved instrumental in the taming the Maoists, a key unfulfilled objective of the 12-Point Agreement.
The message got through. During his meeting with Rao, Maoist chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal was compelled to explain that he was not anti-Indian. For a variety of complex reasons – all not entirely sinister – Nepal’s quest for survival has conflicted with India’s notions of its national interest. The assertion of ‘Nepaliness’ had been long equated with anti-Indianism, the ultimate beneficiary of which has been New Delhi. Dahal could have made a greater contribution by not conceding the premise.
In the vicious power game, New Delhi does not lack perceived favorites. Key contenders, in varying degrees, have been eager to project themselves in that light. This would have been a moment of unrestrained delight for New Delhi had it not had to contend with post-UNMIN ambiguity.
How the United Nations entered Nepal over the evident discomfiture of India and China remains in the realm of continuing inquiry. The Maoists wanted the United Nations in as an insurance policy, and both neighbors grudgingly went along despite the likely precedents for places like Kashmir and Tibet. From a narrow and targeted mission, UNMIN evolved in different ways for the diverse internal and external constituents and stakeholders. So when UMNIN chief Karin Landgren asserted that Nepal stood on the crossroads between a military takeover and Maoist revolt, carefully attributing her view to prevailing popular perception, few saw that as an abdication by UNMIN of its responsibility.
Publicly, New Delhi feigns happiness that Beijing did not oppose UNMIN’s withdrawal. But India recognizes the advantages China gained through the internationalization of the peace process. These past four years have coincided with a surge in the influence of the hawkish People’s Liberation Army and the Ministry of State Security on Chinese foreign policy. The growing advocacy of Maoist norms by key allies of Xi Jinping, the presumptive successor to President Hu Jintao, suggests a further surge of nationalism in Beijing’s regional outlook and attitudes.
The ‘hyperrealist’ school in India, on the other hand, has become more candid about using the Tibet issue to bolster India’s leverage with China. The absence of New Delhi’s affirmation that Tibet remains an integral part of China from the joint communiqué issued after Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent visit was indicative of the influence of hawks in Indian foreign policy.
The diverse fault lines between India and China – security, territory, trade, energy, natural resources, etc. – are embodied in the issue of Tibet, into which Nepal is being increasingly sucked deeper. And through the Tibet issue, other governments, organizations and interests have the capacity to influence India-China bilateralism. Particularly relevant for Nepal is the fact that many members of India’s hyperrealist school are convinced that the United States will hedge its bets in any Sino-Indian conflict, notwithstanding the upswing in Washington-New Delhi relations.
In addition to leaving politicians from all parties vying for its patronage, New Delhi has exhibited clear enough signals that it may be amenable to a variety of outcomes in Nepal. Even on the issue of reinstatement of the 1990 constitution, some Indian sources have envisaged the possibility of dropping the monarchy, an ‘unchangeable’ feature of that document. If anything, the roots of this tentativeness lay in India’s wider geopolitical ambivalence.

Can We Ever Reconcile Our Relative Truths?

By Sanjay Upadhya

Amid calls for the creation of a truth and reconciliation committee to complete the peace process, Maoist leader Dev Gurung has come out with his own flash of candor. He wants a separate ministry to oversee the reconstruction of infrastructure lost in the decade-long “people’s war”.
It would have been comforting to accept Gurung’s assertion as the ultimate acknowledgment of responsibility. If those intent on blowing up Nepal into Year Zero in their quest for a utopia could genuinely undergo such a radical change of heart, well, more Nepalis should be encouraged to bare their souls.
But genuineness is not something that can be easily equated with Gurung’s organization. And not entirely because of the scale of the death, destruction and debris the Maoists have unleashed. A fully and credibly disarmed Maoists – if that could ever be achieved – would still retain their lethal verbal weapons of obfuscation and prevarication.
It has become fashionable to cite post-apartheid South Africa as an example of truth being an effective tool for reconciliation. Not every nation is blessed with the likes of Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. Where Nepal is at a real disadvantage is that truth, here, is more likely to be relative. It would be unfair to single out the Maoists on this count.
Let’s begin with the creation of the modern Nepali state. Decades of profuse state-inspired tributes bestowed upon King Prithvi Narayan Shah almost superhuman abilities. If Lord Ram needed his Hanumans and Bibhishans, could the king of Gorkha have achieved much without confidants and commanders?
In the inevitable backlash, democratic Nepal has veered the other way. National unification stands on clusters of eyeballs, nasal cartilage and ear lobes, not to mention corpses. The Capuchin missionaries – the most prominent chroniclers of the fall of Kirtipur – may have been faithful to what they had witnessed. It hardly seems to matter today that they were allies of the Mallas who had persuaded the British to send Captain Kinloch’s ill-fated expeditionary force against the Gorkha army.
The elasticity of our authenticity endures in other ways. Those condemning the conquerors for having imposed conformity through Khas-Nepali words and practices on diverse indigenous peoples rise up in anger each time a foreigner is perceived to be denigrating Nepal.
Political truths are all the more ambiguous. Was King Tribhuvan’s flight to New Delhi part of a carefully devised plan to turn Nepal into a beacon of democracy? Or was the monarch, already under increasing threat from the Rana rulers, pursuing a strategy for survival?
Was the Nepali Congress really the driver of the 1951 changes as it claims? Or did the organization merely provide the street power for an initiative our southern neighbors had devised to counter the radicalization of our northern ones? Democracy resulting as a byproduct is certainly not the same as one genuinely created. The palace’s consolidation of political power after the dawn of democracy is attributed to ambitious monarchs. Perhaps. But could such a quest have succeeded without the compulsions that seemed to rally most stakeholders around the palace for stability?
King Mahendra’s distress at the emergence of a competing national institution is solely blamed for the overthrow of Nepal’s first elected government. Doubtless, the monarch could barely conceal his antipathy for party politicians in his pronouncements as crown prince. But does that sufficiently explain how up to three-quarters of the 74 Nepali Congress legislators in the lower house could end up supporting the palace? Or is the palace to be blamed for this en masse surrender?
The freedom fighter in Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru could have done nothing less than denounce the royal takeover as a setback to democracy. How do we explain the massive economic assistance New Delhi went on to infuse into the partyless system? Certainly not just because of the torrent of Chinese, Soviet, American and British aid and expertise?
B.P. Koirala based his acceptance of the referendum verdict in favor of the Panchayat system in 1980 on the duties of a democrat. Or was it the anti-communist in him speaking? But, then, who knows how national reconciliation really came to be the euphemism B.P. used to trade house arrest in Emergency-era India for a second stint at Sundarijal? These issues are relevant to understanding why sections of the Nepali Congress – a party that attempted regicide twice in the 1960s and 70s – should still feel compelled to advocate a ceremonial monarchy.
The pragmatism that had taken over Nehru’s Delhi after the 1962 Sino-Indian war could not have melted merely under his grandson’s purported personality clashes with King Birendra. Could Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s landmark visit to China in 1988 have encouraged New Delhi to twist the palace’s arms and slip that 80-page draft memo on the entire gamut of ties to find out which one would work first?
The People’s Movement of 1990 cast a more ominous shadow. Did King Birendra restore multiparty democracy at that late-night meeting or did he simply lift the ban on parties? The distinction is important considering how Nepalis had to spend the subsequent 11 years in a twilight zone. Of course, it took King Gyanendra’s dismissal of Sher Bahadur Deuba’s elected government for our politicians to tell us that the slain monarch was not, after all, the model constitutional monarch they had made him out to be.
The Maoists seem to have been the biggest winners of the April Uprising. Let’s take a closer look. Until last week, the rebels seemed to have won half of their original demands. After the Baluwatar agreement, they have settled for 25 percent, by acknowledging that the House proclamation had already suspended the monarchy.
Yet the real record lies in their virtual silence on the first nine of their 40-point demand. True, Prachanda and his comrades are still calling for a more equitable relationship between Nepal and India. The tone has lost all of its roar now that words like “Bhutanization” and “Sikkimization” have quietly left the comrades’ lexicon. Prachanda must have drawn this important lesson from Madan Bhandari’s tragic end: It makes more sense to attend a global leadership summit down south than to aspire to embody the Great Helmsman up north.
Dr. Baburam Bhattarai certainly recognized the opportunity of the moment and claimed an undeclared working unity with King Birendra. His eloquence impelled him to conclude that Nepalis would rate highly every predecessor of the slain monarch. No one considered it relevant to ask the comrade what he considered to be the most salient features of the reigns of, say, Kings Pratap Singh, Girvan Yuddha, Surendra and Prithvi Bir.
King Gyanendra is expected to take responsibility for 238 years of the Shah dynasty. The 104 years of Rana rule, 30 years of Bhimsen Thapa and the periods an assortment of courtiers manipulated infant kings are all clubbed into one epoch of history. Worse, many descendants of those same Thapas, Pandeys, Basnets, Kunwars and bevy of Bahuns and Newars pretend they can absolve their clans of complicity.
Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala must certainly feel vindicated today when the Maoists insist he must continue as premier. After the Narayanhity carnage, Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai had clubbed Koirala together with the current king and crown prince in a single “coterie”.
The Nepali Congress dissidents and the CPN-UML would not have succeeded in dislodging an elected prime minister who was also the head of the majority party in parliament without the help of the Maoists. Who knows what kind of flexibility power might encourage our rebels turned rulers to exhibit in the run-up to the constituent assembly elections?
Each Nepali has a copious collection of personal truths capable of overwhelming even the strongest willed reconciliation commissioner. The strident mixture of ancient grudges and modern slights – real and perceived – would require an open-ended commission. The truth, they say, shall set us free. But can we ever reconcile our relative truths?

Originally published on November 14, 2006 at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0611/S00250.htm

Beyond Tibet

China’s interest in Nepal has acquired larger dimensions

By Sanjay Upadhya
Normally reticent on the specifics of another country’s internal politics, Chinese leaders nevertheless conveyed to visiting Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal their keen desire to see the new constitution come out on schedule. Beijing’s growing anxiety at the deepening political instability in the world’s newest republic could not have become more palpable within the mode of Chinese diplomacy.
Our premier, too, was prepared to assuage some of China’s concerns. He began his visit from Lhasa, winning instant appreciation from sections of the Chinese media. In Beijing, Prime Minister Nepal reaffirmed our long-held stand that Tibet and Taiwan are inalienable parts of China. He buttressed it with Nepal’s equally long-standing pledge that it would not permit anti-Chinese activities on its soil.
What has been lacking in the aftermath of the visit is a fuller appreciation in Nepal of the multidirectional growth in China’s interest. Slowly but unquestionably, various elements of Chinese domestic and international priorities have morphed into an expanded policy towards this country. Nepal’s inability to acknowledge this reality sufficiently becomes even more portentous in view of the growing imperative to articulate it in our wider international engagement.
Clearly, Chinese concerns over the activities of the “Free Tibet” movement from Nepalese soil have grown significantly since the pre-Olympics protests in 2008. For quite some time, Beijing has concluded that the potential for instability in Tibet stems more from the internationalization of the “Free Tibet” campaign and the adroitness of its advocates than from any perceived or real deficiencies in its policies. Chinese officials have been candid in partly attributing the scale of the 2008 protests in Nepal to the international involvement in our peace process. Such concerns will continue to grow with the extension of our transitional phase.
“China would like to see Nepal achieving political stability within the shortest time, say half a year, or one to two years so that all organized forces could compete to make more contributions in building the motherland,” Wang Hongwei, China’s preeminent expert on Nepal, told this writer in a recent interview. “Failure to achieve this might create further chaos and even induce foreign interference,” said Wang, a professor at the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Foreign influence is a Chinese concern that has been growing since the rise of the Maoist insurgency in the mid-1990s, a time conventional wisdom in Kathmandu held that Beijing had somehow lost its strategic interest in Nepal. Chinese displeasure over the Nepalese rebels’ dishonoring of Chairman Mao’s memory and efforts to blame Beijing for fomenting the insurgency were well known. The frequent government reshuffles and the general political instability that exacerbated the insurgency, in the Chinese view, was the result of “an externally inspired shift of the power matrix,” wrote Zhang Li, professor of international relations at Sichuan University’s Institute of South Asian Studies, in a recent monograph titled “To Manage Conflict in South Asia: China’s Stakes, Perceptions and Inputs.”
The convulsion deepened by the Narayanhity Massacre may have temporarily receded with the advent of peace talks between the government and the Maoists. But Beijing’s wariness was even short-lived. The 9/11 attacks brought the global war on terrorism right on China’s doorsteps in Afghanistan well before the peace process broke down, resulting in a growing lethality of the conflict as well as international interest in a military solution. Anxious to preserve its traditionally volatile frontier, Beijing, like much of the world, saw the palace as the pivot of stability.
But its wider divergences were too stark. By describing King Gyanendra’s takeover of full executive powers in February 2005 as an internal matter, Beijing offered a lifeline to Kathmandu amid strident Indian and western pressure. A year later, although exasperated by the royal regime’s inability to reach out to a wider spectrum of society, Beijing feared an imposed recipe for democracy would open the door wider to intervention and coercion by India and western governments, especially the United States. “This was one of the basic reasons for Beijing to boycott the U.S.-brokered agenda aimed at forcing King Gyanendra to give up direct rule in 2006,” Professor Zhang wrote in his monograph.
Unsentimental pragmatism, an enduring characteristic of Chinese foreign policy, surfaced quite openly during the final months of the royal regime. When State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan arrived in Kathmandu in March 2006, he conveyed what Professor Zhang calls the first message from Beijing “to reserve its diplomatic backing for certain political forces other than the monarchy.”
Paradoxically, Beijing itself became part of the drive to raise international involvement. The UN Mission in Nepal grew partly from Chinese concurrence as a veto-wielding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in the hope that it would be able to influence the scope and extent of the mandate. Beijing has had mixed feelings about international role in Nepal. “The [international organizations] have done some work in promoting the peace process,” Professor Wang said. “But some of them have exposed their special interests to resurrect Mustang as a base against China.”
To pre-empt such moves, China assiduously began building ties with all major political parties. China’s ambassador became the first foreign representative not to present his credentials to the monarch. That could not have been a mere coincidence of the diplomatic calendar. Most notable has been China’s turnaround on the Maoists, but its concerns seem to persist. While Beijing sees the Maoists as a strong and nationalist force enjoying popular legitimacy, it still does not seem persuaded of former rebels’ transformation into a full-fledged political party. Professor Wang believes the Maoists – and the other parties – need to do much more. “I think any party in Nepal, if it really wants to maintain political stability, should try to unite all the patriotic forces of the country,” he said.
As China’s search for stability continues, the amalgamation between its hard and soft power is becoming increasingly conspicuous. Hardly a month passes by without a high-profile Chinese political, military, economic or cultural delegation arriving in Kathmandu. When a Chinese military delegation flew directly to India from Nepal late last year, the symbolism was not lost on New Delhi. But, then, India’s worries on China’s academic and cultural influences in Nepal have now rivaled its strategic and security anxieties.
The frequency with which Nepal feels it has to reaffirm its traditional commitment on Tibet is understandable in the context of Sino-India tensions. One leading Indian analyst last year predicted war with China by 2012. This week the Indian army chief spoke of his country’s readiness for simultaneous conflicts with Pakistan and China. There is a less conspicuous but certainly definite perception among some Chinese experts and analysts of an ascendance of the so-called “confrontationalist” lobby in India that sees advantage in raising the stakes for China in Tibet.
The Maoists, for their part, have raised the stakes for Nepal. Regardless of whether convenience, compulsion or opportunism – or what precise mix of the three – impelled them to make a public demonstration of a drift northward, India has made no secret of its disaffection. “It is difficult for the government to say so, but New Delhi has admonished the Maoists about opening up to China,” Ashok Mehta, a retired Indian army general and leading Nepal watcher, said in a BBC interview while Prime Minister Nepal was holding talks in Beijing.
Such possessiveness has long irked the Chinese. Beijing believes Nepal, like every sovereign and independent country, has the right to devise its own relationship with China. As part of that effort, during Nepal’s visit, China pledged to bolster aid and trade to Nepal to lift ties to “a new high”. Beijing has promised necessary support and assistance to Nepal in hydropower construction, infrastructure development, health, education, human resources development and other fields. It also pledged tariff reductions and other assistance.
Skeptics, however, insist China is asking too much from Nepal – i.e., subjecting itself to the full force of India’s political and economic wrath – for too little by way of tangible gains. Then there is the history of China’s inability to come out in support of Nepal, especially during the 1814-16 war with British India, the 1989-90 Indian trade and transit embargo, and the April 2006 protests against King Gyanendra.
In the first case, Nepal felt China was obligated to offer military support under the 1792 Betravati Treaty that ended the Sino-Nepalese war. In the latter two cases, the predominant dynamic was the Nepalese people’s desire for democracy. However, that could not obscure the fact that Nepal’s China relations were at the core of the dispute with India – Kathmandu’s arms purchases from Beijing and Nepal’s role in inducting China as an observer in SAARC, respectively. Even today, Maoist leader Dahal’s fiery words against India have not entirely drowned out the frustration within the party over what some see as China’s lukewarm support to the organization.
Responding to such concerns, Wang says: “China was and is still a developing country. I do not think it did enough to supporting Nepal’s just struggle for safeguarding its sovereignty and independence. But I believe that with the attention shifting to developing the Western part, China will do more in this field.” The Chinese still plan to link the Golmud-Lhasa train to the Nepalese border, although uncertainty persists over the precise route. They have been promoting Chinese investment, as Nepal witnesses a progressive rise in the number of Chinese tourists. A second highway linking Kathmandu with Tibet is to open shortly.
These developments underline a larger reality. Nepal has become the focus of a convergence of several Chinese domestic and external priorities. Moreover, in such vital areas as the maintenance of internal stability, the reduction of regional development imbalances and national reunification, the People’s Liberation Army has acquired a more assertive role. Both Professors Wang and Zhang underscore Nepal’s role as a land bridge to South Asia, a region hopes to engage with more vigorously as a full member of SAARC.
“The main purpose of the [Golmud-Lhasa] railway is to integrate Tibet more closely to the Chinese economy. But once it is expanded, as planned, to the Nepalese border, this in itself will have a major impact on China’s influence in Nepal, Bhutan, and (to a lesser extent) on the Northeast Indian states,” wrote Professor John Garver in his 2006 essay “Development of China’s Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-west and South Asia”. Chinese goods, investment, migration, and tourism in these Himalayan fringe-lands will increase, added Garver, whose 2002 book “Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century,” remains among the seminal texts on the subject.
Within its South Asia’s policy, wrote Zhang, Beijing has a dual and inter-related strategy in Nepal: to secure its own strategic interests by maintaining credible bonds. “Thus, it is quite expectable for Beijing to adapt its policy options to the changing scenario in the near future in order to ensure Kathmandu’s obligation to preserve China’s interests,” he added.
Such assertions acquire greater significance amid persisting doubts over not only the timely promulgation of the constitution but also the ability of the post-monarchy leadership to handle the sensitivities of our two giant neighbors. “One reason why China maintained close ties with the monarchy before 2006 was because it was patriotic [and] carried out a correct foreign policy,” Wang said. Asked whether China saw a role for the monarchy in view of growing calls for a referendum on the institution, Wang reiterated that it was China’s policy not to interfere in another country’s internal affairs. “I think China will respect any choice and decision made by the Nepalese people in the days to come,” he added.
What about Nepal’s role in nurturing the bilateral relationship? “Beijing even sees Nepal’s Tibet policy as a litmus test for Kathmandu to befriend China,” Zhang wrote in his paper. Assuaging China’s concern on this key front is a primary responsibility but not the only one. To be able to articulate to the rest of the world how China’s stake in a stable and sovereign Nepal has grown, we must first be able to shed our timidity in acknowledging it.
Disparate international dynamics beyond our control will continue to influence Nepal’s relations with its northern neighbor. China’s ability and willingness to sway and deter those dynamics, too, will continue to grow. It may sound presumptuous for a country of our size and strength to start throwing around terms like “peaceful rise” and “defensive war”, “containment” and “counter-encirclement”. It would be prudent nonetheless to keep pondering their implications for our interests.



‘Political Stability In Nepal Requires Unity Of All Patriotic Forces’

--Professor WANG HONGWEI

Professor Wang Hongwei of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is China’s preeminent expert on Nepal. In an email interview with SANJAY UPADHYA, Wang, 74, shared his observations on the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, India, international involvement in the peace process, the monarchy and the future of Sino-Nepal relations. Excerpts:


Q.1: China has moved significantly in building ties with the Nepalese Maoists. United Communist Party of Nepal chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s October 2009 visit to China has established party-to-party relations. Does China consider the Maoists’ transformation from an outlawed rebel organization into a political party sufficient for the maintenance of political stability in Nepal?

Wang: It is certainly not sufficient for the maintenance of political stability in Nepal. I think any party in Nepal, if it really wants to maintain political stability in Nepal, should try to unite all the patriotic forces of the whole country.

Q.2: In recent years, China has become increasingly vocal in its public support for Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. At times, Nepalese feel China has receded to the background during crucial times, such as the 1989-90 Indian trade and transit embargo and during the background to the April 2006 movement against the monarchy. How does China view India’s role in Nepal? Does Beijing in any way concede New Delhi’s assertion of special relations with Kathmandu because of its close cultural, social and religious ties? Or does China insist on Nepal’s ability to conduct its relations with India independently and in keeping with its own national interests?

Wang: China was and is still a developing country. I do not think it did enough to support Nepal’s just struggle for safeguarding its sovereignty and independence. But I believe that with the attention shifting to developing the Western part, China will do more in this field. India is also a developing country, but it has been behaving like the British of old time, in conducting its relations with neighboring countries including China. New Delhi’s unilateral assertion of special relations with Kathmandu, of its close cultural, social and religious ties, is nothing new, and some of its officials let out the secret that they will turn Nepal into the second Bhutan. This makes me remember a saying in China: “The drinker’s intention is actually not in the cup”, but rather in the mountains and rivers around.

The people of Nepal are heroic. So many brilliant leaders and heroes have emerged in its history, like Anshu Varma, King Prithvi Narayan Shah, Bir Balabhadra, Amar Singh Thapa and Bhimsen Thapa. I believe their spirit will encourage the people to fight for maintaining their complete independence and full sovereignty. And I also believe that, if in need, the Chinese people will give a hand to their Nepalese brothers in these fields.

Q.3: How about the role of the United Nations, United States and the European Union in Nepal? In which ways have they been constructive, and where have proven to be less so? And what about continuing allegations within sections of the Nepalese media of these organizations’ support for the “Free Tibet” movement and attempts to resurrect Mustang as a base?

Wang: Their role is mixed. They have done some work in promoting the peace process. But some of them have exposed their special interests to resurrect Mustang as a base against China. To support the so-called “Free Tibet “movement is to attempt to split China. I believe this design is akin to “ants trying to shake a huge tree,” and is not so easy.


Q.4: After April 2006, China has strengthened relations with Nepal at multiple levels through political, military, economic and cultural cooperation. What are China’s key interests in Nepal beyond the well-known Tibet issue? Does China see Nepal as a land bridge to South Asia, especially in view of Beijing’s growing institutional involvement in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation?

Wang: China’s key interest in Nepal beyond the well-known Tibet issue, according my understanding, is to see Nepal become a prosperous, independent and strong nation soon. Besides, Nepal as a land bridge to South Asia is also very important.

Q.5: What kind of Nepal would China like to see emerge, at a minimum, in the near term, i.e., two years? And what are China’s principal anxieties vis-à-vis Nepal’s potential to slide into further chaos?

Wang: China would like to see Nepal achieving political stability within shortest time, say half a year, or one to two years so that all organized forces could compete to make more contributions in building the motherland. Failure to achieve this might create further chaos and even induce foreign interference.

Q.6: China had traditionally maintained strong ties with Nepal’s monarchy. In the view of many Nepalese, Chinese ambassador Zheng Xianglin made symbolic gesture by becoming the first foreign envoy not to present his credentials to the monarch. Amid the political turbulence, there are calls for a referendum on the restoration of the monarchy. How does China view this development? Does Beijing see a role for the monarchy, provided the Nepalese people decide in favor of restoring it?

Wang: China does not like to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs and respects other countries’ people to choose their political system. The reasons why China maintained close ties with the monarch before 2006 was: (1) the monarchy was the legal head of the state then, (2) the monarchy was patriotic, and carried out a correct foreign policy. I have noted that there are different opinions in Nepalese society about the role of the monarchy. That is a natural phenomenon. I think China will respect any choice and decision made by the Nepalese people in the days to come.

National Notions

Can a national government really live up to its name?

By Sanjay Upadhya
After the perilous posturing precipitated by the fall of the Maoist-led government, there is a palpable acknowledgment of the urgency of rebuilding consensus. While this certainly bodes well for the beleaguered peace process, the recognition is more of a reaction to the growing international clamor for ending the dangerous drift than a direct response to the gravity of the situation.
The Indian government, as the prime facilitator of the peace, has become increasingly apprehensive in public over the fraying of consensus, a sentiment broadly shared by other key governments. The Carter Center, one of the international nongovernmental institutions with a longstanding role in the process, has echoed the anxiety of the wider global community. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stepped forth with incredible frankness on the roadblocks that have emerged.
With less than a year remaining for the parties to draft and promulgate the new constitution – the culmination of a peace process inaugurated amid much optimism – the all-round apprehension is entirely reasonable. A popularly drafted constitution remains Nepal’s best hope of acquiring the political stability central to the sustenance of a ‘new’ Nepal. Having averaged one basic law per decade, Nepalis have paid a heavy cumulative price for political improvisation.
Previous calls for a broader democratic alliance or a united communist front to bolster the peace process resonated more as threats from competing ends of the ideological spectrum. The current predilection of the principal political parties for a national or consensus government represents a refreshing change in the tenor of the national conversation.

Flawed Process
Still, the unpleasantness of our reality must be confronted. While consensus and cooperation have become the operative word across the ideological spectrum, the key protagonists are digging in their heels deeper. Each instance of Maoist obstructionism has prompted a degree of disdain from the Nepali Congress and the Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML), which, in turn, has ratcheted up tensions. Every utterance in favor of amity is invariably accompanied by the word ‘accident’.
Part of the reason is that the peace process remains deeply flawed. After the collapse of royal rule, the Nepali Congress, and, specifically, then-prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala, made all-out efforts to accede to every demand the Maoists made. Since it was crucial to keep the Maoists tied deep into the process, ambiguities and outright prevarications underpinned what essentially became periodic adjustments of disagreements. The goal posts were shifted every step of the way, but the players ultimately were able to accept the rules.
Once the Maoists scored an upset electoral triumph, the peace process entered the next phase. With the monarchy out of the way, the political parties were generally expected to turn against one other. But the rivalries have turned far worse than repulsive. The Nepali Congress and the UML still seem incapable of confronting the central fact that the Maoists emerged as the largest party in largely free and fair elections. The Maoists, for their part, have been flaunting their striking albeit uncertain mandate as almost a divine right to rule.
The political class’s inability to figure out who nudged whom along the path toward a ‘new’ Nepal has been troubling enough. The geopolitical maneuverings precipitated by the vacuum left behind by the monarchy have exacerbated matters. The palace, for all the internal calumnies it drew, at least enjoyed enough confidence of the principal external stakeholders to guarantee stability on that vital front.
Once in power, the Maoists overplayed their hand by seeking to shift Nepal’s geopolitical locus northward to the point of utter defiance. Clearly, this, more than anything else, hastened their fall from power. If not the sacking and subsequent reinstatement of the chief of the army staff, then some other controversy would have exposed the impossible strains that government straddled.
The precise circumstances surrounding the resignation of prime minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal remain in the province of speculation. The hubbub over the fall of the mighty ex-rebels eclipsed another pernicious oddity: the preponderance of people defeated in the elections in the new cabinet in terms of stature and influence. The idea of fostering peace at all costs, regardless of its nobility, will exact its own price. Each blow the credibility of the political process receives will have consequences far beyond the vicinity of the protagonists.
The Maoists, once more, have been the first to detect room for maneuver here. There is little to suggest any popular nostalgia for the ex-rebels’ nine-month rule. They are thus relying on popular disenchantment with the current administration. Having failed in their crusade for “civilian supremacy”, the Maoists made a tactical shift in demanding a national government under their leadership. Appeasing the base through the revolt option contradicts the ex-rebels’ professed commitment to democracy. But, then, the Maoists have prospered on their longstanding ability to juggle such stark contradictions.
In the name of promoting nationalism, the Maoists have carefully positioned themselves for a place in the government. By relaxing their stalling tactics in the constituent assembly, they have exhibited some signs of flexibility. As the Nepali Congress and the UML rejoice in what they see as the Maoists’ capitulation after months of swagger, the ex-rebels insist on their right to lead the government. Their ability to do so would depend more on the internal dynamics of the current coalition partners. Should the Maoists achieve their objective, it would merely place them in a wider berth of parties. Logically, this would make consensus on any subject all that more difficult. How they would expect to fare any better than their last stint in power does not seem to have baffled them.
For now, the ex-rebels have zeroed in on their rivals. The Maoists are relishing the influx of cadres from the UML, almost oblivious to the reality that they themselves are hemorrhaging to rival factions. The deep rifts within the UML seem too delicious an opportunity for the Maoists to ignore. Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, for his part, has been more outspoken about the lack of cooperation from the UML than from the ex-rebels.
The Nepali Congress, too, is in a state of malaise. Koirala’s decision to send daughter Sujata as the leader of the party’s team in the cabinet and Ram Chandra Poudel’s defeat of Sher Bahadur Deuba in the parliamentary party elections, among other things, have set off a realignment process inherently different from the one that had characterized much of the post-1990 Nepali Congress. How events actually play out would become clearer after further spasms. The Maoists are no doubt keen to exploit rifts across the board. By accusing the Nepali Congress and the UML of having engineered the split in the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), the ex-rebels have cleverly picked sides in an organization that did much to erode its base in the Terai.

Stark Truth
Amid all this gloom, the central truth of our political evolution has come out starker. Every political turn has been touted as a triumph but has left the country progressively weaker. The triumph of the people has been hailed, only to pave the way for recognition that change has been incomplete. Yet internally, in our effort to elaborate our group grievances, there is a real danger of unleashing a process of fragmentation in perpetuity. Whether a constellation of microstates can in any way sustain itself between our two giant neighbors is a concern that seems to have worried them more than us.
Our northern neighbor enjoys an ethnic homogeneity that allows for conformity on issues of national interest regardless of the polity in existence. To the south, a remarkably diverse array of states has been able to craft a union rooted in consensual national objectives and policies. The recent upsurge in the fiery rhetoric between the two confident giants can only bode ill for a country so precariously perched in the middle. The imponderables presented by farther flung powers – both in their official and non-government manifestations – has certainly complicated our internal dynamics.
As for the current flux, there is a clear divergence in the perceptions and expectation from peace process inside the country and outside. Even among external stakeholders, the struggle to carve spheres of influence is palpable. At this very crucial moment, unfortunately, our ability to articulate and safeguard our national interests is eroding the fastest.
In a moment of remarkable forthrightness, CPN-UML chairman Jhal Nath Khanal claimed the new constitution would be a “brochure of the agreements reached between the political parties, and thus incomplete.” Perhaps it might be prudent to wonder aloud whether we might have put the cart before the horse.
Nepaliness, regardless of its origin, growth and perceived as well as real iniquities, is a reality of our times. This recognition seems to have been able to sensitize Nepalis abroad more than those within the country. For a people caught between the desecration of the statues of Prithvi Narayan Shah and strident pledges of reclaiming territories lost in the Sugauli Treaty, reality has a particularly relative quality. A national government is undoubtedly appealing. But there is little to suggest it might really be able to live up to its name.

(A version of this article appeared in the July/August 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)

NEPAL-INDIA TIES: No Roundabout Way

A teachable moment amid the basic ambiguity of the relationship

By Sanjay Upadhya
Three years after it jumpstarted a peace process predicated on the slow death of the monarchy, India has come full circle in Nepal. The motions have been an odd mixture of tentativeness, calibration, symbolism and intimidation. On the surface, New Delhi’s unease with the Maoists’ motives is palpable. But that anxiety merely covers its wider alarm over the departures from the script.
For many Nepalis, former king Gyanendra’s recent month-long visit to India epitomized the turnaround. The warm reception he received in powerful Indian quarters representing the two major political formations instantly sparked speculation on the possibility of a restoration of the monarchy. Regardless of the election outcome, New Delhi will most likely revise its Nepal policy in keeping with its broader national security imperatives.
The fact that the complexities surrounding an enthronement of a baby king – complexities undoubtedly crucial given Nepal’s own turbulent history of minor monarchs – have been largely ignored perhaps underscores the implausibility of an immediate reversion to royalism. Clearly, New Delhi’s immediate objective was to intimate Nepal’s political powers that it has permanent interests as well as the willingness to uphold them.
That, quite naturally, set off a chain of events. As the most aggrieved party, it was logical for the Maoists to play up the threat of “foreign interference”. Their initial ardor – rhetorical at best – for reinvestigating the royal palace massacre dissipated amid the shrugs from the ex-royals and the half-heartedness of the other political parties. The brinkmanship over the army might have acquired greater traction in the Maoists’ favor had the former rebels not been so perilously perched on the defensive on a host of issues. The active involvement of foreign ambassadors was perceived more as a response to the Maoists’ high-handedness.
The Maoists’ “China card” has stung India far deeper than any of the palace variants of the past. Ashok K. Mehta, a retired general of the Indian Army who does not represent his government’s official thinking but nevertheless retains the attention of audiences so attuned, conceded in a recent interview with BBC Nepali Service that no Nepali government had ever veered so close to China.
Could the “China card” have acquired such high stakes only at Nepal’s initiative? Beijing has provided a clear answer through the succession of political, military and a bevy of other delegations it has been dispatching to Nepal since the collapse of the royal regime. At times, this has led to some aberrant behavior, such as the Indian foreign secretary’s sudden arrival in Kathmandu earlier this year when his counterpart was in China for previously scheduled talks. Judging from its aftermath, the Chinese proposal for a new peace and friendship treaty with Nepal seems to have emerged outside of New Delhi’s much vaunted strategic dialogue with Beijing.
Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s decision to call off his visit to China may have slowed Nepal’s northward tilt. With coalition partners Unified Marxist-Leninists and the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum firmly within Beijing’s hospitality zone, matters have moved beyond the Maoists.

Not An Easy Question
The question of the monarchy was not an easy one for India. From the outset, republicanism has been a central element of India’s Nepal policy deliberations, gaining prominence during moments of bilateral strains. The precise geopolitical maneuverings surrounding King Gyanendra’s February 1, 2005 takeover and the nature of New Delhi’s deliberations with Kathmandu prior to his subsequent advocacy of China’s inclusion as an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation have not come to light. In that shadow, the configuration of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in New Delhi made republicanism quite expedient. The communists supporting the UPA government ratcheted up the pressure on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government, although New Delhi and Kathmandu were still exchanging ministerial visits.
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were equally energetic advocates of formalizing what had already become apparent for years: China’s growing presence in South Asia. Nepal alone was entirely vulnerable to Indian displeasure. Sitaram Yechuri, whom the Chinese could count on as an ally against the US-Indian nuclear deal, symbolized the opposition to the monarchy Beijing was supposedly supporting. Prime Minister Singh and his Congress party saw the imperative of mainstreaming the Nepali Maoists in an effort to weaken the Indian Naxalite movement. The resulting policy shift acquired a momentum of its own.
After the collapse of the royal regime amid massive protests and the onset of the peace process, the monarchy had been portrayed – and perceived – as so inherently anti-Indian that even the Bharatiya Janata Party could only muster enough courage to call for the restoration of a Hindu state.
New Delhi must have pondered the ramifications of a post-monarchical order. When they began their “People’s War”, the Maoists had ranked their anti-Indianism higher than their opposition to the monarchy. Once in the mainstream, the former rebels’ leadership could be coopted through blandishments and admonitions. But what about the rank and file energized by the 40-point charter? The sovereign Nepalese people would be worthy custodians of the new republic. Would that be reassurance enough?
The fact that India’s twin-pillar theory of stability had not lost its relevance was underscored by New Delhi’s zeal for the palace’s first announcement inviting the SPA to form a government. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s subsequent pullback from that commitment mirrored New Delhi’s reading of the popular mood in Kathmandu. The capriciousness of public opinion as well as the institutional amnesia of political parties could one day nullify a long-retired bureaucrat’s disavowal.
In the ebullience over the newness, the pivot of a tenuous peace process had to be addressed. Prime Minister Singh’s national security adviser openly voiced his country’s preference for the Nepali Congress in the run-up to the constituent assembly elections. Gen. Mehta, in his BBC interview, asserted far more candidly in impeccable Nepali New Delhi’s surprise at the Maoists’ success. In any case, New Delhi must have recognized that other newness of a new Nepal. Not only had too many external players entered the stage, India’s fragmented polity, with its disparate ideological and institutional interests and outlooks, had put New Delhi at some disadvantage.
Briefly, New Delhi’s public temptation to dismiss the Maoists’ “China card” as another desperate Nepalese ploy provided a cover to address its own struggles. Unlike during the monarchy, Beijing’s eggs are no longer in one basket. No one knows how many China has placed in each one. Nor do the Chinese seem inclined to reveal the extent of their ability or willingness to reallocate their eggs. And who can say for sure how many more baskets are likely to emerge.
Yet the central reality of Nepal-India relations persists. It is impossible for either country to envisage the relationship outside the framework of China. British India struggled with the dilemma before arriving at a tenuous arrangement with the Ranas. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru supposedly overruled Sardar Ballabh Bhai Patel’s hawkish interpretation of Beijing’s long-term intentions and opted for a middle course on Nepal. But Nehru differed only in style. Former prime minister Matrika Prasad Koirala’s posthumous memoirs contain letters from Nehru that leave little doubt as to independent India’s image of democratic Nepal.
The next four decades were propitious for Nepal in terms of expanding its international identity and options. Contrary to conventional wisdom, King Mahendra’s policy of diversification contained skepticism of north and south, which impelled him to widen contacts with the Soviets and the Americans, overtures both superpowers more than reciprocated. By 1990, however, the international and regional situation had transformed so fundamentally that New Delhi could feel unrestrained in paying back for the accumulation of “snubs,” which were merely actions and approaches any sovereign and independent nation would take in normal course.
It took a while for the rest of the world to realize that the fall of the Berlin Wall precipitated premature celebrations of the “end of history”. In Nepal, the supposedly discredited monarchy became an anchor of stability for India, even in the midst of the palace massacre, until the turbulence of the morning of February 1, 2005.
Beijing’s own notion of the Sino-Nepali relationship has been guided by the quality and content of its ties with New Delhi. During moments of thaw between the two Asian giants, China tends to advise Nepal to build closer ties with India, even describing them as natural. But when tensions resurface, China characterizes the India-Nepal open border as a threat to its national security. Pushed to the brink , Beijing has tended to step back, as in 1989-1990 and 2005-2006. Whether such diffidence will persist is anybody’s guess.

A Teachable Moment
The post-monarchy dispensation has certainly been a teachable moment for India-Nepal bilateralism. A future-looking partnership cannot proceed outside – for lack of a better term – the “anti-Indianism” in Nepal. The phenomenon is for real and can no longer be called one organization’s or individual’s passport to power. No amount of Indian aid or concessions is likely to be accepted as a gesture of good faith as long as this perceptual dissonance dominates. Complementarities cannot be expected to amount to much as long as the basic nature of the relationship remains ambiguous.
Even the most hawkish Indians probably recognize that their ability to “Sikkimize” or “Bhutanize” Nepal in the traditional sense has been eroding over the last three years. Their commitment to a final solution may have not. Intervention by invoking the right to self-defense remains a growing possibility as Nepal plunges deeper into instability. Yet the costs of such a venture are mounting by the minute.
Deliberate or otherwise, Kathmandu may have widened its options through this accumulation of external interests, but it has not overcome its basic geographical constraint which leaves it susceptible to overwhelming Indian punitive pressure. Nepal’s prevailing political culture has certainly not helped fortify ourselves. As political forces take turns courting and castigating India, it has become far easier for New Delhi to undermine Nepal’s real grievances.
In the battle of perceptions, moreover, the Indians seem to be counting on Chinese overreach. For two generations of Nepalis, China has been perceived as a benign influence. What pressures Beijing may have exerted in private in the past is best known to the palace. Should China’s public affirmations to uphold Nepali sovereignty and independence become more commonplace, Nepalis may be goaded toward skepticism in the opposite direction. Admittedly, this will not be enough to counteract the far deeper distrust of the south. Growing acknowledgment of Nepal’s strategic vulnerability, however, might make Nepalis more understanding of their own interests. In this hazy zone, a new regional shadow play has begun.
A year after its abolition, the monarchy maintains some psychological presence in Nepal. A restoration of the institution would be something for the people to decide. Much would depend on republican leadership’s conduct. Should political skirmishing block a new constitution, an unpredictable range of options could begin emerging. For now, the Indians seem to have recognized the salutary effect of the ex-monarch’s presence in his former kingdom. As for recasting the bilateral relationship, there can be no roundabout way for either country.

(A version of this article appeared in the May/June 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)

Appeasement, Either Way

Any successor government would find itself preoccupied with placating the Maoists

By Sanjay Upadhya
True to tradition, the political class has begun plotting an alternative to the Maoist-led government six months after it rose to power. As usual, the opposition – which, not so bizarrely, includes elements within the ruling coalition – claims the future of the country is at stake. As he has always done when not in the hot seat, Nepali Congress President Girija Prasad Koirala is leading the charge. Other leaders across the ideological spectrum are blowing hot and cold on the wisdom of dislodging the Maoists based on their own partisan – and factional – interests.
On the surface, the urgency to act is palpable. The Maoists have flouted the basic commitments they had signed on to as part of the peace process. Once their interpretation of the series of accords laying down the roadmap to a new Nepal stopped resembling the texts, the former rebels gleefully started calling for a renegotiation of the 12-point agreement. When admonition begets that kind of defiance, the conventional wisdom goes, an alliance of democrats becomes imperative. The head of the country’s largest democratic party, regardless of age or interest, could not have remained indifferent.
During his last stint as premier, Koirala was something of an anomaly. He bowed over backwards with the agility of a master contortionist to appease the Maoists every step of the way, alienating many in his own party. In the name of advancing the peace process, he was prepared to pay any price to keep the former rebels onboard. It looked like the longest serving premier of the 1990-2002 experiment was expiating for its collapse. During moments of detachment, the oxygen mask came in handy for Koirala. At other times, his cryptic comments on the nature – and future – of the monarchy eased the way.
It was not unnatural for Koirala, as interim head of state, to see himself as the first president of Nepal. The former rebels, for their part, lavished praise on him. Still, it is hard to believe that such a seasoned veteran could have been so oblivious to the true intentions of the Maoists. Wounded pride can be ruled out as the root cause of his current disenchantment. Of course, hatred of the monarchy may have temporarily blindsided Koirala. But an interim period of two years was more than sufficient for any primary member of the Nepali Congress to make an educated assessment of the party’s prospects in an environment where the Maoists owned the republican agenda.
It is tempting, therefore, to see in Koirala’s anti-Maoist rants self-indictment of his own performance as interim premier. Yet obsession with his flaws is something best left for more tranquil times. Koirala may not be a credible custodian of democracy, but he is its most credible campaigner. If someone who started out as an agitator against the Ranas continues to be Nepal’s last hope for freedom almost six decades later, it surely says more about the nation than the individual.

Villains Galore
In our eternal search for villains, the Maoists were always on the weakest ground. During the campaign to oust the royal regime, it was convenient for the agitating parties and people to praise the Maoists for having raised arms in support of the masses. The Maoists basked in the adulation but were careful not to be carried away. They knew their battles would not end with the fall of the monarchy. The gruesome record of violence was always going to be an albatross on the Maoists. Their best hope lay in eroding the credibility with which their tactical allies could turn against them. As the Maoists kept describing war and peace as interchangeable elements of the revolution, the faith of the followers mattered more than the sneers of the skeptics.
When they faced the first sustained challenge in the form of the Gaur carnage, the Maoists exercised remarkable restraint. Was this a sign of weakness or a profession of their commitment to peaceful change? As the question hung in the air, the former insurgents expanded their power of obfuscation. Months before the anti-Chinese protests began in Kathmandu last year, the Young Communist League (YCL) warned Tibetans against abusing Nepalese soil. Yet when the protests began, the Maoists virtually disappeared from the scene. By this time, persuading Washington to withdraw the terror tag had become more important and expedient, especially when the Nepali Congress and the UML were ready to clamp down on the protests.
During the election campaign, the Nepali Congress was gloating over its success in bringing the Maoists to the mainstream and calculating the extent of the impending electoral reward. The CPN-UML was busy mocking Maoist supremo Pushpa Kamal Dahal as a “wall” president. Where the Maoists really excelled was not in cultivating the royalist vote but in courting former U.S. president Jimmy Carter. Mindful of his stature as the world’s most prominent peacemaker, our ex-rebels watched how Carter had associated with far more unsavory organizations around the world. Before their rivals could challenge the Maoists’ triumph, Carter certified the election as free and fair. Not even the Nepali Congress dared contradict the chief international observer.

Price of Power
Power, to be sure, has come at a heavy price for the Maoists. Dahal’s public acknowledgment of how different leading is from rebelling was only the beginning of a steep learning curve. Internally, malcontents of every stripe could enter the tent of the ideologically disgruntled to put pressure on the leadership. That mouthful of appellations called the People’s Federal Democratic National Republic was an outcome of internal appeasement. The compulsion of having to play to disparate constituencies has led Dahal to make outrageous statements. The ideological rigidity of the “people’s war” may have become untenable in the mainstream politics. But there is that hard strain of a hazy nationalism that allows people like Mohan Baidya and Chandra Prakash Gajurel to remind the faithful of the incompleteness of the revolution.
The Maoists would love to draw more people from the right and left to broaden a communist/nationalist front. The process, which seemed to have begun with the entry of some ex-royalists, progressed with the unification with the CPN-Unity Center. But lately the Unified Maoists have been hemorrhaging far worse, Matrika Yadav’s revolt being just an example.
With every new threat to their survival in power, the Maoists have become increasingly defiant. For quite some time, they have been claiming a veto on the new constitution. Their predilection for ruling through ordinances has confirmed the worst fears of their detractors. The ex-rebels continue to pack important state organizations with loyalists, while forming new ones in the non-government sector. Should pressures beyond his control become too burdensome, Prime Minister Dahal can always look the Nepalese people straight in the eye and resign, citing his refusal to make anti-national compromises. For a nation struggling for a collective identity, nationalism sure has a curious appeal.
What after Dahal’s ouster? It is tempting to believe that the Maoists have lost the initiative through their nonperformance. Their capitulation on the issue of the Pashupati bhattas and vacillation in the standoff with the Nepal Army are considered emblematic of their emaciation. Yet the Maoists are not the traditional adversary. Through the YCL and other avatars in the mainstream, the Maoists’ capacity to launch an urban revolt may not be so inconsistent with their bluster. Therein lies the supreme dilemma. Cornering the Maoists would merely hasten the state capture the opposition says it wants to forestall. Allowing them to retain power and dispense patronage, in a wider effort at moderation, smacks of appeasement. But the more important question is whether the other parties have the credibility and control to sustain a successor government.
The Maoists know how to have it both ways. They prospered on the perception that they were run by the palace. Yet without their participation, the monarchy would not have fallen. When the time came to lavish praise on Koirala, someone they had clubbed together with the former monarch in the aftermath of the Narayanhity massacre, they were more than generous. The Maoists started their rebellion on a charter that began with anti-Indian demands. Yet they took full advantage of Indian soil and perhaps official succor. They derided the Chinese leadership as deviants and endured Beijing’s wrath, but swiftly became its staunchest allies. After all, who can say for sure that Matrika Yadav’s revolt is not a carefully staged diversionary tactic? Or that the United Maoists lack the ability to profit from even the faintest of such perceptions?
For the former rebels, the ends have always justified the means. In full public glare, subterfuge is likely to acquire far greater flexibility and lethality. The Maoists have articulated their destination with chilling clarity even before laying the trajectory. The corollary can only mean an abundance of permutations and combinations. Their official stand still incorporates everything from supporting absolute monarchy (if the Nepalese people so desire) to fighting Indian troops in a final war of national liberation. When they bombard different people with different messages, the onus clearly falls on the listener.
Then there is that eternal truth of politics, which in Nepal’s case has had far greater relevance. Every government is perceived as being worse than the last. Juxtapose that with the perpetual effort any successor government would have to put in to placate the Maoists. No matter how you look at it, it is hard to avoid the sight of appeasement.

(A version of this article appeared in the March/April 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)

Sphere Pressure

Sino-Indian tug-of-war weighs down a wobbly republic

By Sanjay Upadhya
Nepal’s strategic vulnerability between Asia’s two giants has always risen and receded with the state of India-China relations and the external variables influencing them. In the past, the internal fundamentals, regardless of the political system of the day, were sturdy enough to cope with often-competing pressures emanating from the north and south. The improvisation that has become the defining feature of the contemporary Nepalese state has made today’s geopolitical spasms far more ominous.
For two years after the collapse of the royal regime in April 2006, India and the West were keenly attuned to the twists and turns of a peace process inaugurated amid deep contradictions. The monarchy, in virtual suspension, became the glue that held the signatories to a plethora of issue-specific agreements together. Clearly, New Delhi and Washington, among other world capitals, were anxious to see the monarchy continue in some ceremonial form in the interests of stability. The complicated internal and external dynamics involved in reinventing the state – an amorphous concept at best – left them with little else than awaiting the eventual verdict of the people.
Beijing, a longtime backer of the monarchy, used the period to build bridges with the newly empowered political parties. Ever the pragmatist, the Chinese reached out to Maoists, whom they had vigorously opposed politically. The former Nepalese rebels, who had long accused the post-Mao Zedong leadership of betraying the Great Helmsman, reciprocated with great alacrity. They virtually forgave Beijing for supplying arms to the royal regime in its effort to quell the rebellion.

Interesting Manifestations
The new northern dynamics surfaced in other interesting ways. At times, interim prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala – uncharacteristically enough, in view of his political record and reputation – warmed to Beijing, especially after the Indian Oil Corporation interrupted critical petroleum supplies on one pretext or the other. Although the Chinese ambassador had become the first foreign representative to present his credentials to Koirala, in his capacity as interim head of state, the symbolism had its limits.
Beijing declined Kathmandu’s request to revoke a contract the royal regime had signed for the purchase of two aircraft by the erstwhile Royal Nepalese Army. Still, when Koirala implicitly linked India to the unrest in the Terai, it was hard to separate that with repeated Chinese concerns over the region’s deepening instability.
By the time the Maoists rose to power, after their unexpected electoral triumph, Beijing had become increasingly candid in asserting its interests in Nepal. The persistence of the Free Tibet protests in Kathmandu hardened Chinese perceptions of Nepal’s open border with India as a threat to their own security. From describing the royal palace massacre as an external conspiracy aimed at scuttling closer Nepal-China ties to affirming Beijing’s commitment to prevent Nepal from becoming another Sikkim or Bhutan, voices from north became more abundant and unequivocal. Significantly, they seemed equally aimed at audiences in India. The arrival of a succession of Chinese civil and military delegations in Kathmandu underscored the fundamental transformation underway in Sino-Nepalese relations. The Indians appeared on the defensive, a role they were unaccustomed to in recent memory.
Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s visit to China, days after assuming the premiership, prompted many Indians to cry foul. The Maoists, in New Delhi’s view, had violated some unwritten code under which an incoming Nepalese leader always visited India first. During his subsequent visit to New Delhi, Dahal emphasized Nepal’s commitment to a policy of equidistance/equiproximity with both neighbors as a geopolitical compulsion. Although it initially won over key constituencies in India, Dahal’s charm offensive could not penetrate others. Defense Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa’s visit to China, days after Dahal returned from Delhi, left skeptics in India with a deep sense of vindication, but certainly not one they could not rejoice in.
The fact that Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee chose to visit Nepal as his country was holding crucial state elections served to underscore Delhi’s growing anxieties. On the eve of Mukherjee’s arrival, Deputy Prime Minister Bam Dev Gautam raised the regional stakes by urging Beijing’s involvement in the resolution of Nepal’s Kalapani dispute with India.
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi hit the headlines even before he landed in Kathmandu, simply because he was paying an official visit barely a week after Mukherjee’s departure. Urging Kathmandu to help check anti-China activities that could grow in 2009, the 50th year of the Dalai Lama’s flight into and self-exile in India, Yang pledged Beijing’s help to protect Nepal’s sovereignty and independence. He also asserted that China intended to develop relations with Nepal in a way that would serve as a role model for bilateral ties between big and small countries. Clearly, this double whammy could not have been lost on the Indians.
Two days after Yang’s departure, Beijing sent a military mission headed by the deputy chief of its army, Lieutenant General Ma Xiotian. During a meeting with Defense Minister Thapa, the Chinese general pledged to provide the Nepal army with some non-lethal equipment and training facilities. Gen. Ma’s visit succeeded another mission led by the Chinese military commander responsible for the areas bordering Nepal. As all this was going on, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Richard Boucher, who was expected to arrive in Kathmandu to, according to some reports, announce the withdrawal his government’s terrorist tag on the Maoists, put off his travel plans indefinitely. It became hard to see the events as unrelated.
The Nepali Congress took the China question to the constituent assembly, specifically asking Prime Minister Dahal whether Yang’s offer was made in response to any request he had placed before Beijing. Moreover, the party demanded to know where the threat to Nepal’s sovereignty emanated from. India-friendly media outlets in Nepal reacted with far greater stridency to what they almost universally considered Beijing’s gratuitous concern.
Despite having raised their overall profile so substantially, the Chinese have carefully calibrated their Nepal policy. They do not seem to have developed unqualified faith in the top leadership of the Maoists, especially considering their long-standing links in India during the decade-long bloody insurgency. In early 2008, the Maoist-affiliated Young Communist League (YCL) warned it would not allow Tibetans to hold anti-China protests. Once the demonstrations erupted, the YCL – and Maoist organizations in general – were almost invisible. If this was a gesture to the United States, which was in a watch-and-wait mood on the terrorism tag, it must have made some impression.
Indeed, China’s ambivalence on the Maoists has led to wider initiatives, the results of which have been no less ambiguous. Beijing’s interest in forging a wider communist front incorporating the Unified Marxist-Leninists has been stymied by the factionalism in that party. By raising the Yang issue in the legislature, the Nepali Congress pretty much distanced itself from this putative northern alliance.
The focus has thus fallen on the military, which, after the abolition of the monarchy, considers itself the last line of defense vis-à-vis Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The reading here seems to be that the nationalism plank would be attractive enough to forge an alliance between the junior and middle ranks in the Nepal Army and the former rebels. Against this scenario, China’s purported interest in Maoist commanders taking up positions in the higher echelons becomes all the more understandable.

Southern Dynamics
During moments of warmth in Chinese-Indian relations, the dominant sentiment in Delhi has focused on some compact Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai had supposedly reached in 1954. Under that arrangement, whose existence Nehru himself had publicly affirmed at the time, Beijing would honor India’s claim of influence over Nepal while Delhi recognized total and irrevocable Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.
During times of bilateral strains, Indians have remained suspicious of Chinese motives but reasonably confident of the limits of Beijing’s options in Nepal. Lately, Indian fears of a Chinese strategic encirclement seem compounded by recognition of China’s enhanced willingness and ability to shape developments in Nepal. This, in turn, has been exacerbated by Delhi’s palpable unease over the fallout of possible Chinese responses to growing American assertiveness in Nepal.
Recent Indian initiatives to sound out former king Gyanendra may be less about drawing him into a democratic alliance than about preventing him from veering too close to a Maoist-led nationalist platform. On one plane, the fact that the restoration of the monarchy has become part of the mainstream national conversation barely a year after its abolition may be indicative of the fickleness of the Nepalese psyche. At an operational level, it is a backlash against the political flaws and flimsiness of the transformation process. Taken together, they do acquire additional import.
Should the constituent assembly fail to complete a new constitution amid constant political bickering, will all options have been foreclosed? The question would assume greater significance amid calls in India, in the aftermath of the Mumbai carnage, for the enshrinement of national security as the prime tenet of Delhi’s Nepal policy. It is not difficult, on the other hand, to recognize how seriously Beijing has perceived the Free Tibet movement to be a pivotal element of a wider American-led effort to contain its peaceful rise.
The logical question here is: how far would the Chinese go in supporting the Maoists? History does not provide much reassurance here. From imperial times, Beijing has made explicit pledges to defend Nepal from foreign threats. But the Chinese declined Nepalese pleas for aid during the 1814-16 war with British India. China refused to bail out King Birendra and King Gyanendra in 1990 and 2006 respectively, especially when the palace’s disputes with India had been directly related to Nepal’s growing defense and strategic ties to Beijing.
Since Beijing’s ongoing engagement increasingly appears to be predicated on reciprocal institutional and official obligations, the question of the future of the Maoists – or any other group – in power becomes immaterial. The geopolitical equations have been rewritten drastically, and perhaps irrevocably. Nepal’s challenge has been exacerbated by its growing inability to influence the intricate variables.

(A version of this article appeared in the January/February 2009 issue of Global Nepali magazine)

ओबामाको सफलता: सरोकार सबैको

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

बाराक ओबामा संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिकाको ४४औ राष्ट्रपति निर्वाचित भएपछि विश्वले निकै लामो सन्तोषको श्वास फेरेको सुनियो। राहतको अनुभूति अनपेक्षित थिएन नै। चुनाव पहिले बिबिसि र ईकोनमिष्ट लगायतका अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय समाचार संस्थाले गरेका मत सर्वेक्षणहरुले गैरअमेरिकीहरु अधिक्तम बहुमतले ओबामा समर्थक रहेको देखाएका थिए।
गोराहरुको संख्यात्मक बाहुल्य र दर्हो प्रभाव रहिरहेको विश्वको एक मात्र महाशक्तिमा पहिलो पटक अल्पसंख्यक जातिका उम्मेद्धारका पक्षमा परिचालित ब्यापक मनोविज्ञानले निश्चित रुपमा अमेरिका बाहिर पनि उत्हास जगाएको थियो। सताव्दीऔ देखिको दासत्ववाट मुक्त काला जातिका उम्मेद्धार संसारको सबैभन्दा शक्तिशाली मानिएको ओहोदामा पहिलो पटक पुग्ने सम्भावना बढ्दै जानुको वेग्लै रोमान्च थियो।
तुलनात्मक रुपले युवा र मृदुभाषि ओबामाको पक्षमा अमेरिका भित्रको लहरले त्यही पुस्ताका गैरअमेरिकीहरुलाई पनि आकर्षित गर्यो। अनि विगत् आठ वर्ष देखि अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय जगतमा जर्ज बुश प्रशासनले देखाएको हठले समग्र रिपब्लिकन पार्टीलाई नै अलोकप्रीय बनाउदै लगेको थियो। अमेरिकाको विश्वभर बिग्रेको छवि सुधार्ने ओबामाको प्रणले अमेरिकी र बिदेशीहरु दुबैलाई आकर्षित गर्नु स्वभाविक भयो।
तर के विश्वका लागि ओबामाको विजयले आधारभूत रुपमा खासै फरक पार्ला त? परम्परागत् रुपले बिदेश नीतिका विषयमा डेमोक्रयाटिक र रिपब्लिकन पार्टीहरुका वीच आधारभूत राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थहरुमा सहमति हुने गरेको छ। ती स्वार्थ हासिल गर्ने माध्यमका बारे दुई दलका बीच भिन्नता रहने गरेको छ। आर्थिक, सामाजिक र सैनिक मामलामा देखिएका आन्तरिक भिन्नताकै प्रतिविम्व अमेरिकी अन्तरराष्ट्रिय नीतिमा देखिने गर्दछ। कहिलेकाही त्यसलाई नै दुई दल बीचको बैचारिक भिन्नता भनि बुझ्ने बानी अन्य मुलुकलाई परेको हो। चुनाव पूर्व राष्ट्रव्यापी वहसहरुका श्रृङ्खलाले देखाए झै ओबामा र उनका रिपब्लिकन प्रतिद्धन्दी जन मकैन वीच जल्दाबल्दा अन्तरराष्ट्रिय मुद्दाहरुमा प्रक्रियागत् बिमति नै थियो।
निर्वाचन अभियानमा उम्मेद्बारले गर्ने गरेका वाचाहरु पद सम्हाले पछि तिनले पन्छाउने गरेको प्रशस्त इतिहास छ अमेरिकामा। तुलनात्मक रुपमा लामो रहने गरेको अभियानमा अग्रता कायम गरेका प्रत्यासीहरुका सार्वजनिक अभिव्यक्तिहरु सुक्षमताका साथ केलाइने हुदा विपक्षीहरुले त्यसलाई आफ्नै ढंगले व्याख्या गर्ने छुट रहने गर्दछ। मुलुक भित्रका विविध प्रभाव समुहको समर्थन जुटाउन पर्ने वाध्यताका कारण उम्मेद्धारले पनि बेलाबखत त्यस्ता अस्पष्टतालाई कायम राख्ने गर्दछन्।
सत्ता सम्हाले पछि प्रतिपक्षीको प्रतिरोध, घट्नाक्रमको तरलता र तत्कालिन राजनीतिक लाभहानीको तौल जस्ता कारणले राष्ट्रपतिको कबुल र कार्यमा भिन्नता ल्याउने गरेको छ। तर पनि अमेरिकी बिदेश नीतिमा प्रजातन्त्र, मानवअधिकार, खुला बजार अर्थतन्त्र र अमेरिकी विशिष्टता लगायतका परम्परागत् मुल्य मान्यताको उपस्थिति रहने गरेको छ। तिनैको अभिव्यक्ति बोली र ब्यबहार एवं नीति र कार्यक्रमा निरन्तर पाईन्छ।

स्वार्थ र सहकार्य
संसारको एक मात्र महाशक्ति भएपनि स्थिर र सवल अन्तरराष्ट्रिय व्यवस्था सुनिश्चित गर्नाका लागि अमेरिकाले अन्य प्रभावशाली राष्ट्रहरु संग सहकार्य गर्नु पर्ने आवश्यक्ता बढ्दै गएको छ। यो अमेरिकी बहुआयामिक शक्तिमा कुनै ह्रास आएर भन्दा पनि समसामयिक विश्वमा अन्य शक्तिहरुको वर्चस्व बढेकोका कारणले नै हो। बुश प्रशासन भर अमेरिकाले गुमाएको अन्तरराष्ट्रिय विश्वसनीयता माझ ओबामाका लागि यो चूनौतिलाई अझ बढ्नेछ। तर चुनाव अभियानमा बुश प्रशासनलाई जति दोषी बनाए पनि अमेरिका बिरोधी भावनाको जरा इराक युद्ध भन्दा धेरै गहिरो रहेको यथार्थलाई स्वीकारी ओबामालाई अघि बढ्नु पर्ने बाध्यता छ।
आतंकवाद विरुद्बको अभियान, व्यापक क्षति गर्ने हातहतियारको अप्रसार, सांगठित अपराध, वातावरणीय क्षति, चरम गरिवी निवारण, र महारोग प्रतिरोध जस्ता विषयहरुले अन्तरराष्ट्रिय स्वरुप लिएका छन्। युरोपेली संघ, रुस, चीन, भारत, जापान, र ब्र्याजिल जस्ता मुलुकहरु संगको अमेरिकी सम्वन्धमा आफ्नै पृथक चरित्र र जटिलताहरु रहेका छन्। द्धैपक्षिक असहमतिका बाबजूद शान्ति र स्थायित्वका लागि उनीहरु संग प्रत्यक्ष सरोकार राख्ने भौगौलिक क्षेत्रहरुमा सहकार्य गर्नुको विकल्प अमेरिकालाई छैन्। संयुक्त राष्ट्र संघ सुरक्षा परिषदका स्थायी सदस्यका हैसियतले युरोपेली संघ (वेलायत र फ्रान्स), रुस र चीनलाई प्राप्त भिटो शक्तिका कारण अमेरिकाले तिनलाई विश्वासमा लिनु पर्ने चूनौति छ। क्षेत्रिय मुद्दाहरुमा त्यहांका प्रभावशाली मुलुकहरु संगको सम्वन्धले अमेरिकी कार्यक्षमतालाई निर्देशित गर्ने छ।
मध्यपूर्वमा बुश प्रशासनले महत्वपूर्ण नीतिगत् भिन्नता ल्याएको थियो। तेलको सरल बितरणका लागि त्यस क्षेत्रका अप्रजातान्त्रिक सरकारहरुलाई दशकौ देखि वाशिङ्टनले अटूट समर्थन दिदै आएको थियो। तिनै देशहरु मध्येकै सउदी अरेबिया र इजिप्टबाट सेप्टेम्बर ११ का अधिकांश आतंकवादीहरु अमेरिका विरुद्ध उत्रेकाले त्यो नीतिगत् परिवर्तन आयो। तर प्रजातान्त्रिकरणलाई राष्ट्रिय सुरक्षा संग गांसेर केही कार्यक्रमको घोषणा गर्दा नगर्दै वाशिङ्टन इराकको युद्धको दलदलमा फस्न पुग्यो। त्यो बिबादित ब्यस्तताका कारण यता आएर अफ्गानिस्तानमा स्थिति विग्रिन गयो।
युद्ध पूर्वको सूचना सङ्कलनका कम्जोरी, अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कूटनीति जुटाउने क्रमका शिथिलता, युद्ध पछिका लागि अपर्याप्त योजना आदिले अमेरिकी विश्वसनीयतामा ह्रास ल्याउन मद्दत पुर्यायो। ब्यापक क्षेत्रमै अमेरिकी प्रयासहरु निस्तेज हुनुमा इजरायल-प्यालेष्टाइनको रक्तपातपूर्ण गतिरोधका साथ साथै इरानलाई आणविक हतियार प्राप्त गर्नबाट रोक्ने, मित्रहरुको सहयोग जुटाइरहनु पर्ने, आतंकवाद बिरुद्धको अभियानका राष्ट्रजन्य विशेषतालाई ध्यान पुर्याउन पर्ने जस्ता बाध्यताहरुको भूमिका छ।
इराक युद्ध त्यस क्षेत्रमा दशकौ देखि चुलिएका बिभिन्न मुद्दाहरुको केन्द्रविन्दु बनेको छ। खाडी क्षेत्र, अफ्गानिस्तान र पाकिस्तानका ब्यापक जटिलताले मध्य एशियालाई प्रभाव पारेकाले रुस, चीन, भारत र टर्की समेतको प्रत्यक्ष प्रभाव यस क्षेत्रमा पर्दै गएकोछ। इराकबाट अमेरिकी सेना फिर्ता गर्ने ओबामाले गरेको प्रणका बाबजुद त्यसको ब्यापक प्रभावको आंकलन गर्नु पर्ने चूनौति नयां राष्ट्रपतिलाई हुनेछ। विश्वव्यापी रुपमै इराक युद्धद्धारा सृजित नकरात्मक दबाबले बुश प्रशासनलाई आफ्नो बैदेशिक नीतिमा नरमता अप्नाउन लगायो। इरान र उतर कोरिया जस्ता मुलुकहरु संग पनि तल्लो स्तरमै भएपनि अमेरिकालाई वार्ता गर्नु पर्ने स्थिति बनायो।
चुनावको मुखैमा आइपरेको विश्वव्यापी आर्थिक बिपत्तिले नयां अमेरिकी राष्ट्रपतिको आन्तरिक एवं बैदेशिक नीतिको ठूलो हिस्सा ओगट्ने निश्चित छ। तर राजनीतिक कूटनीतिक सैनिक र सामरिक समस्याहरु अझ जटिल बन्ने सम्भावना पनि उत्तिकै छ। विश्वका समस्या निवारणार्थ अन्य शक्ति राष्ट्रहरुको सहयोग जुटाउने र स्थानीय सम्वेदशिलताहरु प्रति ध्यान पुर्याउने ओबामाको प्रतिवद्धता माझ अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय रुपले पुनर्त्थान भएको रुस र नियन्त्रित राजनीतिमै शक्ति सञ्चय गर्दै गएको चीनले गर्ने प्रतिरोधको सामना नयां राष्ट्रपतिले गर्नु पर्नेछ। नयां राष्ट्रपति आउदैमा अमेरिका प्रतिको शंका र संशयको अन्त्य हुनेवाला छैन।

नेपालमा असर
नेपालमा नयां अमेरिकी प्रशासनलाई चाल्नु पर्ने एउटा महत्वपूर्ण कदमको थालनी राष्ट्रपति बुशले नै गरिदिए। माओवादीलाई आतङ्ककारी समूह घोषित गरी तिनिहरु विरुद्ध प्रजातान्त्रिक सरकार र दरबारलाई राजनीतिक र सैनिक सहयोग गरेको बुश प्रशासन माघ १९, २०६१ को चीन मुखी देखिएको शाही कदम पछि राजतन्त्र संग चिढिन पुग्यो। भारत संगको सामरिक सहकार्यलाई निकै अगाडि बढाएको वाशिङ्गटनले नयां दिल्लीकै परामर्शमा माओवादीहरुको चुनावी विजय, राजतन्त्र को अन्त्य, र माओवादीहरुको सत्तारोहण प्रति सहिष्णु बन्यो।
अमेरिकी सरकारको एउटा छुट्टै आतङ्ककारीहरुको सूचिमा रहेको माओवादीहरुलाई अलकाइदा संग तुलना गर्न नमिल्ने जिकिर गरेको अमेरिकी सरकारले पर्ख र हेर को नीति लिएको छ। नेकपा माओवादीका अध्यक्ष प्रधानमन्त्री पुष्पकमल दाहाल संग बुशले नितान्त छोटो र सामुहिक सन्दर्भमा भेट गरे। अमेरिकाले नरुचाएका सरकार प्रमुखलाई त्यस्तो भेटघाटबाट बन्चित गरिने गरेको परम्परा माझ सो भेटलाई कम भन्न मिल्दैन।
अमेरिकी सहायक विदेश मन्त्रीले प्रधानमन्त्री दाहाल र पछि अर्थमन्त्री बाबुराम भट्टराई संग वार्ता गरी नयां सम्वन्धका लागि बाटो खोलेका छन्। यो घट्नाक्रमलाई अमेरिकी सरकारले नेपाली जनताको जनादेशको कदर गरी नेपाल सरकार संग हात बढाएको भनेर मात्र बुझ्न सकिन्न। एशियाका दुई शक्ति बीच अबस्थित नेपालको भूराजनीतिक महत्व माझ नयां दिल्ली संगको परामर्श कै आधारमा नेपाल नीति तय गर्ने परम्परा ओबामा प्रशासनले तोड्ने देखिदैन।
विश्वका दुई प्रमुख प्रजातान्त्रिक शक्ति वीच यस्तो साझा दृष्टि रहेको बारम्बारको सार्बजनिक अठोटलाई नेपालमा लोकतन्त्रको सुनिश्चितताका लागि सुखद संकेत भनि बुझ्न सकिएला। चीनमा भने त्यसले अमेरिका र भारत बीचको ब्यापक गठबन्धनकै अर्थ लिएको बुझ्न गाह्रो पर्दैन। आफ्नो शान्तिपूर्ण उदयको प्रतिकार गर्न अमेरिका बढाइरहेको अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय गठबन्धनकै कडीको रुपमा चीनले नेपालमा भारत-अमेरिकी सहकार्यलाई लिएको छ। स्वतन्त्र तिब्बत आन्दोलनलाई यस्तो प्रतिरोधको एउटा पाटोका रुपमा चीनले महसूस गरेको र नेपालमा सो आन्दोलनले यसै वर्ष सशक्त भएर बढेको सन्दर्भमा नयां दिल्लीको भूमिकाबारे बेइजिङ्गको शंकाको असर काठमाण्डौले भोग्ने लक्षण देखापर्न थालिसकेको छ।
परम्परागत् मित्र शक्ति राजतन्त्रको अवशान पछि चीनले माओवादीहरु संग सम्वन्ध सुदृढ गर्ने प्रक्रिया निकै खुलेरै अघि बढाएको बास्तविक्ता प्रति भारतीयहरु चिन्तित देखिएका छन्। तर जनयुद्ध कालमा भारत मै आसृत एवं भारतीय नेताहरु संग नजिकको सम्वन्ध कायम गरेका माओवादीहरुलाई चीनले बिश्वास गरे नगरेको भेउ अरुले त के माओबादी स्वयमले पाउन सकेको देखिदैन। तत्कालका लागि यो अस्पष्टता कायम राख्नुमा नै माओवादीहरुलाई लाभ हुने देखिन्छ।
उता भारत स्थित नेपाल विज्ञहरुको एक समुहले अमेरिकीहरुको बढ्दो प्रभावकै प्रतिक्रिया स्वरुप चीनले नेपालमा सक्रियता बढाएको प्रति सचेत देखिन्छन्। त्यो भनाईलाई चीन-भारत सम्वन्धमा हालै देखिएको चिसोपनले ओझेलमा पारिदिएको छ। भारतीय विदेश मन्त्री प्रणव मुखर्जीले खुलेरै चीन आफ्नो मुलुकका लागि सामरिक चुनौति रहेको भन्ने सार्वजनिक अभिव्यक्ति दिएर द्धिपक्षीय सम्वन्ध वारेको वहसलाई नयां उर्जा दिएका छन्।
दक्षिण एशियाका नेपाल लगायतका साना मुलुकमा प्रभाव बढाएर चीनले भारत विरुद्ध घेरावन्दी कसेको भन्ने आक्षेप लगाउदै आएको नयां दिल्लीले यता आएर बेइजिङ्गले उत्तरपूर्वी भारतीय राज्यहरुमा आतङ्कवादलाई प्रश्रय दिएको भन्ने सम्मका आरोप लगाउन थालेका छन्।
ओबामा प्रशासनले नेपाल सम्वन्धि नीतिमा कुनै प्रत्यक्ष परिवर्तन नल्याए पनि नेपालीहरु सचेत बन्नु पर्ने अवस्था बिद्यमान छ। अमेरिकाको भारत र चीन संगको स्वतन्त्र सम्वन्ध र भारत-चीनको द्धैपक्षिक उतारचढावले ल्याउने नयां टक्कर र तनाव नेपालीहरुले ब्यहोर्नु पर्ने स्थिति बन्दै गएको देखिन्छ।