संयमको सहारा

सञ्जय उपाध्याय
शान्ति प्रक्रियाको आवरणमा सञ्चालित सहमतिको राजनीति नबुझेका नेपालीलाई राष्ट्रपतीय निर्वाचनको पूर्वसन्ध्यामा नाटकीय रूपले जन्मेको नयाँ समीकरणले एकपल्ट फेरि झस्कायो । जसरी भए पनि मुलुकलाई एउटा निकास चाहिएको थियो र तीन प्रमुख दलले उपाय पनि निकालिहाले । नवीनतातर्फो यात्रामा देशले एउटा अर्को कोसेढुङ्गा पार गर्नुलाई सुखद उपलब्धि नमान्ने नेपाली विरलै होलान् ।
राष्ट्रपति रामवरण यादवको प्रतिष्ठा र पृष्ठभूमि एवम् उनले शपथ लिनुअघि र पछि राष्ट्र र राष्ट्रियताका पक्षमा दोहोर्‍याएका प्रतिबद्धताहरू निकै सकारात्मक र प्रेरणादायी रहे पनि तिनलाई व्यापक राजनीतिक पटलमा देखिएको तिक्तताले ढाक्न पुगेको छ ।
नवीनतम विघ्न खेपेपछि नेकपा माओवादीका नेताहरूको भनाइ सुन्दा र पढ्दा प्रतिशोधको राजनीतिले प्रश्रय पाउने संशय बढेको छ । उता तीनतिर फर्केका नेपाली काङ्ग्रेस, नेकपा एमाले र मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमबीच एक्कासि बढेको सामीप्य माओवादीहरूको सेखी झार्न नै भएको आभास नयाँ समीकरणबाट आइरहेका स्वरहरूले दिन्छन् ।
विदेशी शक्तिहरूको बढ्दो चासोको सशक्त प्रतिविम्ब अनमिनको म्याद बढाउने सर्न्दर्भमा संयुक्त राष्ट्रसङ्घ सुरक्षा परिषदमा देखियो । भारतका स्थायी प्रतिनिधिले महासचिव बान की मुनको प्रतिवेदनबारे उठाएका तिखा प्रश्नहरूले हाम्रो शान्ति प्रक्रियाका सम्बन्धमा नयाँदिल्लीको रक्षात्मक उत्कन्ठा देखाएका छन् । भारतबाट राष्ट्रपति यादवलाई औपचारकि बधाई ढिलो गरी आउनुले पनि केही न केही सन्देश दिएको छ ।
जनआन्दोलन-२ र खासगरी तिब्बत प्रदर्शनका सर्न्दर्भमा स्पष्ट र सक्रिय बनेको चीनले आफ्नो बृहत् आकाङ्क्षा र अपेक्षालाई कसरी प्रस्तुत गर्ला, त्यो त बेइजिङ् ओलम्पिकपछि खुल्दै जाला । विश्वमा उदीयमान दुई एसियाली शक्ति राष्ट्रहरूका बीचमा अवस्थित नेपाललाई तिनीहरूको आपसी सम्बन्धले पार्न सक्ने प्रभावको लेखाजोखा गररिहनु नै पूर्णकालीन काम हुन जान्छ । त्यसमाथि सैनिक/सामरकि गतिशीलता, अर्थबजार, ऊर्जा र वातावरणजस्ता विषयमा चीन र भारतलाई नियालिरहेका अमेरिका र युरोपेली सङ्घका साथै अन्‍तराष्‍ट्रिय रूपमा नै दृढ निश्चयी बन्दै गएको अर्को एसियाली शक्ति जापान नेपालको तरलतामाझ कसरी प्रस्तुत हुँदै जाला भन्नेतिर सचेत हुनुपर्ने अवस्था छ ।
यसरी नयाँ नेपालको खाका आफू अनुकूल बनाउन पृथक् विदेशी कोणहरूबाट चालिने प्रत्यक्ष र परोक्ष कदमहरू महत्त्वपूर्ण बहसका छुट्टै विषय हुन् । राष्ट्रहितविपरीत हुनसक्ने सबै खाले प्रयासहरूको प्रतिरोध गर्ने क्षमता नेपालको नहोला । तर, राष्ट्रिय नेतृत्वले सुझबुझ देखाउन सकेमा विदेशी सरोकारवालाहरूको प्रचुरताले पनि एक प्रकारको अवसर दिनेछ । हाम्रा राजनीतिक दलहरूले भने आफ्नो सुविधा अनुसार वैदेशिक 'हस्तक्षेप'बारे कहिले उग्र बन्दा र कहिले मौनता साँध्दा खुला र र्सार्थक राष्ट्रिय बहस सुरु हुन दिएकै छैनन् ।
त्यसो त, राजतन्त्रको विरोधले गर्दा मात्र एकीकृत भएका राजनीतिक शक्तिहरूबीचको सहमतिको स्वरूप गणतन्त्रको आगमनसँगै समाप्त हुनु थियो र भयो । त्यसलाई जीवित राख्न सक्नु उदारताको परिचायक हुने थियो । तर, जनताले दलहरूको हैसियत निर्धारण गरिदिइसकेपछि त्यो कत्तिको सम्भव हुन्थ्यो - त्यसमाथि प्रतिस्पर्धात्मक प्रकृतिको राजनीतिक व्यवस्थाका लागि त्यस्तो सहमति कत्तिको वाञ्छनीय हुने थियो भन्ने प्रश्न छँदैछ ।
निर्वाचन परिणामले प्रमुख दलहरूबीच ऐतिहासिक परविर्तन संस्थागत बनाउनका लागि महत्त्वपूर्ण पदहरूको भागबन्डा हुनुपर्ने बाध्यता खडा गरिदियो । तर, फरक विचारधारा बोकेका दलहरूबीच चुनाव नतिजा अनुसार अन्तरमि संविधानमा आफू अनुकूल संशोधन खोज्ने उत्सुकताले अविश्वास पनि बढायो । दोहोरो भूमिका दिइएको संविधानसभाले पनि महिनौँ बित्दासम्म पनि अन्तरमि व्यवस्थापिकाको आकारभन्दा माथि उठ्न सकेन । सरकार गठनपछि पनि आग्रह-पूर्वाग्रहद्वारा प्रेरति तीतोपन कायम रहने हो भने संविधान निर्माण प्रक्रियामा मुलुक कहिले र कसरी प्रवेश गर्ला ?
नयाँ नेपालको मुहार हेर्न जतिसुकै आतुर रहे तापनि जनताले राजनीतिक दलहरूको इतिहास बिर्सन सक्ने कुरै भएन । खुला राजनीतिक दलका हैसियतमा माओवादीहरूले पनि खासै पृथक् पहिचान बनाउन सकेनन् । विगतमा मूलधारका राजनीतिक दलहरूको विश्वसनीयता गुम्दै जाँदा वैकल्पिक आग्रह र आह्वानहरूले श्रोता पाए ।
संसदीय प्रजातन्त्रका नाममा भ्रष्टाचार, कुशासन र राजनीतिक अस्थिरता फैलियो भनेर विदेशी राजदूतहरू र अन्‍तराष्‍ट्रिय दातृसंस्थाका प्रमुखहरू कराउँदै गए तर त्यो गुञ्जनले तत्कालीन व्यवस्थामा सकारात्मक परविर्तन ल्याउनभन्दा पनि मुलुकलाई विकल्पहरूको खोजीतर्फउन्मुख गरायो । बदलिँदो अन्‍तराष्‍ट्रिय र क्षेत्रीय पृष्ठभूमिमा विदेशी स्वार्थहरूको टक्करमाझ खलनायक पनि नेपालीहरू नै बन्न गए अनि बहुमूल्य समय पनि नेपालीहरूले नै खेर फाल्न पुगे । त्यसैले, अहिलेको बाक्लिँदो राजनीतिक अविश्वास एक दलले अर्काको मानमर्दन गर्ने अस्त्र मात्र नबनोस्, जनताले आफ्ना नेताहरूको खिल्ली उडाउने आधार पनि नबनोस् ।

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, साउन १२, २०६५)

सन्तुलनको सङ्र्घर्ष

सञ्जय उपाध्याय
गणतन्त्रात्मक नेपालले आफ्नो सन्तुलन खोज्ने क्रममा बेहोर्नुपरेका राजनीतिक जटिलताहरू जति उदेकलाग्दा भए पनि तिनलाई हाम्रा नयाँ यथार्थका उपज नै मान्नुपर्दछ । आधुनिक नेपाल स्थापना भएदेखि राजतन्त्रले ओगटेको स्थानमा आएको रिक्तता भर्न भइरहेका आन्तरकि र बाहिरी अभ्यासहरू कहिले सहयोगात्मक छन् त कहिले द्वन्द्वात्मक । सिद्धान्त र सुविधाको पारस्परकि प्रभावले स्थितिलाई झनै कठिन बनाएको छ ।संविधानसभा निर्वाचन र गणतन्त्रको घोषणापछि जनसाधारणमा नयाँ नेपालको प्रारम्भिक खाका हेर्न उत्सुकता बढ्नु स्वाभाविक नै थियो । प्रमुख राजनीतिक दलहरूको कार्यसूचीमा भने आ-आफ्नो अधिकतम प्रभाव कायम रहने गरी राज्य संरचनामा पकड जमाउनु प्राथमिकता बनेको छ ।आठतिर फर्केका राजनीतिक दलहरू राजतन्त्रविरुद्ध एकीकृत भएको अवस्थामा सहमतिको एउटा विशेष महत्त्व थियो । नयाँ परिवेशमा दलहरूको धर्म आ-आफ्ना नीति र कार्यक्रमका आधारमा प्रतिस्पर्धा गर्नु नै हुन जान्छ । यसलाई फोहरी खेल वा पदलोलुपताका रूपमा नहेरिदिन नेताहरूलाई जनसमक्ष आग्रह गर्न कति मन लाग्दो हो । तर, उनीहरूको विगतले नै विश्वसनीयता घटाएको छ । उता खुला राजनीत्रि्रति माओवादीहरूको प्रतिबद्धतामै शङ्का-उपशङ्का चलिरहेका बेला उनीहरूले दिने स्पष्टीकरणको खासै मूल्य नरहला । त्यसो त वर्तमान अन्योल अनपेक्षित थिएन । सुरुमा माओवादीहरूले संविधानसभाको माग गर्दा अन्य दलहरूले त्यसले 'पेन्डोराको बाकस' खोल्ने छ भनेर करबिकरबि एकै स्वरले विरोध गरेका थिए । अहिले प्रस्फुटन भएका अधिकार, प्रतिनिधित्व, समावेशीकरण र सम्मानका मागहरू सम्बोधन गर्न कोभन्दा को कति पीडित र पिछडिएका रहेछन् भन्ने कुराको छिनोफानो हुन सकेको भए सजिलो हुन्थ्यो होला । त्यसको मापन जात, धर्म, वर्ण, वर्गले मात्र गर्न नसक्ने हुनाले नै सङ्कट राष्ट्रिय राजनीतिको मुटुमै यसरी गहिरिँदै गएको प्रस्ट छ । मधेसकै कुरा गर्दा त्यसको भौगोलिक र भावनात्मक अवधारणाबीचको दूरीलाई आँक्ने फुर्सद मुलुकलाई भएन । देशभित्र र बाहिर प्रतिष्ठाको विषय बनेको निर्वाचन सम्पन्न गर्नका लागि नै गत फागुनमा सम्झौता गरिएको कुरा जिम्मेवार नेताहरूले बिनासङ्कोच स्वीकारेका छन् ।दलहरूका पृथक् प्रकृति र स्वभावले पनि गतिरोधलाई निरन्तरता दिइरहेका छन् । सम्झौतालाई क्रान्तिप्रति धोका ठान्ने माओवादीहरूले शान्ति प्रक्रियाका नाममा मूलधारका दलहरूसँग एकपछि अर्को सुविधा लिँदै गए । निर्वाचनपछि जब आफूहरूले त्याग गर्नुपर्ने बेला आयो, माओवादीहरूलाई आफूहरू क्रान्तिकारी भइरहेको भ्रमजालले छाडेन ।नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसलाई प्रतिपक्षमै बस्न गाह्रो लाग्ने थिएन होला । तर, ऊ अहिले अस्तित्वको लडाइँ लडिरहेको छ । वयोवृद्ध सभापतिपछि नेतृत्वका लागि कोइराला परविारभित्रका दाबेदारहरूको लडाइँलाई अन्य नयाँ पुस्ताका नेताहरूबीचको हानथापले जटिल बनाएको छ । प्रेरणादायी नीति र नेतृत्वबाट मात्र अब आफ्नो भविष्य सुनिश्चित हुने निष्कर्षा पुगेका कार्यकर्ता र र्समर्थकहरू ती दुवैको खडेरी लम्बिरहने भयले ग्रस्त देखिन्छन् । काङ्ग्रेस मात्र लोकतन्त्रको पर्याय भएको दाबीद्वारा बढाइने आत्मविश्वासले कति समय थेग्ला ?नेकपा एमालेको प्राथमिकता नेपाली वामशक्तिको अग्रस्थानमा आफूलाई पुनःस्थापित गर्नमा रहेको कुरा विभिन्न नेताहरूले फरक शब्द र शैलीमा बताइरहेका छन् । 'युथ फोर्स'को स्थापना र क्रियाकलाप हेर्दा एमालेले यसका लागि उग्रताको अस्त्र प्रयोग गर्न खोजेको भान हुन्छ । सत्ता र प्रतिपक्षको अनुभवमा खारिएको मध्यमार्गी परचिय मेटेर एमालेले क्रान्तिकारी बाटोमा हिँड्न खोज्नु मुलुकका लागि कति नै अग्रगामी होला र ? यति सशक्त रूपमा मधेसी दलहरूको उपस्थिति नेपालीहरूका लागि नौलो भएको छ । अन्य दलबाट छुट्टिएर गएका तर एउटै छातामुनि आबद्ध हुन सकेका परिचित नेताहरूको मूल्याङ्कन गर्ने क्षमता जनसाधारणसँग छ । साना दलहरूको हैसियत त मतदाताहरूले तय गरसिकेका छन् ।यस्तो आन्तरकि अस्तव्यस्ततामाथि नेपालमा विशेष प्रभाव राख्दै आएका विदेशी शक्तिहरूको आकाङ्क्षा र अपेक्षा थपिएका छन् । भारत, चीन र अमेअमेरिका लागि राजतन्त्र स्थायित्वको आधार रहँदै आएको थियो । त्यसको ठाउँ लिने र्सवस्वीकार्य निकायको अभावमा नै विभिन्न गठबन्धन बन्दै र बिग्रदै गरेको बुझ्न गाह्रो पर्दैन ।नेपाली काङ्ग्रेस र मधेसी दलहरूको तादात्म्यले भारतलाई केही आश्वस्त तुलाउन सक्ला । चीनको चाख वामशक्तिहरूको व्यापक मोर्चालाई पूर्वराजावादीहरूले दिने टेवाप्रति नै रहेको हुनुपर्दछ । भारतभन्दा एक कदम अघि सरेर अमेरिकाले सेनालाई गैरवामपन्थी मोर्चाको मेरुदण्डका रूपमा देखेको होला ।एउटाको आधारभूमिमा अर्कोले अतिक्रमण नगर्ला भनेर कसरी भन्ने । चीन र भारत दुवैले पछ्याएको माओवादीलाई अमेरिकाले आतङ्ककारी भन्दाभन्दै निर्वाचन परिणाम आएलगत्तै अल कायदासँग तुलना गर्न नमिल्ने स्पष्टीकरण दिई नै सकेको छ । तर्राईमा अहिले सक्रिय भएका र जन्मन सक्ने समूहहरूसँग चीन नजिकिने अवस्था नै नआउला र ? दलहरूका लागि विदेशीहरूको कृपापात्र बन्नु र कोपभाजनमा पर्नु दुवै अभिशाप भएको स्थितिमा सन्तुलनको खोजी कतै अनन्त हुने त होइन ?
(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, असार २९, २०६५)

हस्तक्षेप र हितको हल्कापन

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

नेपाल-भारत सम्बन्धको गाथामा हालै एउटा रोचक पक्ष गांसिन पुग्यो । केही भारतीय नेताहरूले एक र्सार्वजनिक भेलामा नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले अविलम्ब नेकपा माओवादीलाई सत्ता हस्तान्तरण गर्नुपर्ने कुरामा निकै जोड दिए । काङ्ग्रेसको अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय विभागले सो भनाइलाई हस्तक्षेपको संज्ञा दिंदै त्यसको चर्को विरोध गर्‍यो ।
बेलाबखत नेपालबाट आउने यस्ता रोषयुक्त प्रतिक्रियासमक्ष भारतीयहरू विभिन्न रूपले प्रस्तुत हुने गरेका छन् । नीतिगत विषयमा कुनै व्यक्ति वा संस्थाको विवादास्पद भनाइ आउंदा त्यससित आफ्नो कुनै संलग्नता नरहेको भारत सरकारले औपचारकि स्पष्टीकरण दिने गरेको छ । कहिलेकाही त्यस्ता विचार व्यक्त गर्नेले नै स्पष्टोक्ति दिएर माफीसमेत मागेका छन् । अनि, नेपाली भावनामा पुगेको चोटलाई कुनै वर्गविशेषको पूर्वाग्रह ठानी उपेक्षा पनि गरिएको छ ।
भारतीय राष्ट्रवादी काङ्ग्रेसका महासचिव डीपी त्रिपाठीले त आफ्नै बाटो समाए । नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसको वक्तव्यलाई 'कृतघ्नताको परचिय' भन्दै उनले सो फिर्ता लिइनुपर्ने मागसमेत गरे । अनि, सुरुकै भनाइ दोहोर्‍याउंदै नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसलाई जनादेशको पाठ पढाए ।
नेपाली काङ्ग्रेस हाम्रो मुलुकमा भारतको सबैभन्दा नजिकको राजनीतिक मित्रका रूपमा चिनिन्छ । त्यस बुझाइको फाइदा र बेफाइदा विभिन्न पुस्ताका काङ्ग्रेसी नेताहरूले देखेका र भोगेका छन् । वर्तमान सभापति गिरिजाप्रसाद कोइरालाले त छ दशकदेखि भारतलाई विभिन्न हैसियतमा रहेर नियालेका छन् । प्रधानमन्त्रीको चार कार्यकालमध्ये अहिले आएर मात्र कोइरालाले आफ्नो अनुभवलाई केही आकार दिन खोजेको देखिन्छ ।
भारतको सहयोग रहेमा तर्राईको सुरक्षा स्थितिमा तुरुन्त सुधार आउन सक्ने अभिव्यक्ति दिएर कोइरालाले आफ्नो अप्रसन्नतालाई शालीन भएर प्रस्तुत गरे । आफ्नो आत्मकथा सुनाउने क्रममा कोइरालाले आफू भारतमा रहंदा गरेका र गराएका केही 'अवाञ्छनीय' क्रियाकलापहरू त्यहांको सरकारको जानकारीमा रहेको खुलासा गरे । परिवार एवम् निकटस्थहरूको जमघटमा उनले भारतविरुद्ध बोलेको भनिएका शब्दहरू छापामा अविरल आउंदा पनि कोइराला खण्डन गर्न उत्सुक देखिंदैनन् ।
जनआन्दोलन-२ सफल भएलगत्तै भारतीय प्रधानमन्त्री मनमोहन सिंहले दिल्लीमा प्रधानमन्त्री कोइरालालाई दक्षिण एसियाकै सम्मानित नेता भनेर स्वागत गरे । कोइरालालाई भने असोज १८, २०५९ र माघ १९, ०६१ बीच भारत सरकारको ध्यान नेपाली प्रजातन्त्रको भविष्यप्रति जान नसकेको पीडाले पोलिरहेको हुंदो हो । अझ टनकपुरको दलदलमा आफू फस्दै जांदा भारतबाट सहानुभूतिको सट्टा सतर्कता बढेको अनुभव पनि उनमा ताजै हुंदो हो ।
नेपालको राजनीतिक उतारचढावका विभिन्न चरणमा नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले भारतबाट भोग्नुपरेका असुविधाका पुलिन्दा यति भारी हुंदाहुंदै पनि जनताले आफूहरूलाई भारतपरस्त भनेर नै चिन्दा कति नेता-कार्यकर्ताको मन दुखेको होला ?
यसै पनि हस्तक्षेपकर्ता र हितैषी छुट्याउन त्यत्ति सजिलो छैन । उता व्याख्याताको नैतिक धरातलमा पनि धेरै कुरा भर पर्छ, मूलधारका राजनीतिक दलहरू र माओवादीबीच सहकार्यको अभावमा शाही सरकार ढल्ने सम्भावना क्षीण रहेको अवस्थामा भारतीय राजनीतिक संस्थापनका केही पक्षले व्रिद्रोहीहरूलाई सहयोग गर्नुपर्ने नीति अगाडि सारे । भारत सरकारभित्र त्यस्तो उत्कट नीति परविर्तनप्रति मतैक्य हुन सकेको थिएन । सिंह सरकारलाई बाहिरबाट र्समर्थन गररिहेका वामपन्थीहरूको प्रयास सफल हुने देखिएपछि भारतीय जनता पार्टी बाहेक अन्य सबै प्रभावशाली दलहरू त्यसको हिमायती हुन पुगे ।
ती दलहरू आ-आफ्नै स्वार्थबाट प्रेरति भएको बुझ्न गाह्रो थिएन । शाही सरकारकै केही विरोधीहरूले पनि उतिबेलै यसलाई हस्तक्षेपका रूपमा देखेका थिए । तर, नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसलगायतका दलहरूले यस प्रयासलाई असल छिमेकीको सराहनीय चासो भनेर परिभाषित गरे । यस अवस्थामा भारतीय नेताहरूले आफूहरूलाई नेपालको शान्ति प्रक्रियाका महत्त्वपूर्ण लगानीकर्ता ठान्न अस्वाभाविक थिएन । अहिले आएर आफूलाई अनुकूल हुने गरी तिनीहरू प्रस्तुत नभएकै कारण त्यस चासोलाई हस्तक्षेप ठान्ने नैतिक आधार नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले त्यतिबेलै गुमाएको थियो ।
त्रिपाठीको प्रतिक्रियाले ओझेलमा पारेको अर्को वक्तव्य यहां स्मरण गर्नु उचित हुन्छ । भारतीय जनता पार्टीले वैचारिक प्रेरणाको स्रोत मानिंदै आएको राष्ट्रिय स्वयम्सेवक सङ्घका अध्यक्ष केएस सुदर्शनले नेपालको अस्थिरताले भारतलाई पुर्‍याएको खतराका लागि जवाहरलाल नेहरूलाई दोष दिए । नेहरूले भारतमा विलय हुने नेपाली प्रस्ताव मानिदिएको भए आज यो समस्या रहने थिएन भन्ने एक र्सार्वजनिक समारोहमा सुदर्शनले गुनासो पोखे ।
यो कुरा भाजपालगायत अन्य भारतीय दलका नेताहरूले भन्दै आइरहेका हुन् । तर, अन्य भारतीय नेताहरूले झै सुदर्शनले प्रस्तावक भनेर तत्कालीन राजा त्रिभुवनलाई औंल्याएनन् । उनले प्रधानमन्त्री मातृकाप्रसाद कोइरालाबाट त्यो प्रस्ताव आएको बताए । त्रिभुवनले कहिले र कुन सर्न्दर्भमा विलयको प्रस्ताव गरेका थिए भनेर भारतीयहरूले नखुलाएजस्तै मातृका कोइरालाका बारेमा पनि सुदर्शनले थप केही भनेनन् । मातृका कोइरालाका सम्बन्धमा आजका काङ्ग्रेसीहरूले जे-जस्तो धारणा राखे पनि उनी ००७ सालको आन्दोलनका सर्वोच्च कमान्डर थिए भन्ने कुरा सबैले स्मरण गरेकै हुनुपर्छ ।
विदेशीहरूले आफ्नो सुविधा अनुसार विगतका घटना र प्रवृत्तिको व्याख्या गर्दा मरसिकेका प्रमुख पात्रहरू न आफ्नो सफाइ दिन सक्छन्, न त त्यससम्बन्धी थप विवरण नै । बांचेकाहरूले हस्तक्षेपकर्ता र हितैषीका बारे यसरी हल्का नभइदिए राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थ सशक्त ढङ्गले अघि बढाउन सकिन्थ्यो कि !

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, असार १५, २०६५)

राष्ट्रियताः चांदीको घेरा

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

राजतन्त्रको अवसानपछि प्रमुख दलहरूबीच चुलिएको शक्तिसंघर्ष जति अप्रिय लागे पनि नयां नेपालतर्फको यात्रामा त्यसलाई स्वाभाविक मान्नुपर्ने स्थिति देखापर्दैछ। यसलाई पराजयवाद वा निराशावाद नभई हाम्रो विशिष्ट अनुभवबाट निसृत यथार्थका आधारमा बुझ्नुपर्ने भएको छ। असहमतिहरूकै समायोजनका रूपमा दुइ वर्षेखि अघि बढिरहेको शान्ति प्रक्रिया अर्न्तर्गत गन्तव्यको खोजीमा उदेकलाग्दा राजनीतिक गतिरोधहरू कहां बाट कसरी आउलान् भन्न सकिदैन।
संविधान निर्माण प्रक्रियामा ठूला दलहरूले भावी राज्य संरचना र त्यसका संस्थाहरूमा आफ्नो अधिकतम लाभ हुने गरी अघि बढ्न खोज्नु अस्वाभाविक हुने छैन। संविधानसभामा उपस्थित साना दलहरूले त अहिले नै आफूहरू उपेक्षित भएको गुनासो गर्न थालेका छन्। सभाबाहिर रहेका र उपस्थित हुनसक्ने समूहहरूको प्रभाव आकलन गर्नुपर्ने चुनौतीका बारे समसामयिक नेपाली इतिहासले उजागर गरिदिएको छ। मुलुकले समातिसकेको बाटोबाट विमुख हुने विलासिता कसैलाई नहुने भएकाले यस प्रक्रियालाई सहज बनाउन यथार्थवादी नबनी सुखै छैन।
यहां राजनीतिक टक्करको एउटा आयामको चर्चा गर्न खोजिएको छ। राजतन्त्रको विधिवत् समाप्तिपछि विभिन्न दलका नेताहरू प्रत्यक्ष र परोक्ष रूपमा आफूहरूलाई लोकतन्त्रका साथै राष्ट्रियताका संरक्षकका रूपमा प्रस्तुत गर्न आतुर देखिएका छन्। यसलाई उनीहरूको दरबार नै विगतमा राष्ट्रियताको संरक्षक भएको स्वीकारोक्तिकै रूपमा बुझ्न गाह्रो पर्ला। कथित 'मण्डले राष्ट्रवाद'का चर्का आलोचकलाई पनि र्सार्वभौमसत्ता, राष्ट्रिय अखण्डता, प्राकृतिक सम्पदा र साधनलगायत नेपाली प्रतिष्ठासंग जोडिएका सम्पूर्ण विषयहरूको प्रवर्द्धन गर्नुपर्ने उतरदायित्वबोध भएको मान्नुपर्दछ। जुन स्वाभिमानी नेपालीका लागि सन्तोषको विषय भएको छ।
तर, राष्ट्रियताका प्रश्नमा ठूला दलहरू आ-आफ्नै कोणबाट सक्रिय हुने हुंदा त्यसको सम्वर्द्धन प्रक्रिया सहज हुने देखिदैन। लोकतन्त्र/प्रजातन्त्र भन्ने शब्द र शैलीमा एकाधिकार जमाउन तल्लीन नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले अन्तर्राष्टिय समर्थन जुटाएर राष्ट्रियताको प्रवर्द्धन गर्नसक्ने एक मात्र भरपर्दो शक्ति आफूलाई नै देखेको छ। विगतले भने उसलाई पूर्ण साथ दिएको छैन। तीनवटै कोइराला दाजुभाइका प्रधानमन्त्रित्वसंग जोडिएका तीन नदी सम्झौतासम्बन्धी तथ्य-सत्य जेजस्ता भए पनि ती हाम्रो इतिहासका विवादास्पद प्रसङ्ग बनिसकेका छन्।
सन् ५० को सन्धिको पुनरावलोकनको मुद्दालाई पहिलोपल्ट सशक्त र औपचारकि रूपमा उठाएको श्रेय नेकपा एमालेलाई जान्छ। टनकपुरको मुद्दालाई राष्ट्रिय बहसमा ल्याएर राष्ट्रवादी छवि बनाएको एमाले सरकारमा पुगेपछि महाकाली प्याकेजको दलदलमा फस्न पुग्यो। सत्ताच्यूत भइसकेपछि उक्त सन्धिको अनुमोदनमा मतियार बनेको आरोप एमालेले बोकिरहेको छ। सो सन्धिप्रतिका आन्तरकि असहमति नै पार्टी विभाजनको एउटा कारक बन्न पुगेको कुरा अहिले आएर अप्रासङ्गिक भएको छ। त्यस्तै पीडाबोधले पनि होला, एमालेको एक भ्रातृसङ्गठन नै नयां भारतीय राजदूतको हस्तक्षेपकारी भूमिकाको सबैभन्दा सशक्त विरोधी बन्न पुग्यो।
जनयुद्ध सुरु गर्दा गणतन्त्रभन्दा माथि राष्ट्रियतासम्बन्धी मुद्दाहरू राखी ४० बुदे मागपत्र प्रस्तुत गरेका माओवादीहरूलाई उनीहरूले पछिल्लो समयमा भारतीय भूमिमा पाएको आश्रयले केही धक्का पुर्‍यायो। अन्तरिम संसद् र सरकारसम्म आइपुग्दा उनीहरूलाई नागरकिता कानुनले गलायो। दरबारका वरिपरि बसेका केही मानिसहरूको देशभक्तिको बखान गाउदै आएका माओवादी अध्यक्ष अहिले आएर भूतपुर्व राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रलाई नै राष्ट्रवादी मोर्चामा आमन्त्रित गर्न पुगेका छन्।
मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरम जन्मिएको पृष्ठभूमिले नै उसलाई राष्ट्रियताको विषयमा अरूभन्दा खरो बन्नुपर्ने बाध्यता छ। करिबकरिब त्यही स्थिति तराई मधेस लोकतान्त्रिक पार्टीको पनि छ। एउटै क्षेत्रमा ती दुइ पार्टी वीीचको प्रतिस्पर्धाले राष्ट्रियताको बहसलाई कसरी निर्देशित गर्नेछ, त्यो हेर्न बांकी छ। मुद्दाविशेषमा साना दलहरूका बीच बन्ने समीकरण र त्यसलाई आ-आफ्नो सुविधा अनुसार परिचालन गर्न ठूला दलहरूको उत्सुकताले पनि भावी राजनीतिलाई प्रभाव पार्नेछ।
सरकारको नेतृत्व सम्हालिसकेको अवस्थामा नेकपा माओवादीले पनि व्यावहारकि बाध्यता सामना गर्नैपर्ने हुन्छ। जनमानसमाझ लचकताले कति सजिलै आत्मर्समर्पणको पनि रूप धारण गर्न सक्दो रहेछ भन्ने त माओवादीहरूले एमालेको अनुभवबाटै बुझिसकेको हुनुपर्दछ। एमाले क्रान्तिकारी बन्न पुगेको अवस्थामा सत्ता सञ्चालन गर्न माओवादीहरूलाई थप चुनौती पर्ला नै।
रह्यो नेपालमा हावी हुदै आएका तीन प्रमुख विदेशी शक्तिका आकाङ्क्षा र अपेक्षा। दुइ चरणको शाही शासनका अवधिमा प्रभाव विस्तार गरेका अमेरिका र चीन लोकतन्त्र बहालीपछि निकै अगाडि बढेका छन्। आउदा दिनहरूमा तिनको प्रभाव आकलन गर्न उनीहरूको भारतसंगको नीतिगत समन्वय र टक्करका सम्भावनाप्रति सजग रहनुपर्ने हुन जान्छ। तिब्बत प्रदर्शनका सन्दर्भमा चीनद्वारा अपनाइएको सक्रिय सतर्कताले नेपालीहरूलाई दुवै छिमेकीहरूको चासो र क्षमताबारे झन् चनाखो बनाइदिएको छ।
अस्पष्ट बादलहरूका बीच चांदीको घेरा पनि छ। राष्ट्रियतासम्बन्धी मुद्दाहरूमा राजनीतिक दलहरूले लिने इमानदारीपूर्ण अडानलाई सामन्ती निरङ्कुशताको कृत्रिम चीत्कार भनेर निस्तेज पार्ने सुविधा अब विदेशी शक्तिहरूलाई हुने छैन।

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, असार १, २०६५)

व्यावहारिकताकै वर्चस्व

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

नेकपा माओवादीको चुनावी सफलतापछि आफूले आतङ्ककारी घोषित गरेको समूहप्रति 'पर्ख र हेर'को नीतिमा पुगेको अमेरिकालाई भूराजनीतिले अझ यथार्थवादी बन्न कर लगाएको छ। नेपाली जनमतको नवीनतम् अभिव्यक्तिलाई हाम्रा दुइ विशाल छिमेकीहरूले आ-आफ्नै ढङ्गले आत्मसात् गरेको सर्न्दर्भमा तेस्रो प्रभावशाली वैदेशिक शक्तिले समय खेर फाल्न सक्ने कुरै थिएन।
माओवादीहरूसंग औपचारिक सम्पर्क कायम गरी परामर्शका लागि वासिङ्टनतर्फलागेकी अमेरिकी राजदूत न्यान्सी पावेलले स्थितिको गम्भीरताबारे आफ्नो सरकारलाई सशक्त ढङ्गले अवगत गराउन सकेको प्रतीत हुन्छ। पावेल वासिङ्टनमै छंदा एक अमेरिकी अधिकारीले माओवादीहरूलाई 'आतङ्ककारी बहिष्करण सूची'मा राखेको स्पष्टीकरण दिदै आफ्नो सरकारले तिनलाई अल कायदाकै समकक्षी नठानेको भनाइ सार्वजनिक गरे।
पावेल नेपाल फर्केलगत्तै दक्षिण एसियाली मामिलासम्बन्धी उपसहायक विदेशमन्त्री इभान फैगनबउम काठमाडौ आइपुगे। माओवादी अध्यक्ष प्रचण्डलाई भेटी फैगनबउमले उनको दलको सरकारलाई अमेरिकी सहयोग रहने आश्वासन दिए। भलै त्यसको खुलासा माओवादी पक्षलाई गर्न लगाए।
व्यावहारकिताको सम्बन्ध कायम गर्नमा माहिर चीनले शान्ति प्रक्रियाको आरम्भसंगै माओवादीहरूलाई पूर्ण राजनीतिक दलका रूपमा स्वीकार गरसिकेको थियो। नेपालभन्दा पहिले आफूले आतङ्ककारी भन्दै आएको समूहलाई राजतन्त्रविरुद्ध मूलधारका राजनीतिक दलहरूसंग १२ बुदे सम्झौता गराउन भारतलाई व्यावहारकिताले नै अभिप्रेरित गरेको थियो। पूर्वविद्रोहीहरू सरकारमा संलग्न भएपछि नयां दिल्लीलाई राजनीतिक सम्बन्ध बढाउन सजिलो भयो। यस्तो अवस्थामा अमेरिकालाई पुरानै कठोरतामा रहिरहन सम्भव थिएन।
त्यसो त माओवादीहरूलाई आतङ्ककारीको सूचीमा राख्न अमेरिकालाई राष्ट्रिय सुरक्षाभन्दा राजनीतिले नै अभिप्रेरित गरेको थियो। अघिल्लो शताब्दीमै साम्यवादलाई विश्वव्यापी रूपमै परास्त गरेकामा गर्व गर्ने अमेरिकालाई संसारको एउटा कुनाबाट त्यसको पुनरुत्थान हुनसक्ने सम्भावना ग्राह्य भएन। २००१ सेप्टेम्बर ११ को आक्रमणपछि त अमेरिकीहरूलाई राजनीतिक प्रकृतिको हत्या र हिंसा अभियानलाई आतङ्कवादकै स्वरूपमा देख्ने वातावरण बन्यो। अमेरिकी राजदूतावासमा कार्यरत दूइ नेपाली नागरकिको हत्या एवम् कोकाकोलाजस्तो अमेरिकी स्वामित्वमा रहेको व्यापारकि प्रतीकमाथिको माओवादी आक्रमण निश्चय पनि अल कायदाले गरेजस्तो गतिविधिको कोटीमा पर्दैनथे।
उता माओवादीहरू दोस्रो शान्तिवार्तामा बसेका बेला कार्यकारी निर्णयद्धारा बुस प्रशासनले उनीहरूमाथि आतङ्ककारीको बिल्ला लगाएको थियो। त्यसको खास अर्थ र तात्पर्यका बारेमा नेपालीहरूलाई जानकारी गराउन राजनीतिक रूपले अमेरिकालाई चासो भएन। परविर्तित सर्न्दर्भमा त्यो राजनीतिक दृष्टि अप्रासाङ्गिक भयो नै।
राजनीति, संस्कृति, अर्थ, सुरक्षा, प्रविधि र वातावरणजस्ता कोणहरूबाट एसियाका दुइ शक्तिहरूलाई नियालिरहेको अमेरिकाले काठमाडौमा अत्याधुनिक दूतावास बनाएर यहां आफ्नो दीर्घकालीन चासो रहने जनाउ दिइसकेको थियो। भारत र चीनले जस्तै अमेरिकालाई पनि आफ्नो नेपाल नीतिलाई र्सार्वजनिक रूपमै समायोजन गर्नु अपरिहार्य भइसकेको थियो।
घटनाक्रमले माओवादीहरूसंग हात बढाउन अमेरिकीहरू नै बढी आतुर भएजस्तो देखिए पनि धरातलीय यथार्थका सूक्ष्म अध्ययनकर्ता हाम्रा पुर्वविद्रोहीहरू पनि कम उत्सुक छैनन्। आफूहरूलाई दमन गर्न विभिन्न समयका सरकारहरूलाई भारत र चीनले सैनिक सहयोग दिएको विगतप्रति आंखा चिम्लन सक्ने माओवादीहरूले अमेरिकालाई मात्र अपवादका रूपमा लिने कुरै थिएन।
यी तीनवटै प्रभावशाली मुलुकहरूले केही सतर्कताका साथ आफूहरूलाई हेररिहेको अवस्थामा माओवादीहरूलाई पुरानै सूत्र समातेर तिनका अन्तरविरोधहरूबाट हुन सक्ने लाभको आकलन गर्न मौका मिल्यो। राष्ट्रियताको नाराद्वारा चीनलाई आकर्षण गर्न खोजेका माओवादीहरूले भारतको समर्थनबिना सत्तामा पुग्न अनि रहिरहन नसक्ने कुरा बुझेकै थिए।
राजतन्त्रको विरोध गर्दागर्दै पनि दरबारले आफूलाई भूराजनीतिक सन्तुलनको प्रतीकका रूपमा उभ्याउन सकेको कुरा परोक्ष रूपमा माओवादीहरूले सुरुदेखि नै स्वीकारेका थिए। आन्तरकि भन्दा पनि बाह्य आकाङ्क्षा र अपेक्षाले यहांको राजनीतिलाई जटिल बनाउने गरेको यथार्थ त जनयुद्धको इतिहासको एउटा पाटो नै बनिसकेको थियो।
नेपालको राजनीतिक अस्थिरताको सम्पूर्ण दोष राजनीतिक संस्थापन एवम् सम्बन्धित विदेशी शक्तिहरूले राजतन्त्रलाई बोकाउन सफल भए पनि माओवादीहरूले सत्ता सञ्चालन गर्दा आफूहरूले बेहोर्नुपर्ने चुनौती राम्ररी बुझेको देखिन्छ। चुनावी परिणामपछि माओवादी नेतृत्वभित्र चुलिएको भनिएको शक्ति-संघर्षलाई उनीहरूको भारत र चीनबीच समदूरीको नीति अपनाउने सार्वजनिक उदघोषबाट अलग राखेर हेर्न मिल्दैन।
दुइ ठूला छिमेकीका स्वार्थहरूमाझ अलिकति पनि असन्तुलन आउनेबित्तिकै माओवादीहरूलाई पर्ने सङ्कट तल्लो पङ्क्तिमा व्याप्त क्रान्तिकारिताले बढाउनेछ। त्यस अवस्थामा भौगोलिक दूरीले मात्र विश्वको एक मात्र महाशक्तिलाई बाटो छेक्ने छैन। अमेरिकाको दह्रो समर्थन पाउन नसकिहाले पनि सशक्त विरोध खेप्न नपरे स्थिति माओवादीहरूलाई केही सहज बन्नेछ। काठमाडौमा भएका तिब्बती प्रदर्शनहरूका सन्दर्भमा वाईसीएलको निस्कृयतालाई माओवादीहरूले आफ्ना विकल्पहरू खुला राखेको भनी बुझ्नुपर्ला कि ?

(नेपाल राष्टिय साप्ताहिक, जेठ १९, २०६५)

Nepali Congress: Between Haughtiness and Humility

By Sanjay Upadhya
May 18, 2008

Presumptuous as it may seem, the Nepali Congress’ posture after the Constituent Assembly elections is quite understandable. The imperative of handing power to the Maoists, who won the largest bloc of seats, as well as the reluctance to cede the political field to the former rebels both stem from the party’s unique position in the country’s politics.
The Nepali Congress’ predilection for equating itself with democracy must be unnerving to its rivals. Still, there is an element of truth in the claim. If non-Nepali Congress parties – meaning communists in Nepal’s context – had spearheaded the democratic movements of 1950-51, 1990 and 2006, it is debatable whether they would have won the same level of international support, more so in view of Nepal’s sensitive geopolitical realities. Moreover, the government of the day would have found it far easier to resist the challenge.
Then there is that other bitter truth. The Nepali Congress was at the center of the political accidents of 1960 and 2002 (which set the stage for the 2005 royal takeover). No matter how much you berate the palace’s “autocratic tendencies”, the sequence of events does not absolve the Nepali Congress. A party that could endure profound odds to ensure the triumph of democracy was simply ineffective when it came to preserving it. The Nepali Congress’ visceral ability to alienate its political rivals, compounded by bitter internal feuds, eventually subverted democracy on both occasions.
In an organization where ideology has served more as an adhesive for disparate factions rather than a living ideal, you would expect leaders to be more vigilant. Instead, the party always equated the triumph of democracy with its eternalness, forcing the country to pay the price.
Despite winning the second largest number of seats in the Constituent Assembly elections, many Nepali Congress leaders are still smarting from what they consider a humiliation. The party’s failure to benefit from the split in the communist vote must have been painful enough. The fact that the Maoists surged despite the fact that the Nepali Congress controlled the premiership as well as the principal ministries must have exacerbated the soreness.
During previous setbacks, Nepali Congress members have routinely faulted, among other things, extreme nepotism and favoritism, allegations of corruption swirling around senior leaders and the party’s tendency to forget the tenets of democracy once in power for its woes. This time the party was mired in a deeper mess.
In the name of preserving the peace process at all costs, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala systematically rebuffed party members to accommodate the Maoists. Within the Koirala family, rival claimants to the leadership mantle veered closer to the palace and the Maoists respectively. Senior party leaders effortlessly conceded that reunification had not really brought the two factions closer emotionally.
In their quest to reinterpret B.P. Koirala’s national reconciliation policy, the dominant faction discredited people like former premier Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and former speaker Taranath Ranabhat as “royalists”. The post-election hand-wringing over how the royalist vote could go to the Maoists became meaningless.
The Constituent Assembly, republic, an inclusive state structure and other major slogans of contemporary Nepal clearly belonged to the Maoists. Despite having broken with the monarchy, the Nepali Congress could still have built a platform based on religious, social and cultural coexistence. By outlook, temperament and record, Nepali Congress leaders were ill suited for challenging the status quo. There was no way the party could have outdone its rivals in the race for the most revolutionary visage.
The major parties worked hard to project the Constituent Assembly elections as one-in-an-epoch opportunity. Still the people turned out in number barely larger than in the three parliamentary elections after the 1990 change. If the Maoists really triumphed solely on intimidation, as their rivals continue to claim, then the ex-rebels were sophisticated enough to have perpetrated fear under the gaze of international observers. Surely, the Maoists cannot be expected to take responsibility for the Nepali Congress’ failure to recognize that.
The imperative of ceding power to the largest bloc in the new assembly is inherently democratic. Yet it is hard to describe as undemocratic the reluctance to do so to a party that has done precious little to assure the people of its democratic intentions. If any other party had refused to respect the people’s mandate in such a way, the international community would have been outraged long ago.
Whatever the reasons for the Nepali Congress’ setback, it is far from fatal. The party will continue to monopolize the halo of democracy until, at least, the Unified Marxist-Leninists change their name and flag. This is reality is something the Nepal Congress can approach with either humility or haughtiness. The choice will determine its future.

Maoists Confront The Price Of Power

By Sanjay Upadhya

Electoral success has begun to soften Nepal’s former Maoist rebels. The leader of the once-feared organization, Pushpa Kamal Dahal – who still goes by his nom de guerre “Prachanda” (The Fierce One) – is calling for political consensus as the Himalayan nation prepares to abolish the monarchy and write a new constitution.
On foreign policy, too, Prachanda has diluted his party’s earlier threats to abrogate a controversial treaty with India, ban Indian films and stop recruitment of Gurkha soldiers into the Indian and British armies. C.P. Gajurel, chief of the party’s international division, has said the ex-insurgents would stop calling the Americans “imperialists” and the Indians “expansionists”.
Even on the question of the monarchy, the Maoists have been speaking of a “graceful exit” for King Gyanendra. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the party’s chief ideologue, had broached the idea of keeping a “cultural king” who would preside over the predominantly Hindu nation’s myriad festivals and rituals, before coming under criticism from the party. Still, Prachanda has sought a meeting with the monarch to ask him personally to leave the royal palace. The Maoists have said that Gyanendra, as a commoner, could run his businesses and perhaps even enter politics.
At one level, this mellowing stems from sheer expediency. Defying most predictions, the Maoists emerged as the principal force in the April 10 elections. Still, they lack a majority in the 600-plus assembly. The Nepali Congress and the other main communist faction, the Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML), are still licking their electoral wounds. Both are divided on whether to join a Maoist-led government.
Prachanda has said he would give Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala a “respectable” position in a new government. Some have taken this to mean the presidency, after King Gyanendra is formally ousted by the assembly. Dr. Bhattarai, however, insists that Koirala must join the monarch in exiting the national stage.
Koirala, for his part, has come under growing criticism from his Nepali Congress for ceding too much to the Maoists in the name of boosting the peace process that formally ended the decade-long insurgency that claimed at least 13,000 lives. The prime minister, who had said he would resign after the elections, is holding consultations with other political parties on forming the next government.
Some Maoist leaders suspect something sinister behind the maneuvering. They believe the Nepali Congress and the UML are colluding with the Nepali Army and “foreign power centers” to prevent the ex-rebels from heading the new government. And not without reason. Nepali Congress leaders insist the Maoists must first disband their fighting force, currently sequestered in U.N.-supervised camps. The UML, like the Nepali Congress, wants the former rebels to stop attacks on political rivals, end their kangaroo courts and return property confiscated during the insurgency.
The three major external stakeholders, too, are adjusting to the Maoists’ unexpected triumph. The United States, which still considers the Maoists a terrorist organization, has softened its stance after the election. U.S. Ambassador Nancy Powell met with Prachanda, opening Washington’s formal contact with the ex-rebels, before flying to Washington for consultations. It is unclear, though, whether the U.S. government would immediately withdraw the terrorist tag from the Maoists.
India, Nepal’s traditionally influential neighbor to the south, organized a conference on strengthening bilateral relations. The Maoists’ call to renegotiate the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, a demand enjoying wider political support in Nepal, received a patient hearing. Still, India has its own priority and a new ambassador has assumed charge. New Delhi hopes the election in Nepal would encourage its own Maoist insurgents to renounce violence and enter the mainstream. The Indian Maoists, however, seem to be in defiant mood. In a statement, they described Nepalis’ electoral verdict as a defeat for “Indian expansionism.”
Nepal’s northern neighbor China, which had opposed the Maoist insurgency, has steadily built ties with the former rebels. The regularity of pro-Tibet demonstrations in Kathmandu over the past two months has heightened Beijing’s sensitivities on what it has long considered a volatile frontier. Prachanda’s assertion that his party would maintain “equidistance” between Nepal’s two giant neighbors will have placated Beijing somewhat. In New Delhi, it has intensified concern, especially among sections skeptical of the Maoists’ real motives. One veteran analyst, B. Raman, recently wrote that India may have no alternative to backing a military takeover to prevent the Maoists from gaining strength.
Surely, those offering such an extreme prescription have an eye on the turmoil within the Maoist party. Before the election, the former rebels had projected Prachanda as their presidential candidate. Now they have nominated him as the next prime minister, effectively edging out the more articulate Dr. Bhattarai. Although the change has not resulted in any public split in Maoist ranks, the two men do share a history of rivalry.
Immediately, though, the Maoists must contend with the expectations of the rank and file. The Maoists put 23,500 fighters into the camps. As part of the peace agreement, they are to be integrated into the national army. However, the generals do not want to accept the fighters right away, saying they are still politically indoctrinated.
The Maoists have sent women and members of traditionally marginalized groups to the assembly in numbers unprecedented for Nepal. Still, there are rumblings of discontent. Last week, Prachanda faced the first organized protest from within the party over the choice of legislators under the proportional representation category.
Such discord is not new in Nepali politics. The Nepali Congress and the UML suffered damaging splits after having failed to reconcile internal differences. Unlike the Maoists, however, they had already led the government.

आफ्नै कांधको भार

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

संविधानसभामा सबैभन्दा ठूलो दल बनेको नेकपा माओवादीलाई सरकारको नेतृत्व नसुम्पनका लागि केही पक्षले अघि सारेका तर्कहरू वैदेशिक आडमा लोकतन्त्रका आधारभूत मान्यतामाथिको ठाडो अतिक्रमण हुन् वा शक्ति बांडफाटका लागि एउटा दबाबसूत्र मात्र, त्यो त प्रस्टिदै जाला । समग्र बहसको स्तरले भने राजनीतिक असमझदारी गहिरिदै जाने पूर्वाभास भएको छ ।
प्रबुद्ध अन्तर्राष्ट्रय पर्यवेक्षकहरूले निर्वाचन सामान्यतः स्वतन्त्र र निष्पक्ष भएको ठोकुवा उत्तिखेरी नगरिदिएका भए सायद सडकमा अहिले टायर जलिरहेका हुन्थे र ढुङ्गामुढा बर्सिरहेका हुन्थे । भित्रभित्रै भने आगो सल्किरहेकै छ । मतदाताद्वारा निर्दिष्ट आ-आफ्नो हैसियत अनुसार नयां संविधान बनाउन तर्फ कसरी लाग्ने भन्नुको साटो अन्य दलका केही नेताहरू माओवादीलाई कसरी अर्को चुनावमा तह लगाउने भन्नेमै तल्लीन देखिन्छन् ।
यहां २०५२ सालको त्रिशङ्कु संसद्को अनुभव सम्झनुको कुनै तुक रहेन । उतिबेलाको संयुक्त वा अल्पमत सरकार बनाउने प्रस्ट संवैधानिक प्रावधान एवम् त्यसलाई क्रियाशील बनाउन प्रत्यक्ष राजनीतिभन्दा माथि रहेका राष्ट्राध्यक्ष छैनन् । असाधारण परिस्थितिले असाधारण प्रयोजन खोज्ने नै भयो ।
चुनावभन्दा धेरैअघि नै सत्तासीन दलहरूले आफूहरूबीचकै सहमतिका आधारमा राज्यव्यवस्था चलाउने प्रतिबद्धता अन्तरिम संविधानमै जनाइसकेका थिए । नयां शक्तिका रूपमा उदाएको मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमका साथै सभामा उपस्थित अन्य साना दलहरूलाई कसरी प्रभावकारी संयन्त्रमा समावेश गर्ने भन्ने कुराले प्रमुखता पाउनुपर्ने थियो । प्राथमिक विद्यालयको चौरमा सुनिने धमास र घुर्र्कीको स्तरमा पो त बहस झर्‍यो ।
माओवादी अध्यक्ष प्रचण्डले आफूलाई राष्ट्राध्यक्ष पदको उम्मेदवारका रूपमा प्रस्तुत गर्दा र उनलाई 'भित्ते राष्ट्रपति' भनेर अन्य दलका नेताहरूले ठट्टा गर्दा अन्तरिम संविधान सबैका छेउमै थियो । जनताले त्यसमा अन्तरमि राष्ट्रपतिको प्रावधान नभएको कुरा बुझ्न फुर्ुसद पाएनन् होला । नेता र दलहरूले उनीहरूलाई बुझाउन नखोज्नु वा नसक्नुको परिणाम मुलुकले कतिसम्म भोग्दै जाने। प्रचण्डको सैनिक ओहदा र वाईसीएलको उद्दण्डतालाई उनको प्रधानमन्त्री बन्ने अभियानको बाटोमा तगारो देख्नेहरू चुनावअघि दृष्टिविहीन पक्कै थिएनन् । उता वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई शान्ति प्रक्रिया यहां सम्म पुर्‍याएकै आधारमा निरन्तरता दिनु वाञ्छनीय हुने हो भने किन उनलाई आजीवन सरकारप्रमुखको पदवीले विभूषित नगर्ने।
सुरुबाटै शान्ति प्रक्रियालाई जसरी पनि कायम राखिनुपर्ने बाध्यताले आफ्नै प्रकारका तनावहरू सिर्जना गरेको थियो । असहमतिहरूको समायोजन गर्नका लागि सहभागीहरूले पनि आफ्नै नियम बनाए । कहिले राजनीतिक त कहिले संवैधानिक अनि कहिले व्यावहारकि अनिवार्यताद्वारा निर्देशित प्रक्रियामा हचुवा र हल्का निर्णयहरूसमेत अनिवार्य बन्न पुगे । पुराना प्रतिबद्धताहरू नै सबैतिर अलपत्र पररिहेका बेला तिनको पुनःव्याख्या गर्नु सजिलो जुक्ति थियो । सङ्घात्मक गणतन्त्रको ऐनामा नयां नेपालको अनुहार देखियो ।
नयां समस्या र र्सत आइलाग्नासाथ अन्तरिम संविधान संशोधन गरिहाले पुग्ने परम्परालाई अहिले आएर तोड्न सजिलो हुने कुरै भएन । सरकार बनाउन र खसाउन यदि दुइतिहाइ समर्थनको सर्त समस्या बनेको हो भने त्यो फेर्न खोज्नु नै प्राथमिकता भयो । तर, सहमतिका नाममा अस्थायी प्रकृतिको विधान आफू अनुकूल संशोधन मात्र गररिहने हो भने मूल काममा कसले, कहिले र कसरी ध्यान दिने।
विदेशी अनुगमनकर्ताहरू ल्याप्चे लगाएर गइहाले पनि नेपालले उनीहरूको सदासय पाइरहला । भूतपूर्व अमेरिकी राष्ट्रपति जिम्मी कार्टर माओवादीमाथि आफ्नो देशले लगाएको आतङ्ककारीको बिल्ला उतार्न सफल हुन् भन्ने कामना गरौला । तर, यथार्थपरक रहनु नै श्रेयस्कर होला । नेपालपछि सिरिया पुगेर कार्टर वासिङ्टनद्वारा आतङ्ककारी घोषित अर्को सङ्गठन हमासका नेतालाई भेटेर विवादमा परे । अमेरिका फर्केपछि कार्टरले लेखेका र बोलेका शब्दहरू केलाउदा त उनले माओवादी र हमासलाई वर्तमान अमेरिकी विदेश नीतिविरुद्ध उनको बृहत् अभियानमा समाहित गरेको देखियो । यस्तो समायोजनले राख्न सक्ने अर्थका बारेमा माओवादीहरू नै सबभन्दा पहिले चनाखो बनेका होलान् ।
अनमिनमा रहेका विदेशी शुभचिन्तकहरू नेपालले शान्ति प्रक्रियाको अहम् खुड्किलो पार गरेकामा खुसी छन् । हामीकहां विशिष्ट र सीमित राजनीतिक लक्ष्य लिएर संयुक्त राष्ट्रसङ्घ आउनुमा हाम्रै अनुरोधका साथै हाम्रा दुइ विशाल छिमेकीहरूका संवेदनशीलताले काम गरेका थिए । अनमिन राष्ट्रसङ्घ मुख्यालयमा राजनीतिक विभागले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय स्तरमै द्वन्द्व निरोध र व्यवस्थापनमा लिन खोजेको बढ्दो भूमिकाकै उपज पनि थियो । यस प्रसङ्गलाई निश्चय पनि गौण मान्न सकिन्न ।
हाम्रो शान्ति प्रयासमा संलग्न अन्य अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सङ्घसंस्थाहरू पछिसम्म पनि नेपालबारे र्सतर्क रहिरहलान् । उनीहरूलाई संसारभर कार्यक्षेत्रको कुनै कमी रहने छैन । समय र स्रोतका अभावले उनीहरूको उत्सुकतालाई सीमाङ्कन गर्नेछ । जहां सम्म हाम्रा पारस्परकि अविश्वासकै कारण विदेशीहरूलाई निम्त्याइएको यथार्थ छ, त्यसको पर्याप्त सुनुवाइ त चुनावअघि नै हुनसकेको थिएन । कमजोरै भए पनि समझदारी बढाउने अभिभारा हाम्रै कांधमा रहिरहनेछ ।

(नेपाल राष्ट्रिय साप्ताहिक, बैशाख २२, २०६५)

सत्ताको अभिशाप

सञ्जय उपाध्याय
नेकपा माओवादीको अनपेक्षित चुनावी सफलतालाई सबैले आ-आफ्नै ढङ्गले व्याख्या गर्ने क्रमको तीव्रतालाई हर्दा मुलुकले सर्वस्वीकार्य स्पष्टीकरण पाउन गाह्रो पर्ने देखिन्छ। त्यसैले त्यतातिर समय खर्चनुभन्दा भविष्यप्रति उन्मुख हुनुमै बुद्धिमानी ठहरिनेछ । स्पष्टै भन्नुपर्दा माओवादीहरूको सफलतालाई स्वीकार गर्दागर्दै पनि त्यसले निम्त्याउन सक्ने प्रतिक्रिया, प्रभाव र प्रवृत्तिको आकलन गर्नु अत्यावश्यक छ।
उत्कृष्ट वैज्ञानिक दर्शनका अनुयायी भएकोमा गौरव गर्दै आएको माओवादी नेतृत्वले नतिजाको बराबर र विपरीत प्रतिक्रियाको अपेक्षा गररिहेकै होला। नयां राजनीतिक दललाई नवीनताले नै केही न केही फाइदा पुर्‍याउने गर्छ। माओवादीहरूको हकमा त उनीहरू रूपान्तरति भएर आएका हुन्, त्यो पनि एक दशकसम्म हत्या र हिंसाका प्रतीक बनेर।
बन्दुक र बमका साथसाथै उनीहरूले राज्यविरुद्ध शब्दजालको सशक्त प्रयोग गरे। जनयुद्धभरि आफूहरूलाई जसले जसरी हेरेको भए पनि ती विविध बुझाइको तुंवालो पछाडि बसेर नेतृत्वले सङ्गठनलाई यहां सम्म पुर्‍याउन सफल भयो।
निर्दोष नागरकिमाथि भएका जघन्य अपराधपश्चात् माओवादी नेताहरूले कतिपटक आत्मालोचना गरे। राज्यले त्यस्ता घटनाहरू हुदै जानुलाई नेतृत्वले तल्लो पङ्क्तिमाथि पकड गुमाएको भनी अर्थ्यायो। माओवादीहरूले सो बुझाइको प्रतिवाद गर्न उति आवश्यक ठानेनन्। कारण खुल्दै पनि गयो। आफ्ना मूल्य, मान्यता, भाव, आवश्यकता र अपेक्षाका बारेमा आमजनतामा जति भ्रम बाक्लियो, त्यति नै उनीहरूलाई फाइदा पुग्ने भयो।
राजतन्त्र उन्मूलनको अभियानमा चुर्लुम्म डुब्दा पनि दरबारसंगको कार्यगत एकता रहेको स्वीकारोक्ति त एउटा कडी मात्र थियो। दरबार हत्याकाण्डपछि गद्दीनसिन भएको घडीदेखि आफूहरूले खेद्दै आएका राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रको सरकारसंग दुुइपटक वार्तामा बस्न माओवादीहरूलाई असहज भएन। त्यसभन्दा पहिले नारायणहिटी काण्डमा संलग्न रहेको आरोप लगाउदै बहुमतप्राप्त प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई गैरप्रजातान्त्रिक प्रक्रियाबाट पदच्यूत गराउन विद्रोहीहरूले मूलधारका प्रतिपक्षीहरूलाई मद्दत गरेका थिए। पांच वर्ष नबित्दै माओवादीहरू तिनै वयोवृद्ध व्यक्तिको पछि लागेर सिंहदरबार छिर्दा देशले गाह्रो मान्न पाएन।
वार्ता र युद्धलाई पर्यायवाची धरातलीय यथार्थ बताएर नेपाली मनमस्तिष्क रन्थनाउने माओवादीहरूले शान्ति प्रक्रिया अंगालेपछि आफ्नो कुटिलतालाई पनि परिस्कृत गरे। वाईसीएलको उदय र उद्दण्डता एवम् राज्यसत्ता जसरी पनि कब्जा गर्ने चेतावनीजस्ता कुराले माओवादीहरूको अन्तिम लक्ष्यलाई झनै अस्पष्ट बनायो। शाब्दिक चालबाजीको चलन त व्यापकै रहेछ । मूलधारमा समाहित हुन लागेर नेतृत्वले जनयुद्धलाई धोका दिए भनेर कटु आलोचना गर्दै आएका रवीन्द्र श्रेष्ठ त तुलनात्मक रूपले दक्षिणपन्थी एमालेमा छिर्न गए।
नकारात्मक धरातलमै उभिएका शक्तिहरूमध्येबाट र्सार्वभौम नेपाली जनताले माओवादीलाई रोजेका छन्। संविधानसभा निर्वाचन अभियानलाई सबै दलले संसदीय चुनावभन्दा पृथक् नबनाइदिएकाले माओवादीहरूलाई पनि नयां नेपालको खाकामा अल्झिरहनु परेन। तर, अब शासनभार आई नै सकेपछि राष्ट्रको मूल कानुन निर्माण गर्ने प्रमुख जिम्मा माओवादीहरूले नलिई सुखै छैन।
सरकार र सभामा रहने अन्य दलहरूको पनि दायित्व उत्तिकै रहनेछ। तर, उनीहरू मूल रूपले आ-आफ्ना दीर्घकालीन हित सुरक्षित गर्ने खालको संविधान बनाउन प्रयत्नरत हुने हुंदा प्रक्रिया सहज हुने छैन। त्यसमाथि श्रोताका अनुहार र अपेक्षा हेरेर आफ्ना मूल्य र मान्यता व्याख्या गर्ने माओवादीहरूको पुरानो बानीको स्मरण गराइरहने काममा विपक्षी चुक्ने छैनन्। सरकारमा रहने अन्य दलहरूले अपजस जति माओवादीका थाप्लामा थोपर्न खोज्नु अस्वाभाविक हुने छैन। उता काङ्ग्रेस र एमालेमा चुनाव हारेका हस्तीहरूको प्रभाव र प्रवृत्ति सभाबाहिर सवल हुने नै देखिन्छ।
सत्ताको अभिशापले माओवादीहरूलाई व्यापक सहमतिका लागि सहिष्णु बन्न कर लगाउला पनि। तर, जतिसुकै इमानदारीका साथ अन्य दलतर्फ बढ्न खोजे पनि उनीहरूलाई आफैले बुनेको अविश्वासको जालबाट उम्कन सजिलो हुने छैन। उता राज्यसत्तामाथि एकाधिकारको मनोविज्ञानबाट अभ्रिप्रेरित माओवादीहरूको तल्लो पङ्क्तिले नेतृत्वले अन्य दलहरूसंग गर्नसक्ने सम्झौताको दायरा सङ्कुचित बनाउने सामर्थ्य राख्नेछन्। सत्ताबाहिर रहेका र उब्जन सक्ने समूहहरूका असन्तोषका बारेमा त माओवादी नेतृत्वलाई केही भनिरहनुपरेन। असन्तोषको आगो सल्केपछि त्यसमा आ-आफ्नै स्वार्थका लागि घिउ थप्नेहरूको अभाव देशभित्र वा बाहिर रहने छैन।
सुरक्षाको कवचका लागि माओवादीहरूले पनि अन्ततः विदेशीहरूलाई नै समाउन पुगे भने त्यो उनीहरूलाई समस्या बन्ने देखिन्छ। जङ्गलबाट राजधानी पसेको वर्षदन नपुग्दै सङ्गठनमा कुन गुट उत्तर र कुन दक्षिणतिर ढल्केको भन्ने र्सार्वजनिक चर्चाको विषय बनिसकेको थियो। बाह्य शक्ति संगको सामीप्यको मूल्य कति चर्को पर्ने हो एवम् त्यो आफूहरूले नै बेहोर्नपर्ने यथार्थ बुझ्न त माओवादीहरूले काङ्ग्रेस र एमालेलाई हेरे पुग्छ। यस ऐतिहासिक क्षणमा आशङ्का र असमझदारी चिर्दै सबै राजनीतिक शक्तिहरू अघि बढ्न सकून् भन्ने कामना गरौ।

जनमत जगेर्नाको जिम्मेवारी

सञ्जय उपाध्याय
संविधानसभा निर्वाचन होला कि नहोला भन्ने आशङ्कापछि सुनिने गरिएको अर्को प्रश्न अहिले आएर गहन बन्दैछ । चुनाव भइहाले नेकपा माओवादीले आफूप्रतिकूल नतिजालाई स्वीकार्ला - राजतन्त्र र संसदीय व्यवस्था दुवैविरुद्ध हत्या र विध्वंसमा उत्रेको समूह बहुदलीय मूलधारमा आउनुलाई त्यसै पनि स्वाभाविक मानिएको थिएन । त्यसमाथि दसवर्षे 'जनयुद्ध'द्वारा राज्यलाई घु“डा टेकाउन नसके पनि उनीहरू पराजित नभएको यथार्थ सबैका सामु छदै थियो ।
घटना, प्रवृत्ति र पात्रबीचका अन्तरद्वन्द्व चर्काएर त्यसबाट भरपूर फाइदा लिदै आएका माओवादी नेताहरू अहिले आएर कहिले जनमतको आदर गर्ने प्रण गर्छन् त कहिले षड्यन्त्रद्वारा रचिने पराजयको प्रतिकार गर्ने चेतावनी दिन्छन् । के लाई षड्यन्त्र मान्ने र कस्तो प्रतिकार गर्ने भन्ने कुरा उनीहरूले आफैमा सुरक्षित राख्न खोज्नु अनौठो होइन ।
आममतदाताको स्थिति भने दयनीय बनेको छ । दलहरूभित्र कसैलाई संविधानसभा चुनाव राष्ट्रपति बन्ने माध्यम बनेको छ भने कसैले त्यसलाई प्रधानमन्त्री बन्ने अवसरका रूपमा लिएका छन् । जनप्रतिनिधिको त्यत्रो झुन्डले कसरी, कहिलेसम्म र कस्तो संविधान बनाउलान् भन्नेतर्फध्यान पुर्‍याउन नपाउदै कतै माओवादीलाई हराए तिनीहरूले देशलाई पुनः हिंसाको चक्रमा फसाउलान् भन्ने डर आइलागेको छ ।
बाकी सबै दलहरूलाई मौका दिइसकेर निरास भएकाहरूमध्ये कतिलाई माओवादीको पक्ष्मा मत खसाल्न त्यति गाह्रो नपर्ला । तर, यो समूहलाई पनि विजय-पराजयपश्चात् माओवादीहरूले एकदलीय अधिनायकवाद लादे भने कसरी उम्कने भन्ने प्रश्नले कतै न कतै पिरोलेको हुनुपर्दछ ।
समसामयिक विश्व परिस्थतिमा साम्यवादी अधिनायकवाद टिक्न नसक्ने विश्वास लिएर बसेकाहरूलाई नेपालको भूराजनीतिक अवस्थितिले अझ उत्साहित बनाएको होला । माओवादीहरू स्वयम्ले सत्ता कब्जा गर्न सके पनि त्यसलाई टिकाइरहन गाह्रो पर्ने कुरा राम्ररी बुझेकाले त्यस्तो कुनै दुस्साहस नगर्लान् भन्न सकिएला । तर, आधारभूत रूपले सदैव आफ्नै स्वार्थबाट अभप्रेरित रहने हाम्रा दुुइ छिमेकीहरूले अन्य बाह्य शक्तिहरूलाई विस्थापित गर्नैका लागि कतै माओवादीहरूलाई नै स्वीकार त नगर्लान् ।
जनमतका बारेमा शङ्का निवारण गर्ने जिम्मा माओवादीहरूले लेलान् भनेर सोच्न उनीहरूकै पृष्ठभूमिले दिदैन । सत्तासीन साना दलहरू सरकारकै कतिपय निर्णयो खरो आलोचना गर्न पछि पर्दैनन् तर सरकार पनि छोड्न सक्दैनन् । अन्तरिम संसद भित्र र बाहिर पञ्चायती पृष्ठभूमि भएकाहरूले केही बोले प्रतिगमनको प्रतिविम्ब देखिने भइहाल्यो । मधेसका नया दलहरू सरकारसंगको सम्झौतापछि आफै रनभुल्लमा छन् । राजा त शान्ति प्रक्रियाको हकमा निलम्बित अवस्थामै रहेका छन् । अझै पनि दरबारप्रति बफादार भनिएको सेनालाई गुहार्ने हो भने पहिले देशले दुइ वर्ष देखि बुझेको लोकतन्त्रको पुनःव्याख्या नै गर्नुपर्ने हुन्छ ।
नेपालीहरूको आपसी अविश्वासकै कारण शान्ति प्रक्रियालाई सहज बनाउन आएको संयुक्त राष्ट्रसङ्घ अहिले स्थिति सुध्रिएको छैन है भनेर खुलेरै भन्छ । बारम्बारको त्यस्तो खबरदारीमा उसले आफ्नै जिम्मेवारी पूरा गर्न नसकेको स्वीकारोक्ति देख्न सकेको छैन । लोकतन्त्र, मानव अधिकार र समावेशीकरणप्रति प्रतिबद्ध अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय गैरसरकारी सङ्घसंस्थाहरूले केही गर्न सक्ने थिए । तर, अहिले उनीहरू नेपाल सरकारले तिब्बती प्रदर्शनकारीमाथि गररिहेको दुर्र्व्यवहारले स्तब्ध छन् ।
त्यसैले जनमतको कदर हुने प्रत्याभूति दिने दायित्व सत्तँसीन अन्य दुइ ठूला दलहरूको नै हुन जान्छ । त्यहा पनि कुरा सरल छैन । तीनवटा प्रजातान्त्रिक निर्वाचनमार्फ परीक्षित भइसकेको नेकपा एमाले अझै पनि साम्यवादी बिल्ला भिररिहेकै कारण शङ्काको घेराबाट पूर्ण रूपले बाहिरनि सकेको छैन । अन्ततः नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसले नै त्यो जिम्मा लिनुपर्ने भएको छ । त्यो बुझेर उत्साहित बनेका सो दलका नेता, कार्यकर्ता र र्समर्थकहरू आफूहरूले मात्र लोकतन्त्रको रक्षा गर्न सक्ने नाराका साथ पो त जनतामाझ जान थाले । दायित्वबोध दम्भमा परिणत हुन बेरै लागेन ।
निश्चय पनि काङ्ग्रेस तीन-तीनवटा प्रजातान्त्रिक आन्दोलन नेतृत्व गरेको पार्टी हो । तर, बिर्सन नसकिने कुरा के पनि हो भने दुवैपल्ट प्रजातन्त्र अवरुद्ध हुदा काङ्ग्रेस नै सत्तामा थियो । दरबारको कथित अधिनायकवादी संस्कारलाई जतिसुकै दोष दिन खोजे पनि काङ्ग्रेसले आफूलाई पानीमाथिको ओभानो ठान्न मिल्दैन । बहुमतको अहङ्कार र पार्टी अन्तरद्वन्द्वकै सम्मिश्रणले २०१७ र ०५९ का राजनीतिक दुर्घटनाहरूलाई निम्त्याएको प्रस्टै छ ।
हो, यसपटक आन्दोलन सफल भइहाल्यो भनेर काङ्ग्रेस अन्यत्र लम्कन त्यति आतुर भएको देखिएन । तर पनि पुराना रोगहरू बल्झिएकै छन् । चुनावी मनोनयन नपाएकाहरूले विद्रोही उम्मेदवारको लामो पङ्क्ति बनाएका छन् । शाही शासनका दूइ चरणभर भौतिक असुविधा खपेकाहरूमध्येकै केही नेताहरू अहिले राजावादी कित्तामा दर्ज भएकामा खासै असन्तुष्ट देखिदैनन् ।
उता बीपी कोइरालाको मेलमिलाप नीतिको र्सार्वजनिक दुहाई दिनेहरूलाई राष्ट्रपतिको दायित्वबोध भन्दा पनि संस्थापन पक्षप्रतिको असन्तुष्टिले अभिप्रेरित गरेको छैन भन्न सकिने स्थिति छैन । सरकार र राष्ट्रप्रमुखसमेत रहेका काङ्ग्रेस सभापतिले नै सम्भावित राजनीतिक दुर्घटनाको चर्चा गर्न थालेपछि के नै पो गर्ने ।

Tibet Unrest Squeezes an Unstable Nepal

Sanjay Upadhya
April 1, 2008
World Politics Review

From the TV footage coming out of Nepal these days, it is easy to forget that the Himalayan nation is struggling to build a viable democracy. Almost every day since mid-March, when anti-Chinese protests erupted in Tibet and other countries, images of Nepali police beating Tibetan demonstrators have been beamed around the world.
Nepal's major political parties and former Maoist rebels have promised to build an open and inclusive state after years of turmoil. The people are preparing to vote April 10 for a new assembly that would write a new constitution embodying a federal democratic republic. Yet barely two years after having defied King Gyanendra's direct rule, Nepali parties seem to have emulated the palace in cracking down on another group of pro-democracy protesters.
With China limiting international access to Tibet, the most conspicuous images of the anti-Beijing protests are coming out of the Nepali capital, Katmandu. The demonstrations and the strong government response have forced many ordinary Nepalis to ponder their geographical vulnerability.
Prithvi Narayan Shah, the monarch who established the modern Nepali state over two centuries ago from dozens of petty principalities, described his new realm as a "yam between two boulders." His successors fought two wars with the Tibetans, the last resulting in a Chinese retaliation, as British India, Nepal's southern neighbor, rebuffed the kingdom's pleas for assistance. In 1816, the British defeated Nepal in a war that cost the kingdom a third of its territory. After that, each giant saw Nepal as a useful buffer against the other. Amid the enclosement, Nepal's rulers were left struggling to strike the right balance in foreign policy.
The triumph of China's communists in 1949 raised fears of Nepal becoming the next domino. After Chinese troops overran Tibet the following year, India, newly independent, crafted a compromise that empowered Nepal's political parties under an assertive monarchy. Geopolitics continued to weigh heavily on Nepali politics.
In 1960, King Mahendra, father of the current monarch, dismissed Nepal's first democratically elected government and banned political parties in the shadow of growing Sino-Indian tensions. China moved swiftly to build ties with the palace, while India tacitly encouraged an anti-monarchy insurgency. India's defeat in a brief but bloody border war with China two years later encouraged New Delhi to engage the palace.
A decade later, the Nepali military crushed a U.S-backed Tibetan insurgency, as Washington opened ties with Beijing. The monarchy-led regime lasted until 1990, when it was swept away by the global democratic wave that the collapse of the Berlin Wall unleashed. Even so, change in Nepal would not have come so swiftly without improvements in Sino-Indian relations.
Until the mid-1990s, Beijing seemed to acquiesce in Nepal's close relations with India, buttressed by a shared religion and culture. When a group of radical Nepali communists revolted against the king and parliament in 1996 under the banner of Maoism, China grew uneasy. The instability bred by the Maoist insurgency renewed Chinese sensitivities over the 20,000 Tibetan refugees in Nepal.
Successive elected governments in Katmandu maintained a close watch on Tibetan exiles, in line with the country's "one China" policy. Days before King Gyanendra seized power in 2005, the multiparty government had shut down the Tibetan welfare center. After the restoration of democracy, Nepal continues to arrest escapees and deport them to China. The communist factions that dominate the current ruling alliance have criticized the anti-Chinese demonstrations. The Nepali Congress, which heads the coalition, has maintained a studious silence. The government recently announced it would close its side of Mount Everest during China's Olympic Torch relay to the summit in early May. The United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other organizations have deplored Katmandu's crackdown in language reminiscent of their toughness against royal rule.
While India, together with the United States and the European Union, has been actively pushing Nepal's peace process, China has considerably stepped up its overall role. Beijing has become unusually candid in asserting its interests. In public remarks, Zheng Xialing, the Chinese ambassador in Katmandu, has insisted that his country would not tolerate what he calls "foreign interference" in Nepal. Wang Hongwei, a leading Chinese expert on Nepal, has been more candid. In a widely read interview last year, Wang said his government felt "some foreign countries were trying to turn Nepal into the second largest base [after India] for Dalai Lama-led anti-Chinese activities."
Nepal did not figure on the official agenda during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's wide-ranging talks in China earlier this year. Although the visit was billed a success by both governments, Indian news media continue to voice concern about Beijing's growing influence on India's South Asian neighbors. Last month, the Indian Express newspaper, known to reflect official opinion, reported that China Study Centers had mushroomed along Nepal's border with India.
As Tibetans stepped up protests in Katmandu, photographs and video purportedly showing Chinese officials directing Nepali police circulated. Last week, the Times of India, reporting on what it called China's snub in summoning India's ambassador at 2 a.m. on a Saturday to protest against Tibetan activists breaking into the Chinese Embassy in Delhi, lamented how the Indian government was silent on the reported deployment of Chinese troops in Nepal.
That story prompted a sharp response from China's Global Times newspaper, which accused the Indian media of joining the West in an "anti-China chorus." Days later, the official Chinese news service Xinhua released what it called a signed confession from a participant claiming that the Dalai Lama's supporters planned to smuggle weapons into Tibet through Nepal.
In the midst of continuing domestic strife, Nepalis in general are looking forward to building a democratic and inclusive state. Many are also now wondering how much power over their fate really lies in their own hands.

नयां नेपालमा पुरानै अभिभारा

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

तिब्बत प्रकरणले नयां पुस्ताका नेपालीहरूलाई आफ्नो मुलुकको जोखिमपूर्ण भौगोलिक अवस्थितिका बारेमा सशक्त परचिय दियो । सार्वभौभ भनिएका जनताकै हातमा नेपालको भविष्य सुरक्षित रहने हो वा होइन भन्ने प्रश्नले त मुलुकलाई दक्षिणतिरबाट च्याप्दै आएको थियो । उत्तरतर्फका बाध्यताहरूको सार्वजनिक स्वरूपले उक्त बहसलाई व्यापकता दिएको छ ।
भूगोलले नै नेपाली राजनीतिलाई सदैव निर्देशित गररिहेको कुरा हाम्रा लागि प्रँज्ञिक मात्र नभएर एउटा जीवन्त यथार्थ बनिसकेको छ । आधुनिक इतिहासलाई मात्र केलाउने हो भने पनि २००७ सालको प्रजातान्त्रिक सफलता चीनको तिब्बत आगमनसंग कति नजिक जोडिएको थियो भन्ने प्रत्यक्ष अनुभव वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्री र उहांका समवयीहरूलाई छंदैछ ।
०१७ सालमा बहुदलीय व्यवस्थाको समाप्ति र निर्दलीय पञ्चायती व्यवस्थाको दशकौको निरन्तरतामा भारत र चीनबीचको कटुताले निर्वाह गरेको भूमिकासित परिचित नेपालीहरूको सङ्ख्या त अझ धेरै छ । निश्चय पनि ०४७ सालको जनआन्दोलनको सफलताका लागि बर्लिन पर्खाल भत्कनु र भारत-चीन सम्बन्ध सुध्रनुले मद्धत पुर्‍याएको थिए ।
तथापि, त्यस समय चीन आफै तियाननमेन कान्डपछिको तीव्र अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय विरोध नखेपिरहेको भए घटनाक्रमले अर्कै मोड पो लिने थियो कि भन्ने प्रश्न एउटा बौद्धिक विलासिता मात्र हुन सक्दैन । शाही सरकारको अल्पायु नेपाली आन्तरकि राजनीति प्रति चीनको औपचारिक निरपेक्षताका अभावमा अझ कति छोटिन्थ्यो होला ।
भूराजनीतिक यथार्थलाई समसामयिक अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सम्बन्धका मान्यताहरूसंग राख्दा देखिने विडम्बनाले नेपाललाई अहिले पोलिरहेको छ । पटकपटकका आन्दोलनपश्चात् नेपालीहरू दिगो र समावेशी प्रजातन्त्र तर्फ लम्किरहेको कुरालाई अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय समुदायले सराहना गररिहेको थियो । काठमाडौका सडकमा आफ्ना लागि त्यस्तै स्वतन्त्रता खोजिरहेका तिब्बती प्रदर्शनकारीहरूका टाउकामा बज्रिएका लट्ठीहरूका कारण रक्ताम्य दृश्य अहिले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय समाचार बन्न पुगे ।
नेपालको शान्ति प्रक्रियामा सम्मिलित विभिन्न अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सङ्गठन र व्यक्तित्वहरूलाई त यस विरोधाभासले झनै घोचेको हुनुर्पर्छ । द्वन्द्वपश्चात्को राज्य पुनःनिर्माणसम्बन्धी प्रयोगशालाका रूपमा नेपाललाई सदासय साथ हेररिहेकाहरूमध्ये कतिले त अहिले मुन्टो बटाररिहेका होलान् ।
त्यसो त तिब्बत प्रकरणले भारतको छविमा पनि धक्का नपुर्‍याएको होइन । विश्वको सबैभन्दा ठूलो प्रजातन्त्र हाक्ने सरकारले तिब्बतीहरूको स्वतन्त्रताको आकाङ्क्षाको अभिव्यक्ति कुण्ठित पार्न पुग्नुका पछाडि उसको पनि राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थ नै थियो । त्यसपछि दलाई लामाको नेतृत्वमा निर्वासनमा रहेको तिब्बती सरकारलाई आश्रय दिएको मुलुकले तिनैका र्समर्थकविरुद्ध बल प्रयोग गरेर दोह्रो मापदण्ड दर्शायो ।
निश्चय पनि भारतझै नेपाल नकारात्मक अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय जनमत थेग्न सक्ने अवस्थामा छैन । नेपालको बाध्यतालाई नेपालको संलग्नताका रूपमा नलिन अरूलाई कतिसम्म अनुनय गर्ने - सायद त्यो र्व्यर्थ हुनेछ । महत्त्वपूर्ण त हामीलाई अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय छविभन्दा पनि दुइ छिमेकी मुलुकहरूको सदासय नै रहनेछ ।
शान्ति प्रक्रियाका नाममा भित्रिएका केही तत्त्व र प्रवृति प्रति चीनको आफ्नो असन्तुष्टि असाधारण स्पष्टताका साथ व्यक्त गर्दै आएको धेरै भइसक्यो । विगत दुइ वर्षमा चिनिया सरकारी टोलीका लस्करबाट विभिन्नस्तरमा नेपाली अधिकारीहरूले यो सन्देश अझ विस्तृत रूपले पाएका होलान् । हामीकहां शान्ति स्थापना गर्न आएकामध्ये कसैले स्वतन्त्र तिब्बत अभियानलाई सहयोग गररिहेको भए-नभए पनि चीनलाई आश्वस्त पार्ने दायित्व हाम्रै हो ।
उता तिब्बती विरोध प्रदर्शन नियन्त्रण गर्ने काममा नेपाली प्रशासनिक एवम् सुरक्षा संयन्त्रसंग चीनको प्रत्यक्ष संलग्नता रहेको समाचारहरूप्रति भारतले कुनै दरिलो नकारात्मक प्रक्रिया नजनाइहाले पनि उसले त्यस्तै खाले चिन्ता सधै विभिन्न प्रसङ्गमा व्यक्त गर्दै आइरहेको जगजाहेरै छ ।
हो, शीतयुद्धकालको तुलनामा एसियाका यी महाशक्तिहरूको पारस्परकि सम्बन्धमा निकै न्यानोपन आएको छ । राजनीतिक स्तरमा भ्रमणको आदानप्रदानमा आएको तीव्रता, सैनिक र सुरक्षा मामलामा बढ्दै गएको समझदारी, व्यापारमा भएको गुणात्मक वृद्धि आदि त्यही सौहाद्रताका परिचायक हुन् । तर पनि सहयोग, प्रतिस्पर्धा एवम् होडबाजीसमेतको सम्मिश्रणमा आधारित यस सम्बन्धले नेपाललाई स्वाभाविक र अनपेक्षित असर पाररिहनेछ ।
यति हुदाहुदै पनि चीन र भारत दुवै आफ्ना द्विपक्षीय सम्बन्धभित्रका असहजताबाट तेस्रो वैदेशिक शक्तिले लिन सक्ने लाभप्रति सचेत छन् । यस्तो संवेदनशील अवस्थामा नेपाली नेतृत्व पङ्क्तिको सामूहिक विवेकमा आउने सानोभन्दा सानो ह्रासले पनि भयङ्कर परिणाम निम्त्याउने निश्चित छ । विदेशी चलखेल बढ्यो मात्र भनेर टाउको ठटाउनुको कुनै उपयोगिता छैन । सङ्क्रमणकाल भनेर छिमेकीलगायत कसैले छुट देलान् भन्ठान्नु त मूर्खताको पराकाष्ठा ठहरिनेछ ।
अग्रगामी परविर्तनका लागि राजतन्त्र वा गणतन्त्र एवम् एकात्मक वा सङ्घीय राज्य संरचनाजस्ता विषयहरू छिनोफानो गर्न तल्लीन नयां नेपालका निर्माताहरूका सामु दुइ ढुङ्गाबीचको तरुललाई सग्लो राख्नुपर्ने पुरानै अभिभारा कायम छ ।

Republicanism’s Recalcitrant Ripples

By Sanjay Upadhya
September 16, 2007

The Nepali Congress’ headlong plunge into republicanism has spawned some unruly ripples. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai emerged from seclusion to disapprove of the decision. He underscored his displeasure by visiting Crown Prince Paras in the hospital. This dismantling of the ruling alliance’s sustained boycott of the monarchy may have been symbolic, but it was no less significant.
Bhattarai’s stand was immediately ridiculed as a monumental irrelevance. One-time loyalists suddenly saw the sole surviving founding member of the Nepali Congress as a symbol of senility. They resurrected the dead, too. B.P. Koirala’s plea for reconciliation between democrats and the palace had lost its validity, the refrain went. Were B.P. alive, prominent Nepali Congress thinker Pradip Giri asserted, Nepal would have become a republic four years ago. What was more fascinating here was that so many quarters across the political spectrum spent so many sentences on exemplifying an irrelevance.
Whether Bhattarai’s view represented those of the more reticent Nepali Congress members in both factions is unclear. What it does show is that there are still those who see the party’s survival closely tethered to the monarchy’s.
Across the board, the euphoria did not last long among republicans. In retrospect, what the Nepali Congress leadership did was refer the republican agenda to its general convention. The impression is that the body would eventually rubber stamp the decision. Yet other parties do not seem so sanguine. Maoist chairman Prachanda, among others, has pondered in some detail over whether the Nepali Congress would go into the constituent assembly elections with a republican agenda and then vote for the retention of the monarchy.
So far, Prime Minister Koirala has adroitly played off the Maoists and monarchy against each other in an effort to maintain a tenuous peace. That strategy may be running its course. The Maoists have been able to push their 22 preconditions for the constituent assembly elections primarily on the strength of the second amendment to the interim statute.
The eight parties in power had empowered the interim legislature to abolish the monarchy if the palace were found to be obstructing the polls. The argument that the Maoists are somehow shifting the goalposts is, therefore, specious. The only way the other constituents in power can now rebut the ex-rebels is by certifying that the palace has done no such thing – something the maligned Bhattarai seemed to have grasped.
Koirala is keeping his principal card – if he has one, that is – close to his chest. Rooting for the monarchy may be the best route for daughter Sujata to win the succession struggle in the party and perpetuate the Koirala dynasty. The premier may have helped her by asserting that the country’s independence was at stake.
Having discharged the duties – spiritual as well as secular – of head of state over the months, Koirala may now covet the real job. But, surely, he knows that becoming the first president of Nepal would require much more than Prachanda’s consent. The ruling parties would need to persuade internal and external constituencies of their ability to sustain a republic. And reconciling India’s aspirations for a democratic Nepal with China’s desire for a stable one is the easy part.
The postponement of the constituent assembly elections was a thinly guised affirmation of Nepal’s failure to attain political equilibrium. If the elections are delayed once more, it will be because of this factor. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the government’s agreements with the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum and Chure-Bhawar Ekta Samaj have been unable to lift the national mood.
No one – within the country or outside – wants to be blamed for derailing the tenuous peace process. Yet everyone is aware of another fragility: Koirala’s age and ailments. Deep inside, the premier probably considers himself no less vulnerable to the S slur than Bhattarai.

The Koiralas’ Crown Compulsions

By Sanjay Upadhya
May 21, 2007

Contrary to all outward appearances of ambivalence, the Nepali Congress appears to have cemented the centrality of the monarchy to its identity. Each new reiteration by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala of the inevitability of a republic has encouraged some of his closest associates in the party to articulate the crown’s continued relevance with greater clarity.
This affinity, to be sure, does not stem from an underlying affection. Shared class characteristics, as the Maoists like to point out, may be responsible to some degree. If anything, political pragmatism is the prime compulsion for the Nepali Congress.
The precise details of the April 24, 2006 compromise between the Seven-Party Alliance and King Gyanendra – if there was one in the first place – remain under wraps. For Prime Minister Koirala, seizing that middle ground between the monarchy and the Maoists became the first order of business. By playing off the palace and the Maoists against each other, Koirala succeeded in bringing the former rebels into government.
In formalizing the postponement of the constituent assembly elections after roping in the Maoists, Koirala exhibited, more than anything else, his vaunted party-building skills. Maoist chief Prachanda saw where things were headed. Sensing a trap, key associates began to feel they might be better off staying out power. In retrospect, the feverish bargaining over rank and portfolios right up to Koirala’s departure for the SAARC summit in New Delhi provided a convenient cover for all the protagonists.
Prachanda has been making obligatory allegations of betrayal to fortify his flank within. The Maoist chief understands how perilous the peace front of his “people’s war” can be. Despite all the other good things his Young Communist League is doing, the bad ones are hogging the headlines. For the country, it no longer matters how deep the internal split in the Maoists really runs. The nationalism and revolutionary planks in their platform have decayed the fastest.
In the legacy-building stage of his political career, Prime Minister Koirala may have grasped Nepal’s broader options. Vignettes from his previous stints in power must be swirling around him. Facing massive street protests against the Tanakpur accord in 1992-94, Koirala certainly did not relish those pleas by some normally sympathetic Indians for New Delhi to distance itself from the man. The escalation of the Maoist insurgency, the political instability preceding the Narayanhity Massacre and the wider convulsions it created must have encouraged deeper introspection.
After King Gyanendra took over full executive powers in October 2002, Koirala and the Nepali Congress, like much of the mainstream, were at the nadir of their popularity. While other leaders geared up for the looming collision with the palace, Koirala considered his own vulnerabilities. When the palace-appointed government purportedly agreed with Maoist negotiators to limit the army to a five kilometer radius of the barracks, Koirala became the first leader to criticize this infringement of state sovereignty.
That statement became part of a wider dynamic that ultimately shut the door on a palace-Maoist deal that would have bypassed the parties. The bonus Koirala sought – and may have succeeded in getting – lay in plugging that vulnerable hole Tanakpur exposed.
Last year, when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh welcomed him to New Delhi as a South Asian statesman, Koirala must have found it hard to suppress that chuckle inside. For someone who had a hard time scheduling meetings with then-premier Atal Behari Vajpayee during the early years of the anti-palace movement, this was quite a leap – and illusory.
Koirala was too close to his illustrious brother not to have experienced the exasperation B.P. Koirala felt in the late 1960s before abandoning efforts to renew relations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. During the eight years B.P. was imprisoned at Sundarijal, time had not stood still.
B.P.’s subsequent years in exile must have occasioned ample review of his brief tenure as Nepal’s first elected premier. When Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared in parliament in November 1959 that any external aggression on Nepal and Bhutan would be treated as an aggression on India, B.P. felt compelled to respond.
Speaking in the Nepali legislature, Koirala said he took Nehru’s statement as an expression of friendship, but added that Nepal, being a fully sovereign and independent nation, decided its external and home policies without ever referring to any external authority.
Over a week later, Nehru affirmed he agreed entirely with Koirala’s interpretation, but not without disclosing the secret letters that had been exchanged with the 1950 Treaty. Of course, B.P. did not have the benefit of hindsight to see how his battle with the palace would only set the stage for a larger phenomenon that would marginalize the Nepali Congress for three decades. If B.P. considered exile in Sarnath a lot like Sundarijal, who could have understood this better than his youngest brother.
In his current tenure, Prime Minister Koirala has become a changed man. He is an ardent champion of China’s entry into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation as a full member. The prime minister appeared unconstrained in seeking the new Chinese ambassador’s help on ensuring smooth petroleum supplies as the Indian Oil Corporation began tinkering with the taps.
In the cryptic maneuverings that pass for Nepali politics, these moves may be devoid of real substance. Yet coming from Koirala, the symbolism becomes starker. It was not too long ago, after all, that he flew straight into New Delhi from talks in China, left alone to battle the diplomatic fallout. Unlike B.P. Koirala, age has made this prime minister less susceptible to external “penalties” for flaunting his independence. This allows him greater leeway to build his legacy.
The logical question here is whether Koirala can impose his views on a party that largely considers itself the principal victim of the palace. Koirala is the Nepali Congress. Those who broke away under Sher Bahadur Deuba in mid-2002 had an opportunity to prove otherwise. The country recognizes how far anti-Koirala-ism has worked. For most of the younger Koiralas competing for the family mantle, the monarchy remains a pivot. Party members who disagree are most welcome to find another tent.
This brings us to another area where the Koiralas have proved particularly adroit. By allowing the communist factions monopolize the so-called “progressive/left” banner, the Nepali Congress can blur the distinction between the Unified Marxist Leninists and the Maoists, especially in those crucial western eyes.
When the Maoists relentlessly blame international power centers for conspiring to retain the monarchy, the Nepali Congress can afford to nod in affirmation and sit back. Prachanda and Co., by their own logic, have a long way to go toward establishing the scope and structures of republicanism as a viable alternative. Prime Minister Koirala, meanwhile, can continue uttering those obligatory republican sentiments.

Behind The Bombast And Bluster

By Sanjay Upadhya
May 2, 2007

For an organization that has flourished on ambiguity, obfuscation and even prevarication, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist’s latest internal commotions could be yet another subterfuge. Still, it is becoming difficult to view media reports on the ex-rebels’ growing disenchantment with India in isolation from their increasing assaults on Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, their determination consolidate the fiefdoms ministries they control have become, and their newfound eagerness to forge a broader republican front on the left.
Forest Minister Matrika Prasad Yadav’s altercation with Prime Minister Koirala on the military and the projectiles hurled at Peace and Reconstruction Minister Ram Chandra Poudel at the main mass meeting marking the first anniversary of the collapse of King Gyanendra’s regime, among other things, may not be entirely unrelated events. Some mid-ranking Maoist leaders have started reminding the country that Koirala holds the record of having had the greatest numbers of effigies burned. The peace process may not be in danger. But it will not become more tranquil or methodical.
Today’s Maoists barely resemble the group that declared war on the state 11 years ago with a manifesto top heavy with grievances against India. Indeed, Prachanda and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai were already articulating the urgency of toning down their anti-Indian rhetoric at the Lucknow talks with UML general secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal in 2003. Whatever the truth behind the Prachanda-Dr. Bhattarai split that came to the fore in mid-2005, the events leading up to the 12-point agreement with Seven Party Alliance in New Delhi underscored the centrality of India in the Maoists’ internal deliberations.
With enough sophistication, Prachanda’s very public turnaround in New Delhi could have helped the peace process. For a brief moment, it looked like the Maoists were actually capable of creating that vital mixture of nationalism and democracy Nepali politics has been oscillating between. The moment Prachanda felt compelled to criticize Pakistan in order to woo India, he forced many Nepalis into that awful disposition between laughter and lament.
Clearly, India’s immediate goal in securing the 12-point accord was to tame the palace, as evidenced by New Delhi’s enthusiastic albeit premature welcoming of King Gyanendra’s first address to the nation. Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai could not have been oblivious to New Delhi’s larger objective: the mainstreaming of the Maoists as a national security imperative. By subduing the inspirational fount of the Naxalites, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would be more comfortable in confronting what he has called greatest internal security threat since independence.
India’s duality on the Maoists has survived the royal regime. The security establishment, which was more amenable to engagement with King Gyanendra’s government, continues to uncover the Nepali ex-rebels’ purported wider links to terrorism. The political establishment, excluding the Hindu nationalist flank, is busy assuring Indians and the rest of the world that Nepal’s Maoists have little more than ideological ties with the Naxalites.
When the Maoists rail against India’s “trap”, they obviously have the former group in mind. But blaming Indian Hindu extremists and royalists for instigating madhesis, janjatis and other groups that still feel disenfranchised cannot help much. The amplification over the past year of traditional grievances the Maoists claimed to have articulated has questioned the premise of the “people’s war.” Prachanda’s frivolities have only reinforced the siege.
Prachanda’s purported retort at a recent central committee meeting that C.P. Gajurel and Mohan Baidya would still be languishing in Indian prisons without his overtures to India sounded pragmatic. The problem is, Baidya was among those criticizing the party supremo’s policy. If today’s Maoists are the same group of ideologically disciplined people credited with mounting the world’s most successful post-communist revolutionary movement, could they be expected to correct this drift? If so, in which ways? How would the Maoists’ sustained effort to build ties with China in light of Beijing’s policy of pragmatism fit into this drive? More importantly, how would New Delhi respond?
For the moment, the disgruntled Maoists have made renewed calls for unity between nationalist and democratic forces against Indian designs. In the past, that slogan allowed the Maoists to veer closer to the palace. What does “nationalist” imply in the republican context beyond the broader leftist front?
The Nepali Congress seems have grasped the implications of that question. The party continues to remind the Maoists of their undertaking to allow the first sitting of the constituent assembly to decide the fate of the monarch less out of scrupulous adherence to existing agreements than political pragmatism. It is hard to miss the murmurs within the Nepali Congress suggesting that the palace may actually constitute a lesser threat to democracy than the Maoists.
For now, though, the bombast and bluster over the wisdom of declaring a republic from the interim parliament, government and streets provides a convenient cover for all.

A Year On, King Still At The Center

By Sanjay Upadhya
April 16, 2007

A palpable paradox remains the defining feature of the year since the culmination of People’s Movement II. A king supposedly sidelined by his people is very much at the center of the nation.
Amid the inexorable cycle of hope and despair of the last 12 months of peacemaking, the uncertainty gripping the constituent assembly (CA) elections has cast a new pall of gloom for many. But it would be deceitful to cite the postponement of the polls as a setback to the peace process. And not just because large segments of Nepalis feel disenfranchised heading into the exercise. Writing the election schedule into an interim constitution that failed to materialize on time was just one manifestation of the legerdemain that sustains the polity.
As someone accustomed to far worse indictments, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala can shrug off the latest censure from his partners in power. His public pronouncements on the palace had turned sufficiently hostile to deflect charges of coddling the crown. Deep inside, though, Koirala rests confident in the recognition that no party wanted the elections in June.
The Maoists are in a slightly different league. As the owners of the CA agenda, they are entitled to make the loudest noises. Yet their abolish-the-monarchy-first clamor serves more as a cover for their internal churning process. This is a do-or-die situation for the Maoists in the literal as well as figurative sense. The ex-rebels’ claim to have represented the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and geographical grievances that were swept under the People’s Movement I carpet has been thoroughly debunked by, among other things, the madhesi and janjati movements.
Furthermore, as the Maoists were pressing the CA demand for much of the past decade, virtually every party argued that it would open a Pandora’s Box. Now that those parties have gone along, the Maoists are unwilling to acknowledge the steady discharge. In their pointless search for scapegoats, they have merely reinforced the centrality of the monarchy.
Prime Minister Koirala stiffened his stance on the palace only after having lined up a pro-monarchy constituency in his party under daughter Sujata. Even then, the premier’s option envisages placing King Gyanendra’s four-year-old grandson on the throne. It’s pointless to even begin wondering how such an antiquated vision could chart the course to a new Nepal.
That inanity pales in front of the proposal from other quarters to enthrone a granddaughter of King Birendra. The idea of tinkering with such a central element of royal succession when the future of the institution is hanging in the balance was wrong-headed enough. Long before that, the difficulty the female biological cycle would pose to the religious and cultural roles a ceremonial monarchy would have to confine itself to should have been apparent.
Those decrying such chauvinism would do well first to either redefine the rules of our rituals or the role of the monarchy – and possibly both. The rest are perhaps realistic enough to recognize that the monarchy, by definition, offers the least scope for the people to choose their head of state. (This debate has been complicated by the campaign, if only tepid, to create a republican Hindu state.)
The Maoists can claim the high ground here by calling for the outright abolition of the monarchy. Yet their rationale remains spurious. The ex-rebels’ detection of a royalist hand in the madhesi and janjati movements raises interesting questions. If the 238-year-old Shah Dynasty was indeed responsible – as the rebels have long claimed – for the systematic impoverishment of these groups, what might have led the aggrieved seek their salvation in their long-time tormentors?
The Maoists’ refrain that national and international forces are trying to save the monarchy raises its corollary. What might have impelled these forces – obviously the loudest critics of the royal takeover in February 2005 – do so? It’s one thing for the principal domestic actors to claim that Nepal can do without the monarchy. It’s quite another to persuade major international players increasingly driven by the imperative of defensive imperialism.
As for the principal external player, King Gyanendra’s attempt to tether his regime tightly to China was a greater sin than the nature of his regime. Prime Minister Koirala’s call in New Delhi earlier this month for China’s inclusion as a full member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation – from its current status as an observer – must have cast new light on Nepal’s much-maligned “China card.”
Juxtaposed with the “stability” school of thought resurgent in a section of the New Delhi establishment vis-à-vis the neighborhood, the wider dynamics of the preceding year do not necessarily conform to those being projected by the Nepali parties in power.
King Gyanendra’s critics succeeded in portraying the palace takeover as nothing more than a power grab. By directing public wrath to a handful of Panchayat-era individuals in power, Seven Party Alliance (SPA) leaders sidestepped the stark reality that many of their former colleagues were part of the royal regime. It became all the more convenient to ignore the technocrats and entrepreneurs who also underpinned King Gyanendra’s government.
A year later, as the peace process hobbles ahead, the royal regime’s role as a catalyst for the SPA-Maoist alliance has acquired greater clarity. This must have been among the successes King Gyanendra referred to in his much-criticized Democracy Day message in February.

How Strong Is The Maoist Peace Camp?

By Sanjay Upadhya
December 21, 2006

The ecstasy over the outbreak of peace has abated somewhat with the government’s ambassadorial appointments ostensibly aimed at spreading universally the message of amity. The severity of the Maoists’ denunciation of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) government’s “ill-timed” decision was less surprising than the swiftness with which they were able to enforce their six-hour stoppage the other day. At a deeper level, though, this public display of the fragility of the peace process offers a timely reminder of the perils of unrestrained optimism.
The success of any peace and reconciliation effort will depend, above all, on the control Maoist chairman Prachanda exercises over his organization. Until the latest outburst, his political and military lieutenants seemed to be firmly behind the process. Moves to sequester Maoist fighters in UN-managed camps appeared to have started well. It was not difficult to attribute the persistence of abduction, extortion and other violations of the peace accords to Maoist maladjustment. Considering the rollercoaster ride the peace process has proved to be over the past several months, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala may be right in refusing to see the latest episode as a crisis.
Yet doubts about the Maoists’ commitment to peace continue to hover over the horizon. How genuine is the peace consensus in the organization and how long might it prevail? Even an informal rift in rebel ranks could torpedo the gains of the last several months. The national anxiety deepens when one considers that a formal split is still possible.
Indian Maoists have been unequivocal in their criticism of Prachanda’s latest path. Accusations of betrayal have been emanating from a wider universe of the international left long sympathetic to the insurgency. In this climate, any breakaway Maoist faction would not find it too hard to find ideological allies. The swiftness with which moral sustenance can translate into military support is evident in the Maoists’ own evolution since 1996.
The essential question remains: what stakes do the Maoists have in peace? For all the triumphalism Prachanda and Co. have been exuding, the Maoists have paid a hefty price for peace. Militarily, they seemed capable of overrunning the capital and establishing their cherished people’s republic. What impelled them to join hands with the parliamentary mainstream against the monarchy? More importantly, what effect has this alliance with one of their two principal adversaries had on the fighters? “Recognition of international realities” – the Maoists’ phrase of choice – hides more than it reveals. From the outset of the April movement that ousted the royal regime, the SPA has been treating the Maoists as the eighth player, not as the representatives of the “new state” the rebels so energetically project themselves as.
The extent to which Prachanda went to praise India could not have gone unnoticed in an organization that began its original 40-point demand with a tirade against New Delhi’s sustained subjugation of Nepal. Even if the entire Maoist entity were to somehow share Prachanda’s political pragmatism, far fewer would be ready to countenance his conversion to capitalism, something unmistakable in his recent pronouncements.
Prachanda may have lost the credibility to revert into a hardcore revolutionary. Prime Minister Koirala may rescue his peace partner by immediately promulgating the interim constitution and inducting the Maoists into an interim government and parliament. How would such a peace feed into the discontent voiced by other constituencies?
The Terai may yet be calmed, especially considering its proximity to the external agent most able to stoke instability. After all, it was only in the latter phase of the Maoist insurgency that violence really gripped regions bordering India. More ominous are the bruises inflicted in India by the identification of Hinduism with the monarchy. A Hindu republic of Nepal carries considerable resonance among constituencies there that are more than capable of articulating their displeasure.
For now, each of the three political forces claims to enjoy the people’s mandate. A souring of the popular mood could erode the credibility of the entire arrangement that began with the House of Representative Proclamation. The wildly varying opinion polls on the monarchy have flustered the SPA and the Maoists. Uncertainty may yet unite them against the palace. Would that be enough to sustain the peace process? Eternal optimism is a feeble basis for peace; it is dangerous when the process is so amorphous.

Can We Ever Reconcile Our Relative Truths?

By Sanjay Upadhya
November 13, 2006

Amid calls for the creation of a truth and reconciliation committee to complete the peace process, Maoist leader Dev Gurung has come out with his own flash of candor.
He wants a separate ministry to oversee the reconstruction of infrastructure lost in the decade-long “people’s war”.
It would have been comforting to accept Gurung’s assertion as the ultimate acknowledgment of responsibility. If those intent on blowing up Nepal into Year Zero in their quest for a utopia could genuinely undergo such a radical change of heart, well, more Nepalis should be encouraged to bare their souls.
But genuineness is not something that can be easily equated with Gurung’s organization. And not entirely because of the scale of the death, destruction and debris the Maoists have unleashed. A fully and credibly disarmed Maoists – if that could ever be achieved – would still retain their lethal verbal weapons of obfuscation and prevarication.
It has become fashionable to cite post-apartheid South Africa as an example of truth being an effective tool for reconciliation. Not every nation is blessed with the likes of Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. Where Nepal is at a real disadvantage is that truth, here, is more likely to be relative. It would be unfair to single out the Maoists on this count.
Let’s begin with the creation of the modern Nepali state. Decades of profuse state-inspired tributes bestowed upon King Prithvi Narayan Shah almost superhuman abilities. If Lord Ram needed his Hanumans and Bibhishans, could the king of Gorkha have achieved much without confidants and commanders?
In the inevitable backlash, democratic Nepal has veered the other way. National unification stands on clusters of eyeballs, nasal cartilage and ear lobes, not to mention corpses. The Capuchin missionaries – the most prominent chroniclers of the fall of Kirtipur – may have been faithful to what they had witnessed. It hardly seems to matter today that they were allies of the Mallas who had persuaded the British to send Captain Kinloch’s ill-fated expeditionary force against the Gorkha army.
The elasticity of our authenticity endures in other ways. Those condemning the conquerors for having imposed conformity through Khas-Nepali words and practices on diverse indigenous peoples rise up in anger each time a foreigner is perceived to be denigrating Nepal.
Political truths are all the more ambiguous. Was King Tribhuvan’s flight to New Delhi part of a carefully devised plan to turn Nepal into a beacon of democracy? Or was the monarch, already under increasing threat from the Rana rulers, pursuing a strategy for survival?
Was the Nepali Congress really the driver of the 1951 changes as it claims? Or did the organization merely provide the street power for an initiative our southern neighbors had devised to counter the radicalization of our northern ones? Democracy resulting as a byproduct is certainly not the same as one genuinely created.
The palace’s consolidation of political power after the dawn of democracy is attributed to ambitious monarchs. Perhaps. But could such a quest have succeeded without the compulsions that seemed to rally most stakeholders around the palace for stability?
King Mahendra’s distress at the emergence of a competing national institution is solely blamed for the overthrow of Nepal’s first elected government. Doubtless, the monarch could barely conceal his antipathy for party politicians in his pronouncements as crown prince. But does that sufficiently explain how up to three-quarters of the 74 Nepali Congress legislators in the lower house could end up supporting the palace? Or is the palace to be blamed for this en masse surrender?
The freedom fighter in Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru could have done nothing less than denounce the royal takeover as a setback to democracy. How do we explain the massive economic assistance New Delhi went on to infuse into the partyless system? Certainly not just because of the torrent of Chinese, Soviet, American and British aid and expertise?
B.P. Koirala based his acceptance of the referendum verdict in favor of the Panchayat system in 1980 on the duties of a democrat. Or was it the anti-communist in him speaking? But, then, who knows how national reconciliation really came to be the euphemism B.P. used to trade house arrest in Emergency-era India for a second stint at Sundarijal? These issues are relevant to understanding why sections of the Nepali Congress – a party that attempted regicide twice in the 1960s and 70s – should still feel compelled to advocate a ceremonial monarchy.
The pragmatism that had taken over Nehru’s Delhi after the 1962 Sino-Indian war could not have melted merely under his grandson’s purported personality clashes with King Birendra. Could Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s landmark visit to China in 1988 have encouraged New Delhi to twist the palace’s arms and slip that 80-page draft memo on the entire gamut of ties to find out which one would work first?
The People’s Movement of 1990 cast a more ominous shadow. Did King Birendra restore multiparty democracy at that late-night meeting or did he simply lift the ban on parties? The distinction is important considering how Nepalis had to spend the subsequent 11 years in a twilight zone. Of course, it took King Gyanendra’s dismissal of Sher Bahadur Deuba’s elected government for our politicians to tell us that the slain monarch was not, after all, the model constitutional monarch they had made him out to be.
The Maoists seem to have been the biggest winners of the April Uprising. Let’s take a closer look. Until last week, the rebels seemed to have won half of their original demands. After the Baluwatar agreement, they have settled for 25 percent, by acknowledging that the House proclamation had already suspended the monarchy.
Yet the real record lies in their virtual silence on the first nine of their 40-point demand. True, Prachanda and his comrades are still calling for a more equitable relationship between Nepal and India. The tone has lost all of its roar now that words like “Bhutanization” and “Sikkimization” have quietly left the comrades’ lexicon. Prachanda must have drawn this important lesson from Madan Bhandari’s tragic end: It makes more sense to attend a global leadership summit down south than to aspire to embody the Great Helmsman up north.
Dr. Baburam Bhattarai certainly recognized the opportunity of the moment and claimed an undeclared working unity with King Birendra. His eloquence impelled him to conclude that Nepalis would rate highly every predecessor of the slain monarch. No one considered it relevant to ask the comrade what he considered to be the most salient features of the reigns of, say, Kings Pratap Singh, Girvan Yuddha, Surendra and Prithvi Bir.
King Gyanendra is expected to take responsibility for 238 years of the Shah dynasty. The 104 years of Rana rule, 30 years of Bhimsen Thapa and the periods an assortment of courtiers manipulated infant kings are all clubbed into one epoch of history. Worse, many descendants of those same Thapas, Pandeys, Basnets, Kunwars and bevy of Bahuns and Newars pretend they can absolve their clans of complicity.
Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala must certainly feel vindicated today when the Maoists insist he must continue as premier. After the Narayanhity carnage, Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai had clubbed Koirala together with the current king and crown prince in a single “coterie”.
The Nepali Congress dissidents and the CPN-UML would not have succeeded in dislodging an elected prime minister who was also the head of the majority party in parliament without the help of the Maoists. Who knows what kind of flexibility power might encourage our rebels turned rulers to exhibit in the run-up to the constituent assembly elections?
Each Nepali has a copious collection of personal truths capable of overwhelming even the strongest willed reconciliation commissioner. The strident mixture of ancient grudges and modern slights – real and perceived – would require an open-ended commission. The truth, they say, shall set us free. But can we ever reconcile our relative truths?

Precarious Premise Of Peacemaking

By Sanjay Upadhya
October 16, 2006

The grins, quips and all the other breezy displays of optimism surrounding the post-Dasain phase of the peace process have dissolved in the somberness of the indefinite postponement of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA)-Maoist talks.
Given the murkiness of the enterprise, however, another phase of ebullience and enthusiasm could bounce back with surprising speed. The “homework” hiatus should afford the country an opportunity to reflect on the predicaments on both sides.
For the Maoists, blaming the palace and foreign powers for conspiring to keep them out of power would help energize the base and thwart the prospect of serious discontent over the political leadership’s capitulation to the machinations of the mainstream.
When the rebels continue to ascribe to the palace the ability to torpedo the peace process, they are virtually negating the finality of the “historic” proclamation the House of Representatives adopted in May. Yet the SPA – at least the sections of the two Nepali Congress parties that seem to be propelling the ruling alliance – does not seem too bothered.
The Unified Marxist Leninist (UML) and the other communist constituents may be too busy protecting their own turfs against the imminent influx of their more radical cousins to challenge Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala’s deepening affection for the monarchy. The mainstream communists, like the republican wing of the Nepali Congress, have evidently recognized the asset a sufficiently and certifiably tamed palace could prove to be.
The two factors supposedly holding back the breakthrough that was so tantalizingly close – the monarchy and Maoist arms – have brought out the painful predicaments of peacemaking. The government’s annoyance with the Maoists eagerness to maintain simultaneous access to their arms and political power – in defiance of international pressure – is understandable.
No less so is the Maoists’ bafflement over the government’s refusal to “suspend” the monarchy, when, for all practical purposes, the House proclamation has already done that.
Introspection is in order. Considering the approaching anniversary, it should begin with the 12-point SPA-Maoist accord reached in New Delhi last year. The reality that the accord stands on flimsier ground than the 1951 Delhi Compromise rests not on the absence of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as the preponderant player.
The real distinguishing feature is that Jawaharlal Nehru represented India far more credibly than the current Congress premier – and perhaps any future leader of the world’s most populous democracy – can expect to.
The fragility of the peace process becomes more ominous when Maoist chief ideologue Dr. Baburam Bhattarai praises India for facilitating the accord and then blames it for conspiring to keep the rebels out of power, almost in the same breath. If the adroit hair-splitter is making a distinction between those in the Indian Left who mediated the talks with the SPA and the “official sources” who leaked reports to the media that Indian intelligence agencies were “chaperoning” him around New Delhi, then he needs to be more explicit about those negotiations.
The question is, can he? When UML general secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal traveled to Lucknow in November 2003 to meet with Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai, there was palpable mix of outrage and embarrassment in both sides of the border over the ease with which the leader of the opposition could meet “terrorists” on Indian soil.
Those sentiments obscured the more relevant story: Dr. Bhattarai’s candid acknowledgement that the Maoists, like any other political organization in Nepali history, could not advance their objectives by criticizing India. The Indians, for their part, must be equally baffled by how the Maoists, who have vowed to launch massive peaceful urban protests in case the talks fail, could still keep their broader pledge to turn South Asia into a flaming field of Maoist revolutions.”
Such fiery rhetoric cannot obscure the flexibility behind the Maoists’ growth. An organization that took up arms against both the monarchy and parliamentary democracy – more vigorously against the latter until the June 1, 2001 royal palace massacre – has now allied with one.
A 40-point list of grievances heavily targeted against India has now been distilled into diatribe against the 238-year-old monarchy. The obfuscation and prevarication that has gone into justifying such shifts are not helpful. Yet the Maoists persist.
Providing revolutionary ardor to Prithvi Narayan Shah’s famous counsel, the Maoists describe Nepal as a dynamite between two boulders. The yam metaphor of the first Shah king may have contained traces of weakness – as the Maoists allege -- but it still pulsated with a quest for life.
The notion of self-destruction – and its wider devastation -- inherent in the dynamite analogy may not have alarmed many Nepalis. The international community has taken notice. No wonder U.N. General Assembly members on Monday refused to be taken in by the peace-and-democracy platform in Nepal campaign for a two-year seat on the Security Council.

Where Geography And Politics Clash

By Sanjay Upadhya
September 10, 2006

From the assurances emanating from both sides, the audible hardening of positions may not stand in the way of the next summit between Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and Maoist supremo Prachanda. The uncertainty over how this transformation might influence the outcome underscores the precariousness of the peace process.
The Maoists evidently see virtue in letting some ambiguity shroud the deliberations of their recent central committee meeting. The firmness of Prime Minister Koirala’s insistence on the primacy of the arms-management issue vis-à-vis the peace process directly stems from the rebels’ strong utterances after the meeting. Yet he is addressing a wider audience.
In confirming Gen. Rukmangad Katuwal as army chief, over the objections of Seven Party Alliance (SPA) politicians, civil society and the Maoists, Koirala has reminded the country that he still retains enough of his record of implacability. In recent comments, the premier has qualified his insistence on giving space to a ceremonial monarchy with an acknowledgement of the people’s ultimate sacrosanct right to choose.
His political priorities are clear. The draft interim constitution is full of blanks waiting to be filled through political consensus between the SPA and the Maoists. The issue of constituent assembly elections – with or without a referendum on the monarchy – lies beyond Koirala’s immediate gaze. Having brought the army under civilian control – if that is what it is – Koirala recognizes the flip side of the achievement: earning and retaining the loyalty of the forces.
With the Maoists and the SPA squabbling over almost every vital element of the 12-point accord, we now know why the signatories came out with separate statements last November. A broader opposition front had become urgent to tame the palace in the immediate aftermath of the Dhaka SAARC summit, where Nepal was instrumental in shifting the geopolitical locus of South Asia by drawing in China as an observer.
Koirala, who Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh hailed as the greatest statesman of the region in June, could not have forgotten the sustained difficulties he had to encounter in scheduling meetings with Singh’s predecessor in the aftermath of King Gyanendra’s dismissal of Nepal’s last elected government in October 2002.
It took five months for the SPA-Maoist accord to achieve what now appears to have been its sole objective. From this perspective, at least, the 12-point accord lost its relevance the moment King Gyanendra reinstated the House of Representatives. Yet the Maoists chose to moderate their criticism of the SPA’s betrayal of the spirit of the April Uprising because it provided an opening to the urban uprising component of the People’s War.
For the Maoists, the series of steps the legislature took toward eviscerating the palace, democratizing the military and secularizing the state helped to undermine the “old state” a decade of murder and mayhem could not. Sooner or later the MPs’ ebullience would end up bordering on the ridiculous. Their penchant for taking repeated oaths and ordering others to do the same set the stage for other absurdities such as “outlawing” discrimination and throwing in internationally recognized heritage sites to bloat the royal assets they proudly covered.
Over time, Maoist military commanders like Ram Bahadur Thapa Badal broke their mysterious silence on the peace process, but not without employing the creative ambiguity the political commissars had long perfected. Once representatives of the republican camp in Nepali Congress, such as Ram Chandra Poudel, began criticizing the Maoists’ haughtiness, chief rebel ideologue Dr. Baburam Bhattarai grew anxious to see, more than anything else, another split in Koirala’s party.
Having seen King Gyanendra struggle for American and Indian sympathy – if not outright support -- for his compulsions in seizing power on February 1, 2005, Maoist leaders certainly did not think they were making any great revelation in suggesting that the key to peace lay in the hands in Washington and New Delhi.
The four-month-old logjam, on the other hand, must have allowed the two capitals to appreciate the complexity of a stalemate the monarch could not break with the three governments he appointed – the last drawing partial representation from the opposition alliance -- before taking direct control. Surely, the SPA and Maoists are alert to the implications of a deepening of any such assessment.
In retrospect, international opposition to royal rule – at least from quarters that mattered the most -- had more to do with geopolitics than with an underlying revulsion for a grand autocratic design of an ambitious monarch. As Koirala and Prachanda prepare for their next discussions and beyond, Nepal’s geography and its politics remain deeply engrossed in search of that ever-elusive state of equilibrium.