Saturday, January 16, 2021
AUTHOR INTERVIEW: Sanjay Upadhya Speaks About His New Book ‘Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China’
Thursday, January 14, 2021
In Conversation: Sanjay Upadhya
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| Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China |
Wednesday, January 13, 2021
How China Outsmarted India in Nepal
In Backfire in Nepal, SANJAY UPADHYA explores how China has become the ultimate beneficiary of India’s democracy-promotion agenda in the Himalayan state
New Delhi had made a bold bet in 2005, but one that contained two mutually fortifying flaws: the abolition of the monarchy and the empowerment of the former Maoist rebels. The world’s only Hindu monarch and kingdom were bound to India in a special relationship that neither country needed to define or assert. True, Indians had been put off by successive Nepalese monarchs playing New Delhi off against Beijing. In retrospect, a little more compassion for Nepal’s compulsions might have put things into sharper relief.
Nepalese Maoists, being communists first, were trained to denounce Indian ‘expansionism’ before American ‘imperialism’. Experience may have impelled the senior leadership to make practical compromises. It was a leap of faith for New Delhi to trust the leadership to rein in their cadres’ radicalism.
More broadly, since India had also enlisted Western democracies, it needed to address their often-contradictory concerns throughout Nepal’s turbulent transition. The Chinese could act purely on their national interests. India continues to misread how Beijing sees Nepal – both in terms of China’s visions of the past and the future. This complicates the core trilateral challenge: ensuring that Nepal is not sucked deeper into the Sino-Indian vortex, only to be scorned for aggravating the Asian giants’ rivalry.
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495
Tuesday, January 12, 2021
South Asia 101: Democracy And Geopolitics
By Sanjay Upadhya
Before he flew into Dhaka to attend the much-delayed summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh warned of the danger of failed states emerging in the region. Long before he left the Bangladeshi capital, Dr. Singh must have discovered the futility of India’s worry of having to bear the neighborhood’s burdens alone.
Without a seat at the conference table, China had already become part of regional deliberations. India’s “near abroad” had stepped out far ahead in time.
India’s proposal to include Afghanistan as SAARC’s eighth member was expected to sail through – until Nepal stepped in. The Nepalese delegation threatened to veto Afghanistan’s entry unless China was included in the organization as an observer or dialogue partner. The 13th summit of South Asia’s premier grouping already had its share of bad luck. Last year’s tsunami had forced Bangladesh to reschedule the conference for early February. In protest against King Gyanendra’s dismissal of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s multiparty government and takeover of full executive powers, India pulled out of the rescheduled summit.
New Delhi imposed an arms embargo on the Royal Nepalese Army battling a fierce Maoist insurgency in the kingdom. Over the months, India-Nepal relations have hit rock bottom. The Singh government’s handling of the Nepal crisis has revealed ruptures in the Indian political establishment as well.
Playing the gracious host, Bangladesh, where the organization was founded 20 years ago, urged the Indian and Nepalese delegations to sort out their differences. SAARC, which operates on the principle of consensus, eventually configured a compromise. Afghanistan would be invited to join immediately, while the SAARC council of ministers would decide the structure of China’s—and Japan’s—association at a meeting next July.
In asserting India’s equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine, Singh had the option of coming out explicitly against China’s inclusion in SAARC. It had geography on its side, although globalization has diminished the value of that attribute. Then reality set in. If India could see virtue in forging closer links with the Association of South East Asian Nations, could China be faulted for wanting to do the same with SAARC?
For some reason, Indian leaders, who can take on the sole surviving superpower with remarkable assurance, find themselves significantly restrained when it comes to China. Indian objections to China’s entry were couched in such terms as “modalities”, “precedence” and “memorandum of understanding”.
Officially, Pakistan supported Afghanistan’s membership – in one of the rare instances of cooperation between South Asia’s nuclear-armed rivals—so it could avoid India’s direct censure for having spoiled the party. In response to Indian concerns over where to draw the line once such a broad welcome mat were placed at the SAARC door, one Pakistani official urged everyone to look at the bright side: the organization’s popularity.
Amused, the other three members – Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives – joined the host in urging New Delhi and Kathmandu to resolve their differences in the interest of preserving what they had. Thirteen summits in 20 years was hardly a record to be proud of. China, for its part, remained studiously silent over the entire affair.
Much of India’s antagonism was heaped on Nepal and perhaps will continue to be. With Nepali Congress president Girija Prasad Koirala currently in New Delhi and United Marxist-Leninist general secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal just back from extensive consultations there, it was hardly surprising to see the seven-party anti-palace alliance criticize King Gyanendra for playing the so-called “China card”.
But was the issue really the surprise the Indians accused Nepal of springing at the last minute? On the eve of the summit, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reasserted his country’s desire to strengthen cooperation with South Asian countries to achieve common prosperity. In less official settings, the Chinese have been more candid in their desire to join the group.
More significantly, the Chinese spokesman’s remark came against the background of Beijing’s steady extension of its economic reach in South Asia. China’s trade volume with all South Asian nations is close to $20 billion a year, of which $13.6 billion is with India. Although they run trade deficits with Beijing, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal receive significant economic assistance from China.
In a clear display of China’s growing political influence in the region, all four nations affirm the “one-China” policy that views Taiwan as an inalienable part of the mainland. Similarly, they recognize Tibet as an integral part of China.
On the sidelines of the summit, Dr. Singh was anxious to re-educate King Gyanendra on the basic tenets of democracy. In the main sessions, the Indian prime minister got a crash course on geopolitics.
Originally published on November 14, 2005
The Unfolding ‘Great Game’ In South Asia
By Sanjay Upadhya
South Asia’s growing geo-strategic profile is being raised several notches by another global player. Japan plans to create a special South Asia department in its Foreign Ministry, designed to coordinate diplomacy with India and monitor China's regional influence, the Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun reported April 5. The new department will also be responsible for focusing greater attention on Pakistan and other South Asian nations, the newspaper said.
During the Cold War, ideological inhibitions and the insularity of South Asian economies had pushed the region to the margins of Japanese diplomacy. Although Tokyo saw South Asia as strategically important, especially in view of the sea-lanes vital to its oil imports from the Middle East, development cooperation with the region took precedence over everything else. As South Asian nations began liberalizing their economies and opening their doors to foreign investment in the early 1990s, Japan's economic involvement in the region grew substantially.
The timing of Japan’s latest effort to step up engagement with South Asia is significant; it comes weeks after the Bush administration merged the State Department’s South Asian and Central Asian bureaus into a single unit. Afghanistan, which is set to officially join the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a full member later this year, is seen as the vital bridge between the two volatile regions of Asia. The United States and South Korea have applied for observer status at SAARC, a position China and Japan have been granted.
Geopolitical Shift
The geopolitical locus of South Asia underwent a dramatic shift last November when Nepal successfully tied Afghanistan’s SAARC membership to observer status for China. New Delhi’s strong initial opposition to the linkage crumbled as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka backed Nepal.
Clearly, the simultaneous inclusion of Japan – a traditional rival of China to which India has been warming up in recent years -- was intended to mollify New Delhi. For Tokyo, a formal foothold in South Asia comes amid a resurgence of popular opinion in favor of a more vigorous international role.
A recent poll by the Yomiuri Shimbun found 71 percent of Japanese want the country's constitution to "clarify the existence of the Self-Defense Force." Fifty-six percent said the constitution should be modified to take the SDF into consideration. The poll also put the number of those who want the pacifist Article 9 of the constitution revised at 39 percent - the highest percent in five years.
Ever since coming to office in 2000, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has argued the need for Japan to come out of the humiliation of its defeat in the Second World War and consider itself as a regional, if not global, power. In Beijing’s view, Tokyo has already embarked on assertive internationalism, especially in view of its deployments in Iraq, joint development of anti-missile systems, in-air refueling capabilities and interoperability among the various branches of service. China, which opposes Japan’s and India’s bids to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, is anxious to offset a Tokyo-New Delhi alignment in South Asia.
Asian Giants’ Rivalry
To be sure, relations between India and China have come a long way since their brief but bitter border war in 1962. The upturn has been spurred in large part by the two Asian giants’ booming economic ties. China is set to replace the United States as India's leading trade partner in the near future. New Delhi and Beijing, which recently held their second "strategic dialogue," have declared 2006 as a friendship year. They have agreed to cooperate, rather than compete, for global energy resources vital to fueling their growing economies.
Overall relations, however, are still inherently fragile. Contrasting cultures, disparate international outlooks, divergent political systems, and competing geostrategic interests, among other things, have left India-China ties vulnerable to sudden deterioration.
The U.S.-India nuclear deal, which aims to recognize New Delhi as the sixth nuclear power as well as open up civilian nuclear supplies, despite India’s refusal sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is only one of several contentious areas. Beijing believes the deal, signed during President George W. Bush’s visit to India early last month, would have a negative impact on the global nuclear order. The official Chinese media have been less reticent in voicing their concern; editorial writers and opinion columnists warn that if Washington made a nuclear exception for New Delhi, other powers could do the same with their allies.
Two other developments have forced Indians to sit up and ponder. Last November, New Delhi was taken aback by the emergence of a pro-China bloc comprising Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh at the 13th SAARC summit in Dhaka. A month later, at the first East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur, China largely succeeded in confining India to the periphery of a future East Asia Community.
Chinese Strategic Contours
The strategic contours of China’s South Asia policy are becoming clearer. After Pakistan and Myanmar, Beijing is skillfully employing economic and military means to draw India’s other smaller neighbors into its own sphere of influence. The People’s Liberation Army’s recent incursions and road construction in Bhutanese territory are aimed at pressuring the tiny Himalayan kingdom to end its protectorate ties with India.
China has been steadily enhancing cooperation with Nepal, where King Gyanendra’s takeover of full executive powers last year prompted widespread international condemnation and arms embargos from traditional suppliers India, Britain and the United States. Spurning Indian pleas not to step into the vacuum, Beijing has supplied arms to King Gyanendra’s government, which – ironically enough -- is fighting a vicious Maoist insurgency.
Amid a downturn in India’s relations with Bangladesh, over such issues as illegal immigration, Islamist terrorism and trade, China has gained naval access to the Chittagong port. Through a road link with Bangladesh via Myanmar, China hopes to access Bangladesh’s vast natural gas reserves. China, the major arms supplier to Bangladesh, recently offered to provide Dhaka with nuclear reactor technology, heightening Indian anxieties.
China's growing regional assertiveness has had its impact on bilateral relations with India. During the last round of border talks in September, Indian analysts detected a hardening of Beijing stance on their long-running territorial dispute. Moreover, China, which finally seemed to have come around to recognizing India’s 1975 annexation of the former Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim, now appears to be going slow on formalizing that position.
U.S. Written All Over
Beijing’s fears that Washington was using New Delhi and Tokyo as part of a broader campaign to contain China were further enflamed in February by the publication of the U.S. Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized Washington for attempting to play up a “non-existent Chinese military threat.”
Chinese analysts see the QDR’s designation of their country as a “strategic threat,” along with the U.S. focus on enhancing its Pacific military assets and increasing its long-range strike capability, as clear preparations for a future conflict. The full implications of a U.S.-led China-containment strategy in South Asia are yet to emerge. In an already volatile region, perceptions have a dangerous way of defining reality.
Originally published on April 12 2006.
Sunday, January 10, 2021
China’s Sore Spot in Nepal
Excerpt from Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China by Sanjay Upadhya
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495
Friday, January 08, 2021
Chinese Acceptance of India’s Primacy in Nepal: How Real?
“Chinese acquiescence in India’s primacy in Nepal – if that is a correct characterisation of Beijing’s stand even when it professes it – would operate within the context of China’s interests. Yet Indian commentators and analysts have taken gleeful pride at instances where they saw Beijing discarding Kathmandu. In far subdued tones, however, Chinese analysts refused to acknowledge that phases of pullback represented a conscious decision by Beijing to recognise Indian paramountcy in Nepal. The logical extension of that contention would be a resumption of Chinese rivalry with India for influence in Nepal and wider South Asia when circumstances became more propitious for Beijing.”
By Sanjay Upadhya
Chinese Assertiveness Vs. Nepalese Impatience
Excerpt from Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China by Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495
Thursday, January 07, 2021
Counting the Cost of India’s Disregard of Nepalese Grievances
Excerpt from Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China by Sanjay Upadhya
“Sustained disregard for Nepalese grievances fuelled perceptions over time that India was attempting to delegitimise them. As a result, the territory in dispute not only ballooned in size but became so etched in Nepal’s Constitution. The continued temptation to see the dispute as a Chinese-inspired ploy to weaken India on another key front is not only misguided. It is a misreading of reality, given that Nepal’s own relationship with China is not free from suspicion. The Nepalese still recall Beijing’s eagerness to sign the Lipulekh agreement without consulting Nepal when things were going its way.”
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495
Wednesday, January 06, 2021
China’s Eternal Tibet Litmus Test On Nepal
“Beijing believes Nepal, like every sovereign and independent country, has the right to devise its own relationship with China. As part of that effort, China regularly pledges to bolster aid and trade to lift ties with Nepal to ‘a new high’. There are Nepalese who maintain China is asking too much from Nepal – i.e., subjecting itself to the full force of India’s political and economic wrath – for few tangible gains. Non-conditionality in Chinese assistance loses its meaning when Beijing eternally poses the Tibet litmus test on Kathmandu.”
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495
Tuesday, January 05, 2021
An Inapt Obsession That Impairs Nepal-India Relations
The posthumous memoirs of Pranab Mukherjee, India’s 13th President, among other things, echoes the lament over how India lost an opportunity in 1950 to incorporate Nepal into the Indian union.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru dealt with Nepal very diplomatically, Mukherjee writes in ‘The Presidential Years: 2012-2017’ released on January 5, 2021.
“After the Rana rule was replaced by the monarchy in Nepal, he wished for democracy to take root. Interestingly, Nepal’s king, Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, had suggested to Nehru that Nepal be made a province of India. But Nehru rejected the offer on the grounds that Nepal was an independent nation and must remain so,” Mukherjee says.
“Had Indira Gandhi been in Nehru’s place, she would have perhaps seized upon the opportunity, like she did with Sikkim,” he adds.
Although not a new contention, what makes it significant this time is that it comes not only from a former Indian president but from someone who has dealt with Nepal under successive Nehru successors as foreign and defense minister over several decades.
In a memorable interview with Qatar-based Al Jazeera television in 2009, Mukherjee detailed how India had played a direct role in mainstreaming the former Maoist rebels in an alliance with leading Nepalese opposition parties against the monarchy. If there was anyone versed well enough on Nepal matters amid his own considerable vicissitudes, it was Poltu Da, as Mukherjee was affectionately known.
Far from daunting physically, Mukherjee’s amiable Bengali-tuned diction made him personally likeable. I was struck by his easy accessibility and remarkable openness in discussing a few Nepal-related issues in the corridors of the United Nations Headquarters in the mid-1990s.
It was hard to believe that this was a man who had the audacity to challenge Rajiv Gandhi for the leadership of the Congress Party in the immediate aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984.
At a broader level, however, Mukherjee remains emblematic of Indians who know Nepal well – but in their own way. The facts surrounding what really happened at Hyderabad House during King Tribhuvan’s exile in New Delhi in 1950-51 will remain in the realm of speculation. Indians like Mukherjee continue to see an independent Nepal as a product of Nehru’s misguided altruism.
From the Nepalese standpoint, admittedly one not widely known in the country, the situation was so dire that King Tribhuvan and Crown Prince Mahendra were said to routinely converse in Newari to evade their eavesdropping hosts.
This fixation with how Nehru, in rejecting Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel counsel of Nepal’s full and formal incorporation into the Indian union as a matter of national security, was bound to gain credence in India in subsequent decades amid the vagaries of bilateral relations. What must not be overlooked is that much of those difficulties stemmed from Nepal’s assertion of its identity as a sovereign and independent nation.
The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Nehru’s ambassador and the absolute ruler of a tottering oligarchy may have been one way India thought it could handle the largest of three disparate Himalayan states (the others being Bhutan and Sikkim) the British Raj had left behind.
Nepal came to the treaty table intending to assert and preserve its status as a sovereign nation. If Nehru’s notion of security expressed through the 1950 Treaty had resonance for Nepal, it was to the extent of ensuring an independent Nepal did not threaten India’s interests. It may be entirely fortuitous that the new treaty triggered a chain of events that would culminate in the grand Delhi Compromise. Still, the parties and palace that displaced the Ranas adhered to Nepal’s original expectation from the treaty. Only nine years later, when Nepal was under an elected government, would the reciprocity the Indians sought become public knowledge, when New Delhi revealed the confidential exchange of side letters to the treaty.
Those letters obliged Nepal to depend on India for its security. In case of any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor, the two governments would consult with each other and devise effective countermeasures. Nepal agreed that it would not import arms, ammunition and other military equipment except with India’s consent. Yet when Nepal and India agreed to joint manning of posts on the Nepal–Tibet border and set up an Indian Military Mission in Nepal, they did so when Nepal feared a Chinese threat, particularly after the Chinese occupation of Tibet. These steps were not Kathmandu’s confirmation of India’s invocation of any right to control Nepal’s political and economic life.
The security aspects lost their relevance as Nepal established diplomatic ties with China and concluded their boundary agreement, Nepal’s pursuit of a foreign policy intended to assert its independent identity no longer automatically provided India a second vote at the United Nations General Assembly. A landlocked country dependent on transit through India for trade with third countries went on to find new opportunities for economic diversification. Thus, adhering to international law, it considered transit to be a right but trade a matter of convenience.
Every time Nepal sought a review, India pointed to the provision for unilateral termination on a year’s notice. It was only after democratically elected leaders in the 1990s began pressing the case that New Delhi agreed to discuss the matter. Yet even some of the same Indians who acknowledge how the Indian government and public have never shown adequate sensitivity to Nepalese pride in their sovereignty and independence have difficulty in seeing Kathmandu’s assertion of its independence as more than skilful leveraging of its geographical contiguity with China. During the latest border dispute, many Indian experts and analysts have placed much faith in how the unique people-to-people relations would see the two countries through this crisis. While urging India to do everything it should to nurture the invaluable asset it has in the goodwill of the Nepalese people, some in this fraternity still counsel India to reject the Nepalese state’s ill-conceived territorial claims.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pledge in 2014 to see a revision done during his tenure and invitation to Nepal to present proposals was the clearest articulation of India’s change of heart. Yet Modi still has had the time to receive the report prepared by the bilateral Eminent Persons Group in 2018. How much are pledges worth if a set of nonbinding recommendations agreed together cannot merit sufficient official attention in New Delhi? Mukherjee may not be available to provide an answer. His acolytes must.
Based on the author’s forthcoming book, Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China (New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021).
The Run Keeps Getting Longer in Nepal
Excerpt from Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China by Sanjay Upadhya
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495
Thursday, December 31, 2020
Excerpts: Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China
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“Privately, Nepalese leaders often voice exasperation with the conduct of their Chinese counterparts, but none match the public candour reserved for Indian politicians and bureaucrats. Should China’s public affirmations to uphold Nepalese sovereignty and independence become monotonous to the point of triteness, Nepalese scepticism could lead in the opposite direction. Admittedly, this will not be enough to counteract the far deeper distrust of India. Growing acknowledgement of Nepal’s strategic vulnerability, however, might make the Nepalese more understanding of their own interests.”
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“Beijing believes Nepal, like every sovereign and independent country, has the right to devise its own relationship with China. As part of that effort, China regularly pledges to bolster aid and trade to lift ties with Nepal to ‘a new high’. There are Nepalese who maintain China is asking too much from Nepal – i.e., subjecting itself to the full force of India’s political and economic wrath – for few tangible gains. Non-conditionality in Chinese assistance loses its meaning when Beijing eternally poses the Tibet litmus test on Kathmandu.”
**********
“Chinese acquiescence in India’s primacy in Nepal – if that is a correct characterisation of Beijing’s stand even when it professes it – would operate within the context of China’s interests. Yet Indian commentators and analysts have taken gleeful pride at instances where they saw Beijing discarding Kathmandu. In far subdued tones, however, Chinese analysts refused to acknowledge that phases of pullback represented a conscious decision by Beijing to recognise Indian paramountcy in Nepal. The logical extension of that contention would be a resumption of Chinese rivalry with India for influence in Nepal and wider South Asia when circumstances became more propitious for Beijing.”
**********
“Sustained disregard for Nepalese grievances fuelled perceptions over time that India was attempting to delegitimise them. As a result, the territory in dispute not only ballooned in size but became so etched in Nepal’s Constitution. The continued temptation to see the dispute as a Chinese-inspired ploy to weaken India on another key front is not only misguided. It is a misreading of reality, given that Nepal’s own relationship with China is not free from suspicion. The Nepalese still recall Beijing’s eagerness to sign the Lipulekh agreement without consulting Nepal when things were going its way.”
**********
“Some Indians suggest that since 1954 China and India have had an understanding on Nepal. India and China, this interpretation goes, would do nothing to undermine each other’s vital interests beyond the Himalayas. According to this understanding, India has been hosting the Dalai Lama’s government in exile without supporting its claims for independence or greater autonomy for Tibet. If there was such an arrangement on Nepal and it had survived the 1962 war, the Chinese gave little indication of its existence.”
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“Nepal recognises that most pledges from China to ease the country’s dependence on India foresee the long term. Moreover, little of tangible consequence has even begun, a fact that has the potential to raise public impatience. Greater exposure to Chinese business tactics, the darker side of growing interactions such as crime, and the general Chinese perceptions of themselves and their place in the world risk bringing more Nepalese discontent to the fore. Dismissing Nepalese grievances with India as Chinese-instigated ploys could present New Delhi with stricter challenges from Beijing from Nepal. This assertion stems not from Nepalese arrogance but from anguish over the additional pain that might be inflicted upon the country.”
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“Although Beijing considers the situation in the Tibetan region more stable, it expects the region to continue to be a core factor in relations with Kathmandu. With the three external powers most active on the Tibet issue – India, the United States and the European Union – increasingly involved in Nepal’s peace process, Beijing’s concerns about renewed potential for destabilisation from that volatile frontier have grown. The inevitable passing of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and ensuing succession politics are certain to energise an increasingly restless exile community in Nepal and those living across the porous border in India.”
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“The Chinese have moved beyond Tibet in their engagement with Nepal, at least in the traditional sense. There is new recognition in China that, given its border disputes with India and absence of diplomatic relations with Bhutan, only Nepal could provide it physical connectivity to South Asia. Beijing has divided South Asia into western (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and eastern (India at the centre) components and sees Nepal the most viable bridge to the latter. Expressions of such benign motives are not going to impress India, which has long seen Chinese trans-Himalayan ambitions as growing from a desire to keep a check on India’s rising capabilities.”
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“[I]nstead of obsessing over why the Nepalese see China the way they do, India might want to delve deeper into how China sees Nepal. Although it might not advertise it, Beijing sees Tibet and Nepal as part of its integrated ‘peripheral policy’. Nepal’s northern border is an easy gateway to the Tibet Autonomous Region. China worries that political instability in Nepal could lead to enhanced anti-Chinese activities in Nepal. Every time India is tempted to wave the Tibet card to China, it is enough to wobble Nepal.”
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495
Monarchy And Modernization Not Mutually Exclusive
By Sanjay Upadhya
The release of former Nepalese prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala from two months of house arrest, along with the freeing of nearly 300 other political activists across the nation, should help create the climate for constructive discussions on the political future of the tiny Himalayan kingdom.
Ever since King Gyanendra dismissed Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s multiparty government and assumed full political powers on February 1, the mainstream political parties have focused their energies on restoring democracy without addressing the principal impediment to that objective: the Maoist rebels’ threat to sabotage free and fair elections.
Worse, the mainstream parties’ periodic threats of political engagement with the rebels on abolishing the monarchy betray a sense of defeatism. For democrats, how can the Maoists’ objective of a historically discredited one-party totalitarian communist state be more appealing than King Gyanendra’s vision of a constructive monarchy which has not even had the patient hearing it deserves? Moreover, when the king is the only person talking about how 21st century Nepal could benefit as a member of the World Trade Organization and by acting as a hub between the rapidly growing economies of China and India, it becomes difficult to accept the thesis that monarchy and modernization are somehow antithetical.
Admittedly, the onus of restoring democratic legitimacy to the Nepalese state lies with the political parties. Events at home and abroad, however, have moved beyond the point where platitudes and generalities can substitute for dispassionate thinking. Internally, the Maoist insurgency, which has claimed some 11,000 lives, has raised issues of nationalism, social progress and economic development that need to be addressed urgently. Internationally, it is no longer disputed that weak states can compromise global security by, among other things, providing havens for terrorism and organized crime, spurring waves of migrants, and undermining global efforts to control environmental threats and disease.
The Financial Times reported last week that the US intelligence community is drawing up a secret watch-list of 25 countries where instability might precipitate American intervention, with one official quoted as saying that Nepal was the subject of a special study.
As for the state of Nepalese democracy before the royal takeover, a stinging rebuke came from an unlikely source: neighboring Bhutan. While unveiling the draft of the kingdom’s first constitution last week, government officials gave clear indications that they sought to institutionalize structures and safeguards to prevent a replication of the breakdown of Nepalese polity.
In their simplest form, political parties are mechanisms for the articulation of the shifting will of the people. The parties can embody and express the sovereignty of the people only through periodic free and fair elections to parliament. Certainly not by using the Maoist insurgency as an excuse to avoid elections and striving to seek legitimacy on the streets. The demand for the restoration of a parliament duly dissolved by an elected prime minister, a move held to be constitutionally valid by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, does not address the imperative of democratizing the state. Mock sessions of parliament on the streets confer legitimacy neither on the attendees nor their underlying aspirations.
To be sure, legitimacy cannot be held in abeyance in the absence of the requisite constitutional and political structures. For such difficult times, Nepal is fortunate in having an institution rooted in tradition, historical continuity, religious sanction and popular acceptance, capable of safeguarding constitutional authority and the power of the state. This framework of constitutionalism and rule of law should provide the basis for a wider national debate, especially at a time when the Maoist leadership is split between camps advocating peace and continuation of violence.
Such a debate can begin only when the tendency of envisaging the monarchy in anything but the Westminster model is shed. Thailand's King Bhumibol Adulyadej once said, "In order to be King, you have to be King 24 hours a day." His sagacity and wisdom brought such stability to a country in tumult that the fact that the 18-year-old Bhumibol ascended the throne in 1946 after the mysterious gun-shot death of his brother, King Ananda Mahidol, has receded into the background of history.
The emergence of an assertive monarch in King Gyanendra, who ascended to the throne in June 2001 after his brother, King Birendra, and other royals were murdered at the palace by a drink-fuelled crown prince who later shot himself, sparked needless paranoia in the major political parties. Through public comments and newspaper interviews, the new monarch demonstrated early on that the personality, experience and wisdom of the person wearing the crown define the role a constitutional monarch plays. By exercising his prerogative to be consulted, the responsibility to warn and the right to encourage, King Gyanendra sought to spur politicians to advance the tenets of democracy and the imperatives of development together, but to little avail.
Explaining his decision to seek direct political control in the midst of political paralysis and a raging civil conflict, King Gyanendra said the nation had chosen an agenda that embodied the unacceptability of terrorism. “When we are fighting for democracy and against terrorism,” the king told a group of Nepalese editors, “the Nepalese people want to know what our friends are thinking.”
Nepal needs the patient understanding of its international friends, not aid embargoes and diplomatic isolation. “We want our friends to help us by words and by deeds. If this is not the agenda they want to go along with, then they should tell us what their agenda is.” Two months on, the Nepalese people are still waiting for an answer.
Wednesday, December 30, 2020
चीन-भारत भू-सामरिक होडबाजी माझ नेपाल
— सञ्जय उपाध्याय
वृद्ध १४ अौ दलाई लामाको अवश्यंभावी अन्त, विश्व भर छरिए बसेका तिब्बती शरणार्थी समुदायमा व्याप्त असन्तोष एवं स्वतन्त्र तिब्बत अान्दोलन प्रतिको बढ्दो अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय समर्थनले सो हिमाली मु्द्दालाई अन्तर्र्ाष्टि्य समाचार बनाई राख्ने निश्चित छ।दलाई लामा र उनका दशौ हजार समर्थकलाई बिगत अाधा शताब्दी देखि शरण दिइरहेको भारतले तिब्बत मुद्दालाई चीन सितको
आफ्नो सिमा बिबाद सुल्झाउने तथा वृहत द्धिपक्षिक सम्बन्ध सुधार्ने क्रममा सौदाबाजीको तुरुपका रुपमा खुलेरै देख्न थालेको आभास हुंदैछ। यस अवस्थामा दुई एशियाली महाशक्ति राष्ट्र बीच च्यापिएको तथा करिव २०,००० तिब्बती शरणार्थीका घर बनेको नेपाल अझै महत्वपूर्ण क्रिडास्थल बन्ने देखिन्छ।
कम्तिमा नेपालका परिप्रेक्षबाट तिब्बत मुद्दा एउटा भौगोलिक क्षेत्रको स्वतन्त्रता, एउटा संस्कृतिको मुक्ति, वा एउटा जीवनशैलीको सराहना भन्दा भिन्न कुरा रहेको छ। यस क्षेत्र बाह्य शक्तिहरुलाई आफ्ना बिभिन्न स्वार्थ सिद्ध गर्न् थलो रहि आएको यथार्थको साक्षी नेपाली इतिहास बसेको छ।
तिब्बत मुद्दाले नेपालमा एक बिशिष्ट मनोवैज्ञानिक आकार ग्रहण गरेको छ। दलाई लामा तथा उनको संघर्षलाई सबैभन्दा सहानुभूतिपूर्वक हेरिरहेका नेपालीहरुकै पंक्तिबाट तिब्बतमा चीनियां आधिपत्य कायमै रहोस भन्ने चाहना राख्ने धेरै मानिस भेटिन्छन्। कतिपय नेपालीहरुमा स्वतन्त्र तिब्बतका कारण आफ्नो मुलुकले चीन सँगको प्रत्यक्ष सिमाना गुमाउने चिन्ता रहेको पाइन्छ। त्यस्तो अबस्थामा नेपालमा अहिले नै थेग्न नसकिने गरी भइरहेको प्रत्यक्ष र परोक्ष भारतीय हस्तक्षेप अझ बढ्ने डर धेरैमा छ।
नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्धको केन्द्रमा तिब्बत रहिआए पनि यी दुई देश बीचको अन्तरक्रिया तिब्बतबाट प्रारम्भ भएको थिएन। यो सम्बन्ध चीनका भिक्षुहरुको मध्य एशियाली मार्ग हुँदै ब्यापक गंगा क्षेत्रमा बुद्ध धर्म सम्बन्धी दस्तावेज र विधि-संग्रहको गरिएको प्रत्यक्ष खोजी बाट सुरु भएको हो। इस्वी सातौ सताब्दीमा शक्तिशाली तिब्बती राजा स्रङ चङ गम्पोले ‛विवाह-द्धारा-शान्ति’ भन्ने कूटनीतिक सिद्धान्त बमोजिम नेपाली र चीनियां राजपरिवार बाट एक-एक रानी भित्राएका थिए। यी दुइ रानीहरु आ-आफ्ना माईतीबाट तिब्बतमा बुद्ध धर्म भित्राउन मद्दत गरे जसले गर्दा नेपाल र चीन बीच सिधा हिमाली बाटो खुल्ने आधार बन्यो।
धर्म र ब्यापार हिमाली नाकाबाट वारपार गर्दा गर्दै शान्ति र सद्भाव कमजोर पर्न गयो। भारत माथि बेलायती सूर्य चढ्दै जाँदा नेपालले तिब्बत संग दुइवटा युद्ध गर्यो जसले नेपाल माथि चीनियां सैनिक हमला निम्त्यायो। नेपालले शान्तिका लागि गरेको सन्धिका आधारमा चीनको पैत्रित्व स्वीकार गर्यो भने चीनले नेपाललाई तेश्रो शक्ति विरुद्ध सैनिक संरक्षत्व दिने बाचा गर्यो। नेपालले उक्त सन्धि अन्तर्गत पांचपांच बर्षमा चीनका सम्राट समक्ष अर्जी र सौगातयुक्त प्रतिनिधिमण्डल पठाउन थाल्यो।
सन् १८१४-१६ को नेपाल-अङग्रेज युद्ध सम्म आइपुग्दा चीनले नेपाललाई सैनिक सहयोग गर्न अस्वीकार गर्यो। नेपाललाई पराजित गरि एकतिहाई भूमि खोसी सकेर पनि चीन-नेपाल सम्बन्धको प्रकृतिका बारेमा अङग्रेजहरु अलमलमै परिरहे। यसले गर्दा दक्षिण एशियामा बेलायती उपनिवेशको जालो फैलिदा नेपालले आफ्नो स्वतन्त्रता कायम राख्न सफल भयो।
सन् १८५५-५६ मा तिब्बत संग तेश्रो युद्ध लडेको नेपालले १९०४ मा तिब्बतीहरुलाई अङग्रेजी आक्रमण बिरुद्ध सहयोग गर्न इन्कार गर्यो। तत्पश्चात बेलायती सेनाको फिर्ती गराउनमा नेपालले महत्वपूर्ण कूटनीतिक योगदान गर्यो। तर त्यो कूटनीतिक सफलता धेरै दिन टिक्न सकेन किनकी जर्जर अबस्थामा पुगी सकेको चीङ साम्राज्यले नेपाल माथि आफ्नो आधिपत्य रहेको सूचना अङग्रेजहरुलाई पठायो। त्यसमा गम्भिर आपत्ति जनाउदै चन्द्र सम्सेर राणाले अङग्रेज सरकार संग सल्लाह गरि चीिनयां सम्राटलाई अर्जी र सौगात पठाउने प्रचलन नै बन्द गरिदिए। यसरी चीङ् सामराज्यको पैत्रित्व स्वीकारी सौगात बुझाउने विदेशी मुलुकहरुमा नेपाल अन्तिम हुन पुग्यो।
तिब्बतमा आफ्नो ब्यापारिक वर्चस्व कायम राख्न तथा आफ्नो स्वतन्त्र अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय अस्तित्वको परिचय दिन नेपालले सन् १९१२ मा बेइजिङ र ल्हासा बीच चीनियां फौजको फिर्तीका लागि सशक्त मध्यस्तकर्ताको भूमिका खेल्यो जस पश्चात् तिब्बतले करिब करिब स्वतन्त्रताको अनूभूति गर्न थाल्यो।
चीनियां राजतन्त्र संग तथा एकआपसमा गहिरो मतभेद भए पनि चीनका राष्ट्रबादी-गणतन्त्रबादी र साम्यबादी दुबै समूहले नेपाल माथि आफ्नो अाधिप्त्य रहेको दाबी कायम नै राखिरहे। सन् यात सेन र माओ जे डोङ दुबैले नेपाललाई चीनले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय साम्राज्यबाद समक्ष गुमाएका राज्यहरु मध्य भनेर चित्रण गरेका थिए।
तिब्बतमा १९५० मा भएको चीनियां सैनिक प्रवेश माझ भरखरै स्वतन्त्रता प्राप्त गरेको भारतको नयां नेतृत्व पंक्तिले हिमालयको दक्षिण तर्फ साम्यबादको अभ्युदय रोक्ने चुनौति देखे। त्यसै सिलसिलामा भारतले राजतन्त्र अन्तर्गत राणाहरु सहितको बहुदलीय ब्यबस्थाको निर्माण गरी आफ्नो सुरक्षात्मक छाता माझ नेपालको आन्तरिक स्थिति सुदृढ पार्ने प्रयत्न गरे। सन् १९५९ मा नेपालको पहिलो आम निर्वाचनको पूर्वसन्ध्यामा तिब्बतीहरुले चीन बिरुद्ध आन्दोलन सुरु गरे जसको बिफलता पछि १४अौ दलाई लामा भागेर भारतमा शरण लिन पुगे।
यस्तो पेचिलो भू-सामरिक बाताबरणमा नेपालका प्रथम जननिर्वाचित प्रधानमन्त्री बिपी कोइराला चीन र भारत दुबै संग मित्रता कायम राखी नेपालमा प्रजातन्त्र सुदृढ गर्ने अभियानमा लागे। तर उनी असफल भए। राजा महेन्द्रले बहुदलीय पद्धती माथि प्रहार गर्दा चरम राजकीय अहं वा महत्वाकांक्षा भन्दा पनि बदलिदो अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय र क्षेत्रिय राजनीतिक समिकरण कारक तत्व रह्यो।
त्यस बखत नेपाल कयौ एशियाली‚ अफ्रिकी एवं लैटिन अमेरिकी मुलुकहरु जस्तै महाशक्ति राष्ट्र संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका र सोभियत संघ बीचको शीत युद्धको शिकार भइसकेको थियो। उता भारत र चीन बीच पनि सीमा लिएर तनाव बढ्दै थियो। त्यसै बेला नेपाल चीन बिरोधी अमेरिका समर्थित तिब्बती खम्पा बिद्रोहीहरुको अखडा बन्न पुग्यो।
१९६० र १९७० का दशकहरुमा त प्रजातन्त्रका खम्बा मानिने अमेरिका र भारत कटुताको सम्बन्धमा लिप्त थिए। त्यस्तै प्रमुख साम्यबादी शक्तिहरु सोभियत संघ र चीन बीच शत्रुता बढ्दै गयो। १९७० को अागमन सगै अमेरिका र चीनको सम्बन्धमा नाटकीय सुधार भयो भने भारत र सोभियत संघ बीच सैनिक गठबन्धन सरहकै सम्बन्ध कायम हुन पुग्यो। यसको प्रभाव नेपाल लगायत ब्यापक दक्षिण एशियाली क्षेत्रमा १९७० र १९८० को दशक भर रह्यो।
१९८० को दशकको अन्त्य हुदा सम्म तिब्बतमा उत्पन्न राजनीतिक अस्थिरता तियनमिएन स्क्वेयरमा भएको बिद्यार्थी अान्दोलनमा समाहित हुन पुग्यो। त्यो आन्दोलन सरकारी दमन र रक्तपातमा परिणत हुंदा नेपालीहरु पूर्वी युरोपमा ब्याप्त प्रजातान्त्रिक लहरले उत्प्रेरित भइरहेका थिए। भारतले लगाएको अार्थिक नाकाबन्दीको छायाँमा संचालित जनअान्दोलन माझ निर्दलीय पञ्चायत व्यवस्थाको अवसान संगै अाफ्नो मित्र शक्ति राजतन्त्रको प्रत्यक्ष शासन समाप्त हुदां समेत आन्तरिक राजनीति सुल्झाउन ब्यस्त चीन चुप लागेर बस्यो।
नेपालको प्रजातान्त्रिक अभ्यासको क्षयीकरण हुदा माअोका नेपाली अनुयायीहरुले जनयुद्धको थालनी गरे। दरबार हत्याकाण्ड पछि नयां राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रले सत्ता आफ्नो हातमा लिदा भारत‚ अमेरिका र पश्चिमा मुलुकहरुले शाही सरकारलाई एक्लाउन खोज्दा चीनले दरबारलाई सहयोग पुर्यायो। त्यसबाट राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रले चीनकै आडभरोसामा सत्ता हत्थाए भन्नेहरुको कथनलाई बल पुर्यायो।
नेपाली बिद्रोहीहरुले माअोलाई बदनाम गरे भन्दै चीनले शाही सरकारलाई बिद्रोह दबाउन सैनिक सहयोग पनि गर्यो। तर एक बर्ष पछि शाही सरकार प्रति आन्तरिक राजनीतिक प्रतिरोध बढ्दै जादा चीन पछि हट्यो र अन्ततगोत्वा दरबारलाई त्याग्दै नेपाली माअोबादी समेत राजनीतिक दलहरुलाई समर्थन गर्यो।
चीनको नेपाल नीतिमा रहेको अस्प्ष्टता र संशयात्मक स्थितिबाट दुबै मुलुकले फाइदा पनि उठाएका छन्। एक थरिले अहिलेको बढ्दो चीनियां गतिबिधीलाई अस्वभाविक मान्दै अन्तत: चीनले आफ्नो सुविधा र अनुकुलताको परराष्ट्र नीतिका आधारमा नेपाललाई भारतकै प्रभाव क्षेत्रका रुपमा स्वीकार गर्नेमा ढुक्क देखिन्छन्। तर नेपालमा चीनको स्वार्थ तिब्बत मुद्दा भन्दा माथि उठेका कारण चीनको नेपाल प्रतिको रुचि उसको ब्यापक दक्षिण एशियाली नीतिमा समाहीत भई बढदै जाने देखिन्छ।
ल्हासामा कुटनीतिक प्रतिनिधित्व रहेको नेपाल एक मात्र बिदेशी मुलुक हो भने बास्तविक्ता बाट उत्पन्न हुने नेपाली दायित्वको बोध चीनले बिभिन्न तरिकाले बारम्वार गराइरहने छ। तिब्बतमा आफूले गरिरहेको ब्यापक बिकास-निर्माण कार्यबाट हुन सक्ने लाभको स्मरण नेपाललाई गराउदै चीनले नेपाललाई नयां दीर्घकालीन राजनीतिक‚ सुरक्षा‚ अार्थिक र सास्कृतिक सम्झौता एवं समझदारी द्धारा द्धिपक्षिय सम्बन्ध विस्तार गर्दै लैजान उत्प्रेरित गरिहने देखिन्छ।
इतिहासलाई बर्तमान नीति र भविष्यको खाकाको आधारशिला बनाउदै गरेका चीनियांहरुले नेपालले चीनको पैत्रित्व मानेको बिगत र चीनलाई अन्तिम अर्जीयुक्त प्रतिनिधिमण्डल पठाएको मुलुकका रुपमा देख्ने क्रम बढ्न सक्छ। यसबाट नेपाललाई भारतको अप्रसन्नतायुक्त प्रभावको सामना गर्ने चूनौति त छंदै छ भने तेश्रो राष्ट्रहरु र तिनिहरु द्धारा सचालित गैरसरकारी सस्था तथा संयन्त्रका केही गतिबिधिले राजनीतिक अस्थिरतामा गांजिएको नेपाललाई भू-सामरिक सन्तुलन कायम राख्न कठीन पर्ने देखिन्छ।
(यो अालेख संजय उपाध्याय द्धारा लिखित तथा रट्लेजद्धारा लण्डन तथा न्युयोर्कबाट मार्च २०१२ मा प्रकाशित ‛नेपाल एण्ड द जियो-स्ट्रेटिजिक राइभल्री बिट्विइन चाईना एण्ड ईण्डिया’ पुस्तकको सम्पादित अंशको नेपाली रुपान्तर हो।)
Tuesday, December 29, 2020
Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China
Friday, December 25, 2020
Nepal: Republicanism’s Recalcitrant Ripples
By Sanjay Upadhya
The Nepali Congress’ headlong plunge into republicanism has spawned some unruly ripples. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai emerged from seclusion to disapprove of the decision. He underscored his displeasure by visiting Crown Prince Paras in the hospital. This dismantling of the ruling alliance’s sustained boycott of the monarchy may have been symbolic, but it was no less significant.
Bhattarai’s stand was immediately ridiculed as a monumental irrelevance. One-time loyalists suddenly saw the sole surviving founding member of the Nepali Congress as a symbol of senility. They resurrected the dead, too. B.P Koirala’s plea for reconciliation between democrats and the palace had lost its validity, the refrain went.
Were B.P. alive, prominent Nepali Congress thinker Pradip Giri asserted, Nepal would have become a republic four years ago. What was more fascinating here was that so many quarters across the political spectrum spent so many sentences on exemplifying an irrelevance.
Whether Bhattarai’s view represented those of the more reticent Nepali Congress members in both factions is unclear. What it does show is that there are still those who see the party’s survival closely tethered to the monarchy’s.
Across the board, the euphoria did not last long among republicans. In retrospect, what the Nepali Congress leadership did was refer the republican agenda to its general convention. The impression is that the body would eventually rubber stamp the decision.
Yet other parties do not seem so sanguine. Maoist chairman Prachanda, among others, has pondered in some detail over whether the Nepali Congress would go into the constituent assembly elections with a republican agenda and then vote for the retention of the monarchy.
So far, Prime Minister Koirala has adroitly played off the Maoists and monarchy against each other in an effort to maintain a tenuous peace. That strategy may be running its course. The Maoists have been able to push their 22 preconditions for the constituent assembly elections primarily on the strength of the second amendment to the interim statute.
The eight parties in power had empowered the interim legislature to abolish the monarchy if the palace were found to be obstructing the polls. The argument that the Maoists are somehow shifting the goalposts is, therefore, specious. The only way the other constituents in power can now rebut the ex-rebels is by certifying that the palace has done no such thing “ something the maligned Bhattarai seemed to have grasped.
Koirala is keeping his principal card – if he has one, that is – close to his chest. Rooting for the monarchy may be the best route for daughter Sujata to win the succession struggle in the party and perpetuate the Koirala dynasty. The premier may have helped her by asserting that the country’s independence was at stake.
Having discharged the duties – spiritual as well as secular – of head of state over the months, Koirala may now covet the real job. But, surely, he knows that becoming the first president of Nepal would require much more than Prachanda’s consent. The ruling parties would need to persuade internal and external constituencies of their ability to sustain a republic. And reconciling India's aspirations for a democratic Nepal with China's desire for a stable one is the easy part.
The postponement of the constituent assembly elections was a thinly guised affirmation of Nepal’s failure to attain political equilibrium. If the elections are delayed once more, it will be because of this factor. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the government’s agreements with the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum and Chure-Bhawar Ekta Samaj have been unable to lift the national mood.
No one – within the country or outside – wants to be blamed for derailing the tenuous peace process. Yet everyone is aware of another fragility: Koirala’s age and ailments. Deep inside, the premier probably considers himself no less vulnerable to the S slur than Bhattarai.
Thursday, December 24, 2020
Synergism vs. Single-mindedness
The Chinese, for their part, could act purely upon their present and projected national interests.
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495
Wednesday, December 23, 2020
Republican Nepal’s Royal Quandary
By Sanjay Upadhya
Five years after Nepal’s democratic parties and former Maoist rebels joined hands to abolish the 240-year monarchy, turning the world’s only Hindu kingdom into a secular republic, elements on both ends of the erstwhile alliance have begun voicing doubts on the wisdom of that decision.
Their comments come on the heels of growing indications that regional giants India and China, rivals for influence in the small landlocked nation they sandwich, might be working together to prevent instability from seeping into their own borders.
Massive and bloody popular protests in 2006 forced King Gyanendra to restore parliament and end his direct rule. The Maoists, who had waged a decade-long violent insurgency to abolish the crown before entering peaceful politics, eventually persuaded the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) to abandon their support for constitutional monarchy.
Elections in 2008 made the Maoists the largest party in the constitutional assembly, which formally abolished the monarchy. Their common adversary vanquished, political infighting intensified, leading to five prime ministers in as many years. The assembly failed to write a new constitution institutionalizing Nepal as a federal democratic republic, despite repeated extensions.
Facing mounting public criticism, Nepal’s key political parties earlier this year invited the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Khil Raj Regmi, to head a government of retired bureaucrats to hold fresh elections in November.
Many Nepalis doubt the elections would be held on time, given the deep polarization. Others remain skeptical whether another elected assembly could resolve the tough issues that stymied its predecessor.
Chief among them is the issue of federalism. The Maoists owed part of their success to effective articulation of the aspirations of Nepal’s dozens of ethnic and linguistic communities. These groups – at least 72 by official count – felt marginalized by what they considered a traditionally centralized polity symbolized by the monarchy.
Republicanism has created demands for separate states by many of these groups. Public debates on the model of federalism and the number of states Nepal needs have turned vociferous and protests have often brought the country to a standstill. A growing number of Nepalis now fear a fragmentation of the nation.
The prospect of several microstates in a geopolitically sensitive region has worried China and India. Beijing, long preoccupied with calming Tibet, which Nepal borders, fears destabilization from Nepal spilling all the way into Xinjiang. India, many of whose border states are larger than Nepal, worries of growing separatism within at a time when it is battling a raging Maoist insurgency of its own.
Although China has made significant inroads into Nepal, which India has traditionally considered its exclusive sphere of influence, there have been suggestions of cooperation between Beijing and New Delhi to stabilize Nepal in their mutual interest. Prolonged political instability, both New Delhi and Beijing seem to recognize, would allow extra-regional government and nongovernment forces greater room for maneuver.
In public, the imperative of stability is being expressed more candidly inside Nepal. Shashank Koirala, a leader of the Nepali Congress, conceded in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation that abolishing the monarchy had been a blunder. “There may come a time when the Nepali people might have to bring back the monarchy to save the nation-state,” he said.
Days later, Mohan Baidya, chief of the Maoist faction that broke away from organization that led the insurgency and who is perceived to be close to Beijing, spoke of a possibility of an alliance between his party and the former king. “Royalists are more nationalist than the other political forces,” Baidya said in a jibe at the perceived pro-Indian tilt of the major politicians.
These comments led former prime minister Baburam Bhattarai, the chief ideologue of the main Maoist party, to demand the arrest of former king Gyanendra for alleged attempts to subvert the elections. The former monarch is on an extended tour of western Nepal where he is also distributing relief material to people affected by recent floods.
Opinion polls have shown a sharp decline in popular faith in political leaders. However, no survey has directly asked respondents on whether the monarchy should be restored.
Gyanendra ascended to the throne in June 2001 after the bloody palace massacre that wiped out much of the royal family. Although an official report blamed then Crown Prince Dipendra for gunning down King Birendra, Queen Aishwarya and other relatives over a domestic dispute before killing himself, suspicion long focused on Gyanendra, as the immediate beneficiary.
Before vacating the royal palace seven years later, Gyanendra rejected those allegations and dared those making them to prove his complicity. The two Maoist leaders who had directly accused Gyanendra – Maoist party chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Bhattarai – both became prime minister but did nothing to reopen the case. This led many Nepalis to see political posturing in the allegations, allowing them to review their opinion of the former monarch.
During Gyanendra’s previous national tours – marked by inaugurations of temples and attendances in religious ceremonies – he has conceded that direct rule had been a mistake, while keeping open the prospect of a restoration of the monarchy. Leading politicians tended to ridicule the prospect of a return to monarchy. The fact that Bhattarai has now taken a stern tone also suggests that few of his peers may be considering that a laughing matter anymore.
Originally published on July 24, 2013
A Bold Bet With Two Mutually Fortifying Flaws
Although bold, writes SANJAY UPADHYA, India’s 2005 bet in Nepal contained two mutually fortifying flaws: the emaciation of the monarchy and the empowerment of the Maoist rebels. Despite regular turbulence, the world’s only Hindu monarch was bound to India in a special relationship that neither country needed to define or assert.
Nepalese Maoists, being communists first, were trained to denounce Indian ‘expansionism’ before American ‘imperialism’. Experience may have impelled the senior leadership to make practical compromises. It was a leap of faith for New Delhi to trust the leadership to rein in their cadres’ radicalism.
Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495