पुस्तक समीक्षा: अमेरिका, भारत र चीनको रणनीतिक चेपुवामा नेपाल

रमेश केसी 

बिहीबार, १९ चैत, २०७७

 

२००७ र २०४६ सालमा जस्तै २०६२/६३ को परिवर्तन पनि भारतको उत्प्रेरणामा आएको स्पष्ट छ। तर, ‘अमेरिकी साम्राज्यवाद’को भन्दा बढी ‘भारतीय विस्तारवाद’को विरोध गर्ने माओवादीलाई मूलधारमा ल्याएर भारतले के उपलब्धि हासिल गर्‍यो?

अमेरिकी राणनीतिकार रोबर्ट काप्लानले विश्व राजनीतिमा १९औँ शताब्दी जस्तै भूगोल महत्त्वपूणर् हुन थालेको आकलन गरेका छन्। ‘रिभेन्ज अफ जीयोग्राफी’ आलेखमा उनले एसियामा विश्व शक्तिहरूको प्रतिस्पर्धा शुरू भएको बताएका छन्। यसबाट नेपाल अछुतो नरहने निश्चित छ।

नेपाल दुई उदाउँदा शक्तिराष्ट्र चीन र भारतबीचमा छ। यी राष्ट्रबीच हुने शक्ति प्रतिस्पर्धाको प्रभाव नेपालको आन्तरिक राजनीति, वैदेशिक सम्बन्ध लगायत धेरै क्षेत्रमा पर्छ। पत्रकार सञ्जय उपाध्याको ‘ब्याकफायर इन नेपाल हाउ इन्डिया लस्ट द प्लट टु चाइना’ पुस्तकले भूराजनीतिको यही कथा भन्छ। विशेष गरेर २०६२/६३ को जनआन्दोलन, राजतन्त्रको उन्मूलन, धर्मनिरपेक्षताको घोषणा र संघीयता लागू भएसँगै नयाँ नेपालको परिवेशलाई पुस्तकले उजागर गर्छ।

के ‘भारतद्वारा पहल गरिएको’ १२ बुँदे सम्झौता उपलब्धिमूलक रह्यो? माओवादी विद्रोहको औचित्य अहिले स्थापित हुन्छ कि हुँदैन? नेपाल योजनामा भारत र चीनले के-के गरे? अमेरिका युरोपको मनसाय के थियो? आदि विषयमा परख गरिएको यो पुस्तक नेपाल मामिलामा जानकारी राख्ने सबैलाई रोचक लाग्नेछ।

२०४६ सालको परिवर्तनपछि नेपाल संवैधानिक राजतन्त्र र संसदीय व्यवस्थाको मार्गमा थियो। तर, यो परिवर्तनको ६ वर्षपछि तत्कालीन नेकपा माओवादीले युद्धको शुरूआत गर्‍यो। उक्त विद्रोह टुंगोमा पुर्‍याउन भारतले कडा मिहिनेत गरेको त्यहाँका पूर्वपरराष्ट्र सचिव एवं नेपालका लागि राजदूत श्याम शरणले स्वीकारेको पुस्तकमा उल्लेख छ। पूर्वराष्ट्रपति प्रणव मुखर्जीले पनि नेपालका माओवादीलाई शान्ति सम्झौतामा ल्याउन भारतको भूमिका रहेको अल जजीरा टेलिभिजनमा बताएका थिए।

शान्ति सम्झौतापछि उत्तरी छिमेकी चीनले नेपालमा खेलेको भूमिकाबारे पनि उनले पुस्तकमा सविस्तार व्याख्या गरेका छन्। चीनको नेपाल नीति राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थ र लामो योजनामा आधारित रहेको लेखकको ठम्याइ छ।

राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रले ढाका सार्क सम्मेलनमा चीनलाई सार्कको सदस्यमा ल्याउनुपर्ने धारणा राखेर  चाइना कार्ड खेलेका थिए। जसबाट भारत चिढियो। भारतको राजनीतिक नेतृत्व र गुप्तचर विभाग ‘रअ’ राजाप्रति कठोर भए पनि सेना र आन्तरिक खुफियाले नरम नीति लिएको पुस्तकमा खुलासा गरिएकाे छ।

२४० वर्ष लामो इतिहास भएको राजतन्त्र उन्मूलन गर्ने आन्दोलनमा जाने माओवादी प्रस्तावमा सबै दल सहमत भए पनि यो विषय विवादास्पद र रहस्यमय छ। भारतसँगको धार्मिक र सांस्कृतिक सम्बन्ध भएको हिन्दू राजतन्त्रले बेलाबेला भारतविरुद्ध ‘चिनियाँ कार्ड’ खेल्ने गरेको उनले उल्लेख गरेका छन्। राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रले ढाका सार्क सम्मेलनमा चीनलाई सार्कको सदस्यमा ल्याउनुपर्ने धारणा राखेर त्यस्तै कार्ड खेलेका थिए। जसबाट भारत चिढियो। भारतको राजनीतिक नेतृत्व र गुप्तचर विभाग ‘रअ’ राजाप्रति कठोर भए पनि सेना र आन्तरिक खुफियाले नरम नीति लिएको उनले खुलासा गरेका छन्। 

२००७ र २०४६ सालमा जस्तै २०६२/६३ को परिवर्तन पनि भारतको उत्प्रेरणामा आएको स्पष्ट छ। तर, ‘अमेरिकी साम्राज्यवाद’को भन्दा बढी ‘भारतीय विस्तारवाद’कोे विरोध गर्ने माओवादीलाई मूलधारमा ल्याएर भारतले के उपलब्धि हासिल गर्‍यो भन्ने लेखाजोखा पुस्तकमा छ।

भारत पनि माओवादी आन्दोलनले आक्रान्त थियो। अहिले पनि छिटपुट घटना हुने गरेका छन्। नेपालका माओवादीको सफलताले त्यहाँ पनि नकारात्मक सन्देश जाने थियो। तत्कालीन भारतीय प्रधानमन्त्री मनमोहन सिंहले भारतको माओवादी आन्दोलन राष्ट्रका लागि सबैभन्दा ठूलो सुरक्षा चुनौती भएको बताइसकेका थिए। भारतीय माओवादीको दमन गर्ने भारतीय संस्थापन पक्ष नेपालका माओवादीसँग सहकार्य गर्न पुगे। यसको पेचिलो भूराजनीतिलाई लेखक उपाध्याले सविस्तार व्याख्या गरेका छन्। 

प्रसिद्ध भारतीय पत्रकार एमजे अकबरले भनेका छन् कि तत्कालीन पाकिस्तानी राष्ट्रपति परवेज मुसरफ नेपालको प्रधानमन्त्री भए पनि उनी भारतपरस्त हुनुपर्छ। यसले नेपालको भूराजनीतिक बाध्यता र जटिलता प्रष्ट पार्छ।

२००७ सालअघि र पछि पनि भारतको प्रभाव नेपालमा रहिरह्यो। २०४६ सालको परिवर्तनपछि पनि त्यो कायम रह्यो। तर, भारतकै सहयोगमा भएको २०६२/०६३ को परिवर्तनपछि भने किन भारत नेपाल गुमेको महसूस गर्दै छ? नेपालविज्ञ अमेरिकी राजनीतिशास्त्री लियो रोजले नेपाल जहिले पनि ‘बाँच्नुको रणनीति’मा रहेको भन्दै ‘नेपाल स्ट्राटेजी फर सर्भाइभल’ पुस्तक नै लेखेका छन्। 

नेपालको कूटनीतिको प्राचीन कालदेखि आधुनिक कालसम्मको फेहरिस्त दिने यो पुस्तकका विषयवस्तु अहिले पनि सान्दर्भिक छन्। केपी ओलीको नेतृत्वमा सरकार बनेको अवस्थामा पार्टीभित्र आन्तरिक किचलो हुँदा किन वर्तमान चिनियाँ राजदूत सक्रिय भइन्? के चीन नेपालको माइक्रो म्यानेजमेन्टमा लागेको हो? यदि हो भने त्यसको कारण भारतले लगाएको नाकाबन्दी हुनसक्छ।

नेपालको कूटनीतिको प्राचीन कालदेखि आधुनिक कालसम्मको फेहरिस्त दिने यो पुस्तकका विषयवस्तु अहिले पनि सान्दर्भिक छन्। केपी ओलीको नेतृत्वमा सरकार बनेको अवस्थामा पार्टीभित्र आन्तरिक किचलो हुँदा किन वर्तमान चिनियाँ राजदूत सक्रिय भइन्? के चीन नेपालको माइक्रो म्यानेजमेन्टमा लागेको हो? यदि हो भने त्यसको कारण भारतले लगाएको नाकाबन्दी हुनसक्छ।

नयाँ संविधानको घोषणापछि भारतले गरेको नाकाबन्दी प्रत्युत्पादक रहेको र त्यहीकारण नेपाल चीनको पोल्टामा गएको भारतका विपक्षीहरूले पनि टिप्पणी गरे। भारतको नेपाल नीतिको कमजोर पक्ष यहाँको आन्तरिक मामलामा बढ्दो हस्तक्षेपलाई मान्नेहरू पनि छन्। 

चीनका लागि भने नेपालमा तिब्बत शरणार्थीको मामिला पेचिलो प्रश्न भएको छ। करीब १२ हजार तिब्बती शरणार्थीको मुद्दालाई नेपालमा जीवित राखेर पश्चिमाहरू चीनलाई घेर्ने रणनीतिमा छन्। अमेरिकी गुप्तचर संस्था सीआईएको सहयोगमा विगतमा नेपालको मुस्ताङबाट तिब्बत लक्षित खम्पा विद्रोह भएको थियो। त्यो चिनियाँहरूको स्मृतिमा ताजै छ। यसर्थ तिब्बती प्रश्नमा नेपाल हदैसम्मको संवेदनशील होओस् भन्ने चाहना छ।

नेकपामा विवाद चुलिएर विभाजन उन्मुख हुँदा मिलाउन चिनियाँ कम्युनिष्ट पार्टीको प्रतिनिधिमण्डल काठमाडौं उत्रियो। राजतन्त्रको बेला चीनले नेपालका राजालाई स्थायी मित्र ठान्थ्यो। तर, राजतन्त्र नरहेपछि नेकपालाई त्यस्तै मित्र बनाउन लागिपरेको देखिन्छ।

केपी ओली दोस्रो पटक प्रधानमन्त्री भएपछि सन् २०१२ मा चिनियाँ राष्ट्रपति सी चिनफिङले नेपाल भ्रमण गरे। २३ वर्षपछि चिनियाँ राष्ट्रपतिको नेपाल भ्रमण भएको थियो। भ्रमणका क्रममा चीनले नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्ध रणनीतिक भएको बतायो। उक्त भ्रमणपछि सत्तारूढ रहेको विघटित नेकपाका नेताहरू सी विचारधाराबाट प्रशिक्षित समेत भए।

नेकपामा विवाद चुलिएर विभाजन उन्मुख हुँदा मिलाउन चिनियाँ कम्युनिष्ट पार्टीको प्रतिनिधिमण्डल काठमाडौं उत्रियो। राजतन्त्रको बेला चीनले नेपालका राजालाई स्थायी मित्र ठान्थ्यो। तर, राजतन्त्र नरहेपछि नेकपालाई त्यस्तै मित्र बनाउन लागिपरेको देखिन्छ।

अमेरिकी परियोजना एमसीसी पारित गर्ने विषयमा तत्कालीन नेकपाभित्रै मतभेद देखियो। इन्डो-प्यासिफिक रणनीतिमा नेपाल संलग्न भएको विषय बहसमा आयो। यसैबीच कालापानी र लिपुलेकको भूभाग समेटेको नक्शा नेपालले संसद्बाट पारित गरेपछि भारतसँग ‘नक्शा युद्ध’ नै देखियो। 

नेपाल अब अमेरिका, चीन र भारतको रणनीतिक राडारमा प्रवेश गरिसकेको छ। त्यसैले नेपालको रणनीतिक चातुर्य यो चेपुवाबाट उम्कनु नै हुनेछ। यही रणनीतिक चेपुवा र आन्तरिक राजनीतिको उथलपुथललाई लेखक उपाध्याले राम्रोसँग केलाएका छन्।

सन् १९६० सम्म यो हिमालय क्षेत्रमा चार वटा राजतन्त्र थिए, भुटान। सिक्किम, तिब्बत र नेपाल। तीमध्ये तिब्बत सन् १९५९ मा चीनले कब्जा गर्‍यो। जनमतसंग्रहमार्फत सिक्किम भारतमा विलय भयो। सन् १९४९ को सम्झौता मार्फत भुटान भारतको अधीनस्थ राष्ट्र बन्यो। नेपाल राजतन्त्रको उन्मूलनसँगै गणतन्त्रमा प्रवेश गर्‍यो। हिमाली क्षेत्रका यी साना राष्ट्रहरूको कथा ‘हिमालय महाखेल’ले भरिएको छ। यही महाखेलको एउटा विवरण हो, यो पुस्तक। 

 

किताब: ब्याकफायर इन नेपाल 

लेखक: सञ्जय उपाध्याय

प्रकाशक: भीटास्टा मूल्य: ४९५ भा.रू. पृष्ठ: २७५

 

बिहीबार, १९ चैत, २०७७, १७:५६:०० मा प्रकाशित

थप सामग्री : https://www.himalkhabar.com/news/122702

75 Years of India-US Relations: 5 Questions

Foreign Policy Research Center Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya

1) How do you look at four years of India-US ties under President Trump?

Although relations had been strengthening across the board since the Clinton administration, growing American and Indian concerns about China accelerated more in-depth and more institutionalized defense and security ties. Platforms for bilateral and multilateral engagement – including the once cast-off Quad – were strengthened. Moreover, consultations were stepped up in bilateral, regional and global institutions on a bevy of traditional and emerging issues.

All this has had beneficial effects on the bilateral economic engagement, which, in any case, had acquired a logic and momentum of its own. The regularity and vibrancy of the dialogue process has been able to keep bilateral political/security and economic/trade differences within manageable levels.

The personal chemistry of the two leaders and ideological convergences between the ruling parties over the past four years also carried the risk of casting the relationship in a partisan light. However, realities on the ground and a broader convergence of interests have been able to offset that risk.

2) What does the Biden presidency mean for India? How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - strategic and trade deals - and move forward?

New Delhi will closely watch the Biden administration’s approach to China and the Indo-Pacific region generally. President Trump’s declassification of the “US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific” – which states that “a strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance to China – was perhaps intended to commit his successor to his policies. While New Delhi may have some misgivings on that formulation, particularly relating to its evident impingement on India’s vaunted ‘strategic autonomy’, Biden’s early statements have cast Beijing as a “long-term competitor”. This would signal continuity in the content of the US-India-China triangle.

However, over the next few months, if the Biden administration were to depart from its predecessor to seek greater cooperation with China on other issues such as climate change and health security while sorting out the more contentious bilateral challenges, India may find itself having to make adjustments.

While India will welcome a return by the United States to multilateralism, New Delhi would continue to prefer issue-based coalitions rather than formal alliances. India’s engagement with Russia and Iran, among other things, could prove to be periodic irritants, but not necessarily roadblocks to closer relations.

Over the next few months, there is a likelihood of greater cooperation on such issues as the supply and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. As the challenge of economic recovery starts to predominate, differences over trade, investment and immigration could become more prominent.

At another level, the Biden White House – as Democratic administrations traditionally have been – could be more assertive and outspoken on domestic developments in India. This, in turn, would prompt New Delhi to ward off no less ebulliently Washington’s interference in what it considers internal matters. The echo chamber of the daily news cycle and the effervescence of non-state actors in both countries could make things appear worse than they actually are. The Biden administration would be hamstrung by the United States’ own struggles with ensuring full rights and representation to marginalized communities within. On the other hand, the general vibrancy India’s democracy and institutions should be able to withstand undue pressures. All this perhaps would indicate an urgency for loosening linkages between strategic and trade issues.

3) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

India’s decision in 2018 to buy five Russian S-400 missile systems has strained bilateral ties and threatened Washington’s own defense sales in New Delhi. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), passed by Congress in 2017 to punish Russia for interfering with the 2016 US elections, comes very close to requiring the White House to impose sanctions on any country that makes “significant” purchases of military equipment from Russia.

As the law stands, therefore, Biden must invoke CAATSA on India. However, he can waive the implementation of sanctions under the national security exception built into the legislation. Since that exception is narrow, Biden and his advisers would need to muster much executive creativity while contending with the legislature.

What would help here is the countervailing argument in favor of India’s value as a partner in confronting China across Eurasia. We can debate who needs the other more. Still, the fact remains that New Delhi possesses a growing and palpable willingness and ability to act as a counterbalance to China, something the Americans cannot be oblivious to. Thus, the United States may feel it has an incentive to go soft on sanctions if it wants India’s full-fledged partnership.

This, of course, ties into the broader issue of India-Russia relations. Here, too, there seems to be growing recognition in Washington that strong ties between New Delhi and Moscow might help check undue Chinese influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

4) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

India has publicly maintained that its relationship with any one country is not about containing any other country. However, realities on the ground also dictate India's necessity to build strong partnerships with like-minded countries to counter the threat from China.

The United States is ready to help India as a full-fledged ally. However, India has no desire to become one because of the vibrancy of the economic dimensions of its relations with China. After all, India remains an active member of the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the largest borrower from the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Last year, China again emerged as India’s biggest trade partner, relegating the United States to the second position after two years.

Evidently, New Delhi’s preferred option is to cooperate with Beijing when possible and compete only when necessary. In other words, New Delhi feels complete reliance on Washington would seriously constrain the country’s strategic space, especially when it sees little to suggest the Americans would be ready to assume new security obligations in the region. The challenge would thus lay in defining the terms of any partnership.

5)  How do you look at the Pakistan factor in India-US relations under Biden’s Presidency?

Early statements from the Biden administration indicate that the United States will be taking a tougher position on Pakistan. Senior administration officials have affirmed that Washington’s history of accommodation has not worked.

Still, the United States has to square this realization with the importance Pakistan holds in its Afghanistan policy, particularly in relation to the peace process and eventual military withdrawal.

India and the United States both recognize they can leverage their bilateral relations to maintain stability in South Asia as the Pakistan-China partnership, despite evident irritants, continues to deepen. The case for strengthening India’s role as a regional leader in any recalibration of Washington’s South Asia policy under Biden remains strong.

The corollary is that India will be expected to play a more prominent role in stabilizing Afghanistan’s situation by deploying more significant assets. Much would depend on India’s readiness to shed its past reluctance to do so. Yet, again, neither side seems prepared to allow Pakistan to constrain the US-India relationship. Perhaps India’s near-simultaneous de-escalation with China and Pakistan marks a conscious recalibration in all three countries amid the change of guards in Washington DC.

Foreign Policy Research Center Journal (J-45) 2021 (1) 52-55

Nepal Caught Between Public Anxiety and Royal Apathy

Why Gyanendra Shah is in little hurry

By Sanjay Upadhya

Behind the boisterous demands for the restoration of Nepal’s monarchy, after the country’s elusive quest for newness, there exists a defiant wall of silence. Former king Gyanendra Shah’s apparent disinterest in growing public demonstrations in his favor remains baffling to loyalists and critics alike.

It shouldn’t, at least from that individual’s point of view. Prince Gyanendra Shah survived the still inexplicable royal palace massacre in 2001 only to be accused of masterminding it. As he unexpectedly ascended the throne a second time in half a century, Gyanendra confronted a country that was as unsure of its future as it was in 1950.

When King Tribhuvan led his family into Indian exile as part of the growing popular movement against the century-old hereditary Rana prime ministers, he had left behind his toddler grandson. Gyanendra did much more than occupy the throne.

Much remains murky about what transpired in New Delhi and Kathmandu over the four months between November 1950 and February 1951. Declassified files, mostly from Britain archives, suggest a hectic geostrategic power play between newly independent India and the Anglo-American West. Nepal ultimately maintained its independence and sovereignty amid fears of the Maoist juggernaut in China.

Bad optics

Gyanendra did not appear in the official dynastic succession annals, although the Ranas had organized an elaborate coronation. Over the years, he worked closely with his father, King Mahendra, and brother, King Birendra, as Nepal sought to consolidate its international identity through the Cold War’s chills. Most Nepalis, however, only saw him as a palace hardliner intent on preserving his extensive business interests.

That general impression only worsened with the waywardness of his only son, Paras, accused, among other things, of running over a popular singer/musician outside a Kathmandu bar. In the aftermath of the palace massacre, there was a ready fall guy as the sole surviving prince ended up becoming the prime beneficiary.

As the successor to his slain brother and nephew, Dipendra – the official heir apparent who was crowned briefly under a coma before his own death – King Gyanendra’s assertiveness instantly alienated mainstream politicians. The parties shrewdly deflected public attention from their own mismanagement to the new king’s purported hunger for absolute power.

After a growing Maoist insurgency prevented fresh elections to a legislature an elected prime minister dissolved – a decision the Supreme Court subsequently upheld – King Gyanendra confronted Nepal’s traditional machinations where political factions contended for partisan interests. Considering it the most prudent path, the king assumed total powers promising an elected government within three years.

The king evidently detected an opportunity for the palace to regain much of the power and influence it had lost in 1990, when a popular movement turned Nepal into a British-style constitutional monarchy. Still, the parties had provided him with that opportunity. Nepal’s crisis was real, and it was worsening. Ultimately, the very notion of the king serving as his own prime minister united the mainstream parties and the Maoist rebels against the monarchy, albeit not without overt external prodding.

King Gyanendra probably understood the risk he was taking. After all, he had never shown an interest in an official coronation for the history books. When the monarchy was abolished, and Nepal turned into a secular and federal republic in 2008, after another round of widespread protests two years earlier, Gyanendra surprised many by holding a press conference. He said he was handing over the crown to the people – its true custodians – before driving off to his private residence a few kilometers away.

When monarchs lose their crown, they invariably flee into exile, if they are fortunate to keep their heads. Gyanendra stayed in the country and soon began hectoring his successors to remain faithful to the people. This annoyed the politicians, but they eventually lost the credibility to criticize the ex-king. Instead of reopening an investigation to the palace massacre to prove their charge of the ex-monarch’s complicity – something that had contributed significantly to anti-palace public sentiments – politicians were busy establishing themselves as new potentates.

As Gyanendra began visiting India on trips that would soon acquire overt political connotations, the Chinese, too, were becoming less reticent about their contacts with the ex-monarch. Over the years, Gyanendra’s public comments, during key Hindu festivals and political anniversaries, became less tolerant of the prevailing political shenanigans. It was as if he was reminding the parties that had stepped out of the way because they promised they could do a better job running the country.

When public opinion began shifting palpably on the streets by mid-2020, many Nepalis expected Gyanendra to step into the national arena more assertively. Prominent royalists soon were left lamenting they could do little when the ex-king wasn’t terribly interested in restoring the monarchy.

Gyanendra is believed to tell his domestic and international interlocutors alike that only the Nepali people could restore the monarchy. His subtext: Nepalis needed to find a way to do that.

They haven’t – so far. The pro-monarchy camp is splitting hairs between terms like ‘royalist’ and ‘monarchist’, driven by a reluctance to be seen as advocates of a return to autocratic rule. Others seek the enthronement of Gyanendra’s grandson, Hridayendra, a teenager. Some want a ceremonial monarch, others a cultural king, that elected representatives would choose.

Clear distinction

Gyanendra is clutching on to a clear distinction between a republic and a monarchy. In the latter, others don’t get to choose who sits on the top. More importantly, in his view, is the question of why Nepal needed a monarchy again.

The clear premise would be that the country faces a vacuum. If so, would ‘cultural’, ‘ceremonial’ or any other nomenclature stand in the way of the monarch doing what he is supposed to: provide guardianship to the people and safeguard Nepal’s independent and sovereign identity above and beyond the elected representatives?

Gyanendra’s insistence on such clarity can be easily confused as nonchalance or, worse, disregard for the country. But, then, upon his second enthronement, he had repeatedly insisted that he would serve as a hands-on monarch because that was the kind Nepal needed.

The line between activism and apathy can be inconsistent amid Nepal’s enduring political and geopolitical fault lines. “The parties did not enthrone me, nor did the people dethrone me,” Gyanendra is reported to have said to recent visitors. Supporters may be in a hurry, but he seems confident enough to contend with the judgment of history.

Book Review: An Account of Nepal-India Relations With A Focus on China

Sanjay Upadhya’s “Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China” provides a detailed account of Nepal-India relations in the last fifteen years, focusing on China’s diplomatic and strategic success in Nepal.

China, India See Interests Converge in Upholding Nepal Stability

Sanjay Upadhya 

Traditionally competitors for influence in neighboring Nepal, China and India are now signaling readiness to join forces to pull the Himalayan nation out of its chronic political instability.

The contours of a formal cooperation framework are yet to emerge. But academic and media circles in China and India suggest a growing convergence of interest in preventing instability from spilling across Nepal’s borders. ...

Originally published on Wednesday, July 31, 2013

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13129/china-india-see-interests-converge-in-upholding-nepal-stability

BOOK REVIEW – Backfire In Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

US-based Nepali journalist Sanjay Upadhya helps find these answers

By RISHI GUPTA

In 2005, India facilitated the historic Peace Agreement between the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance in Nepal, ending a decade-long war waged against Nepal's centuries-old monarchy. A decade and a half later, Nepal and India hit the lowest point despite the two countries share close socio-cultural, political, economic, and strategic ties. Similarly, Karan Singh, who had successfully convinced King Gyanendra to accept the people’s demand and pave the way for democracy in 2006; visit by the Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankarto Kathmandu at the eleventh hour to convince the Nepal Government to accommodate the demands of Madhesis, was termed as the ‘wrong advice.’ What led Nepal to shift from ‘special relations’ with India to ‘conditional relations’ and forge strategic ties with China?

Many such questions seek an answer as one begins to unfurl the Roti-Beti relations between India and Nepal amidst the ongoing India-Nepal fiasco.

The book entitled The Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost Plot to China by US-based Nepali journalist Sanjay Upadhya helps find these answers. The book provides a detailed account of Nepal-India relations in the last fifteen years. In his previous books,Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry Between China and India from Routledge in 2012, and The Raj Lives: India in Nepalfrom Vitasta in 2008, Upadhya had carried ground-breaking works on India’s colonial past and its impact on Nepal, and Nepal’s geo-strategic location between two Asian giants. Unlike his previous research works, The Backfire in Nepal is a journalistic account of Nepal-India relations focusing on China’s diplomatic and strategic success in Nepal in recent years.

Divided into seven chapters, the book provides a timeline of events in India-Nepal relations beginning with the 2006 peace-building process in Nepal which was officially overlooked by the United Nations Mission in Nepal to facilitate inclusion of the former Maoist fighters into the Nepal Army, their arms surrender and peaceful conduct of first Constituent Assembly elections in 2008. In the second chapter Provisional Posturing, the author has beautifully portrayed the free-Tibet movement of 2008, which got China worried as it hosted world athletes for the Beijing Olympics. The unconditional support from a new Maoist Prime Minister Pushpa Kamala Dahal alias Prachanda in cracking down on the protesters and arrest of Tibetan refugees amidst global criticism was a beneficial ‘New Nepal’ China.

Between 2005 to 2020, Nepal has forged new transit, trade, security and strategic ties including Belt and Road Initiative and first-ever Joint-Military exercises with China. Chinese investment in Nepal accounts for more than sixty percent of the total Foreign Direct Investment in Nepal, which was once topped by India until 2014. China’s annual aid to Nepal had also reached USD 128 from a meager USD 20-24 million in the past decade. The number of high-level visits from China to Nepal including President Xi’s in October 2019 amidst border row between India and Nepal over Kalapani and Lipulekh, have provided China with an ultra-edge in the political and foreign affairs of Nepal. Most importantly, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal has direct hotlines with the President, Prime Minister, and Chief of the Nepal Army, allowing the former to make public appearances in these offices and advise on administrative and political matters. Millions of military assistance from China have helped Beijing buy diplomatic immunity to its citizens involved in scamming, phishing, and trafficking in Nepal.

While previous administrations in Nepal strike a balance between India and China including Prachanda who stood as a staunch critic of alleged Indian ‘expansionism’ since 1950, KP Oli has used India’s 2015 unofficial border blockade to his advantage in evoking ultra-nationalism based on anti-India maneuverings. Oli also holds India accountable for his ouster in 2016 from the Government, and with his present tenure, he continues to be revengeful. Meanwhile, post-December 13 dissolution of the Parliament, Oli was seen taking a moderate view of India. However, it changed very soon after he reiterated Kalapani, Lipulekh as Nepalese territories, and relocated Ayodhya in Nepal.

On the other hand, despite a turbulent relationship, India’s humanitarian assistance to Nepal helps ease the tensions. Noteworthy, India was the first country to reach on the ground after a major earthquake had hit Nepal in 2015. India has also supplied a million doses of the COVID-19 vaccine and other medical assistance including medicines, ambulances, and medical appliances. However, India continues to misread Nepal’s political developments.

Prime Minister Modi’s 2014 visit after seventeen years gap by an Indian Prime Minister to Nepal helped India “dispel many traditional Nepalese misgivings about India policy”, but the hidden push for a Hindu Rashtra in Nepal backfired on India. India cannot deny that its shortfalls are due to short-sighted strategic interests and the lack of promised deliveries to Nepal. For instance, in 2016, the Eminent Persons Group (EPG)was formed to revise the 1950 Treaty and smoothen border management. Still, five years since its formation, the final report of the EPG continues to dust in the Prime Minister’s Office. Nepal also waits for India to exchange the demonetized Indian currency stuck with the Nepal Rashtra Bank.

In contrast, the “Chinese have acted purely on national interest”. There has been no compromise on China’s security concerns looming from a critical border between Tibet and Nepal. From cracking down the 2008 free-Tibet movement to the signing of Mutual Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters in 2019, and Nepal’s unequivocal support to ‘One China Policy’, China has shown an uncompromised bargain in Nepal. On the other hand, India continues to misread how Beijing sees Nepal – both in terms of China’s visions of the past and the future. This complicates the core trilateral challenge: ensuring that Nepal is not sucked deeper into the Sino-Indian vortex, only to be scorned for aggravating the Asian giants’ rivalry.

As the events unfold between India and Nepal, the book could not have been timelier. The book becomes a must-read for policymakers, journalists, researchers intending to know recent developments in India-Nepal relations as it covers the history and the most recent events. That said, the book falls short on the analytical front. The author has also avoided dealing with dates which makes the reader seek digital support that breaks the rhythm. Overall, unlike history books, the books' language keeps the momentum for a reader until a few scattered pages of the last chapter- All in Mind, often repeating the arguments. The book is the most recent addition to the literature in India-Nepal relations with a focus on the China factor. While the book interests Indian readers, it is a must book for readers in Nepal too; though it may take some time to be available in the Nepalese book stores. Meanwhile, the Kindle version of the book shall be coming soon.

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost Plot to China
Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021, pp. 288, Rs. 495

Rishi Gupta is ICSSR Doctoral Fellow, Center for South Asian Studies, JNU, India; Senior Fellow, Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs, Kathmandu

(Courtesy: New Spotlight newsmagazine)

China Seeks to Secure its Role in Nepal

Sanjay Upadhya

Bereft of an ally since the collapse of monarchical rule in Nepal nearly four years ago, China has been struggling to secure its place in the buffer state, wedged between China's volatile Tibet region and its regional rival, India. Hardly a month goes by now without a high-level Chinese delegation arriving in Kathmandu seeking assurances on its security interests.

In February 2005, China offered then-King Gyanendra a lifeline by calling his seizure of power, which otherwise prompted widespread international condemnation, an internal matter. A year later, when the royal regime no longer seemed tenable, China scrambled to build ties with the mainstream opposition parties. When the monarchy finally capitulated in the face of massive popular protests, China began building ties with the country's Maoist rebels, despite having previously armed the royal government to crush the group. ...

Originally published on Wednesday, Jan. 13, 2010

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4936/china-seeks-to-secure-its-role-in-nepal

Tibet Unrest Squeezes an Unstable Nepal

Sanjay Upadhya 

From the TV footage coming out of Nepal these days, it is easy to forget that the Himalayan nation is struggling to build a viable democracy. Almost every day since mid-March, when anti-Chinese protests erupted in Tibet and other countries, images of Nepali police beating Tibetan demonstrators have been beamed around the world.

Nepal’s major political parties and former Maoist rebels have promised to build an open and inclusive state after years of turmoil. The people are preparing to vote April 10 for a new assembly that would write a new constitution embodying a federal democratic republic. Yet barely two years after having defied King Gyanendra’s direct rule, Nepali parties seem to have emulated the palace in cracking down on another group of pro-democracy protesters. ...

Originally published on Tuesday, April 1, 2008

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1876/tibet-unrest-squeezes-an-unstable-nepal

Excerpts: Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

“Burdened with micromanaging Nepalese affairs while studiously denying doing so, India had the additional responsibility of looking after American interests. When the United States veered too close to the interests of its European partners on social issues, India understandably felt uncomfortable. China had the freedom to act alone. Perhaps India considered the erosion of its influence temporary and reversible over the long run. But the run kept getting longer.” 

**********

“Privately, Nepalese leaders often voice exasperation with the conduct of their Chinese counterparts, but none match the public candour reserved for Indian politicians and bureaucrats. Should China’s public affirmations to uphold Nepalese sovereignty and independence become monotonous to the point of triteness, Nepalese scepticism could lead in the opposite direction. Admittedly, this will not be enough to counteract the far deeper distrust of India. Growing acknowledgement of Nepal’s strategic vulnerability, however, might make the Nepalese more understanding of their own interests.”

**********

“Beijing believes Nepal, like every sovereign and independent country, has the right to devise its own relationship with China. As part of that effort, China regularly pledges to bolster aid and trade to lift ties with Nepal to ‘a new high’. There are Nepalese who maintain China is asking too much from Nepal – i.e., subjecting itself to the full force of India’s political and economic wrath – for few tangible gains. Non-conditionality in Chinese assistance loses its meaning when Beijing eternally poses the Tibet litmus test on Kathmandu.”

**********

“Chinese acquiescence in India’s primacy in Nepal – if that is a correct characterisation of Beijing’s stand even when it professes it – would operate within the context of China’s interests. Yet Indian commentators and analysts have taken gleeful pride at instances where they saw Beijing discarding Kathmandu. In far subdued tones, however, Chinese analysts refused to acknowledge that phases of pullback represented a conscious decision by Beijing to recognise Indian paramountcy in Nepal. The logical extension of that contention would be a resumption of Chinese rivalry with India for influence in Nepal and wider South Asia when circumstances became more propitious for Beijing.”

**********

“Sustained disregard for Nepalese grievances fuelled perceptions over time that India was attempting to delegitimise them. As a result, the territory in dispute not only ballooned in size but became so etched in Nepal’s Constitution. The continued temptation to see the dispute as a Chinese-inspired ploy to weaken India on another key front is not only misguided. It is a misreading of reality, given that Nepal’s own relationship with China is not free from suspicion. The Nepalese still recall Beijing’s eagerness to sign the Lipulekh agreement without consulting Nepal when things were going its way.”

**********

“Some Indians suggest that since 1954 China and India have had an understanding on Nepal. India and China, this interpretation goes, would do nothing to undermine each other’s vital interests beyond the Himalayas. According to this understanding, India has been hosting the Dalai Lama’s government in exile without supporting its claims for independence or greater autonomy for Tibet. If there was such an arrangement on Nepal and it had survived the 1962 war, the Chinese gave little indication of its existence.” 

**********

“Nepal recognises that most pledges from China to ease the country’s dependence on India foresee the long term. Moreover, little of tangible consequence has even begun, a fact that has the potential to raise public impatience. Greater exposure to Chinese business tactics, the darker side of growing interactions such as crime, and the general Chinese perceptions of themselves and their place in the world risk bringing more Nepalese discontent to the fore. Dismissing Nepalese grievances with India as Chinese-instigated ploys could present New Delhi with stricter challenges from Beijing from Nepal. This assertion stems not from Nepalese arrogance but from anguish over the additional pain that might be inflicted upon the country.”

**********

“Although Beijing considers the situation in the Tibetan region more stable, it expects the region to continue to be a core factor in relations with Kathmandu. With the three external powers most active on the Tibet issue – India, the United States and the European Union – increasingly involved in Nepal’s peace process, Beijing’s concerns about renewed potential for destabilisation from that volatile frontier have grown. The inevitable passing of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and ensuing succession politics are certain to energise an increasingly restless exile community in Nepal and those living across the porous border in India.”

**********

“The Chinese have moved beyond Tibet in their engagement with Nepal, at least in the traditional sense. There is new recognition in China that, given its border disputes with India and absence of diplomatic relations with Bhutan, only Nepal could provide it physical connectivity to South Asia. Beijing has divided South Asia into western (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and eastern (India at the centre) components and sees Nepal the most viable bridge to the latter. Expressions of such benign motives are not going to impress India, which has long seen Chinese trans-Himalayan ambitions as growing from a desire to keep a check on India’s rising capabilities.”

**********

“[I]nstead of obsessing over why the Nepalese see China the way they do, India might want to delve deeper into how China sees Nepal. Although it might not advertise it, Beijing sees Tibet and Nepal as part of its integrated ‘peripheral policy’. Nepal’s northern border is an easy gateway to the Tibet Autonomous Region. China worries that political instability in Nepal could lead to enhanced anti-Chinese activities in Nepal. Every time India is tempted to wave the Tibet card to China, it is enough to wobble Nepal.”

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021, Rs. 495

Islamist-Communist Alliance in South Asia: Hyperbole or Hazard?

Sanjay Upadhya 

Patterns of a resurgence in cooperation between Islamic extremists and radical communists -- faint in some places, more pronounced in others -- are emerging. While much of the current focus is on parts of Europe, South Asia could emerge as the principal arena for a communist-jihadist alliance.

Depending on whom you talk to, an alliance between Islamic extremists and radical communists is either more sinister war-on-terror hyperbole or a clear and present danger. At the most basic level, the two groups are divided by their outlook on the supreme being. For Islamist extremists, killing in the name of and dying for God is an investment in the hereafter. But the communist's variety of death and destruction is motivated by a worldview rooted in materialism. ...

Originally published on Thursday, Nov. 1, 2007

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1295/islamist-communist-alliance-in-south-asia-hyperbole-or-hazard

Nepal is Early Test for China-India Efforts at Cooperation

Sanjay Upadhya 

While much of the region is busy analyzing the aftermath of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's high-profile visit to China this month, one fragile nation finds itself squeezed harder in the middle.

For nearly two years, leading political parties and former Maoist rebels in Nepal, sandwiched between the Asian giants, have been precariously following a New Delhi-brokered roadmap to peace. Amid the uncertainty, China has stepped up its role in the tiny landlocked Himalayan nation. The future of Nepal, including whether it becomes a republic or retains some form of monarchy, seems inextricably linked to its neighbors. ...

Originally published on Thursday, Jan. 24, 2008

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1533/nepal-is-early-test-for-china-india-efforts-at-cooperation

Excerpts: Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

“Burdened with micromanaging Nepalese affairs while studiously denying doing so, India had the additional responsibility of looking after American interests. When the United States veered too close to the interests of its European partners on social issues, India understandably felt uncomfortable. China had the freedom to act alone. Perhaps India considered the erosion of its influence temporary and reversible over the long run. But the run kept getting longer.” 

**********

“Privately, Nepalese leaders often voice exasperation with the conduct of their Chinese counterparts, but none match the public candour reserved for Indian politicians and bureaucrats. Should China’s public affirmations to uphold Nepalese sovereignty and independence become monotonous to the point of triteness, Nepalese scepticism could lead in the opposite direction. Admittedly, this will not be enough to counteract the far deeper distrust of India. Growing acknowledgement of Nepal’s strategic vulnerability, however, might make the Nepalese more understanding of their own interests.”

**********

“Beijing believes Nepal, like every sovereign and independent country, has the right to devise its own relationship with China. As part of that effort, China regularly pledges to bolster aid and trade to lift ties with Nepal to ‘a new high’. There are Nepalese who maintain China is asking too much from Nepal – i.e., subjecting itself to the full force of India’s political and economic wrath – for few tangible gains. Non-conditionality in Chinese assistance loses its meaning when Beijing eternally poses the Tibet litmus test on Kathmandu.”

**********

“Chinese acquiescence in India’s primacy in Nepal – if that is a correct characterisation of Beijing’s stand even when it professes it – would operate within the context of China’s interests. Yet Indian commentators and analysts have taken gleeful pride at instances where they saw Beijing discarding Kathmandu. In far subdued tones, however, Chinese analysts refused to acknowledge that phases of pullback represented a conscious decision by Beijing to recognise Indian paramountcy in Nepal. The logical extension of that contention would be a resumption of Chinese rivalry with India for influence in Nepal and wider South Asia when circumstances became more propitious for Beijing.”

**********

“Sustained disregard for Nepalese grievances fuelled perceptions over time that India was attempting to delegitimise them. As a result, the territory in dispute not only ballooned in size but became so etched in Nepal’s Constitution. The continued temptation to see the dispute as a Chinese-inspired ploy to weaken India on another key front is not only misguided. It is a misreading of reality, given that Nepal’s own relationship with China is not free from suspicion. The Nepalese still recall Beijing’s eagerness to sign the Lipulekh agreement without consulting Nepal when things were going its way.”

**********

“Some Indians suggest that since 1954 China and India have had an understanding on Nepal. India and China, this interpretation goes, would do nothing to undermine each other’s vital interests beyond the Himalayas. According to this understanding, India has been hosting the Dalai Lama’s government in exile without supporting its claims for independence or greater autonomy for Tibet. If there was such an arrangement on Nepal and it had survived the 1962 war, the Chinese gave little indication of its existence.” 

**********

“Nepal recognises that most pledges from China to ease the country’s dependence on India foresee the long term. Moreover, little of tangible consequence has even begun, a fact that has the potential to raise public impatience. Greater exposure to Chinese business tactics, the darker side of growing interactions such as crime, and the general Chinese perceptions of themselves and their place in the world risk bringing more Nepalese discontent to the fore. Dismissing Nepalese grievances with India as Chinese-instigated ploys could present New Delhi with stricter challenges from Beijing from Nepal. This assertion stems not from Nepalese arrogance but from anguish over the additional pain that might be inflicted upon the country.”

**********

“Although Beijing considers the situation in the Tibetan region more stable, it expects the region to continue to be a core factor in relations with Kathmandu. With the three external powers most active on the Tibet issue – India, the United States and the European Union – increasingly involved in Nepal’s peace process, Beijing’s concerns about renewed potential for destabilisation from that volatile frontier have grown. The inevitable passing of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and ensuing succession politics are certain to energise an increasingly restless exile community in Nepal and those living across the porous border in India.”

**********

“The Chinese have moved beyond Tibet in their engagement with Nepal, at least in the traditional sense. There is new recognition in China that, given its border disputes with India and absence of diplomatic relations with Bhutan, only Nepal could provide it physical connectivity to South Asia. Beijing has divided South Asia into western (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and eastern (India at the centre) components and sees Nepal the most viable bridge to the latter. Expressions of such benign motives are not going to impress India, which has long seen Chinese trans-Himalayan ambitions as growing from a desire to keep a check on India’s rising capabilities.”

**********

“[I]nstead of obsessing over why the Nepalese see China the way they do, India might want to delve deeper into how China sees Nepal. Although it might not advertise it, Beijing sees Tibet and Nepal as part of its integrated ‘peripheral policy’. Nepal’s northern border is an easy gateway to the Tibet Autonomous Region. China worries that political instability in Nepal could lead to enhanced anti-Chinese activities in Nepal. Every time India is tempted to wave the Tibet card to China, it is enough to wobble Nepal.”

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021, Rs. 495

China’s Fast-Track to South Asia

Sanjay Upadhya 

China’s new railroad linking the city of Golmud in Qinghai province with Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, is a $4.2 billion engineering feat. Stretching 710 miles at an average elevation of 13,000 ft, it is the highest railroad in the world.

Technological excellence was not the only reason why President Hu Jintao called the line a "magnificent feat" while flagging off the inaugural run on July 1. The railroad is a powerful instrument with which Beijing hopes to complete the full integration of Tibet with the mainland. ...

Originally published on Wednesday, July 19, 2006

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/66/chinas-fast-track-to-south-asia

INTERVIEW - Sanjay Upadhya: Journey Through South Asia

Today, we have a renowned author and journalist, Mr. Sanjay Upadhya, joining us from Florida where he will be explaining his experiences in South Asia and revealing information about the true culture in the region.

INTERVIEW: India-Nepal Relations: Post-2014

Foreign Policy Research Center Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya

1. How does Nepal look at India’s ‘Neighborhood First’ Policy post-2014?

Nepal welcomed Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s election in 2014 as a harbinger of change in bilateral relations. Over the months, Mr. Modi overtures – rhetorical as well as real – reinforced Nepali perceptions of the advent of a positive era. The economic blockade India imposed the following year changed all that. If India had any legitimate reservations on the content of Nepal’s new constitution as well as the nature and direction of Nepal’s growing relationship with China, New Delhi could have chosen to address them through proper diplomatic and political channels. To this day, the Nepali people do not know much about India’s grievances.
That India used an agitation launched by Nepali Madhesi leaders for greater internal autonomy to camouflage its imposition of a wholesale economic blockade for months on only served to validate Nepali perceptions of the enduring nature of the divide-and-rule policy India had inherited from the British Raj. Moreover, the fact that the blockade came merely months after Nepal suffered a devastating earthquake only hardened Nepali sentiments. The blockade has left Nepal in a cautious wait-and-see mood vis-à-vis any Indian initiatives such as ‘Neighborhood First’.

2. How does India look at Nepal’s foreign policy – From ‘looking at India’ to ‘backing up China’?

China’s growing assertiveness in Nepal is an undeniable reality. It is also true that Nepal continues to use its relations with China to balance India – sometimes too flagrantly. Today Nepal is ruled by a Communist Party formed recently by two factions sharing a pronounced Maoist legacy, which is new experience for the country. Nepali opposition parties regularly caution the government against tilting to the north out of sheer ideological fealty. It would be wrong, however, to view official Nepali policies and pronouncements as an outgrowth of some collective national strain of anti-Indianism.
In 2006, India played a major role in facilitating the alliance between mainstream democratic parties and the Maoist rebels to restore peace after a 10-year ‘people’s war’. Yet Chinese engagement in the economic, social and cultural spheres of Nepal has grown precipitously since 2006. While the causes and consequences of China’s expanding footprint in Nepal precisely during this period continues to be studied extensively in Nepal and India, there has been a natural political impact of Beijing’s active engagement. We cannot keep dwelling on the supposed ease with which Nepal flashes the China card against India at every opportunity without trying to understand the real compulsions that may lay behind Nepal’s recent policies and pronouncements.

3. Do you agree that India’s effort to revitalize BIMSTEC is signaling that its foreign policy is now shifting to address the reservations of its neighbours?

Nepal looks forward to the revitalization of BIMSTEC as a new dimension of regional cooperation for collective prosperity. The eastward shift of the locus to include new partners certainly brings new opportunities for Nepal. At the same time, there is a feeling in Nepal that BIMSTEC may be evolving in a way that would supplant the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Nepal is fully behind the notion that bilateral issues, such as those between India and Pakistan, must not be allowed to hold back regional cooperation. However, it also recognizes the limits that could be imposed by overtly exclusionary efforts. SAARC and BIMSTEC are antithetical entities and should not be considered as such.

4. Why did Nepal prefer to be neutral during the Doklam standoff in 2017?

From Nepal’s perspective, the Doklam standoff was a symptom of the larger border dispute between India and China. New Delhi and Beijing have wisely decided not to let their long-running border dispute prevent cooperation in other mutually beneficial areas. Yet Nepal cannot be oblivious to the possibility of periodic India-China border flare-ups pending a formal and final settlement between the two countries. More importantly, Nepal recognizes the direct and dire implications of such tensions given its own precarious position between the two giant neighbors. As such, Nepal needs to maintain extreme judiciousness in its approach so as to do no further harm. Neutrality on Doklam was guided by Nepal’s national interest.

5. India bashing is still a favorite sport with most Nepalis who blame New Delhi for most of the ills in their country little knowing the dynamics of relations between both countries. Do you subscribe to this viewpoint?

This has been a long-standing trait in Nepal because of the rich political value it produces domestically. However, a shift in Nepali public opinion is also becoming palpable in recent years. There is growing recognition that Nepal must engage more constructively with India on all contentious issues and shun grandstanding in order to sustain a mutually productive relationship. Over the last decade, increasing contacts with China in different areas have allowed Nepal to compare and contrast its relationship with each neighbor. There is growing appreciation of how geography, culture, politics and language bring Nepal closer to India as well as the advantages they offer. History and geography as well as the realities of the modern world have taught us that Nepal-India and Nepal-China relations cannot and need not be mutually exclusive.

6. Do you believe transforming the India-Nepal border from an ‘open border’ to a ‘closed border’ would severely damage the traditional socio-cultural ties?

I do. More than that, I am not sure Nepal can sustain the short-term costs closing the border would entail – or even whether the costs would be short. Nepalis recognize the benefits accruing from an open border with India very well because they are living it every day. In a spirit of true reciprocity, Nepal should address the political, security, economic and diplomatic concerns of India as far as practicable to maintain what I believe is a basic underpinning of our vital relationship.

7. What are the existing security relations and strategic perceptions of India and Nepal? What are the reasons for the erosion of mutuality and its impact on Indo-Nepal relationship?

Theoretically, at least, the key underpinnings of a robust security relationship between Nepal and India are in place. Concerns on both sides relate to implementation of those commitments. Each country has grievances over the safe haven criminals and questionable characters enjoy on the other side of the border. As far as Nepal is concerned, India may perhaps pause to consider whether lack of action on the part of Nepali authorities is deliberate or is rooted in administrative and police weaknesses. This is not to deny the existence of malicious motives behind certain cases.
On contentious cases, India could approach Nepal on a case-by-case basis. Definitional gaps relating to criminal activities need to be handled through legal and judicial institutions.

Similarly, the strategic perceptions of each country are defined by realities based on their sovereign existence. The erosion of mutuality is rooted in the tendency on both sides to attribute every instance of inaction, hesitation and deliberation to some deep-seated antipathy toward the other. However, I do see signs of change for the better on both sides. One is that India and China have become more aware of the potential of third countries engaged with Nepal to disrupt the stability of what is emerging as a vital triangular Sino-Indian-Nepali relationship. Of course, there is a vast distance between recognizing something and doing something about it. Still, this realization could provide a sound basis for positive action for all three countries to usher in a phase of peace and prosperity in the region.

8. Indian army chief General Bipin Rawat says Nepal and Bhutan cannot delink from India due to geography, cautions countries against China’s aid. Do you agree with this statement?

There is little to quibble with the first part of Gen. Rawat’s statement. The second part is problematic on at least two counts. First, any decision on whether to accept Chinese aid has to be made by Nepalis themselves. Second, Gen. Rawat’s caution comes from his specific and specialized vantage point, i.e., the Indian military, which is but one dimension of relations between states.
Nepali decision-makers and the public are aware enough of the global debate surrounding costs and benefits of Chinese assistance. Nepalis are equally aware that China, like India, is a sovereign and independent country that makes decisions based on its values, attitudes, needs and expectations. Based on a careful assessment of relevant considerations, Nepalis should be free to make decisions. Of course, Nepalis should listen to the views and perspectives of people like Gen. Rawat in a spirit of utmost goodwill.

9. The proposed China-Nepal railway is expected to be game-changer. Nepal’s hope is that apart from new trading opportunities, the railway will offer a crucial lifeline against potential Indian blockades. Do you agree?

The China-Nepal railway has been a promise dating back to the first meeting between King Birendra and Chairman Mao in the early 1970s, when it was a technical improbability. Even though the idea is becoming more feasible, Nepalis have gradually come around to realizing the futility of hyping it without at least gaining a vague idea of when it might eventually come into operation. From most accounts, the project is still in the technical feasibility phase. Then there are questions of funding. Furthermore, we need to know what those trains will carry into Nepal and how those commodities and products will eventually be priced and whether Nepalis can afford them as an alternative to supplies from India.
Yes, there are people who think the Chinese railway will offer a crucial lifeline against potential Indian blockades. Even if that were true, I think such a focus would be misplaced. We need to deploy our collective efforts to conduct Nepal-India relations in an atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill so as to preclude future blockades.

10. Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his May 2018 visit said India-Nepal relations are like those of a family and that misunderstandings were now over. However, India remained silent on exchanging banned Indian notes parked in various financial and banking institutions and held by general people. Any prospects of solution to this problem?

From media accounts and public pronouncement of key Indian political figures, it seems India has realized that the blockade was a mistake. Nepali leaders, too, while periodically raking up the issue of the blockade, recognize the imperative of turning a new page. On the issue of banned Indian notes, it looks like both governments have decided to address the issue quietly.
The political process facilitated by India in 2006 eventually abolished the monarchy two years later and ushered in a political order that – at least, theoretically – has broadened popular political participation and inclusion. Perhaps as an unintended consequence, it has also created strategic ambiguity as a multiplicity of actors such as the European Union and the United States are active alongside India and China, sometimes at cross-purposes. Amid growing disenchantment with the government and even the political order, many Nepalis are watching whether Prime Minister Modi’s second term will see any significant change in India’s Nepal policy.

FPRC Journal, 38-2019(2), Foreign Policy Research Center, New Delhi, 2019.

AUTHOR INTERVIEW: Sanjay Upadhya Speaks About His New Book ‘Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China’

Vitasta Books’ KANISHK SHEKHAR in conversation with author SANJAY UPADHYA on Nepal’s wider geopolitical dynamics

In Conversation: Sanjay Upadhya

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

Happy to announce that I will be speaking about my new book Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China with Kanishk Shekhar on Saturday, January 16. 

Please do join us if you can.

URL https://lnkd.in/eVbSG_u

How China Outsmarted India in Nepal

In Backfire in Nepal, SANJAY UPADHYA explores how China has become the ultimate beneficiary of India’s democracy-promotion agenda in the Himalayan state

New Delhi had made a bold bet in 2005, but one that contained two mutually fortifying flaws: the abolition of the monarchy and the empowerment of the former Maoist rebels. The world’s only Hindu monarch and kingdom were bound to India in a special relationship that neither country needed to define or assert. True, Indians had been put off by successive Nepalese monarchs playing New Delhi off against Beijing. In retrospect, a little more compassion for Nepal’s compulsions might have put things into sharper relief.

Nepalese Maoists, being communists first, were trained to denounce Indian ‘expansionism’ before American ‘imperialism’. Experience may have impelled the senior leadership to make practical compromises. It was a leap of faith for New Delhi to trust the leadership to rein in their cadres’ radicalism.

More broadly, since India had also enlisted Western democracies, it needed to address their often-contradictory concerns throughout Nepal’s turbulent transition. The Chinese could act purely on their national interests. India continues to misread how Beijing sees Nepal – both in terms of China’s visions of the past and the future. This complicates the core trilateral challenge: ensuring that Nepal is not sucked deeper into the Sino-Indian vortex, only to be scorned for aggravating the Asian giants’ rivalry.

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495

South Asia 101: Democracy And Geopolitics

By Sanjay Upadhya

Before he flew into Dhaka to attend the much-delayed summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh warned of the danger of failed states emerging in the region. Long before he left the Bangladeshi capital, Dr. Singh must have discovered the futility of India’s worry of having to bear the neighborhood’s burdens alone.

Without a seat at the conference table, China had already become part of regional deliberations. India’s “near abroad” had stepped out far ahead in time.

India’s proposal to include Afghanistan as SAARC’s eighth member was expected to sail through – until Nepal stepped in. The Nepalese delegation threatened to veto Afghanistan’s entry unless China was included in the organization as an observer or dialogue partner. The 13th summit of South Asia’s premier grouping already had its share of bad luck. Last year’s tsunami had forced Bangladesh to reschedule the conference for early February. In protest against King Gyanendra’s dismissal of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s multiparty government and takeover of full executive powers, India pulled out of the rescheduled summit.

New Delhi imposed an arms embargo on the Royal Nepalese Army battling a fierce Maoist insurgency in the kingdom. Over the months, India-Nepal relations have hit rock bottom. The Singh government’s handling of the Nepal crisis has revealed ruptures in the Indian political establishment as well.

Playing the gracious host, Bangladesh, where the organization was founded 20 years ago, urged the Indian and Nepalese delegations to sort out their differences. SAARC, which operates on the principle of consensus, eventually configured a compromise. Afghanistan would be invited to join immediately, while the SAARC council of ministers would decide the structure of China’s—and Japan’s—association at a meeting next July.

In asserting India’s equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine, Singh had the option of coming out explicitly against China’s inclusion in SAARC. It had geography on its side, although globalization has diminished the value of that attribute. Then reality set in. If India could see virtue in forging closer links with the Association of South East Asian Nations, could China be faulted for wanting to do the same with SAARC?

For some reason, Indian leaders, who can take on the sole surviving superpower with remarkable assurance, find themselves significantly restrained when it comes to China. Indian objections to China’s entry were couched in such terms as “modalities”, “precedence” and “memorandum of understanding”.

Officially, Pakistan supported Afghanistan’s membership – in one of the rare instances of cooperation between South Asia’s nuclear-armed rivals—so it could avoid India’s direct censure for having spoiled the party. In response to Indian concerns over where to draw the line once such a broad welcome mat were placed at the SAARC door, one Pakistani official urged everyone to look at the bright side: the organization’s popularity.

Amused, the other three members – Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives – joined the host in urging New Delhi and Kathmandu to resolve their differences in the interest of preserving what they had. Thirteen summits in 20 years was hardly a record to be proud of. China, for its part, remained studiously silent over the entire affair.

Much of India’s antagonism was heaped on Nepal and perhaps will continue to be. With Nepali Congress president Girija Prasad Koirala currently in New Delhi and United Marxist-Leninist general secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal just back from extensive consultations there, it was hardly surprising to see the seven-party anti-palace alliance criticize King Gyanendra for playing the so-called “China card”.

But was the issue really the surprise the Indians accused Nepal of springing at the last minute? On the eve of the summit, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reasserted his country’s desire to strengthen cooperation with South Asian countries to achieve common prosperity. In less official settings, the Chinese have been more candid in their desire to join the group.

More significantly, the Chinese spokesman’s remark came against the background of Beijing’s steady extension of its economic reach in South Asia. China’s trade volume with all South Asian nations is close to $20 billion a year, of which $13.6 billion is with India. Although they run trade deficits with Beijing, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal receive significant economic assistance from China.

In a clear display of China’s growing political influence in the region, all four nations affirm the “one-China” policy that views Taiwan as an inalienable part of the mainland. Similarly, they recognize Tibet as an integral part of China.

On the sidelines of the summit, Dr. Singh was anxious to re-educate King Gyanendra on the basic tenets of democracy. In the main sessions, the Indian prime minister got a crash course on geopolitics.

Originally published on November 14, 2005