‘World Realities Give India and Russia Enough Space for Cooperation Amid New Challenge’
Foreign Policy Research Center Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya
1. Does Russia continue to be a “time-tested partner of India”? If this is not so, what does it need to correct the ‘perceptions’, and re-strengthen the link?
I think the terms of the ongoing debate serve to cloud the contours of the bilateral relationship. Pithy slogans certainly help drive the news cycle. Yet, in nations’ lives, deliberation and discrimination will always remain central. The notion of a ‘reset’ in Indo-Russian ties tends to be equated with benchmarks and baselines of the past. Amid changing world realities, India and Russia are forced to reassess and readjust their immediate and near-term policies in conformity with their national interests. India and Russia may no longer face some of the objective conditions underpinning the 1971 Peace and Friendship Treaty. Nor may they confront the same realities that obtained during the transition from the tottering Soviet Union to the Russian Federation and India’s concurrent efforts to unshackle itself from socialist economic verities.
Amid the robustness of the debate surrounding India’s international outlook and orientation, there is recognition that its policy of ‘strategic autonomy’ has stood the test of time; New Delhi is in no mood to bandwagon itself with the West. Moreover, the nationalist strain permeating India’s international outlook, the resurgence of nationalism in Russia and the two countries’ respective visions of the evolving world and their respective place in it create enough space for cooperation amid new challenges. Any quest to dwell on exclusively issue-based appraisals would certainly prove to be more depressing than the general direction India and Russia’s core interests would dictate in the future.
1. Does Russia continue to be a “time-tested partner of India”? If this is not so, what does it need to correct the ‘perceptions’, and re-strengthen the link?
I think the terms of the ongoing debate serve to cloud the contours of the bilateral relationship. Pithy slogans certainly help drive the news cycle. Yet, in nations’ lives, deliberation and discrimination will always remain central. The notion of a ‘reset’ in Indo-Russian ties tends to be equated with benchmarks and baselines of the past. Amid changing world realities, India and Russia are forced to reassess and readjust their immediate and near-term policies in conformity with their national interests. India and Russia may no longer face some of the objective conditions underpinning the 1971 Peace and Friendship Treaty. Nor may they confront the same realities that obtained during the transition from the tottering Soviet Union to the Russian Federation and India’s concurrent efforts to unshackle itself from socialist economic verities.
Amid the robustness of the debate surrounding India’s international outlook and orientation, there is recognition that its policy of ‘strategic autonomy’ has stood the test of time; New Delhi is in no mood to bandwagon itself with the West. Moreover, the nationalist strain permeating India’s international outlook, the resurgence of nationalism in Russia and the two countries’ respective visions of the evolving world and their respective place in it create enough space for cooperation amid new challenges. Any quest to dwell on exclusively issue-based appraisals would certainly prove to be more depressing than the general direction India and Russia’s core interests would dictate in the future.
2. Balancing Russia and the United States is a challenge to India’s multi-alignment policy?
Given that realpolitik remains the underlying driver of India’s attitudes and outlook, creating such a balance will remain an enduring endeavor not only because of the rapidity of change across the world but also the perceptions driven by social media et al. Realism in its offensive, defensive or any other connotation may not enjoy much public reputation. Still, those who theorize and practice international relations do recognize its centrality to nations’ behavior. Certain phases of history may have conferred different names to this balancing, such as ‘nonalignment’, but even then, core national interests impelled India and Soviet Union to move closer despite outward divergences such as their antithetical political systems.
3. How do you look at the apparent recent reset in Pakistani-Russian relations? What are its implications for India?
The virtual American abandonment of Pakistan amid that country’s centrality to the region’s peace and stability gave Moscow the incentive and opportunity to cultivate Islamabad. From outward appearances, it is understandable to view the development as a loss to India. Russia must have weighed all variables vis-à-vis its relations with India against those with China and come to certain conclusions.
Viewed from the larger perspective of South and Central Asia’s search for a new equilibrium amid new global realities, the development would make far saner sense. I believe India’s strategic, diplomatic and political community has, over the past 70 years, accumulated the wisdom to see both the risks and opportunities inherent in such developments and make prudent adjustments.
Viewed from the larger perspective of South and Central Asia’s search for a new equilibrium amid new global realities, the development would make far saner sense. I believe India’s strategic, diplomatic and political community has, over the past 70 years, accumulated the wisdom to see both the risks and opportunities inherent in such developments and make prudent adjustments.
4. How will India’s involvement in the Quad and the promotion of the Indo-Pacific strategy impact on Indo-Russian ties?
The exuberance surrounding the Quad owes much to the fact that advocates and adversaries alike are seeing whatever they want in the undertaking. The institutional, attitudinal and operational dynamics the Quad needs to become an instrument to prevent China’s rise or moderate its international behavior are sorely lacking. The contradictions among the partners are bound to become more pronounced as the details of the Quad, the Indo-Pacific policies are worked out. For now, perceptions of an emergent anti-China bloc help the members. Beijing, too, benefits from the ‘China under siege’ narrative as an extension of its ‘century of humiliation’ credo.
Globalization was hyped as a cure-all in the post-Cold War era. Yet we cannot underestimate the effort nations placed in creating conducive structures and policies to further political, economic and other interactions across the globe. And the benefits have no doubt been immense. Yet the core realities of nations and nationalism that persisted long before the Covid-19 pandemic stripped the camouflage of contrived camaraderie. The world needs to be mindful of the risks of going overboard in the opposite direction.
Globalization was hyped as a cure-all in the post-Cold War era. Yet we cannot underestimate the effort nations placed in creating conducive structures and policies to further political, economic and other interactions across the globe. And the benefits have no doubt been immense. Yet the core realities of nations and nationalism that persisted long before the Covid-19 pandemic stripped the camouflage of contrived camaraderie. The world needs to be mindful of the risks of going overboard in the opposite direction.
5. Moscow has increasingly leaned on China both for support as well as a way to undermine American power. How effective are Moscow’s efforts to facilitate contacts and dialogue between Delhi and Beijing? Does RIC—the Russia, India, and China grouping—stand for anything useful?
The western commentariat has been obsessed with how close or distant Russia and China are and will be. As massive civilizational states with their own characteristics, coexistence poses its own challenges. For their part, Moscow, New Delhi and Beijing are aware of both the contradictions and complementarities inherent in the evolving trilateral dynamics. That Moscow and Beijing appear to coordinate their policies on the UN Security Council does not mean the two countries should remain sanguine about their economic, demographic and aspirational disparities.
We can debate the extent to which Moscow played a role in containing the Sino-Indian border tensions. Still, the fact remains that such an effort could be made at all is because the three countries have a shared interest in not letting conflict undermine the extent of cooperation that has been possible through regional forums. How the multilateralism of the future will evolve remains an open question. The fact that Western definitions no longer dominate the debate suggests that we are in uncharted waters. Diplomacy and demagoguery will have to operate side by side, which certainly does heighten the challenge for all.
We can debate the extent to which Moscow played a role in containing the Sino-Indian border tensions. Still, the fact remains that such an effort could be made at all is because the three countries have a shared interest in not letting conflict undermine the extent of cooperation that has been possible through regional forums. How the multilateralism of the future will evolve remains an open question. The fact that Western definitions no longer dominate the debate suggests that we are in uncharted waters. Diplomacy and demagoguery will have to operate side by side, which certainly does heighten the challenge for all.
Sanjay Upadhya is a Nepalese journalist, author and analyst based in the United States. He has worked for the British Broadcasting Corporation, The Times of London, Inter Press Service, Khaleej Times and the United Nations. Upadhya is the author, most recently, of Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China (New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021). His previous books include Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry Between China and India (New York and London: Routledge, 2012) and The Raj Lives: India in Nepal (New Delhi: Vitasta, 2008).
