The Sanjay Upadhya Quintet

 

Democracy in Turns: A Political Account of Nepal

As Nepal struggles to construct a new democratic identity under its seventh constitution in as many decades, the wider machinations and manipulations that have dominated politics ever since the country emerged from the unification of petty principalities in the mid-eighteenth century continue to cast a long shadow, SANJAY UPADHYA argues.

DEMOCRACY IN TURNS critically examines the country’s past political experiments – complete with all key players and proceedings – in an effort to understand modern Nepali democracy and envision its future.

Democracy in Turns: A Political Account of Nepal on Amazon.com

Coming Soon: ‘Democracy in Turns: A Political Account of Nepal’ by Sanjay Upadhya (Kathmandu: FinePrint Books)

 

Coming Soon: ‘Democracy in Turns: A Political Account of Nepal’ by Sanjay Upadhya 

(Kathmandu: FinePrint Books)

Two Books on Nepali Political History Coming Out Soon

Two books on Nepali political history coming out one after another from FinePrint Books.

One, ‘Democracy in Turns’ by Sanjay Upadhya, coming out this month and the other, ‘Plains of Discontent’ by Max Mørch, coming out next month.

Coming Soon: ‘Democracy in Turns: A Political Account of Nepal’ by Sanjay Upadhya (Kathmandu: FinePrint Books)

भूराजनीतिक चुनौतीप्रति संवेदनशील हुँदाहुँदै पनि समग्र नेतृत्व भूमरीमा फसेझैं छ: सञ्जय उपाध्याय [अन्तर्वार्ता]

नेपाल सरकारले पौष २७ गते पृथ्वी जयन्तीमा राष्ट्रिय बिदा दियो। पृथ्वीनारायण शाहले नेपाललाई दुई ढुंगाबीचको तरुल भनेको ठानिन्छ। झण्डै अढाई सय वर्षपछि अहिले नेपालका विदेश नीतिसम्बन्धी चुनौतीहरु के कस्ता छन्? यीनै विषयवस्तुमा रहेर नेपाल लाइभ समूहका सल्लाहकार सम्पादक भगीरथ योगीले अमेरिकाको मिशिगनमा बस्दै आएका पत्रकार, लेखक तथा राजनीतिक विश्लेषक सञ्जय उपाध्याय सँग गरेको कुराकानीको सम्पादित अंश: 

दुईवटा प्रमुख कम्युनिष्ट पार्टीहरू मिलेर नाटकीय रुपमा बनेको प्रचण्ड नेतृत्वको सरकारलाई हाम्रा छिमेकीहरुले कसरी हेरिरहेका छन्?  
मेरो आफ्नो विश्लेषण भन्नुपर्दा चीनबाट सुरु गरौं। यो सरकार गठनमा चीनको के कति कस्तो हात थियो वा रह्यो? रहेन? त्यसबाहेक पनि चिनियाँ सरकारको एक किसिमको प्रतिक्रिया आयो। नाका खोल्ने, रेलको सम्भाव्यता अध्ययनका लागि  डेलिगेसन पठाउनेदेखि लिएर मलाई प्रमुख दुईवटा कुराहरु लागिरहेको छ। 

चीनलाई यो गठबन्धन सरकार बनेको एक किसिमको खुसी लागेको हुनुपर्छ। चिनियाँहरु साधारणतया नबोलेर काममार्फत् आफ्नो प्रतिक्रिया दिने गर्दछन्। दोस्रो यो हतारोले कस्तो लाग्छ भने यो विषयमा चिनियाँहरु अझै पूर्णरुपमा आश्वस्त छैनन् सरकार पूरै कार्यकाल चल्छ भन्ने बारेमा।

पोखरा अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय विमानस्थललाई ‘बेल्ट एण्ड रोड इनीशियटिभ’ (बीआरआई) सँग जोड्नेदेखि लिएर ग्लोबल सेक्युरिटी इनीशियटिभसँग जोड्ने उनीहरुको प्रयास, पहल आउनुको मतलब जे जति किसीमका आफ्ना स्वार्थ अनुकूलका सन्धि, सम्झौता, बुझाइहरु अहिले गराइहाल्न सकियो भने भरे भोलि यो सरकार के होला? कस्तो होला? त्यो अवस्थामा पनि सुरक्षित धरातलमा उभिरहौं भन्ने चिनियाँको एउटा भावना जस्तो पनि लाग्छ मलाई।

जहाँसम्म भारतसँगको कुरा छ, भारत अघिल्लो गठबन्धनको सरकार नै निरन्तरता होस् भन्ने चाहन्थ्यो। तर मलाई यस्तो पनि लाग्दछ कि भारतले धेरै पश्चिम निकट गठबन्धनको सरकार बनेको अवस्थामा, नेपालमा चीनको यसै उग्र उपस्थिति भइरहेको अवस्थामा अलिकति चीनलाई पनि चिढ्याएर जाने खालको सरकार रह्यो भने, त्यसको रियाक्सन जुन भारतलाई पर्न आउने हो, भारतले एक्लै खेप्नु पर्ने खालको बुझाइ हुनसक्छ। त्यसबाट मुक्त हुन यो सरकारलाई खासै इच्छा नहुँदा नहुँदै पनि सुरुमा समर्थन दिएर पछि नेपाली कांग्रेसबाट बाह्य सहयोगमार्फत् पनि त्यो नाटकीय रुपमा आएको देख्दछु म। त्यसलाई खुला रुपमा दिएको हुनुपर्छ भन्ने मलाई लाग्छ। 

तपाईंले प्रचण्ड नेतृत्वको सरकारलाई नेपाली कांग्रेसले बाह्य रुपमा गरेको सहयोगको कुरा उठाइहाल्नु भयो। नेपाली कांग्रेसको त्यस्तो निर्णयका पछाडी नेपालभित्रको आन्तरिक राजनीतिक समीकरण प्रमुख हो जस्तो लाग्छ कि नेपालको भूराजनीति?
मलाई त भूराजनीति नै हो भन्ने लाग्दछ। दक्षिणी छिमेकीको संलग्नता र पश्चिमतीरका अकाशे छिमेकीको पनि यो सरकारलाई गुड ह्यूमरमा राख्नको लागि अलिकति प्रयास भएकै आधारमा हो कि जस्तो लाग्छ। किन भने नेपाली कांग्रेसभित्रका प्रभावशाली आवाजहरुले विरोध गर्दा–गर्दै पनि यसमा बाह्य कारणले नै प्रमुखता पाएको भन्ने लाग्छ।

नेपालमा कम्युनिष्ट नेतृत्वको सरकार बन्यो भने भारत र अमेरिकाले रुचाउँदैनन् पनि भनिन्छ। यो भनाइ कत्तिको सत्य हो?
कम्युनिष्ट सरकार रुचाउँदैनन् भन्ने व्याख्या चाहिँ कत्तिको कम्युनिष्ट रहे हाम्रा पार्टीहरु? भन्नेसँग जोडिनुपर्ने हुन्छ। अब नामको मात्र कम्युनिष्ट भए परम्परागत कम्युनिज्मको भाष्य र सिद्धान्त हेर्दाखेरी। त्यसभित्र भारत र पश्चिमा मुलुकहरुले आफ‍ूलाई उभ्याउन सजिलो मार्ग पनि पाएका छन्। जसले गर्दा उनीहरुलाई त्यति असजिलो हुन्छ जस्तो लाग्दैन। शितयुद्धकालीन अवस्था जस्तो कम्युनिष्टहरुको विरोधको अवस्था छैन। 

नेपालमा नयाँ सरकार गठन भएसँगै चीन सरकारले बन्द गरेको एकतर्फी नाका खोलियो। रेल्वे परियोजनाको अध्ययन पनि अगाडि बढेको छ। यो केवल संयोग मात्रै हो कि? चीनले केही संकेत पनि गर्न खोजेको हो?
यस विषयमा चीनको संकेत प्रष्ट रुपमा बुझ्न सकिन्छ। कम्युनिष्ट नेतृत्वको मान्छेहरु पनि आफ्नो निजी कुराकानीमा भन्ने गर्दछन् कि चीन सरकारले ‘रेसिप्रसीटी’ बलियो बनाउनका लागि त्यस्तो केही गर्दो रहेनछ। एक किसिमको गुनासो सन् २००६ पछि, खास गरि माओवादीको पहिलो सरकारको पतनसँग जोडिएको कुराहरु सुनिन्थे। चीनका पनि आफ्ना गुनासा छन्। चीनले यही बेलामा हतारो गर्दा उसलाई दुई किसिमको फाइदा भयो। प्रतिबद्धता पनि गराइहालौं। कम्युनिष्ट घटक आएकोमा खुसी छौं है हामी भन्ने किसिमले एउटा संकेत दिएको र अब तिमीहरुको पालो हो। तिमीहरुले आफ्नो तर्फबाट जुन सम्झौताहरुलाई अगाडि बढाउनु पर्ने आवश्यकता छ, त्यसमा पहल सुरु गर्छौं भन्ने आश राख्दै संकेत दिएको जस्तो लाग्छ। 

नेपालको सन्दर्भमा कुरा गर्दा चीन तिब्बतको सुरक्षाबारे बढी संवेदनशील छ भन्ने सुनिन्छ। नेपालबाट चीनले अपेक्षा गरेको खास कुरा के हो?
चीनका जनमत निर्माताहरुको कुरा सुन्यो भने, व्यापार, भौतिक संरचनाहरु, दक्षिण एसियाली क्षेत्रसँगको एउटा पुल  (ल्याण्ड ब्रिज) पश्चिमतिरबाट पाकिस्तान पूर्वतिर नेपालबाट गर्न सक्छौं भन्ने उनीहरुको ध्येय र आकांक्षा देखिन्छ। 

तर अल्टिमेट्ली गएर बुझ्दा चाहिँ तिब्बत नै हो। तिब्बत किन हो भन्दा विस्तारै वर्तमान दलाई लामाको शेषपछि नयाँ दलाई लामाको चयनको कुरा पनि आउँछ। त्यसमा चीनभित्र, चीन बाहिरबाट कसलाई बनाउने भन्ने आफ्नै प्रक्रियामा सबै लागिपर्ने देखिन्छ। वृहत् तिब्बती परम्पराको सन्दर्भमा हेर्दा आज एउटा दलाई लामा गएपछि अर्का दलाई लामा भोलिपल्ट आउने प्रक्रिया थिएन। यदि त्यो कायम रह्यो भने उनीहरु तीन चार वर्षको प्रक्रियामा जान्छन्।

उत्तराधिकारी बालक यही चाहिँ हो भन्ने पत्ता लगाएर नयाँ दलाई लामा घोषणा गर्ने हिसाबले त्यो प्रकृयाबाट चयन गरिएका दलाई लामालाई बाह्य सरकारहरुले कति मान्लान्? आफ्नो ठाउँमा छँदैछ। तर त्यो नेपालका लागि तत्कालीन अवस्था हुन्छ। जसमा चीनलाई सत्ता (रिजिम) को सुरक्षा खतरा छ भन्ने आयो कम्युनिष्ट पार्टीको कंग्रेसमा।

त्योसँग जोड्दा उसको सीमा सुरक्षा नै तिब्बत मामलाबाट नेपाललाई उचाल्न सक्छ। ताइवान लगायतका ५-७ वटा विषयबाट चीनलाई खतरा महसुस भएको देखिन्छ। त्यसमा नेपालबाट आउने तिब्बतको मामलामा सीमा सुरक्षा, आवत जावतको प्रक्रिया नबढोस् भनेर त्यहाँ स्थानीय रुपमा पनि प्रदर्शन नबढोस् भन्नेमा चीन चनाखो देखिन्छ। नेपाल पश्चिमी अजेण्डामा लागेर एउटा प्रजातान्त्रिक मुलुकले अर्को प्रजातान्त्रिक मुलुकलाई दिने सहयोगको आधारमा नहोस्।

तत्कालका लागि तिब्बतको सुरक्षाका लागि यो तीन/चार/पाँच वर्ष चाहिँ नेपालबाट त्यही नै सहयोग प्रत्याभूति सहयोग खोजेको भान हुन्छ। 

भारतमा आगामी एक-डेढ वर्षभित्र अयोध्यामा राममन्दिरको निर्माण सम्पन्न हुन गैरहेको छ। त्यसलगत्तै सन् २०२४ को मे महिनामा आम निर्वाचन पनि हुँदैछ। यो सन्दर्भमा यी दुईवटा ठूला परिघटनाको नेपालको राजनीतिलाई तलसम्म पनि प्रभावित गर्ने आकलन पनि छ। खास गरेर नेपाललाई हिन्दू राष्ट्र बनाउनु पर्छ भन्ने माग चर्केर जाने सम्भावना कत्तिको देख्नुहुन्छ?
आन्तरिक कुरा हेर्ने हो भने नेपालमा हिन्दू राष्ट्र होस् भन्ने जमात पनि बढ्दैछ। त्यसमा मलजल हाल्ने कुरा छँदै होला, त्यसलाई नकार्न सकिँदैन। नेपालमा हिन्दू राष्ट्र बनाउने कुरामा भारतले अभियान नै चलाउने उनीहरुको पार्टी पंक्तिमा बृहत् संघ परिवारमा बलियो जमात छ।

भारतमा पार्टीगत हिसाबले, समूहगत हिसाबले आस्थागत रुपमा त्यो माहोल बन्ने छ। तर भारतले राज्यको रुपमा हाम फालिहाल्नु पर्ने कुरामा जुन सकस देखिएको छ। ती आनाकानीले यीनिहरुलाई संकोच पनि परिराखेको छ। हाम्रो आन्तरिक मामलामा त्यसले के असर पार्ला? जुन अहिलेको राजनीतिक व्यवस्था छ।

त्यसले हिन्दू धर्मलाई ‘मौन समर्थन’आफ्नो पार्टीगत हिसाबले दिइराखेको छ। तर नेपालभित्र चाहिँ हिन्दूधर्मको अलिकति राजतन्त्रसँग सम्बन्ध भइराखेको अवस्थामा नेपालका पार्टीहरुले कसरी रियाक्ट गर्लान् त? भन्ने चीजहरुमा मान्छेहरु सचेत छन्। त्यसको व्याख्या नै गर्ने हो भने राजतन्त्र बाहिरिएको अवस्थामा मिलेर शक्ति बाँडफाँट गर्ने बानी परेका पार्टीहरुले एक कदम अगाडि बढेर राजतन्त्रसँग नजिकिने प्रस्ताव नमानि हाल्लान्।

जबसम्म भारतमा राज्य र पार्टीको एक किसिमको तादात्म्य स्थापना हुँदैन तबसम्म भारतले सिधै पहल गर्ने हिम्मत गर्दैन। पछाडिबाट गर्ने सहयोग जुन छ, त्यसमा पनि ‘ल्युकवार्म सपोर्ट’ नै रहिरहने छ जस्तो लाग्छ मलाई। 

अहिले हिन्दू गणतन्त्रको कुरा पनि आइराखेको छ। तपाईंको २०२१मा प्रकाशित पुस्तक ‘व्याकफायर इन नेपाल - हाउ इन्डिया लस्ट द प्लट टू चाइना’ मा लेख्नु भएको छ कि सन् २००५ मा दिल्लीको मध्यस्थतामा तत्कालीन सात दलहरु र प्रतिबन्धित नेकपा माओवादीबीच दिल्लीमा जुन किसिमको १२ बुँदे समझदारी बन्यो र नेपालमा संविधानसभाको चुनाव भयो। राजतन्त्रको अन्त्य भयो त्यसपछि नेपालमा चिनियाँ प्रभाव बढ्न गएको कुरा उल्लेख गर्नु भएको छ। के भारतीय जनता पार्टीले ‘कोर्स करेक्सन’ गर्न खोजेको जस्तो लाग्छ तपाईंलाई?

‘कोर्स करेक्सन’ गर्न खोजेको हो। उनीहरु डाइरेक्ट आएर हिन्दू गणतन्त्रको कुरा गरिराखेका छन्। त्यसमा पनि मेरो आफ्नो विचार के छ भने, हिन्दू गणतन्त्र भन्ने चीजको पछाडि गएर त्यसको भायबिलिटी के कस्तो हुन्छ? त्यसलाई हामीले कुनै पोप नभएको अवस्थामा धर्म गुरु भारतीय शंकराचार्यलाई नै मान्न पर्ने हो कि? योगी आदित्यनाथ जस्ता सन्यासीहरुलाई मान्न पर्ने हो कि? भन्ने यावत् सवालहरु उठ्लान्।

त्यो कुरा उठिसकेपछि फेरि अखण्ड भारतसँगै टाँसिन जाने पो हो कि यो? अल्टीमेट्ली हिन्दू गणतन्त्र भन्ने हिसाबले नेपालमा एक किसिमको भाष्य जन्माइएला राजतन्त्रवादीहरुबाट पनि। गणतन्त्रवादीहरुबाट पनि त्यो चीज उठाइला। त्यसमा बहस हुनसक्ला।

कोर्स करेक्सन भनिए पनि भारतीय जनता पार्टीले अलिकति गणतन्त्रको कुरा गर्छन्। तर राजतन्त्रको विषयमा प्रत्यक्ष कुरा गर्न सकिराखेका छैनन। मैले चाहिँ किताबमा के उल्लेख गरेको छु भने त्यो चाहिँ उनीहरुले गल्ती गरिहाले। तर अब के गर्ने? नेपालमा राजतन्त्र मान्नेहरुले सांकेतिक रुपमा राजतन्त्र गएको छैन भन्छन्। एक बेलाको राजा सधै राजा हुन्छन् भन्ने कुरा ठिकै होला। राजा पनि ठाउँ–ठाउँमा जाँदा जनताको सहयोग पाइराखेकै छन्। जनमत पनि होला।

तर सन् २००६ पछि राजतन्त्रलाई जसरी ओझेलमा पार्दै पार्दै त्यसको इन्सिट्युस्नल रिजिलियन्सको लागि स्टकस्चरहरु चाहिने थियो (सेना, सरकार एवं शहरीया मध्यम वर्ग इत्यादि) कत्तिको छ? यस्ता कुराको आकलन भारतीयहरुले गरिराखेकै पनि होलान्। राजतन्त्र फर्काउँदा कत्तिको समस्या हल हुने हो? खरो रुपमा भन्नु पर्दा डाडु,पन्यू आफ्नै हातमा हुँदा खेरी अफ्ठ्यारो अवस्थामा गुज्रिरहेको राजतन्त्रले के कति गर्न सक्छन् भन्ने चीजको लेखा जोखा हामीले खुला रुपमा गर्न नसकेको अवस्थामा चाहिँ कोर्स करेक्सनको बाटो के?

यतिका वर्ष अभ्यास गरिसकेको संविधान छ। विभिन्न तहकासमेत दुई, दुईवटा त चुनाव नै भइसके। यसको प्रकिया के हो भन्ने कुरामा यो एक किसिमको अन्योल र अस्पष्टताको सन्दर्भमा ‘कोर्स करेक्सन’ एउटा खाका, एउटा विचार आकांक्षा भएता पनि कसरी गर्ने भन्ने कुराले अल्झाइराखेको जस्तो देखिन्छ। 

तेस्रो छिमेकी अर्थात् आकाशे छिमेकी अमेरिकाको कुरा गरौं। नेपालको संसद्ले एमसीसी परियोजना पारित गर्‍यो। सुरक्षासम्बन्धी परियोजना एसपीपीलाई अगाडि बढाउन सक्दैनौं, त्यसमा भाग लिन सक्दैनौं भनिराखेको छ। आगामी दिनमा अमेरिकाले आफ्नो सुरक्षा स्वार्थका कारण नेपालमाथि थप दबाब दिने सम्भावना कति देख्नुहुन्छ?
सूक्ष्म रुपमा अध्ययन गर्दा नेपाललाई उनीहरुले बदलिँदो विश्व व्यवस्थामा सेन्ट्र्ल एसियामा किर्गिस्तान, नेपाल, अफ्रिकामा जिबुटीजस्ता देशहरुको भूराजनीतिक महत्व बढ्दै आइरहेको छ। अर्को क्षेत्रबाट हेर्दा चिनियाँलाई सुरक्षा चासोका बारेमा नेपालले जे गरिदियोस् भन्ने उसको आकांक्षा छ त्यहि, त्यही चीजमा अमेरिकाले दबाब हाल्ने स्थिति देख्दछु म। तिब्बती स्वतन्त्रता नै अमेरिकाको उद्देश्य देखिँदैन।

चिनियाँलाई तिब्बतमै अल्मलाई राखेमा उता ताइवानमा प्रेसर हट्ने, विश्व व्यवस्थामा चीनको प्रभाव कम गराउने, उनीहरुको राज्यको व्यवहारलाई तह लगाउने किसिमको अमेरिकी गतिविधि बढ्दै जाने छ। दलाई लामाको सक्सेसन उनीहरुका लागि ठूलो अवसर पनि भएको देखिन्छ।

जुन नियमित रुपमा अमेरिकाले चीनबाट हुने यस मामलामा कुनै पनि हस्तक्षेप सह्य नहुने भन्दछ, त्यसले गर्दा नेपाललाई अमेरिकाको प्रेसर त बढ्छ नै किनभने त्यो तिब्बतसँग मात्रै सरोकार भएन। चीन आफ्नो आर्थिक प्रतिस्पर्धी, भोलि सैनिक प्रतिस्पर्धी पनि। पूरा चाइनाकोर अमेरिका र पश्चिमेली मुलुकहरुको अप्रोचमा नेपाल परिसक्यो। त्यसमा राम्रोसँग आफ्नो बुद्धि नपुर्‍याइकन, आफ्नो एजेन्सी, आफ्नो स्वायत्तता नराख्ने हो भने नेपाललाई चाहिँ अति मुस्किल दिनहरु आउनेछन्। 

अमेरिकाले इन्डो प्यासेफिक स्ट्रेटेजी अगाडि बढाइरहेको छ, अर्कोतिर चीनले बीआरआई परियोजना अघि बढाइराखेको छ। यस्ता ठूल्ठूला परियोजनाहरुबाट, ठूला सामरिक रणनीतिबाट नेपाल जस्तो अस्थिर मुलुकले कसरी आफ्नो स्वार्थको रक्षा गर्न सक्ला? आगामी दिनहरुमा नेपालको भविष्य कस्तो देख्नुहुन्छ? 
नेपालमा असंलग्न परराष्ट्र नीति पुरानो भइसक्यो भन्ने कुरा पनि चल्दैछ किनभने विश्वव्यापीकरणको अवस्थामा आधारभूत मूल्य मान्यताहरु स्थिर हुन्छन्, त्यसमा असंलग्न भन्ने हुँदैन भन्ने कुरा पनि छ। तर हाम्रो राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थबाट हेर्दा मलाई लाग्छ,अमेरिकाको सामरिक सुरक्षा र चीनसँगको सामरिक सुरक्षामा हामी लाग्नु हुँदैन। हामीले स्पष्ट यीनिहरुलाई भन्न पर्यो एउटा राष्ट्रिय सहमतिकै आधारमा हाम्रो अवस्था यस्तो छ।

विकासका आकांक्षाहरु यस्ता छन्। जसले गर्दा हामी तिमीहरुको होडबाजीमा पर्न सक्दैनौं। पर्नु पनि हुन्न, पर्न पनि चाहँदैनौं। त्यसमा हामीलाई कर नगर भन्ने हिसाबले सन्तुलित व्यवहार हामीले गर्नुपर्छ। 

जस्तो हामीले एमसीसी परियोजना पारित गर्‍यौं। एसपीपी परियोजनाबारे छलफल गर्‍यौं। बीआरआई हामीले लिऔं तर उनीहरुको ग्लोबल सेक्युरिटी इनिशियटिभ (जिसआई) मा जानुपर्छ भन्ने लाग्दैन। खास गरि जिएसआई त अमुक नै छ। नेपालको सहभागिताले के हित वा हानी पुर्‍याउँछ भन्ने कुराको हामी आकलन गर्न नसक्ने कुरामै जाँदा बढी उत्साहित भएर यहाँ जानु पर्ने आवश्यकता छैन।

जसले गर्दा भोलि अर्को पक्षले पनि त्यस्तै खालको कार्यक्रम ल्याएर आओस्। सबैसँग त्यस्तै सुरक्षा कार्यक्रम गर्दै जाँदा कहाँ पुग्छौं हामी? को पट्टी जाने हो? हाम्रो परम्परागत असंग्न नीति थियो। त्यो सरकार, त्यो व्यवस्था नरुचाए पनि त्यसका राम्रा पक्षहरुलाई हामीले ग्रहण गर्नुपर्छ। हामी असंलग्न नीतिमै रहनुपर्छ।

अमेरिकी राजनीतिशास्त्री लियो इ रोजले सन् ७० को दशकमा लेखेका थिए कि नेपाल त्यस्तो मुलुक हो। जसको परराष्ट्र सम्बन्धले त्यसको घरेलु नीति निर्देशित गर्छ। अब अहिले ५० वर्षपछि आएर हेर्दा केही परिवर्तन पाउनु भएको छ कि छैन?
मोटामोटी रुपमा त्यो कथन अहिले पनि वास्तविक जस्तो नै लाग्छ। हाम्रो घरेलु नीतिमा पनि हाम्रो परराष्ट्र नीति, विदेशी आंकाक्षा, विदेशी अपेक्षाको धेरै माने राख्दछ। तर त्यसलाई अलिकति संशोधित गर्ने हिसाबले मैले कतै लेखेको पनि छु। नेपालको राजनीतिक प्रणाली र नेपालको भू–राजनीतिक प्रणाली एक अर्काको विपरित (क्रस परपोज) मा गइराखेको पनि म देख्दछु। हाम्रो जुन व्यवस्था छ खुलमखुला बहस गर्नका लागि नेपालीहरु लागेका छन्। चुनावको बेलामा लागेका छन्। नयाँ सरकार आउँछ। त्यसमा बहस गरेका छन्।

त्यो हिसाबको एउटा धार चलिराखेकै हुन्छ। त्यसले हाम्रो भू–राजनीतिक धारलाई कसरी संहाल्न सकेको छ भन्ने कुराको राम्रो निर्क्योल एउटा अध्ययन गर्नुपर्ने व्यवस्था आएको छ। त्यसमा लिओ रोजले भनेजस्तै विदेश नीतिले नै हामीलाई, आन्तरिक नीतिलाई गाइड गर्दै जान दिनेहो भने हठात् रूपमा संसद विघटन हुँदै जानेछ। हिजोसम्म सत्तोसराप गरिरहेका पार्टी फेरि एकै रातमा मिल्दै जानेछन्।

उता कतिपय आन्तरिक कारणले हुने घटनाहरुमा पनि विदेशी हात देख्ने भयौं। विदेशीलाई पनि नेपालको सन्दर्भमा आफू त्यसरी तानिएकोमा पछुतो नरहेको अवस्था देखिँदै गएको छ। जसले गर्दा विदेश नीति नै हावी भएर गएको कथन चाहिँ मलाई सत्य नै हो जस्तो लाग्छ।

सत्तापक्ष, प्रतिपक्षभन्दा पनि अहिलेको समग्र नेतृत्व भूराजनीतिक चुनौतीप्रति कत्तिको संवेदनशील छ जस्तो पाउनुहुन्छ?
उहाँहरु यता आएको बेलामा कुराकानी गर्‍यो भने उहाँहरु संवेदनशील जस्तो देखिनुहुन्छ। उहाँहरुका आफ्ना अफ्ठ्याराहरु व्यक्तिगत रुपमा पनि देखाउनु्हुन्छ। त्यो एउटा भूमरीमा गाँजिनु भएको जस्तो लाग्दछ। अब चाहिँ यस्तो लाग्छ कि नेताहरुलाई गाली गर्नुभन्दा पनि सिंगो नेतृत्त्वको माया लाग्ने अवस्था आइसकेको छ। आफूसँगै कलेज पढेका राजनीतिकर्मीहरु आफ्नो आस्थाका लागि जेल, नेल भोग्नु भयो। हामीले प्रत्यक्ष रुपमा पनि देख्यौं।

शक्तिमा पुगेपछि के हुँदो रहेछ? के मा तानिँदो रहेछ। बाँधिदो रहेछ। जसले गर्दा जनतालाई कुरा भन्न नसक्ने, त्यहाँ गएर हाम्रा यी यी अफ्ठ्यारा हुन्। त्यहाँ पुगेर गाँजिनु नै भएको छ। उ बेला किसुनजी, गिरिजाप्रसाद, मनमोहनको समयमा केही दह्रिलोपना थियो। अहिलेका त माया लाग्दा पात्रहरु भए। यो जुन ‘सक्सेसर जेनेरेसन’ पनि छ, उनीहरुमा पनि बोल्न नसक्ने अवस्था आएको छ। त्यहाँ के हुँदो रहेछ भन्ने अनुसन्धानकर्ता एवं विद्यार्थीलाई चाहिँ शोध गर्न चाखलाग्दो विषय भएको छ।

• #सञ्जय उपाध्याय

भारत र चीनसँगै अब नेपालमाथि अमेरिकाको पनि दबाब बढ्छ : सञ्जय उपाध्याय

NEPAL: Foreign Policy Challenges of New Government

Iran-India Relations

Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya

 1) How do you look at 12U2 in the context of India-Iran Relations? Is India abandoning Iran for a Western Quad?

The I2U2 was formed to deepen technological and private sector collaboration in the region and tackle transnational challenges in six focus areas: water, energy, transportation, space, health and food security. Despite the lack of an explicit geopolitical focus, the grouping, given the other members’ policy orientations, does pose a challenge to India’s relationship with Iran.
Yet as a bilateral relationship that has its own history, logic and convergences, New Delhi recognizes the folly of brinkmanship. The national interest generally has dissuaded India from approaching diplomacy as a zero-sum game. Still, India has been grappling with the challenge of balancing its relationship with Iran with its other bilateral and multilateral engagements. The I2U2 adds to that challenge.

2) Do you believe like a third wheel, the US complicates India-Iran Relations?

Amid the United States’ four-decade campaign to isolate Iran, New Delhi’s drive for a robust relationship with Tehran was always bound to generate pressures from Washington. However, like in its relationship with Russia, India has been able to press its case on the merits of national interest.
So far, the United States, too, has demonstrated some tolerance of New Delhi-Tehran relations, although it would be imprudent on the part of India to take this posture for granted. Still, New Delhi can be expected to pursue this balancing act with appreciable success in the period ahead through deft diplomacy.

3) How should India approach Iran, responding to the growing Chinese involvement in the country (Iran-China 25-year Agreement)?

The bilateral tensions between India and China or the Iran-China bonhomie need not necessarily constrain New Delhi’s ties with Tehran. This is especially so given the fact that Iran, too, recognizes the imperative of the broadest based international engagement it can manage under the adverse circumstances it confronts.
More broadly, when it comes to their national interest, India and China have been able to rise above their bilateral tensions to cooperate on specific matters on the international stage. Iran provides space for both Asian giants to maintain vibrant bilateral relationships as long as they possess the ability to approach their contradictions with prudence and consideration.

4) How do major powers look at Iran’s nuclear impasse? Is an international consensus still possible on this issue?

Despite the growing international frustration with Iran on the nuclear issue, the consensus on stopping that country from acquiring nuclear weapons remains firm. After the initial enthusiasm it generated in 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JCPOA) suffered a blow when the Trump administration withdrew from the deal three years later, citing Tehran’s noncompliance.
Upon assuming office, the Biden administrated signaled its intention to reverse its predecessor’s action, but negotiations by the other JCPOA signatories to bring both the United States and Iran back to the original agreement have stalled on a variety of disagreements. Furthermore, every new detail that Tehran may have advanced further ahead along the nuclear-weapons path complicates any breakthrough.

5) The relationship of Iran with both Russia and India shows a dual approach of both "rapprochement and constraint.” Do you agree with the view India and Iran could well play a major part in giving INSTC the required boost to reap benefits of resultant trade.

Behind this ‘rapprochement and constraint’ approach, the three countries appreciate their wider economic and commercial compatibilities. With Iran and Russia under U.S. sanctions, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) provides them a much-needed geostrategic alternative.
This is in addition to the fact that the route is more cost-effective and saves a significant amount of travel time for the countries involved. Long-term plans to integrate Iran’s Chabahar Port with the INSTC to expand trade beyond the region provide an incentive to both India and Iran to give the transport corridor a boost.

FPRC Journal 51

घोषणापत्रमा वाचा गरेजस्तै नेपाली दलहरूले भारत र चीनसँग ‘सन्तुलित सम्बन्ध’ राख्न सक्लान्?

नेपालको अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सम्बन्ध बारेका विभिन्न पुस्तकका लेखक सञ्जय उपाध्याय भन्छन्, “नेपालले कूटनीतिक कौशलका माध्यमबाट भारत र चीन दुवैबाट सहयोग पाउन सक्छ जुन एउटाको प्रभाव रोक्न अर्को (देश)ले चाल्ने कदममा निर्भर हुन्छ।”
“जोखिम के छ भने त्यस्तो सहयोग मुद्दा केन्द्रित र लेनदेनमा आधारित हुन्छ। उदाहरणका लागि एउटा छिमेकीले राष्ट्रिय स्वाधीनता प्रवर्द्धन गर्ने हाम्रो अभियानमा सघाउने र अर्कोले लोकतान्त्रीकरणमा पूर्ण रूपमा जोड दिने अवस्थामा हामी रहन सक्दैनौँ। हामीलाई दुवैमा सबैको सहयोग चाहिन्छ।”
उपाध्याय भन्छन्, “चीनलाई जोड दिएको हालैको अमेरिकी राष्ट्रिय सुरक्षा रणनीति र शासन व्यवस्थाको सुरक्षामा केन्द्रित रहेको चिनियाँ कम्युनिष्ट पार्टीको राष्ट्रिय कांग्रेसले नेपालले अबको पाँच वर्षमा भोग्ने मूल चुनौतीबारे स्पष्ट सन्देश दिएको छ। हाम्रो बृहत् विदेश नीति यी अवधारणाभित्र पर्नेछ जसको अर्थ नेपालले (कसैको) पक्ष लिनुपर्ने हुन्छ।”
गम्भीर राजनीतिक अस्थिरता बेहोरिरहेको नेपालका लागि आधारभूत भूराजनीतिक चुनौतीको सामना गर्न गाह्रो हुने उल्लेख गर्दै उनले त्यसो भएमा आर्थिक विकास, सामाजिक समावेशीकरण र अरू महत्त्वपूर्ण अत्यावश्यक मुद्दालाई ओझेलमा पार्ने बताए। 

https://www.bbc.com/nepali/articles/clwqpye5vdqo

Expect Stiffer US-China Contestation in Nepal

SANJAY UPADHYA, a US-based foreign policy expert, says the new US National Security Strategy describes China as the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to advance that objective.
“Clearly, this assertion takes the US-China rivalry to a new level. As Washington would have the prerogative of defining what behavior on the part of Beijing is ‘coercive’, Nepal could expect further US assertiveness vis-à-vis our general foreign policy in the period ahead,” he says.
The ongoing National People’s Congress of China has indicated how regime security would be an even more categorical concern for Beijing going forward.
“In such a situation,” says Upadhya, “Nepal can be expected to experience a stiffer tug-of-war between the two global powers.”

Expect stiffer US-China contestation in Nepal - The Annapurna Express

Sphere Pressure: When Politics Contends with Geopolitics

Nepal's strategic vulnerability owing to its location between two giants of Asia has risen and fallen with the status of India and China relations, the quality of their bilateral relations, and the principal external variables influencing them. 

In recent years, Nepal's boisterous domestic politics has emerged as an additional source of instability, SANJAY UPADHYA writes in Kathmandu-based Journal of Foreign Affairs. 

In the past, the internal fundamentals, regardless of the political system of the day, were sturdy enough to cope with often-competing pressures emanating from the north and south, the author states in ‘Sphere Pressure: When Politics Contends With Geopolitics’. 

The improvisation that has become the defining feature of the contemporary Nepali state, has made today's geopolitical spasms far more ominous. 

While it may be outlandish to suggest that Nepal's politics and geopolitics have become antithetical, there is sufficient basis for probing that question, UPADHYA states.

Upadhya, S. (2022) Sphere pressure: When Politics Contends with Geopolitics: Journal of Foreign Affairs (JoFA), Volume 2, Issue 1

DOI: https //doi.org/10.3126/iofa.v2i01.44007

Russia’s Pivot to China

Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya

1. Are China and Russia becoming allies? Driven by opposition to perceived US hegemony, Putin and Xi meet frequently, stimulating cooperation on a range of international policy and security issues. Joint military exercises have become a regular occurrence. “Axis of collusion/connivance” may be a more appropriate description of the relationship. Do you agree?

Although they have not created a full and formal alliance, China and Russia have embarked on a major strategic alignment. During their summit in Beijing, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have reaffirmed that the new inter-state relations between Russia and China are superior to the political and military alliances of the Cold War era. They asserted that friendship between the two States has no limits, and there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation. The strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.

Beyond the lofty rhetoric, it remains to be seen how strongly they can collaborate. One thing is becoming increasingly clear: as the bilateral relationship expands, they are also becoming more asymmetric in China’s favour, from trade to the economy to politics. Yet the two nations see a major window of opportunity to challenge the Western-constructed and -dominated international order. If collusion/connivance can be contextualized within each country’s commitment to preserving and promoting its core national interests, then yes, the characterization is apt.

2. How does the US look at Russia’s pivot to China? Can the US counter this alliance?

Opinion, as expected, is divided in the United States. At one end are the alarmists who see this development as a strategic failure over successive US administrations. At the other end are pragmatists who tend to see less coherence in the pivot than the parties advertise. This latter group notes that Russia has a GDP per capita less than half that of the United States and China less than a third. Moreover, the pragmatists assert, both Russia and China have major regime legitimacy and succession issues as well as daunting demographic and economic challenges. These pragmatists contend that any panicked or frenzied response is unwarranted.

Both groups of American analysts agree that the way to lessen the threat of the partnership between Russia and China is to make them less valuable to each other. In their view, Russia only has two tools of influence, its military force and energy resources. In response, NATO needs to strengthen its conventional and strategic deterrence by, among other things, ensuring that each member state contributes its fair share. The U.S., at the same time, should augment its contribution to forward presence. The American response to the Ukraine conflict broadly fits into this pattern.

Furthermore, Washington would be called upon to stand with its allies to confront Beijing’s misadventures in the South and East China Seas and in the Taiwan Strait, tighten Chinese access to American technology, and continue to campaign against China’s violations of human rights. At the same time, the West would need to become more serious against overreliance on gas and oil from Russia. All this, of course, represents a broad mixture of initiatives with a lot of uncertainties involved.

3. Indian perspective on Russia’s rapprochement with China:

A) Russia-India relations have come a long way despite the turbulent journey. However, the question now arises, where does this relationship stand in this highly volatile global order? Is the bond still strong, or can one witness the chunks in the armor? Steps like (QUAD, Malabar Exercise) have made communist China annoyed and made Russia displeased. Moreover, India’s alignment with the US and its allies to counter China is a cause of concern for the Russians.

B) How do you explain Russia’s “NEW ERA RELATION EXPERIMENT” with Pakistan? Is Russia trying to balance its ties between India and Pakistan?

C) Do you agree with the view that Russia regards China as being far more important than India when thinking about issues in the EAEU, Eurasia and the World?

As ardent advocates of multipolarity, India and Russia still have broad convergences in their global outlook that continue to sustain a strong relationship. Admittedly, developments such as the Quad and Malabar exercise have displeased Russia and China. Additionally, India’s perceived alignment with the US and its allies to counter China is a cause of concern for the Russians. Yet in crude world of realpolitik, Moscow might not mind so much another Asian power vigilant on the Chinese flank.

As for Moscow’s new-era relation experiment with Pakistan, it is hard to separate the development from Russia-China relations in general and, in particular, China’s own ‘all-weather’ relations with Pakistan. This development is much more an outcome of Moscow’s global realignment more than an effort to balance ties between New Delhi and Islamabad.

It would defy common sense to argue that Russia would rank India above China in terms of EAEU, Eurasia and its world view. That does not mean Russia has subordinated India in its worldview. History and strategy have provided Moscow enough prudence not to put all its eggs exclusively in the Chinese or Indian basket. India hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin for the annual bilateral summit in December 2021, despite the growing tensions between the West and Moscow. India and Russia also held their first-ever 2+2 Ministerial dialogue in December. Over the threat of American sanctions through CAATSA, India decided to go ahead with the S-400 missile defence systems deal signed in 2018. Furthermore, New Delhi finalised a new deal for the manufacture of 750,000 AK-203 rifles. Although India’s trade with Russia pales compared to that with the United States, New Delhi’s defence and energy partnership with Moscow remains significant.

4. Russia-China-India Trilateral: 

Russia maintained neutrality on the India-China border dispute. “In fact, Russia remains a key stakeholder in resolving the India-China border conflict, since normal relations between Beijing and New Delhi are a vital condition for the realization of Moscow’s vision of Greater Eurasia, which is in essence the project for creating a concert of Eurasian powers.” Do you agree?

Evidently, Moscow has been viewing the India-China border dispute within its vision of a Greater Eurasia. Amid India’s own vision of robust relationships with different parts of Asia, there are bound to be critical areas of competition and cooperation as the major Asian powers rise on the vast continent. 

The perception of a reduction of India’s room for manoeuvre in the midst of the Russia-China strategic alignment would enhance calls for New Delhi to seek other ways of preventing a Chinese-dominated Asia. Furthermore, India would be under pressure to engage with the other major powers in the region facing a similar predicament. 

Much would depend on how successfully India preserves its strategic autonomy in such engagements. New Delhi’s votes in the UN Security Council and General Assembly on the Ukraine conflict suggest it reserves its options based on the merits of the case. As to China, New Delhi has opted for prudence and patience despite calls for bandwagoning onto the United States to contain that neighbour. Adventurism, on the other hand, could bring major imponderables into sharper focus along with their attendant costs.

FPRC Journal 49

The Aftereffects of Wang Yi’s Nepal Visit

US-based foreign policy expert SANJAY UPADHYA says Wang sought to impress upon Nepali leaders “the imperative of creating the necessary domestic conditions” that would discourage Nepal from becoming a geopolitical playground against China. 

He believes Wang was interested primarily in gauging Nepal’s continued commitment to its traditional foreign policy tenets amid shifting global geostrategic contours. 

“In particular, Beijing sought to determine whether Kathmandu was adjusting its outlook and—if so—whether it was doing so under unwarranted influence of third countries,” Upadhya says. As the Nepali side stated its case, he adds, Beijing must have sought fresh assurances from Kathmandu on One-China and other specific issues of Chinese concern.

(Quoted in Annapurna Express)

The aftereffects of Wang Yi’s Nepal visit

नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्धमा नै अब सिंहावलोकन गर्नुपर्ने अवस्था छ – सञ्जय उपाध्याय

एमसीसीबाहेक पनि कैयौँ समस्याका कारण नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्ध गिजोलिन थालेको भन्दै एक विज्ञले यसको समाधान खोजिनुपर्ने बताएका छन्।
"जग्गा जमिनको विवाद, कतिपय अपराधका कुराहरू छन्। अनि अघोषित नाकाबन्दी जस्तो र त्यसमा तिमीहरू यसो नगर अनि हामी अड्कलेर दिऊँला भन्ने चीनले बताउने गरेको जस्तो देखिन्छ। चीनतर्फ असन्तुष्टि छ भन्ने जस्तो देखिन्छ," नेपालको परराष्ट्र मामिलाबारे विभिन्न पुस्तकका लेखक सञ्जय उपाध्यायले भने।
उनले परापूर्वकालदेखि नेपाल र चीनबीच सम्बन्ध रहेको बेइजिङले स्वीकार गर्दै आएको उल्लेख गर्दै आपसी अविश्वासलाई सम्बोधन गरिनुपर्ने बताए।
उनले थपे, "चीनले कतिपय गतिविधि प्रायोजित रूपले भइरहेको छ भन्छ। तर सीमा विवादको बारेमा जुलुस नै निस्किने जस्तो हुन थालेपछि थोरै समयमा आफ्नो छविमा धक्का पुगेको महसुस गर्न थालेको हो कि भन्ने भान हुन्छ। त्यही भएर द्विपक्षीय सम्बन्धमा नै अब एक किसिमको सिंहावलोकन गर्नुपर्ने अवस्था छ। यो भ्रमण त्यसका लागि एउटा प्रस्थानबिन्दु बन्न सक्छ।"
उनले शक्तिराष्ट्रको आपसी होडबाजीमा आफूलाई नतान्न नेपालले चिनियाँपक्षलाई भन्नुपर्ने पनि बताए।

नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्ध: चिनियाँ विदेशमन्त्री वाङको भ्रमण यसरी बन्न सक्छ सम्बन्ध सुधारको प्रस्थानबिन्दु

'चीनसँग अब टालटुले कुरा नगरौँ' – सञ्जय उपाध्याय

नेपालको परराष्ट्र मामिलाबारे विभिन्न पुस्तकका लेखक सञ्जय उपाध्याय एमसीसी प्रकरणलाई चीनले प्रतिष्ठाको विषय बनाएको र त्यसले सम्बन्धमा चिसोपन निम्त्याएको भन्दै वाङको भ्रमणमा त्यसलाई सम्बोधन गरिनुपर्ने बताउँछन्।
उनले भने, "एमसीसीको सन्दर्भमा चीनको अमेरिकासँगको हानथाप हो। उनीहरूको प्रेस या सरकारी तवरले नै हामीलाई मुछ्नेगरी तिमीहरूको सरकार पश्चिमा समर्थक भयौँ वा तिमीहरू बिक्यौ भन्ने गरी चिनियाँ भाषामा अलिकति कडा टिप्पणी गरिएको देख्दा नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्धमा असन्तुष्टि व्याप्त रहेको देखेको छु।"
उनले नेपालका नेताहरूले चिनियाँ विदेशमन्त्रीलाई एकमतले आफूहरूले सार्वभौम देशका हिसाबले निर्णय गरेको धारणा सुनाउनुपर्ने उल्लेख गरे।
उपाध्याय भन्छन्, "चिनियाँ विदेशमन्त्रीले सरकार र त्यसबाहेक दुई भूतपूर्व प्रधानमन्त्री भेट्दैछन्। त्यो बेलामा नेपालका तर्फबाट हामीले सशक्त रूपमा एमसीसीका बारेमा हामीले एउटा स्वाधीन र सार्वभौमसत्ता सम्पन्न देशले गरेको निर्णय हो भनेर उनीहरूलाई बताउन सकेको खण्डमा मलाई लाग्छ त्यो एउटा सुरुवात हुन्छ।"
उनले नेपालमा एकता नहुँदा "भावनात्मक रूपमा" बाह्य शक्तिहरूले खेल्न पाइरहेको भन्दै त्यस्तो अवसर दिन नहुने बताए।
एमसीसी अनुमोदनबारे चीनले भन्यो, 'जबरजस्तीपूर्ण कूटनीतिको हामी विरोध गर्छौँ'
नेपालमा के चाहन्छ चीन?
उपाध्याय थप्छन्, "हामीहरूले यो कारणले यसरी भएको हो भनेर बताउन सक्नुपर्‍यो। तिमीहरूको जे लडाइँ हो वा असहमति हो तिमीहरू आफैँ सुल्झाऊ किनभने हामीहरू यसमा पर्न चाहँदैनौँ भन्नुपर्‍यो। जसरी सानो मुलुक हामी, भारत वा अमेरिकासँग पर्न चाहँदैनौँ त्यसरी हामी चीनसँग पनि पर्न चाहँदैनौँ भन्ने एउटा सीमारेखा कोरेर अघि नबढेसम्म सम्बन्ध अघि बढ्न आधार तयार हुँदैन। नत्र फेरी टालटुले कुरा मात्रै हुन्छ।"

नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्ध: चिनियाँ परराष्ट्रमन्त्री वाङको भ्रमणमा एमसीसीप्रति अभिव्यक्त चिनियाँ असन्तोषको सम्बोधन कसरी

‘Maila Baje’ is Sanjay Upadhya

Nepali blogger who wrote under a pseudonym finally comes out of the shadows in new book 

 

Maila Baje is No More a Mystery Now

By Our Reporter

Finally, Sanjay Upadhya, currently residing in the US, has revealed that he is Maila Baje who wrote contemporary articles on the blog “Nepali Netbook” since 2005.

When People’s Review chose to reproduce Maila Baje’s pieces picked up from the Nepali Netbook blog, the editorial team was frequently asked a question, “Who is this Maila Baje?”

People’s Review regularly published Maila Baje’s pieces since the team found the write-ups were excellent, well qualified with the political chronology, strong arguments on Nepali civilization, deep study on the contemporary developments, more than that, strong presentation on Nepal’s perspectives.

Sanjay Upadhya writes:

It feels good to finally come out. I’ve been tempted to do so several times over the last decade and a half. The shades just seemed too soothing. I chose this nom de guerre before I’d decided what I’d call my blog. Relatively new, the blogosphere beckoned with all its breeziness.

King Gyanendra’s royal rule was at its toughest. The Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists had signed the 12-Point Understanding but so much was unclear. Geopolitics, public opinion, hope, despair—the imponderables were too many. Powerful as the royal regression narrative was, I never bought it—and still don’t.

Our triangular fight had become too drawn out for anyone’s good. I don’t think King Gyanendra had any specific plan when he took over on February 1, 2005. He wanted a realignment of forces into a bipolar one, and thought he could pull it off. If not, well, others were free to try. They did and here we are.

I’d been defending the royal takeover in that spirit, drawing all the venom I expected to. There seemed so much going on that seemed so unreal. Yet, a lot of what seemed to be going on seemed too real to discount.

I had used this genre as Puskar Bhusal in the Nepali Times. Yes, Kunda Dixit soon found out I was somewhere in Nepal. And Kanak Dixit, although still burdened by my indolence to his years of prompting, asked me to contribute an essay to his superb volume ‘State of Nepal’—in my real name.

Over the years, People’s Review weekly carried my pieces under the bylines of Krishna Singh Bam, Madan Prasad Khanal and Rabindra Adhikari. (Frankly, I can’t recall the other names.) My inspiration was my father, Devendra Raj Upadhya, who would write as ‘Jatayu’, ‘Sampati’ and a bevy of other beings in an assortment of Nepali weeklies.

I recognised the disadvantages going in. I’d be called a coward for shooting from the shadows. A propagandist who could sell his soul but not show his face. An agent for this, an agent provocateur for that. I’m still called all that, although I was careful to disable the comments function on Nepali Netbook. What surprised me was the positive interest my posts also began generating early on. The guessing game began.

Top on the list was King Gyanendra. My mentor—and cousin—Dipak Gyawali, having worked with the monarch both in the King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation and as his minister, detected similarities in style and some of the expressions used. During a one-to-one talk of over an hour in Narayanhity palace in August 2007, I only recently learned, Dipak daju asked the monarch directly: he just waved his hand dismissively!

Bhola Bikram Rana, another mentor, had also asked the monarch in a formal interview. Again, his denial didn’t seem to matter. Others said it had to be a former biggie out to cash in on the regime change. Still, others said it couldn’t be a Nepali because a royalist couldn’t write in English.

Gen. Rookmangad Katawal, given his public past with pseudonyms, was another candidate. My first boss and great teacher, Mana Ranjan Josse, conceding his status as a middle son and a Bahun, came out with a full denial more than once.

Was Maila Baje young or old? In Nepal or abroad? A Nepali or a foreigner? Male or female posing as one? Heck, was I even one person or a composite? When, to my surprise, Janabhawana weekly started translating my posts and publishing it as a weekly column, everything took a whole new form.

Dipak daju later told me that while he did suspect me, he was also skeptical. Maila Baje was writing about events, the news of which had not even crossed the Ring Road in Kathmandu. Anyone not living in Kathmandu and in the thick of it all could not even be aware of these events let alone comment on them. On Twitter, he recently offered anyone who correctly identified me a nice recommendation for the world’s top investigative journalism award. (Thank you, Dipak daju, for the deflection).

My good friend Rabindra Mishra once asked me point blank. I gave him a flat denial. He couldn’t believe it. I couldn’t see his facial expression because he was on the phone line from BBC Nepali Service in London explaining my assignment for the morning. My lie must have infuriated him. I’m sorry, Rabindra ji. But I believed I had a good reason.

The blogosphere had already given me enough space to wander at will. Pseudonymity added to its appeal. As time flew, Maila Baje acquired a personality of its own. Coming out of the shadows would stifle him. Any time I had any inhibition, I would shut my eyes and imagine Nepal’s map and its position on a slowly revolving globe. It always felt like I was doing something good.

Nepal has never ceased to amaze me. Being squeezed between giant opposites India and China provided the element of space. Time, too, was of essence. I grew up as Indian parliamentarism and Chinese communism contended with American capitalism and Soviet collectivism. Born into a family that allowed me varying levels of proximity with royals, the Nepali Congress and communists of all hues, curiosity abounded as the same story differed with the teller.

My profession afforded me contact with foreigners who had something to do with Nepal or knew a lot about the country in ways a Nepali did not. The more I looked around Nepal, the more I saw so much to uncover. That’s when I began understanding something I was once told by King Mahendra. A nine-year-old standing on the line waiting to welcome the monarch during his visit to Thailand—where my father was posted—I bowed a respectful namaste when my turn came.

As my father introduced me, the king glared at me for a few seconds before saying: ‘Consider yourself very fortunate here. Study well and use your education in the service of Nepal, no matter where you may be.’

Condescending and even royally conceited? Not at all. Years later, when I happened to meet B.P. Koirala in New Delhi, I began introducing myself. He remembered meeting me a few years back and wondered where I was in my engineering studies. Stunned, I told him I had changed disciplines. ‘Whatever you study, study it well and be of use to Nepal, wherever you may be.’

Only if these two great men had been able to work together. I refuse to believe that politicians really resemble their caricature. They are not in the game to intentionally harm the country and people. There is something up there that’s just different. Compulsions, compromises, enticements, intimidations all end up taking their toll. Sure, some individuals are more vulnerable and vicious than others. By and large, though, it’s the nature of the beast.

Nepal, somehow fertile ground for initiatives and experiments fair and foul, is perhaps more susceptible to superfluous influences, alien and local. Things just don’t just happen here in a vacuum. Trying to make sense of it all is strenuous but still fun. Conspiracy theories instantly run wild. But that doesn’t necessarily make them irrelevant. Pulling these seemingly disparate strands together into a coherent 600 words every week or so has value. ‘If you can’t solve things, at least expose the problems you see’ seems to be a good motto.

One afternoon an uncle visiting from New York asked whether I read Maila Baje’s blog. When I said I did, he asked whether I knew who he or she was, and began naming names others had suggested to him. Maili Bajai sitting next to me told him the truth. She turned to me to say the time had long come.

Actually, it hadn’t. It took two more years, when my good friend Ajit Baral of Fine Print shot me an email asking me what I thought about a compilation. When I ‘outed’ myself to Dipak daju and sheepishly sought his suggestions on bringing out the book, he promptly gave the structure a new vibrancy and direction, for which I am indebted.

With this selection before you, all I can say now is, gee, it’s so bright out here.

Sanjay Upadhya

(aka Maila Baje)

Published in People’s Review, January 27, 2022

‘Maila Baje’ is Sanjay Upadhya

Nepali blogger who wrote under a pseudonym finally comes out of the shadows in new book

This the Foreword and concluding chapter of Empowered and Imperiled: Nepal’s Peace Puzzle in Bits and Pieces in which US-based Nepali writer Sanjay Upadhya confesses that he is the Maila Baje who wrote the Nepali Netbook blog. The new book is a collection of his entries over the years.

Sanjay Upadhya also wrote a column on current affairs for Nepali Times between 2001-2003 under the pen name Puskar Bhusal, which are in this paper’s online archives. It includes this piece on Sher Bahadur Deuba’s second tenure as prime minister which is as relevant today is it was in 2002: Consensus Charade.

Out of the Shadows, Finally

It feels good to finally come out. I’ve been tempted to do so several times over the last decade and a half. The shades just seemed too soothing. I chose this nom de guerre before I’d decided what I’d call my blog. Relatively new, the blogosphere beckoned with all its breeziness. A notebook on Nepal on the net. Bingo.

King Gyanendra’s royal rule was at its toughest. The Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists had signed the 12-Point Understanding but so much was unclear. Geopolitics, public opinion, hope, despair—the imponderables were too many. Powerful as the royal regression narrative was, I never bought it—and still don’t. 

Our triangular fight had become too drawn out for anyone’s good. I don’t think King Gyanendra had any specific plan when he took over on February 1, 2005. He wanted a realignment of forces into a bipolar one, and thought he could pull it off. If not, well, others were free to try. They did and here we are.

I’d been defending the royal takeover in that spirit, drawing all the venom I expected to. There seemed so much going on that seemed so unreal. Yet, a lot of what seemed to be going on seemed too real to discount. (Read more at nepalitimes.com)

Taiwan: Balancing Act Among Beijing, Taipei and Washington: Five Questions

Foreign Policy Research Center Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya 

 1. Do you believe China seems eager for Taiwan to go the way of once-autonomous Tibet in the early 1950s? Is the timing of China’s muscle-flexing by display of air power against Taiwan recently significant?

The Chinese acted in Tibet swiftly in 1950, a year after the communists came to power, leaving no room for equivocality. Today, vagueness regarding Tibet’s historical status remains tethered to one side. The position of Taiwan, on the other hand, was left uncertain wilfully by both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), although far less so by the latter. 

The core ambiguity left behind by the 1972 Shanghai Communique and its successors that underpinned the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC was never going to resolve itself. In the ensuing decades, this strategic ambiguity did promote dual deterrence of sorts, i.e., keeping China from invading Taiwan and preventing the island from moving towards formal independence. Yet this was the product of prevailing power balances that were amenable to shifts. Beijing, which never hid its intention of ‘eventual reunification’, is merely adhering to established policy. China’s growing preponderance was bound to affect Beijing’s patience and its reading of the rest of world’s resolve vis-à-vis Taiwan’s defence. The latest muscle flexing by Beijing could be a test of wills at a time when the Chinese see Biden mired in domestic problems and other US allies grappling to come up with a coherent response to China’s rise.

2. Has US President Joe Biden’s recent shift to a more conciliatory approach toward China probably bolstered Xi’s confidence further ? Is Taiwan really a ‘difficult choice’ for the US?

The consolidation of public opinion in the PRC on Taiwan’s unification over the decades on the one hand and the de facto independence the island has enjoyed on the other have made the issue more difficult for the United States and its allies. For US President Joe Biden, the imperative of not being Donald Trump has inspired the adoption of a different if not entirely conciliatory posture on Taiwan. Yet the underlying predicament persists. Washington has never promised to help Taiwan fight in the event of a conflict with China. At the same time, it has never promised not to step in. Bringing any form of clarity to that policy risks raising nationalist ardour for formal independence in Taiwan. Moreover, a clear promise of American military help to Taiwan would increase the pressure from hardliners on President Xi Jinping. The prospects for miscalculation have grown considerably on all sides.

3. Do you agree the risks are particularly acute for Japan, whose southernmost islands are adjacent to Taiwan? - “Okinawa could be next.” Other US allies – such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand – would likely be brought into China’s sphere of influence.

Japan is in an unenviable position. US military bases in Okinawa would be crucial to any conflict with Beijing. Japan, moreover, is a key trading partner of both world powers and also has an interest in preserving the status quo. 

Calls are also growing for Japan to respond to strategies China might adopt to force Taiwan unification in ways that would not invite intervention by the US military. Scenarios under which China would achieve unification of Taiwan with the mainland such as through cyberattacks, economic pressure and the installation of a pro-Beijing regime in Taipei would still provoke a response. As such, a Taiwan conflict in ‘grey zone’ would bolster those calling for further militarization of Japan, which in turn would set the stage for a broader realignment in the region.

While China’s provokes deep-seated suspicions in that part of its neighbourhood, today’s contest for influence among the key regional players would be influenced by historical and geographic factors in ways that would be neither predictable nor passive.

4. Do you agree Taiwan faces a lengthy—and growing—list of challenges, both internal and external. How can the international community help Taiwan in meeting these challenges?

While political relations have stalled, Taiwan’s economy is closely integrated with the mainland’s. This overreliance has worried a section of Taiwanese as unhealthy, while others see this as a guarantee against conflict. But with too many variables at play, the odds of a conflict have grown. Bolstering Taiwan’s ability to defend itself would be the most prudent course for its international allies. However, with other issues bedevilling Western ties with China, the key challenge would be to not arm Taiwan to the point where it provokes China. The downside to pursuing such an approach would be a precipitous blurring of the line between assertiveness and appeasement, which is hardly a reassuring prospect during perilous times. 

5. It’s said that India risks China’s wrath for stronger ties with Taipei. Do you agree?

Significantly, India remains at the centre of two major flashpoints for China. An overt coupling of the Tibet and Taiwan issues by New Delhi would raise the stakes considerably in the India-China equation. So far, New Delhi has studiously avoided doing so, despite pronounced calls from sections of its strategic community. 

In the absence of formal political ties, Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy and India’s Act East policy, among others, have served as guideposts for greater cooperation. The imperative of Indo-Pacific outreach has also encouraged wider and deeper engagement. However, any natural progression in India’s ties with China is bound to increase China’s anger, especially given the already bitter legacy of the Tibet issue in the bilateral relationship. Even though India-Taiwan ties are being bolstered by non-government organizations and civil society, it is official India that would have to contend with China’s wrath. This realization must have contributed New Delhi’s cautious approach to Taipei.

FPRC Journal (48)