By Sanjay Upadhya
December 21, 2006
The ecstasy over the outbreak of peace has abated somewhat with the government’s ambassadorial appointments ostensibly aimed at spreading universally the message of amity. The severity of the Maoists’ denunciation of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) government’s “ill-timed” decision was less surprising than the swiftness with which they were able to enforce their six-hour stoppage the other day. At a deeper level, though, this public display of the fragility of the peace process offers a timely reminder of the perils of unrestrained optimism.
The success of any peace and reconciliation effort will depend, above all, on the control Maoist chairman Prachanda exercises over his organization. Until the latest outburst, his political and military lieutenants seemed to be firmly behind the process. Moves to sequester Maoist fighters in UN-managed camps appeared to have started well. It was not difficult to attribute the persistence of abduction, extortion and other violations of the peace accords to Maoist maladjustment. Considering the rollercoaster ride the peace process has proved to be over the past several months, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala may be right in refusing to see the latest episode as a crisis.
Yet doubts about the Maoists’ commitment to peace continue to hover over the horizon. How genuine is the peace consensus in the organization and how long might it prevail? Even an informal rift in rebel ranks could torpedo the gains of the last several months. The national anxiety deepens when one considers that a formal split is still possible.
Indian Maoists have been unequivocal in their criticism of Prachanda’s latest path. Accusations of betrayal have been emanating from a wider universe of the international left long sympathetic to the insurgency. In this climate, any breakaway Maoist faction would not find it too hard to find ideological allies. The swiftness with which moral sustenance can translate into military support is evident in the Maoists’ own evolution since 1996.
The essential question remains: what stakes do the Maoists have in peace? For all the triumphalism Prachanda and Co. have been exuding, the Maoists have paid a hefty price for peace. Militarily, they seemed capable of overrunning the capital and establishing their cherished people’s republic. What impelled them to join hands with the parliamentary mainstream against the monarchy? More importantly, what effect has this alliance with one of their two principal adversaries had on the fighters? “Recognition of international realities” – the Maoists’ phrase of choice – hides more than it reveals. From the outset of the April movement that ousted the royal regime, the SPA has been treating the Maoists as the eighth player, not as the representatives of the “new state” the rebels so energetically project themselves as.
The extent to which Prachanda went to praise India could not have gone unnoticed in an organization that began its original 40-point demand with a tirade against New Delhi’s sustained subjugation of Nepal. Even if the entire Maoist entity were to somehow share Prachanda’s political pragmatism, far fewer would be ready to countenance his conversion to capitalism, something unmistakable in his recent pronouncements.
Prachanda may have lost the credibility to revert into a hardcore revolutionary. Prime Minister Koirala may rescue his peace partner by immediately promulgating the interim constitution and inducting the Maoists into an interim government and parliament. How would such a peace feed into the discontent voiced by other constituencies?
The Terai may yet be calmed, especially considering its proximity to the external agent most able to stoke instability. After all, it was only in the latter phase of the Maoist insurgency that violence really gripped regions bordering India. More ominous are the bruises inflicted in India by the identification of Hinduism with the monarchy. A Hindu republic of Nepal carries considerable resonance among constituencies there that are more than capable of articulating their displeasure.
For now, each of the three political forces claims to enjoy the people’s mandate. A souring of the popular mood could erode the credibility of the entire arrangement that began with the House of Representative Proclamation. The wildly varying opinion polls on the monarchy have flustered the SPA and the Maoists. Uncertainty may yet unite them against the palace. Would that be enough to sustain the peace process? Eternal optimism is a feeble basis for peace; it is dangerous when the process is so amorphous.
