Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya
1. Are China and Russia becoming allies? Driven by opposition to perceived US hegemony, Putin and Xi meet frequently, stimulating cooperation on a range of international policy and security issues. Joint military exercises have become a regular occurrence. “Axis of collusion/connivance” may be a more appropriate description of the relationship. Do you agree?Although they have not created a full and formal alliance, China and Russia have embarked on a major strategic alignment. During their summit in Beijing, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have reaffirmed that the new inter-state relations between Russia and China are superior to the political and military alliances of the Cold War era. They asserted that friendship between the two States has no limits, and there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation. The strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.
Beyond the lofty rhetoric, it remains to be seen how strongly they can collaborate. One thing is becoming increasingly clear: as the bilateral relationship expands, they are also becoming more asymmetric in China’s favour, from trade to the economy to politics. Yet the two nations see a major window of opportunity to challenge the Western-constructed and -dominated international order. If collusion/connivance can be contextualized within each country’s commitment to preserving and promoting its core national interests, then yes, the characterization is apt.
2. How does the US look at Russia’s pivot to China? Can the US counter this alliance?
Opinion, as expected, is divided in the United States. At one end are the alarmists who see this development as a strategic failure over successive US administrations. At the other end are pragmatists who tend to see less coherence in the pivot than the parties advertise. This latter group notes that Russia has a GDP per capita less than half that of the United States and China less than a third. Moreover, the pragmatists assert, both Russia and China have major regime legitimacy and succession issues as well as daunting demographic and economic challenges. These pragmatists contend that any panicked or frenzied response is unwarranted.
Both groups of American analysts agree that the way to lessen the threat of the partnership between Russia and China is to make them less valuable to each other. In their view, Russia only has two tools of influence, its military force and energy resources. In response, NATO needs to strengthen its conventional and strategic deterrence by, among other things, ensuring that each member state contributes its fair share. The U.S., at the same time, should augment its contribution to forward presence. The American response to the Ukraine conflict broadly fits into this pattern.
Furthermore, Washington would be called upon to stand with its allies to confront Beijing’s misadventures in the South and East China Seas and in the Taiwan Strait, tighten Chinese access to American technology, and continue to campaign against China’s violations of human rights. At the same time, the West would need to become more serious against overreliance on gas and oil from Russia. All this, of course, represents a broad mixture of initiatives with a lot of uncertainties involved.
3. Indian perspective on Russia’s rapprochement with China:
A) Russia-India relations have come a long way despite the turbulent journey. However, the question now arises, where does this relationship stand in this highly volatile global order? Is the bond still strong, or can one witness the chunks in the armor? Steps like (QUAD, Malabar Exercise) have made communist China annoyed and made Russia displeased. Moreover, India’s alignment with the US and its allies to counter China is a cause of concern for the Russians.
B) How do you explain Russia’s “NEW ERA RELATION EXPERIMENT” with Pakistan? Is Russia trying to balance its ties between India and Pakistan?
C) Do you agree with the view that Russia regards China as being far more important than India when thinking about issues in the EAEU, Eurasia and the World?
As ardent advocates of multipolarity, India and Russia still have broad convergences in their global outlook that continue to sustain a strong relationship. Admittedly, developments such as the Quad and Malabar exercise have displeased Russia and China. Additionally, India’s perceived alignment with the US and its allies to counter China is a cause of concern for the Russians. Yet in crude world of realpolitik, Moscow might not mind so much another Asian power vigilant on the Chinese flank.
As for Moscow’s new-era relation experiment with Pakistan, it is hard to separate the development from Russia-China relations in general and, in particular, China’s own ‘all-weather’ relations with Pakistan. This development is much more an outcome of Moscow’s global realignment more than an effort to balance ties between New Delhi and Islamabad.
It would defy common sense to argue that Russia would rank India above China in terms of EAEU, Eurasia and its world view. That does not mean Russia has subordinated India in its worldview. History and strategy have provided Moscow enough prudence not to put all its eggs exclusively in the Chinese or Indian basket. India hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin for the annual bilateral summit in December 2021, despite the growing tensions between the West and Moscow. India and Russia also held their first-ever 2+2 Ministerial dialogue in December. Over the threat of American sanctions through CAATSA, India decided to go ahead with the S-400 missile defence systems deal signed in 2018. Furthermore, New Delhi finalised a new deal for the manufacture of 750,000 AK-203 rifles. Although India’s trade with Russia pales compared to that with the United States, New Delhi’s defence and energy partnership with Moscow remains significant.
4. Russia-China-India Trilateral:
Russia maintained neutrality on the India-China border dispute. “In fact, Russia remains a key stakeholder in resolving the India-China border conflict, since normal relations between Beijing and New Delhi are a vital condition for the realization of Moscow’s vision of Greater Eurasia, which is in essence the project for creating a concert of Eurasian powers.” Do you agree?
Evidently, Moscow has been viewing the India-China border dispute within its vision of a Greater Eurasia. Amid India’s own vision of robust relationships with different parts of Asia, there are bound to be critical areas of competition and cooperation as the major Asian powers rise on the vast continent.
The perception of a reduction of India’s room for manoeuvre in the midst of the Russia-China strategic alignment would enhance calls for New Delhi to seek other ways of preventing a Chinese-dominated Asia. Furthermore, India would be under pressure to engage with the other major powers in the region facing a similar predicament.
Much would depend on how successfully India preserves its strategic autonomy in such engagements. New Delhi’s votes in the UN Security Council and General Assembly on the Ukraine conflict suggest it reserves its options based on the merits of the case. As to China, New Delhi has opted for prudence and patience despite calls for bandwagoning onto the United States to contain that neighbour. Adventurism, on the other hand, could bring major imponderables into sharper focus along with their attendant costs.
FPRC Journal 49
