Foreign Policy Research Center Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya
1. Do you believe China seems eager for Taiwan to go the way of once-autonomous Tibet in the early 1950s? Is the timing of China’s muscle-flexing by display of air power against Taiwan recently significant?
The Chinese acted in Tibet swiftly in 1950, a year after the communists came to power, leaving no room for equivocality. Today, vagueness regarding Tibet’s historical status remains tethered to one side. The position of Taiwan, on the other hand, was left uncertain wilfully by both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), although far less so by the latter.
The core ambiguity left behind by the 1972 Shanghai Communique and its successors that underpinned the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC was never going to resolve itself. In the ensuing decades, this strategic ambiguity did promote dual deterrence of sorts, i.e., keeping China from invading Taiwan and preventing the island from moving towards formal independence. Yet this was the product of prevailing power balances that were amenable to shifts. Beijing, which never hid its intention of ‘eventual reunification’, is merely adhering to established policy. China’s growing preponderance was bound to affect Beijing’s patience and its reading of the rest of world’s resolve vis-à-vis Taiwan’s defence. The latest muscle flexing by Beijing could be a test of wills at a time when the Chinese see Biden mired in domestic problems and other US allies grappling to come up with a coherent response to China’s rise.
2. Has US President Joe Biden’s recent shift to a more conciliatory approach toward China probably bolstered Xi’s confidence further ? Is Taiwan really a ‘difficult choice’ for the US?
The consolidation of public opinion in the PRC on Taiwan’s unification over the decades on the one hand and the de facto independence the island has enjoyed on the other have made the issue more difficult for the United States and its allies. For US President Joe Biden, the imperative of not being Donald Trump has inspired the adoption of a different if not entirely conciliatory posture on Taiwan. Yet the underlying predicament persists. Washington has never promised to help Taiwan fight in the event of a conflict with China. At the same time, it has never promised not to step in. Bringing any form of clarity to that policy risks raising nationalist ardour for formal independence in Taiwan. Moreover, a clear promise of American military help to Taiwan would increase the pressure from hardliners on President Xi Jinping. The prospects for miscalculation have grown considerably on all sides.
3. Do you agree the risks are particularly acute for Japan, whose southernmost islands are adjacent to Taiwan? - “Okinawa could be next.” Other US allies – such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand – would likely be brought into China’s sphere of influence.
Japan is in an unenviable position. US military bases in Okinawa would be crucial to any conflict with Beijing. Japan, moreover, is a key trading partner of both world powers and also has an interest in preserving the status quo.
Calls are also growing for Japan to respond to strategies China might adopt to force Taiwan unification in ways that would not invite intervention by the US military. Scenarios under which China would achieve unification of Taiwan with the mainland such as through cyberattacks, economic pressure and the installation of a pro-Beijing regime in Taipei would still provoke a response. As such, a Taiwan conflict in ‘grey zone’ would bolster those calling for further militarization of Japan, which in turn would set the stage for a broader realignment in the region.
While China’s provokes deep-seated suspicions in that part of its neighbourhood, today’s contest for influence among the key regional players would be influenced by historical and geographic factors in ways that would be neither predictable nor passive.
4. Do you agree Taiwan faces a lengthy—and growing—list of challenges, both internal and external. How can the international community help Taiwan in meeting these challenges?
While political relations have stalled, Taiwan’s economy is closely integrated with the mainland’s. This overreliance has worried a section of Taiwanese as unhealthy, while others see this as a guarantee against conflict. But with too many variables at play, the odds of a conflict have grown. Bolstering Taiwan’s ability to defend itself would be the most prudent course for its international allies. However, with other issues bedevilling Western ties with China, the key challenge would be to not arm Taiwan to the point where it provokes China. The downside to pursuing such an approach would be a precipitous blurring of the line between assertiveness and appeasement, which is hardly a reassuring prospect during perilous times.
5. It’s said that India risks China’s wrath for stronger ties with Taipei. Do you agree?
Significantly, India remains at the centre of two major flashpoints for China. An overt coupling of the Tibet and Taiwan issues by New Delhi would raise the stakes considerably in the India-China equation. So far, New Delhi has studiously avoided doing so, despite pronounced calls from sections of its strategic community.
In the absence of formal political ties, Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy and India’s Act East policy, among others, have served as guideposts for greater cooperation. The imperative of Indo-Pacific outreach has also encouraged wider and deeper engagement. However, any natural progression in India’s ties with China is bound to increase China’s anger, especially given the already bitter legacy of the Tibet issue in the bilateral relationship. Even though India-Taiwan ties are being bolstered by non-government organizations and civil society, it is official India that would have to contend with China’s wrath. This realization must have contributed New Delhi’s cautious approach to Taipei.
