Thursday, November 17, 2022

NEPAL: Foreign Policy Challenges of New Government

Wednesday, November 16, 2022

Iran-India Relations

Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya


 1) How do you look at 12U2 in the context of India-Iran Relations? Is India abandoning Iran for a Western Quad?


The I2U2 was formed to deepen technological and private sector collaboration in the region and tackle transnational challenges in six focus areas: water, energy, transportation, space, health and food security. Despite the lack of an explicit geopolitical focus, the grouping, given the other members’ policy orientations, does pose a challenge to India’s relationship with Iran.
Yet as a bilateral relationship that has its own history, logic and convergences, New Delhi recognizes the folly of brinkmanship. The national interest generally has dissuaded India from approaching diplomacy as a zero-sum game. Still, India has been grappling with the challenge of balancing its relationship with Iran with its other bilateral and multilateral engagements. The I2U2 adds to that challenge.

2) Do you believe like a third wheel, the US complicates India-Iran Relations?

Amid the United States’ four-decade campaign to isolate Iran, New Delhi’s drive for a robust relationship with Tehran was always bound to generate pressures from Washington. However, like in its relationship with Russia, India has been able to press its case on the merits of national interest.
So far, the United States, too, has demonstrated some tolerance of New Delhi-Tehran relations, although it would be imprudent on the part of India to take this posture for granted. Still, New Delhi can be expected to pursue this balancing act with appreciable success in the period ahead through deft diplomacy.

3) How should India approach Iran, responding to the growing Chinese involvement in the country (Iran-China 25-year Agreement)?

The bilateral tensions between India and China or the Iran-China bonhomie need not necessarily constrain New Delhi’s ties with Tehran. This is especially so given the fact that Iran, too, recognizes the imperative of the broadest based international engagement it can manage under the adverse circumstances it confronts.
More broadly, when it comes to their national interest, India and China have been able to rise above their bilateral tensions to cooperate on specific matters on the international stage. Iran provides space for both Asian giants to maintain vibrant bilateral relationships as long as they possess the ability to approach their contradictions with prudence and consideration.

4) How do major powers look at Iran’s nuclear impasse? Is an international consensus still possible on this issue?

Despite the growing international frustration with Iran on the nuclear issue, the consensus on stopping that country from acquiring nuclear weapons remains firm. After the initial enthusiasm it generated in 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JCPOA) suffered a blow when the Trump administration withdrew from the deal three years later, citing Tehran’s noncompliance.
Upon assuming office, the Biden administrated signaled its intention to reverse its predecessor’s action, but negotiations by the other JCPOA signatories to bring both the United States and Iran back to the original agreement have stalled on a variety of disagreements. Furthermore, every new detail that Tehran may have advanced further ahead along the nuclear-weapons path complicates any breakthrough.

5) The relationship of Iran with both Russia and India shows a dual approach of both "rapprochement and constraint.” Do you agree with the view India and Iran could well play a major part in giving INSTC the required boost to reap benefits of resultant trade.

Behind this ‘rapprochement and constraint’ approach, the three countries appreciate their wider economic and commercial compatibilities. With Iran and Russia under U.S. sanctions, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) provides them a much-needed geostrategic alternative.
This is in addition to the fact that the route is more cost-effective and saves a significant amount of travel time for the countries involved. Long-term plans to integrate Iran’s Chabahar Port with the INSTC to expand trade beyond the region provide an incentive to both India and Iran to give the transport corridor a boost.

Saturday, November 05, 2022

घोषणापत्रमा वाचा गरेजस्तै नेपाली दलहरूले भारत र चीनसँग ‘सन्तुलित सम्बन्ध’ राख्न सक्लान्?

नेपालको अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सम्बन्ध बारेका विभिन्न पुस्तकका लेखक सञ्जय उपाध्याय भन्छन्, “नेपालले कूटनीतिक कौशलका माध्यमबाट भारत र चीन दुवैबाट सहयोग पाउन सक्छ जुन एउटाको प्रभाव रोक्न अर्को (देश)ले चाल्ने कदममा निर्भर हुन्छ।”
“जोखिम के छ भने त्यस्तो सहयोग मुद्दा केन्द्रित र लेनदेनमा आधारित हुन्छ। उदाहरणका लागि एउटा छिमेकीले राष्ट्रिय स्वाधीनता प्रवर्द्धन गर्ने हाम्रो अभियानमा सघाउने र अर्कोले लोकतान्त्रीकरणमा पूर्ण रूपमा जोड दिने अवस्थामा हामी रहन सक्दैनौँ। हामीलाई दुवैमा सबैको सहयोग चाहिन्छ।”
उपाध्याय भन्छन्, “चीनलाई जोड दिएको हालैको अमेरिकी राष्ट्रिय सुरक्षा रणनीति र शासन व्यवस्थाको सुरक्षामा केन्द्रित रहेको चिनियाँ कम्युनिष्ट पार्टीको राष्ट्रिय कांग्रेसले नेपालले अबको पाँच वर्षमा भोग्ने मूल चुनौतीबारे स्पष्ट सन्देश दिएको छ। हाम्रो बृहत् विदेश नीति यी अवधारणाभित्र पर्नेछ जसको अर्थ नेपालले (कसैको) पक्ष लिनुपर्ने हुन्छ।”
गम्भीर राजनीतिक अस्थिरता बेहोरिरहेको नेपालका लागि आधारभूत भूराजनीतिक चुनौतीको सामना गर्न गाह्रो हुने उल्लेख गर्दै उनले त्यसो भएमा आर्थिक विकास, सामाजिक समावेशीकरण र अरू महत्त्वपूर्ण अत्यावश्यक मुद्दालाई ओझेलमा पार्ने बताए। 

https://www.bbc.com/nepali/articles/clwqpye5vdqo