Foreign Policy Research Center Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya
Although relations had been strengthening across the board since the Clinton administration, growing American and Indian concerns about China accelerated more in-depth and more institutionalized defense and security ties. Platforms for bilateral and multilateral engagement – including the once cast-off Quad – were strengthened. Moreover, consultations were stepped up in bilateral, regional and global institutions on a bevy of traditional and emerging issues.
All this has had beneficial effects on the bilateral economic engagement, which, in any case, had acquired a logic and momentum of its own. The regularity and vibrancy of the dialogue process has been able to keep bilateral political/security and economic/trade differences within manageable levels.
The personal chemistry of the two leaders and ideological convergences between the ruling parties over the past four years also carried the risk of casting the relationship in a partisan light. However, realities on the ground and a broader convergence of interests have been able to offset that risk.
2) What does the Biden presidency mean for India? How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - strategic and trade deals - and move forward?
New Delhi will closely watch the Biden administration’s approach to China and the Indo-Pacific region generally. President Trump’s declassification of the “US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific” – which states that “a strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance to China – was perhaps intended to commit his successor to his policies. While New Delhi may have some misgivings on that formulation, particularly relating to its evident impingement on India’s vaunted ‘strategic autonomy’, Biden’s early statements have cast Beijing as a “long-term competitor”. This would signal continuity in the content of the US-India-China triangle.
However, over the next few months, if the Biden administration were to depart from its predecessor to seek greater cooperation with China on other issues such as climate change and health security while sorting out the more contentious bilateral challenges, India may find itself having to make adjustments.
While India will welcome a return by the United States to multilateralism, New Delhi would continue to prefer issue-based coalitions rather than formal alliances. India’s engagement with Russia and Iran, among other things, could prove to be periodic irritants, but not necessarily roadblocks to closer relations.
Over the next few months, there is a likelihood of greater cooperation on such issues as the supply and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. As the challenge of economic recovery starts to predominate, differences over trade, investment and immigration could become more prominent.
At another level, the Biden White House – as Democratic administrations traditionally have been – could be more assertive and outspoken on domestic developments in India. This, in turn, would prompt New Delhi to ward off no less ebulliently Washington’s interference in what it considers internal matters. The echo chamber of the daily news cycle and the effervescence of non-state actors in both countries could make things appear worse than they actually are. The Biden administration would be hamstrung by the United States’ own struggles with ensuring full rights and representation to marginalized communities within. On the other hand, the general vibrancy India’s democracy and institutions should be able to withstand undue pressures. All this perhaps would indicate an urgency for loosening linkages between strategic and trade issues.
3) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?
India’s decision in 2018 to buy five Russian S-400 missile systems has strained bilateral ties and threatened Washington’s own defense sales in New Delhi. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), passed by Congress in 2017 to punish Russia for interfering with the 2016 US elections, comes very close to requiring the White House to impose sanctions on any country that makes “significant” purchases of military equipment from Russia.
As the law stands, therefore, Biden must invoke CAATSA on India. However, he can waive the implementation of sanctions under the national security exception built into the legislation. Since that exception is narrow, Biden and his advisers would need to muster much executive creativity while contending with the legislature.
What would help here is the countervailing argument in favor of India’s value as a partner in confronting China across Eurasia. We can debate who needs the other more. Still, the fact remains that New Delhi possesses a growing and palpable willingness and ability to act as a counterbalance to China, something the Americans cannot be oblivious to. Thus, the United States may feel it has an incentive to go soft on sanctions if it wants India’s full-fledged partnership.
This, of course, ties into the broader issue of India-Russia relations. Here, too, there seems to be growing recognition in Washington that strong ties between New Delhi and Moscow might help check undue Chinese influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia.
4) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?
India has publicly maintained that its relationship with any one country is not about containing any other country. However, realities on the ground also dictate India's necessity to build strong partnerships with like-minded countries to counter the threat from China.
The United States is ready to help India as a full-fledged ally. However, India has no desire to become one because of the vibrancy of the economic dimensions of its relations with China. After all, India remains an active member of the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the largest borrower from the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Last year, China again emerged as India’s biggest trade partner, relegating the United States to the second position after two years.
Evidently, New Delhi’s preferred option is to cooperate with Beijing when possible and compete only when necessary. In other words, New Delhi feels complete reliance on Washington would seriously constrain the country’s strategic space, especially when it sees little to suggest the Americans would be ready to assume new security obligations in the region. The challenge would thus lay in defining the terms of any partnership.
5) How do you look at the Pakistan factor in India-US relations under Biden’s Presidency?
Early statements from the Biden administration indicate that the United States will be taking a tougher position on Pakistan. Senior administration officials have affirmed that Washington’s history of accommodation has not worked.
Still, the United States has to square this realization with the importance Pakistan holds in its Afghanistan policy, particularly in relation to the peace process and eventual military withdrawal.
India and the United States both recognize they can leverage their bilateral relations to maintain stability in South Asia as the Pakistan-China partnership, despite evident irritants, continues to deepen. The case for strengthening India’s role as a regional leader in any recalibration of Washington’s South Asia policy under Biden remains strong.
The corollary is that India will be expected to play a more prominent role in stabilizing Afghanistan’s situation by deploying more significant assets. Much would depend on India’s readiness to shed its past reluctance to do so. Yet, again, neither side seems prepared to allow Pakistan to constrain the US-India relationship. Perhaps India’s near-simultaneous de-escalation with China and Pakistan marks a conscious recalibration in all three countries amid the change of guards in Washington DC.
Foreign Policy Research Center Journal (J-45) 2021 (1) 52-55
