By Sanjay Upadhya
Normally reticent on the specifics of another country’s internal politics, Chinese leaders nevertheless conveyed to visiting Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal their keen desire to see the new constitution come out on schedule. Beijing’s growing anxiety at the deepening political instability in the world’s newest republic could not have become more palpable within the mode of Chinese diplomacy.
Our premier, too, was prepared to assuage some of China’s concerns. He began his visit from Lhasa, winning instant appreciation from sections of the Chinese media. In Beijing, Prime Minister Nepal reaffirmed our long-held stand that Tibet and Taiwan are inalienable parts of China. He buttressed it with Nepal’s equally long-standing pledge that it would not permit anti-Chinese activities on its soil.
What has been lacking in the aftermath of the visit is a fuller appreciation in Nepal of the multidirectional growth in China’s interest. Slowly but unquestionably, various elements of Chinese domestic and international priorities have morphed into an expanded policy towards this country. Nepal’s inability to acknowledge this reality sufficiently becomes even more portentous in view of the growing imperative to articulate it in our wider international engagement.
Clearly, Chinese concerns over the activities of the “Free Tibet” movement from Nepalese soil have grown significantly since the pre-Olympics protests in 2008. For quite some time, Beijing has concluded that the potential for instability in Tibet stems more from the internationalization of the “Free Tibet” campaign and the adroitness of its advocates than from any perceived or real deficiencies in its policies. Chinese officials have been candid in partly attributing the scale of the 2008 protests in Nepal to the international involvement in our peace process. Such concerns will continue to grow with the extension of our transitional phase.
“China would like to see Nepal achieving political stability within the shortest time, say half a year, or one to two years so that all organized forces could compete to make more contributions in building the motherland,” Wang Hongwei, China’s preeminent expert on Nepal, told this writer in a recent interview. “Failure to achieve this might create further chaos and even induce foreign interference,” said Wang, a professor at the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Foreign influence is a Chinese concern that has been growing since the rise of the Maoist insurgency in the mid-1990s, a time conventional wisdom in Kathmandu held that Beijing had somehow lost its strategic interest in Nepal. Chinese displeasure over the Nepalese rebels’ dishonoring of Chairman Mao’s memory and efforts to blame Beijing for fomenting the insurgency were well known. The frequent government reshuffles and the general political instability that exacerbated the insurgency, in the Chinese view, was the result of “an externally inspired shift of the power matrix,” wrote Zhang Li, professor of international relations at Sichuan University’s Institute of South Asian Studies, in a recent monograph titled “To Manage Conflict in South Asia: China’s Stakes, Perceptions and Inputs.”
The convulsion deepened by the Narayanhity Massacre may have temporarily receded with the advent of peace talks between the government and the Maoists. But Beijing’s wariness was even short-lived. The 9/11 attacks brought the global war on terrorism right on China’s doorsteps in Afghanistan well before the peace process broke down, resulting in a growing lethality of the conflict as well as international interest in a military solution. Anxious to preserve its traditionally volatile frontier, Beijing, like much of the world, saw the palace as the pivot of stability.
But its wider divergences were too stark. By describing King Gyanendra’s takeover of full executive powers in February 2005 as an internal matter, Beijing offered a lifeline to Kathmandu amid strident Indian and western pressure. A year later, although exasperated by the royal regime’s inability to reach out to a wider spectrum of society, Beijing feared an imposed recipe for democracy would open the door wider to intervention and coercion by India and western governments, especially the United States. “This was one of the basic reasons for Beijing to boycott the U.S.-brokered agenda aimed at forcing King Gyanendra to give up direct rule in 2006,” Professor Zhang wrote in his monograph.
Unsentimental pragmatism, an enduring characteristic of Chinese foreign policy, surfaced quite openly during the final months of the royal regime. When State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan arrived in Kathmandu in March 2006, he conveyed what Professor Zhang calls the first message from Beijing “to reserve its diplomatic backing for certain political forces other than the monarchy.”
Paradoxically, Beijing itself became part of the drive to raise international involvement. The UN Mission in Nepal grew partly from Chinese concurrence as a veto-wielding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in the hope that it would be able to influence the scope and extent of the mandate. Beijing has had mixed feelings about international role in Nepal. “The [international organizations] have done some work in promoting the peace process,” Professor Wang said. “But some of them have exposed their special interests to resurrect Mustang as a base against China.”
To pre-empt such moves, China assiduously began building ties with all major political parties. China’s ambassador became the first foreign representative not to present his credentials to the monarch. That could not have been a mere coincidence of the diplomatic calendar. Most notable has been China’s turnaround on the Maoists, but its concerns seem to persist. While Beijing sees the Maoists as a strong and nationalist force enjoying popular legitimacy, it still does not seem persuaded of former rebels’ transformation into a full-fledged political party. Professor Wang believes the Maoists – and the other parties – need to do much more. “I think any party in Nepal, if it really wants to maintain political stability, should try to unite all the patriotic forces of the country,” he said.
As China’s search for stability continues, the amalgamation between its hard and soft power is becoming increasingly conspicuous. Hardly a month passes by without a high-profile Chinese political, military, economic or cultural delegation arriving in Kathmandu. When a Chinese military delegation flew directly to India from Nepal late last year, the symbolism was not lost on New Delhi. But, then, India’s worries on China’s academic and cultural influences in Nepal have now rivaled its strategic and security anxieties.
The frequency with which Nepal feels it has to reaffirm its traditional commitment on Tibet is understandable in the context of Sino-India tensions. One leading Indian analyst last year predicted war with China by 2012. This week the Indian army chief spoke of his country’s readiness for simultaneous conflicts with Pakistan and China. There is a less conspicuous but certainly definite perception among some Chinese experts and analysts of an ascendance of the so-called “confrontationalist” lobby in India that sees advantage in raising the stakes for China in Tibet.
The Maoists, for their part, have raised the stakes for Nepal. Regardless of whether convenience, compulsion or opportunism – or what precise mix of the three – impelled them to make a public demonstration of a drift northward, India has made no secret of its disaffection. “It is difficult for the government to say so, but New Delhi has admonished the Maoists about opening up to China,” Ashok Mehta, a retired Indian army general and leading Nepal watcher, said in a BBC interview while Prime Minister Nepal was holding talks in Beijing.
Such possessiveness has long irked the Chinese. Beijing believes Nepal, like every sovereign and independent country, has the right to devise its own relationship with China. As part of that effort, during Nepal’s visit, China pledged to bolster aid and trade to Nepal to lift ties to “a new high”. Beijing has promised necessary support and assistance to Nepal in hydropower construction, infrastructure development, health, education, human resources development and other fields. It also pledged tariff reductions and other assistance.
Skeptics, however, insist China is asking too much from Nepal – i.e., subjecting itself to the full force of India’s political and economic wrath – for too little by way of tangible gains. Then there is the history of China’s inability to come out in support of Nepal, especially during the 1814-16 war with British India, the 1989-90 Indian trade and transit embargo, and the April 2006 protests against King Gyanendra.
In the first case, Nepal felt China was obligated to offer military support under the 1792 Betravati Treaty that ended the Sino-Nepalese war. In the latter two cases, the predominant dynamic was the Nepalese people’s desire for democracy. However, that could not obscure the fact that Nepal’s China relations were at the core of the dispute with India – Kathmandu’s arms purchases from Beijing and Nepal’s role in inducting China as an observer in SAARC, respectively. Even today, Maoist leader Dahal’s fiery words against India have not entirely drowned out the frustration within the party over what some see as China’s lukewarm support to the organization.
Responding to such concerns, Wang says: “China was and is still a developing country. I do not think it did enough to supporting Nepal’s just struggle for safeguarding its sovereignty and independence. But I believe that with the attention shifting to developing the Western part, China will do more in this field.” The Chinese still plan to link the Golmud-Lhasa train to the Nepalese border, although uncertainty persists over the precise route. They have been promoting Chinese investment, as Nepal witnesses a progressive rise in the number of Chinese tourists. A second highway linking Kathmandu with Tibet is to open shortly.
These developments underline a larger reality. Nepal has become the focus of a convergence of several Chinese domestic and external priorities. Moreover, in such vital areas as the maintenance of internal stability, the reduction of regional development imbalances and national reunification, the People’s Liberation Army has acquired a more assertive role. Both Professors Wang and Zhang underscore Nepal’s role as a land bridge to South Asia, a region hopes to engage with more vigorously as a full member of SAARC.
“The main purpose of the [Golmud-Lhasa] railway is to integrate Tibet more closely to the Chinese economy. But once it is expanded, as planned, to the Nepalese border, this in itself will have a major impact on China’s influence in Nepal, Bhutan, and (to a lesser extent) on the Northeast Indian states,” wrote Professor John Garver in his 2006 essay “Development of China’s Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-west and South Asia”. Chinese goods, investment, migration, and tourism in these Himalayan fringe-lands will increase, added Garver, whose 2002 book “Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century,” remains among the seminal texts on the subject.
Within its South Asia’s policy, wrote Zhang, Beijing has a dual and inter-related strategy in Nepal: to secure its own strategic interests by maintaining credible bonds. “Thus, it is quite expectable for Beijing to adapt its policy options to the changing scenario in the near future in order to ensure Kathmandu’s obligation to preserve China’s interests,” he added.
Such assertions acquire greater significance amid persisting doubts over not only the timely promulgation of the constitution but also the ability of the post-monarchy leadership to handle the sensitivities of our two giant neighbors. “One reason why China maintained close ties with the monarchy before 2006 was because it was patriotic [and] carried out a correct foreign policy,” Wang said. Asked whether China saw a role for the monarchy in view of growing calls for a referendum on the institution, Wang reiterated that it was China’s policy not to interfere in another country’s internal affairs. “I think China will respect any choice and decision made by the Nepalese people in the days to come,” he added.
What about Nepal’s role in nurturing the bilateral relationship? “Beijing even sees Nepal’s Tibet policy as a litmus test for Kathmandu to befriend China,” Zhang wrote in his paper. Assuaging China’s concern on this key front is a primary responsibility but not the only one. To be able to articulate to the rest of the world how China’s stake in a stable and sovereign Nepal has grown, we must first be able to shed our timidity in acknowledging it.
Disparate international dynamics beyond our control will continue to influence Nepal’s relations with its northern neighbor. China’s ability and willingness to sway and deter those dynamics, too, will continue to grow. It may sound presumptuous for a country of our size and strength to start throwing around terms like “peaceful rise” and “defensive war”, “containment” and “counter-encirclement”. It would be prudent nonetheless to keep pondering their implications for our interests.
‘Political Stability In Nepal Requires Unity Of All Patriotic Forces’
--Professor WANG HONGWEI
Professor Wang Hongwei of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is China’s preeminent expert on Nepal. In an email interview with SANJAY UPADHYA, Wang, 74, shared his observations on the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, India, international involvement in the peace process, the monarchy and the future of Sino-Nepal relations. Excerpts:Q.1: China has moved significantly in building ties with the Nepalese Maoists. United Communist Party of Nepal chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s October 2009 visit to China has established party-to-party relations. Does China consider the Maoists’ transformation from an outlawed rebel organization into a political party sufficient for the maintenance of political stability in Nepal?
Wang: It is certainly not sufficient for the maintenance of political stability in Nepal. I think any party in Nepal, if it really wants to maintain political stability in Nepal, should try to unite all the patriotic forces of the whole country.
Q.2: In recent years, China has become increasingly vocal in its public support for Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. At times, Nepalese feel China has receded to the background during crucial times, such as the 1989-90 Indian trade and transit embargo and during the background to the April 2006 movement against the monarchy. How does China view India’s role in Nepal? Does Beijing in any way concede New Delhi’s assertion of special relations with Kathmandu because of its close cultural, social and religious ties? Or does China insist on Nepal’s ability to conduct its relations with India independently and in keeping with its own national interests?
Wang: China was and is still a developing country. I do not think it did enough to support Nepal’s just struggle for safeguarding its sovereignty and independence. But I believe that with the attention shifting to developing the Western part, China will do more in this field. India is also a developing country, but it has been behaving like the British of old time, in conducting its relations with neighboring countries including China. New Delhi’s unilateral assertion of special relations with Kathmandu, of its close cultural, social and religious ties, is nothing new, and some of its officials let out the secret that they will turn Nepal into the second Bhutan. This makes me remember a saying in China: “The drinker’s intention is actually not in the cup”, but rather in the mountains and rivers around.
The people of Nepal are heroic. So many brilliant leaders and heroes have emerged in its history, like Anshu Varma, King Prithvi Narayan Shah, Bir Balabhadra, Amar Singh Thapa and Bhimsen Thapa. I believe their spirit will encourage the people to fight for maintaining their complete independence and full sovereignty. And I also believe that, if in need, the Chinese people will give a hand to their Nepalese brothers in these fields.
Q.3: How about the role of the United Nations, United States and the European Union in Nepal? In which ways have they been constructive, and where have proven to be less so? And what about continuing allegations within sections of the Nepalese media of these organizations’ support for the “Free Tibet” movement and attempts to resurrect Mustang as a base?
Wang: Their role is mixed. They have done some work in promoting the peace process. But some of them have exposed their special interests to resurrect Mustang as a base against China. To support the so-called “Free Tibet “movement is to attempt to split China. I believe this design is akin to “ants trying to shake a huge tree,” and is not so easy.
Q.4: After April 2006, China has strengthened relations with Nepal at multiple levels through political, military, economic and cultural cooperation. What are China’s key interests in Nepal beyond the well-known Tibet issue? Does China see Nepal as a land bridge to South Asia, especially in view of Beijing’s growing institutional involvement in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation?
Wang: China’s key interest in Nepal beyond the well-known Tibet issue, according my understanding, is to see Nepal become a prosperous, independent and strong nation soon. Besides, Nepal as a land bridge to South Asia is also very important.
Q.5: What kind of Nepal would China like to see emerge, at a minimum, in the near term, i.e., two years? And what are China’s principal anxieties vis-à-vis Nepal’s potential to slide into further chaos?
Wang: China would like to see Nepal achieving political stability within shortest time, say half a year, or one to two years so that all organized forces could compete to make more contributions in building the motherland. Failure to achieve this might create further chaos and even induce foreign interference.
Q.6: China had traditionally maintained strong ties with Nepal’s monarchy. In the view of many Nepalese, Chinese ambassador Zheng Xianglin made symbolic gesture by becoming the first foreign envoy not to present his credentials to the monarch. Amid the political turbulence, there are calls for a referendum on the restoration of the monarchy. How does China view this development? Does Beijing see a role for the monarchy, provided the Nepalese people decide in favor of restoring it?
Wang: China does not like to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs and respects other countries’ people to choose their political system. The reasons why China maintained close ties with the monarch before 2006 was: (1) the monarchy was the legal head of the state then, (2) the monarchy was patriotic, and carried out a correct foreign policy. I have noted that there are different opinions in Nepalese society about the role of the monarchy. That is a natural phenomenon. I think China will respect any choice and decision made by the Nepalese people in the days to come.
