Taiwan: Balancing Act Among Beijing, Taipei and Washington: Five Questions

Foreign Policy Research Center Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya 

 1. Do you believe China seems eager for Taiwan to go the way of once-autonomous Tibet in the early 1950s? Is the timing of China’s muscle-flexing by display of air power against Taiwan recently significant?

The Chinese acted in Tibet swiftly in 1950, a year after the communists came to power, leaving no room for equivocality. Today, vagueness regarding Tibet’s historical status remains tethered to one side. The position of Taiwan, on the other hand, was left uncertain wilfully by both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), although far less so by the latter. 

The core ambiguity left behind by the 1972 Shanghai Communique and its successors that underpinned the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC was never going to resolve itself. In the ensuing decades, this strategic ambiguity did promote dual deterrence of sorts, i.e., keeping China from invading Taiwan and preventing the island from moving towards formal independence. Yet this was the product of prevailing power balances that were amenable to shifts. Beijing, which never hid its intention of ‘eventual reunification’, is merely adhering to established policy. China’s growing preponderance was bound to affect Beijing’s patience and its reading of the rest of world’s resolve vis-à-vis Taiwan’s defence. The latest muscle flexing by Beijing could be a test of wills at a time when the Chinese see Biden mired in domestic problems and other US allies grappling to come up with a coherent response to China’s rise.

2. Has US President Joe Biden’s recent shift to a more conciliatory approach toward China probably bolstered Xi’s confidence further ? Is Taiwan really a ‘difficult choice’ for the US?

The consolidation of public opinion in the PRC on Taiwan’s unification over the decades on the one hand and the de facto independence the island has enjoyed on the other have made the issue more difficult for the United States and its allies. For US President Joe Biden, the imperative of not being Donald Trump has inspired the adoption of a different if not entirely conciliatory posture on Taiwan. Yet the underlying predicament persists. Washington has never promised to help Taiwan fight in the event of a conflict with China. At the same time, it has never promised not to step in. Bringing any form of clarity to that policy risks raising nationalist ardour for formal independence in Taiwan. Moreover, a clear promise of American military help to Taiwan would increase the pressure from hardliners on President Xi Jinping. The prospects for miscalculation have grown considerably on all sides.

3. Do you agree the risks are particularly acute for Japan, whose southernmost islands are adjacent to Taiwan? - “Okinawa could be next.” Other US allies – such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand – would likely be brought into China’s sphere of influence.

Japan is in an unenviable position. US military bases in Okinawa would be crucial to any conflict with Beijing. Japan, moreover, is a key trading partner of both world powers and also has an interest in preserving the status quo. 

Calls are also growing for Japan to respond to strategies China might adopt to force Taiwan unification in ways that would not invite intervention by the US military. Scenarios under which China would achieve unification of Taiwan with the mainland such as through cyberattacks, economic pressure and the installation of a pro-Beijing regime in Taipei would still provoke a response. As such, a Taiwan conflict in ‘grey zone’ would bolster those calling for further militarization of Japan, which in turn would set the stage for a broader realignment in the region.

While China’s provokes deep-seated suspicions in that part of its neighbourhood, today’s contest for influence among the key regional players would be influenced by historical and geographic factors in ways that would be neither predictable nor passive.

4. Do you agree Taiwan faces a lengthy—and growing—list of challenges, both internal and external. How can the international community help Taiwan in meeting these challenges?

While political relations have stalled, Taiwan’s economy is closely integrated with the mainland’s. This overreliance has worried a section of Taiwanese as unhealthy, while others see this as a guarantee against conflict. But with too many variables at play, the odds of a conflict have grown. Bolstering Taiwan’s ability to defend itself would be the most prudent course for its international allies. However, with other issues bedevilling Western ties with China, the key challenge would be to not arm Taiwan to the point where it provokes China. The downside to pursuing such an approach would be a precipitous blurring of the line between assertiveness and appeasement, which is hardly a reassuring prospect during perilous times. 

5. It’s said that India risks China’s wrath for stronger ties with Taipei. Do you agree?

Significantly, India remains at the centre of two major flashpoints for China. An overt coupling of the Tibet and Taiwan issues by New Delhi would raise the stakes considerably in the India-China equation. So far, New Delhi has studiously avoided doing so, despite pronounced calls from sections of its strategic community. 

In the absence of formal political ties, Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy and India’s Act East policy, among others, have served as guideposts for greater cooperation. The imperative of Indo-Pacific outreach has also encouraged wider and deeper engagement. However, any natural progression in India’s ties with China is bound to increase China’s anger, especially given the already bitter legacy of the Tibet issue in the bilateral relationship. Even though India-Taiwan ties are being bolstered by non-government organizations and civil society, it is official India that would have to contend with China’s wrath. This realization must have contributed New Delhi’s cautious approach to Taipei.

FPRC Journal (48)

Understanding Nepal’s Foreign Policy – Nepal-China Relations

Sanjay Upadhya addresses a session on Nepal-China Relations as part of the online conference on Understanding Nepal’s Foreign Policy organized by the Nepal Institute of International Cooperation and Engagement on November 28, 2021.

Birth Of A Republic: Stories Behind The Story

By Sanjay Upadhya

The idea that the deep unpopularity of Nepal’s last monarch became the greatest catalyst for republicanism has an alluring pithiness. But tight headlines and terse nut-graphs cannot tell what is, by any measure, a far more complex story. The Nepalese political discourse has been dominated by incessant criticism – justified as well as inflated – of the palace. This singular obsession with former king Gyanendra’s “excesses” and the monarchy’s inherently “anti-democratic” proclivities creates a warped picture of the past. More importantly, it obstructs the extrapolation of valuable pointers for an increasingly uncertain future.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the monarchy was not always the preponderant national institution during its 240-year existence. The death of Prithvi Narayan Shah, seven years after the founding of the Nepalese state, led to a weakening of the monarchy. A succession of minor kings left rival royal factions competing for power. The loss of a third of the nation’s territory in a debilitating war with the British only fueled the feuds. From the bloodletting rose the Ranas, who oversaw the eclipse of the monarchy for over a century.

Nepal’s foray into modernity in the 1950s revealed the new contradictions the monarchy would reign atop. The overthrow of the Rana regime, hailed as the dawn of democracy, ended up consolidating the monarchy. The inauguration of Nepal’s first elected government precipitated a battle of wills in which the palace prevailed over the Nepali Congress. Royal preponderance reached its zenith during the three decades following King Mahendra’s dismissal of Prime Minister B.P. Koirala’s government and abolition of multiparty democracy.

The incongruity of an impoverished nation having to finance an expensive institution was ideologically anathema to the communists. Yet the communists, whom the palace considered a counterweight to the Nepali Congress, prospered the most during 30 years of palace-led nonparty rule. The Nepali Congress, for its part, saw a constitutional monarchy as a bulwark against a preponderance of the left. Yet it made attempts on the lives of two kings.

The restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990 was expected to put Nepal irrevocably on the path of democratic modernity. Barely six years later, an avowedly republican Maoist insurgency helped the palace to gradually consolidate its position. International and regional powers, mindful of such internal contradictions, considered the palace the fulcrum of stability. India and the United States – the world’s two most prominent democratic republics – joined communist China to support the monarchy.

That compact was shaken – more internally than internationally – by the June 2001 Narayanhity massacre. The carnage dealt a grievous blow to the monarchy from multiple directions. It ended any halo of divinity surrounding the monarchy. The notion that the king was the guardian of the nation exploded with the bursts of gunfire. Nepalis were reminded of the history of bloodshed and machinations associated with palace politics.

The shady reputations of the new monarch and the heir apparent, coupled with swirling suspicions of their role in the palace massacre, could hardly provide a promising beginning. Yet the political parties lay discredited by their own performance and the Maoists had little to offer politically. A wary political class as well as public watched King Gyanendra’s moves to strengthen the palace’s role. Still, the royal interventions of October 2002 and February 2005 failed to rouse the people into vigorous opposition. Within Nepal, the two events were considered part of a continuum. Geopolitically, they were different. The contrast revealed an essential truism of Nepalese politics. International and regional powers, with their competing interests in and expectations from Nepal, have precipitated political changes.

When King Gyanendra dismissed an elected prime minister in 2002 for failing to hold elections on schedule, India and the United States seemed generally content. China maintained its characteristic silence. Over the preceding years, Western governments and international donors had been growing increasingly critical of the infighting, corruption and mismanagement that had gripped the polity. Their representatives in Kathmandu had become increasingly explicit in voicing those concerns.

The 2005 royal takeover, on the other hand, instantly infuriated the Indians and Americans, while the Chinese, again, professed non-interference. Yet Beijing’s anxiety was clear. A series of palace-appointed premiers had failed to quell the Maoist insurgency, prompting greater Indian as well as American military involvement. New Delhi’s own discomfort with American activism was palpable. Allowing the Maoists to triumph over the state would have grave implications for India’s Maoist insurgency.

Cautious China

Chinese apprehensions ran deeper. The Nepalese rebels’ wholesale discrediting of Mao Zedong’s reputation was intolerable enough, something Beijing expressed with great candor. It was not hard to fathom how a total Maoist triumph could energize restive populations in the Chinese hinterland deprived of a part of the post-Mao economic miracle. The prospect of Nepal’s inexorable drift toward the Indian-American camp carried grave implications for China’s soft underbelly, Tibet. On the eve of the 2005 royal takeover, Nepal shut down the local offices of the principal Tibet-related organizations. The event was thus cast as a pro-Chinese initiative.

Far from extending full support to the royal regime, however, the Chinese remained cautious. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao skipped Nepal during his South Asian tour, sending his foreign minister to Kathmandu instead. King Gyanendra’s anticipated visit to China to mark the 50th anniversary of bilateral ties did not materialize. The Indians succeeded in preventing the Americans from striking a separate deal with the palace. New Delhi, for its part, was negotiating with the king. It bailed out Nepal from massive censure at the UN Human Right Conference in Geneva and dangled the promise of a resumption of military – and perhaps even political –assistance.

A section of the Indian establishment always considered the monarchy the problem and found a conducive political alignment in New Delhi. The communist parties backing the ruling Indian coalition took the lead and moved swiftly to bring the Maoists and mainstream parties in an anti-palace alliance. The Indian army and internal security apparatus, insistent on helping the king and the Nepalese army, was not pleased, as a series of leaks in the Indian media showed. This conflict emboldened the royal government, which sought to internationalize its fight against the Maoists by linking it to the global war on terror. On the ground, it went after the mainstream parties without being able to dent the rebels. New Delhi checkmated the king by facilitating a ceasefire on the eve of his attempt to raise the insurgency at the United Nations General Assembly.

The monarch responded by spearheading a campaign to secure China’s position as an observer in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The move came amid China’s drive to block India from regional initiatives in East Asia. In New Delhi, the palace’s brazen flaunting of the “China card” hardened critics and alienated the remaining supporters of the king. The Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoist rebels hurriedly signed the 12-point pact to bring down the royal regime.

The collaboration energized the Nepalese masses. The opportunity for peace and stability after years of bloodletting and instability was too enticing to squander. As anti-palace demonstrations picked up speed, India sent a royal relative, Karan Singh, as an emissary. The king’s invitation to the SPA to form the next government won instant praise from New Delhi, Washington and London. It failed to quell the protests. For the republican camp within Nepal and outside, the public defiance served to expose the depth of anti-monarchism.

The collapse of the royal regime led to a swift and systematic clipping of the palace’s powers. Still, a republican Nepal was not a done deal. The next phase – the suspension of the monarchy after the enactment of the interim constitution – morphed in line with a careful power play. A precipitous de-monarchization of the nation was precluded by the imponderables involved. The true nature of Nepalese public opinion vis-à-vis the monarchy, the loyalty of the army and the Maoists’ real commitment to the democratic process remained unknown. What was obvious was not inspiring: the mainstream parties’ poor record of governance.

Yet for India, mainstreaming the Maoists had become a matter of national security. The insurgency launched by Indian Maoists, or Naxalites, was spreading fast. The Naxalites were in no position to overwhelm the state, but they risked exacerbating India’s already grave internal security challenge. Engaging the Nepalese Maoists in the peace process through incremental carrots was tied to India’s plan to tame the Naxalites.

Faith-based Initiative?

For influential international quarters, King Gyanendra became too much of a liability. He continued to insist that he had seized power in good faith, adding that the effort failed because of “several factors”. The caveat could not have been lost on India. For the democratic West, the monarch’s overt tilt toward China was inexcusable enough. His espousal of the Hinduism mantle, with a fervor surpassing that of any of his predecessors, was tantamount to insolence. While Christian organizations had not listed Nepal high on the list of persecutor nations, many called it one of the most unreached nations for the Gospel. A Hindu monarch in a secular nation was far from tenable.

There were scattered reports of contacts in Delhi between the Maoists and Christian groups – some suggesting financial transactions – but they mostly emanated from the Hindu nationalist spectrum of the Indian media. Given the Maoists’ record of successfully using secondary adversaries to accomplish their immediate ends, the convergence of interest was plausible.

Had Crown Prince Paras enjoyed a better public image, forcing King Gyanendra to abdicate in favor of his son might have been an option. Passing the crown to Paras’s son, Hridayendra, would have mollified royalists. For the country, it meant a return of regency. King Gyanendra, more than anyone else, understood what this would mean for the monarchy. He dismissed calls for abdication made by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and others.

Publicly, the international community shunned the monarch. Privately they maintained channels. One reason was China’s swift move to build ties with the Maoists. The arrival of a modern high-speed train to the Tibetan capital Lhasa had greatly improved China’s access to Nepal. Nepal’s open border to the south exposed the Indian heartland to what many analysts there considered an enhanced military threat from China. The Terai erupted in violence against centuries of injustices inflicted by the hillspeople. The specific assurances foreign governments sought from the palace in exchange for the retention of some form of monarch remains unknown.

Clearly, the second amendment to the interim constitution, which declared Nepal a republic subject to an elected assembly’s ratification, was intended as a carrot and a stick for the palace. The monarch found more time to reconsider his options. To pre-empt any royal assertiveness, the statute also provided for the removal of the monarchy by two-thirds majority of the interim parliament. This ultimatum failed to influence the king but vitiated the political climate for the palace.

Previously, the Maoists and the mainstream parties – for their own interests – had made a distinction between the institution of the monarchy and individual kings. If Mahendra and Gyanendra were denounced as autocrats, Birendra and Tribhuvan, in their estimation, fared better as liberals. But now statues of Prithvi Narayan Shah were being demolished. Paradoxically, those committed to preserving Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity viewed the state as the culmination of unjust wars of aggressions. Supporters of some form of monarchy in the Nepali Congress attempted to frame the discussion in different ways. The fear of being perceived as royalists in a ruling alliance heavily dominated by republicans dissuaded them. Moreover, royalist parties like the Rastriya Prajatantra Party and the Rastriya Janashakti Party had become monarchy neutral.

Opinion polls up to the run-up to the elections showed that half the country wanted to retain some form of monarchy. A referendum would have put the issue to rest. Victory would have permitted King Gyanendra to recreate the monarchy in his own image. A defeat would have allowed him to depart as a democrat.

Many expected the king to resist the republic declaration. The inability of the ruling alliance to agree on the precise structure of the presidency as well as power sharing up to the first meeting of constituent assembly suggested as much. Whether royal defiance would have succeeded is a different thing altogether. Ultimately, the ex-king saw the overwhelming assembly vote in favor of a republic as the best expression of the popular will under the circumstances which he and his predecessors always invoked.

The monarchy had been central to the policies of the three major international stakeholders in Nepal. The Maoists took in royalists reportedly on the advice of the Chinese to bolster a nationalist front. A Maoist-UML alliance could go a far way toward mollifying Beijing. For New Delhi, the Nepali Congress and the three Madhesi parties could provide succor. Washington, which began its own rapprochement with the Maoists after their electoral success, perhaps sees the military as the backbone of a non-communist front.

The presence of the ex-monarch within the country would probably help stabilize politics in the same way the return of Zahir Shah, Afghanistan former king, helped the Hamid Karzai government find its footing. With the end of the monarchy, a new quest for internal and regional equilibrium has begun.

(A version of this article appeared in the August 2008 inaugural issue of Global Nepali)

Republicanism: How About A Real Public Debate?

 By Sanjay Upadhya

Amid the flurry of political activity in Kathmandu and New Delhi in recent weeks, the myth surrounding the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990 is being dispelled. From the outset, it was clear that the tripartite agreement among the royal palace, the Nepali Congress and a disparate alliance of communist factions was an uneasy one.

The main communist faction, the Marxist-Leninist, had officially expressed qualified support for the new constitution. The party’s objections primarily centered on the role and privileges of the monarchy. It was hardly a secret that the communist parties’ acceptance of constitutional monarchy was a tactical decision. The comrades, not too surprisingly, saw the palace as a useful counterweight to the Nepali Congress’ ambitions.

In the aftermath of King Gyanendra’s February 1 takeover of full executive powers, the Nepali Congress, too, has signaled that its support for constitutional monarchy is, at best, driven by expediency.

Ever since King Gyanendra dismissed the last elected government in October 2002 for failing to hold elections, Nepali Congress president Girija Prasad Koirala has been warning that the king’s political ambitions would compelled him to contemplate an alliance with the Maoist rebels to abolish the monarchy. This is surely a leap of faith for a man who headed the government that inaugurated the unleashing of state power against the rebels, who have been fighting since 1996 to establish a communist republic.

Now Koirala’s one-time deputy, Ram Chandra Poudel, has gone a step further by asserting that King Birendra was not satisfied with the powers granted him under the constitution. For a party that proclaimed that King Birendra was the paragon of virtue when it came to adherence to the constitution, Poudel’s disclosure was revealing departure. 

Moreover, Poudel must have had to summon much antipathy to speak in the way he did against the former monarch around the fourth anniversary of the palace massacre that wiped out most of the royal family.

The monarchy, to be sure, could not have been satisfied with the restricted political role the two major parties envisaged for him in the new constitution. What King Birendra announced on the night of April 8, 1990 was merely the lifting of the ban on political parties. The ensuing days witnessed a struggle for power on the streets and in the media. The scales were tipped against the palace, already weakened by a crippling trade and transit embargo imposed by India. Fifteen years later, the palace stepped in to claim a role it believed it never had relinquished under the tripartite agreement.

Among the leaders still detained by the royal government after the lifting the state of emergency on April 30 are leading proponents of a constituent assembly. This is a key demand of the Maoists, who expect the elected body to transform the kingdom into a republic. The detentions indicate that the palace is ready for a showdown regardless of the quarter it emanated from.

Koirala, the leader of the seven-party anti-palace alliance formed last month, is currently in India for medical treatment. He has been holding talks with sympathetic Indian leaders in an effort to consolidate the democracy movement in Nepal. Advocating a “fight to the finish for full democracy”, he may be contemplating some kind of alliance with the Maoists, who have acknowledged opening their own contacts with key Indian leaders. It remains unclear, though, whether the latest consultations would help clarify the republican agenda.

Indeed, precious little has been heard so far. Considering the Nepalese political parties’ propensity for polarization while in power – a trait preponderant during the two phases of multiparty democracy in 1951-1960 and 1990-2002 – the contours of a republican future need to be drawn clearly. The process needs to begin with a precise definition of the relationship between the head of state and head of government, including role, functions and powers.

To some extent, a United States-style presidential system might help avoid conflicts. Since such a model would be seen centralizing power in one branch, legislative and judicial checks and balances acquire special attention.

An Indian-style prime ministerial model would envisage a titular head of state. Since the president would be the supreme commander of the armed forces, the command-and-control conflicts the mainstream parties see under the monarchy would still exist. This issue acquires additional urgency in view of the heavy politicization of the police force and bureaucracy under successive elected governments.

Irrespective of the model, effective safeguards against potential conflicts between the executive and legislative branches must be put in place. Questions relating to the president’s tenure, including impeachment, must be addressed vigorously, considering the frequency with which no-confidence motions were introduced against the prime minister in the past.

The prime minister’s prerogative to dissolve parliament and call fresh elections, a subject of much divisiveness in the past, must be clearly addressed. There are legitimate issues concerning the judiciary, especially since each prime minister that dissolved the House of Representatives was eventually challenged in the Supreme Court.

In the case of direct elections to both offices, the issue of power-sharing by a president and prime minister representing rival parties becomes crucial. French-style “cohabitation” under which jurisdictions for foreign and domestic policies are clearly laid out, might provide some insights.

Awaiting greater clarification, though, is the precise mechanism of ushering in a republic. The current discussions on a constituent assembly remain superficial. Worse, they presume that the popular verdict is already known. Will voting be conducted along the present first-past-the-post system or proportional representation? How can traditionally underrepresented groups expect their voices and concerns to be heard? Would the people’s representatives elected on diverse platforms assemble to vote on a future model? Or would the issue be put directly to a referendum? 

Considering the deep divisions in the electorate, how would each of the alternative outcome scenarios be addressed? Who exactly will be drafting a new constitution? Discussions have focused too narrowly on how the palace might react to an adverse result. How would the mainstream parties and the Maoists respond to an outcome not to their liking?

In the case of a republican victory, how would the ambiguities contained in the Maoists’ commitment to their ultimate goal of establishing a communist republic be addressed? This question becomes all the more important in view of the growing interest and influence of external powers in Nepal.

For China, India, United States and Britain, among other countries, the monarchy has been the pivot of stability since the 1950s. Public support, tradition and continuity have conferred special legitimacy to the institution, which external powers have acknowledged and incorporated in their policies vis-à-vis the country.

A full Maoist takeover would hardly be acceptable to them, albeit for different reasons. The United States, which sees its victory over communism as a seminal event of the last century, would hardly countenance such a brazen reversal of that reality. Moreover, Washington has designated the rebels a terrorist group.

The Maoists, who have carefully calibrated their postures in keeping with the exigencies of the moment, may be ready to shed some of their doctrinaire policies and rhetoric in exchange for legitimacy.

However, it remains doubtful whether they would be ready to change the party name and flag in exchange for western support, especially when the far more moderate Unified Marxist Leninists have not been able to do so.

Despite misguided attempts to portray a Chinese hand behind the insurgency, it is clear that Beijing would hardly acquiesce in the emergence of a hard-line Maoist government in Nepal. The Nepalese Maoists continue to espouse aspects of the Cultural Revolution—including class conflicts and retribution – which modern-day Chinese communists would prefer to forget. Moreover, at a time when economic reforms have left a huge rural-urban income divide in China, the communist leadership in Beijing cannot be unaware of the destabilizing effects of a homegrown yet antiquated ideology in a volatile part of South Asia.

As for India, extreme left-wing insurgencies grip some 40 percent of the country’s 593 districts. A full-fledged Maoist takeover in Nepal would serve to energize these groups into forging their wider compact revolutionary zone in South Asia. Considering the long and porous border between the two countries and the peoples’ longstanding links, sections in the Indian establishment might be willing to contemplate a Maoist-dominated republican Nepal under the presidency of, say, the Nepali Congress.

Indeed, New Delhi’s recent decision to open direct channels of communication with the Nepalese Maoists, purportedly under the auspices of leftist supporters of the ruling coalition, could be aimed at facilitating such an alliance. Would the vociferous Hindutva element in India accede to the destruction of the world’s only Hindu kingdom?

Despite the much-hyped bonhomie between China and India, New Delhi’s enthusiasm in defining a new state structure in Nepal would clearly sensitize Beijing. Growing cooperation between the world’s two most populous nations cannot mask the reality that they are also competitors. The limits to conciliation have been on display for some time.

Despite India’s full recognition of Tibet as an integral part of China, Beijing has hardly shown unequivocal reciprocity on the issue of Sikkim, the Himalayan kingdom India annexed in 1974. China’s reticence on India’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council provides yet another illustration of this complex relationship.

In keeping with its massive economic expansion, China has decided to deepen its strategic influence in the region, especially with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. According to a report published in April by Washington DC-based Jamestown Foundation, Nepal’s strategic location makes the kingdom an important part of South Asia. Nepal’s borders meet China’s restive western province of Tibet on the one hand, and Naxalite-dominated Indian states on the other.

China has traditionally viewed the monarchy as the cornerstone of its Nepal policy. Weeks after describing the royal takeover as an “internal matter,” China sent Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing to Nepal in a clear gesture of support. Jia Qinglin, chairman of the National Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, China’s top advisory body, reaffirmed his country’s support during a meeting with King Gyanendra in April on the sidelines of the Boao Forum for Asia conference in Hainan.

In return, the Jamestown report says, China wants the Nepalese government to stay clear of any foreign (Indian or the U.S.) influence that could make trouble in Tibet. To further the goal of status quo in Tibet, China is integrating Nepal into the Tibetan economy, and laying a highway that will connect the two. Chinese President Hu Jintao, who served as Communist Party secretary in Tibet from 1988 to 1992, perhaps best understands the importance of this integration.

The United States, which joined India and Britain in arming and training the Royal Nepalese Army in its fight against the Maoists, has embarked on a deft policy. While the other two countries responded to the royal takeover by announcing a suspension of military assistance, the United States adopted a watch-and-wait policy. Publicly, Washington continues to emphasize policy coordination with New Delhi and London. Behind the scenes, Washington has engaged with Beijing, already is a key intermediary in the North Korean nuclear crisis.

The Bush administration, aware of China’s recent moves to fill a vacuum in Asian leadership, has assigned Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick to head a permanent U.S. delegation to talk with China one a variety of international issues, including Burma, Nepal and Sudan.

In a 2002 report, the U.S. research organization Stratfor wrote that Washington has relatively little interest in Nepal’s insurgency. However, it added, the Pentagon likely would not mind having another emergency air base or logistics center close to Pakistan and Central Asia. “In looking toward the longer term, the United States definitely wants as much of a presence on the border with China as possible,” the report said.

Beijing is well aware of Washington’s intentions and is no doubt concerned about the U.S. encirclement that is already taking place, Stratfor said. “The U.S. military has bases in Pakistan, throughout Central Asia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and it has relations with Mongolia, Taiwan, Singapore and Thailand. Nepal is another link in the chain,” it added.

Referring to India’s strategic decision in the mid-1990s to move closer to the United States, Stratfor said New Delhi hoped to benefit from increased trade, eventual access to U.S. weapons systems and the formation of a strong alliance to counter China.

“However, American involvement with Nepal and Sri Lanka raises conflicting impulses. On one hand, New Delhi is glad to see Washington trying to clean up the insurgencies that have spilled over into its borders for years. On the other hand, there is a visceral reaction against foreign involvement in India’s backyard, especially when those foreigners maintain strong ties with Indian rival Pakistan.”

The report added: “Many in India’s foreign policy circles are concerned that Washington may replace India as the dominant power in South Asia, assuming that Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Bhutan prefer the freedom that comes with casting their allegiance with a distant giant rather than one close to home.” This, according to Stratfor, has dampened India’s hope of becoming the dominant power in the Indian Ocean and interacting with Washington as a near equal.

In an earlier report, Stratfor underscored Nepal’s strong geo-strategic value to world powers. “The power that stations its space-linked surveillance, intelligence and navigation systems on Nepal’s high mountains gets geo-strategic leverage over several Asian regions, from Central Asia to South-East Asia,” the report said.

Clearly, Nepal must brace for new domestic and international challenges. Proponents of a republican agenda need to persuade the people that the new model would be more effective than the monarchy in address these challenges. Rhetorical threats must not be allowed to take the place of substantive discussions. The accusation that King Gyanendra in this day and age is bent on reviving autocracy is an insult to the intelligence of the Nepalese people.

Originally posted on June 8, 2005

India–Nepal Relations: Post-2014

Foreign Policy Research Center Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya

1. How does Nepal look at India’s ‘Neighborhood First’ Policy post-2014?

Nepal welcomed Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s election in 2014 as a harbinger of change in bilateral relations. Over the months, Mr. Modi overtures – rhetorical as well as real – reinforced Nepali perceptions of the advent of a positive era. The economic blockade India imposed the following year changed all that. If India had any legitimate reservations on the content of Nepal’s new constitution as well as the nature and direction of Nepal’s growing relationship with China, New Delhi could have chosen to address them through proper diplomatic and political channels. To this day, the Nepali people do not know much about India’s grievances.
That India used an agitation launched by Nepali Madhesi leaders for greater internal autonomy to camouflage its imposition of a wholesale economic blockade for months on only served to validate Nepali perceptions of the enduring nature of the divide-and-rule policy India had inherited from the British Raj. Moreover, the fact that the blockade came merely months after Nepal suffered a devastating earthquake only hardened Nepali sentiments. The blockade has left Nepal in a cautious wait-and-see mood vis-à-vis any Indian initiatives such as ‘Neighborhood First’.

2. How does India look at Nepal’s foreign policy – From ‘looking at India’ to ‘backing up China’?

China’s growing assertiveness in Nepal is an undeniable reality. It is also true that Nepal continues to use its relations with China to balance India – sometimes too flagrantly. Today Nepal is ruled by a Communist Party formed recently by two factions sharing a pronounced Maoist legacy, which is new experience for the country. Nepali opposition parties regularly caution the government against tilting to the north out of sheer ideological fealty. It would be wrong, however, to view official Nepali policies and pronouncements as an outgrowth of some collective national strain of anti-Indianism.
In 2006, India played a major role in facilitating the alliance between mainstream democratic parties and the Maoist rebels to restore peace after a 10-year ‘people’s war’. Yet Chinese engagement in the economic, social and cultural spheres of Nepal has grown precipitously since 2006. While the causes and consequences of China’s expanding footprint in Nepal precisely during this period continues to be studied extensively in Nepal and India, there has been a natural political impact of Beijing’s active engagement. We cannot keep dwelling on the supposed ease with which Nepal flashes the China card against India at every opportunity without trying to understand the real compulsions that may lay behind Nepal’s recent policies and pronouncements.

3. Do you agree that India’s effort to revitalize BIMSTEC is signaling that its foreign policy is now shifting to address the reservations of its neighbours?

Nepal looks forward to the revitalization of BIMSTEC as a new dimension of regional cooperation for collective prosperity. The eastward shift of the locus to include new partners certainly brings new opportunities for Nepal. At the same time, there is a feeling in Nepal that BIMSTEC may be evolving in a way that would supplant the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Nepal is fully behind the notion that bilateral issues, such as those between India and Pakistan, must not be allowed to hold back regional cooperation. However, it also recognizes the limits that could be imposed by overtly exclusionary efforts. SAARC and BIMSTEC are antithetical entities and should not be considered as such.

4. Why did Nepal prefer to be neutral during the Doklam standoff in 2017?

From Nepal’s perspective, the Doklam standoff was a symptom of the larger border dispute between India and China. New Delhi and Beijing have wisely decided not to let their long-running border dispute prevent cooperation in other mutually beneficial areas. Yet Nepal cannot be oblivious to the possibility of periodic India-China border flare-ups pending a formal and final settlement between the two countries. More importantly, Nepal recognizes the direct and dire implications of such tensions given its own precarious position between the two giant neighbors. As such, Nepal needs to maintain extreme judiciousness in its approach so as to do no further harm. Neutrality on Doklam was guided by Nepal’s national interest.

5. India bashing is still a favorite sport with most Nepalis who blame New Delhi for most of the ills in their country little knowing the dynamics of relations between both countries. Do you subscribe to this viewpoint?

This has been a long-standing trait in Nepal because of the rich political value it produces domestically. However, a shift in Nepali public opinion is also becoming palpable in recent years. There is growing recognition that Nepal must engage more constructively with India on all contentious issues and shun grandstanding in order to sustain a mutually productive relationship. Over the last decade, increasing contacts with China in different areas have allowed Nepal to compare and contrast its relationship with each neighbor. There is growing appreciation of how geography, culture, politics and language bring Nepal closer to India as well as the advantages they offer. History and geography as well as the realities of the modern world have taught us that Nepal-India and Nepal-China relations cannot and need not be mutually exclusive.

6. Do you believe transforming the India-Nepal border from an ‘open border’ to a ‘closed border’ would severely damage the traditional socio-cultural ties?

I do. More than that, I am not sure Nepal can sustain the short-term costs closing the border would entail – or even whether the costs would be short. Nepalis recognize the benefits accruing from an open border with India very well because they are living it every day. In a spirit of true reciprocity, Nepal should address the political, security, economic and diplomatic concerns of India as far as practicable to maintain what I believe is a basic underpinning of our vital relationship.

7. What are the existing security relations and strategic perceptions of India and Nepal? What are the reasons for the erosion of mutuality and its impact on Indo-Nepal relationship?

Theoretically, at least, the key underpinnings of a robust security relationship between Nepal and India are in place. Concerns on both sides relate to implementation of those commitments. Each country has grievances over the safe haven criminals and questionable characters enjoy on the other side of the border. As far as Nepal is concerned, India may perhaps pause to consider whether lack of action on the part of Nepali authorities is deliberate or is rooted in administrative and police weaknesses. This is not to deny the existence of malicious motives behind certain cases.
On contentious cases, India could approach Nepal on a case-by-case basis. Definitional gaps relating to criminal activities need to be handled through legal and judicial institutions.
Similarly, the strategic perceptions of each country are defined by realities based on their sovereign existence. The erosion of mutuality is rooted in the tendency on both sides to attribute every instance of inaction, hesitation and deliberation to some deep-seated antipathy toward the other. However, I do see signs of change for the better on both sides. One is that India and China have become more aware of the potential of third countries engaged with Nepal to disrupt the stability of what is emerging as a vital triangular Sino-Indian-Nepali relationship. Of course, there is a vast distance between recognizing something and doing something about it. Still, this realization could provide a sound basis for positive action for all three countries to usher in a phase of peace and prosperity in the region.

8. Indian army chief General Bipin Rawat says Nepal and Bhutan cannot delink from India due to geography, cautions countries against China’s aid. Do you agree with this statement?

There is little to quibble with the first part of Gen. Rawat’s statement. The second part is problematic on at least two counts. First, any decision on whether to accept Chinese aid has to be made by Nepalis themselves. Second, Gen. Rawat’s caution comes from his specific and specialized vantage point, i.e., the Indian military, which is but one dimension of relations between states.
Nepali decision-makers and the public are aware enough of the global debate surrounding costs and benefits of Chinese assistance. Nepalis are equally aware that China, like India, is a sovereign and independent country that makes decisions based on its values, attitudes, needs and expectations. Based on a careful assessment of relevant considerations, Nepalis should be free to make decisions. Of course, Nepalis should listen to the views and perspectives of people like Gen. Rawat in a spirit of utmost goodwill.

9. The proposed China-Nepal railway is expected to be game-changer. Nepal’s hope is that apart from new trading opportunities, the railway will offer a crucial lifeline against potential Indian blockades. Do you agree?

The China-Nepal railway has been a promise dating back to the first meeting between King Birendra and Chairman Mao in the early 1970s, when it was a technical improbability. Even though the idea is becoming more feasible, Nepalis have gradually come around to realizing the futility of hyping it without at least gaining a vague idea of when it might eventually come into operation. From most accounts, the project is still in the technical feasibility phase. Then there are questions of funding. Furthermore, we need to know what those trains will carry into Nepal and how those commodities and products will eventually be priced and whether Nepalis can afford them as an alternative to supplies from India.
Yes, there are people who think the Chinese railway will offer a crucial lifeline against potential Indian blockades. Even if that were true, I think such a focus would be misplaced. We need to deploy our collective efforts to conduct Nepal-India relations in an atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill so as to preclude future blockades.

10. Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his May 2018 visit said India-Nepal relations are like those of a family and that misunderstandings were now over. However, India remained silent on exchanging banned Indian notes parked in various financial and banking institutions and held by general people. Any prospects of solution to this problem?

From media accounts and public pronouncement of key Indian political figures, it seems India has realized that the blockade was a mistake. Nepali leaders, too, while periodically raking up the issue of the blockade, recognize the imperative of turning a new page. On the issue of banned Indian notes, it looks like both governments have decided to address the issue quietly.
The political process facilitated by India in 2006 eventually abolished the monarchy two years later and ushered in a political order that – at least, theoretically – has broadened popular political participation and inclusion. Perhaps as an unintended consequence, it has also created strategic ambiguity as a multiplicity of actors such as the European Union and the United States are active alongside India and China, sometimes at cross-purposes. Amid growing disenchantment with the government and even the political order, many Nepalis are watching whether Prime Minister Modi’s second term will see any significant change in India’s Nepal policy.

FPRC Journal, 38-2019(2), Foreign Policy Research Center, New Delhi, 2019.

चीन-भारत भू-सामरिक होडबाजी माझ नेपाल

— सञ्जय उपाध्याय

वृद्ध १४ अौ दलाई लामाको अवश्यंभावी अन्त, विश्व भर छरिए बसेका तिब्बती शरणार्थी समुदायमा व्याप्त असन्तोष एवं स्वतन्त्र तिब्बत अान्दोलन प्रतिको बढ्दो अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय समर्थनले सो हिमाली मु्द्दालाई अन्तर्र्ाष्टि्य समाचार बनाई राख्ने निश्चित छ।दलाई लामा र उनका दशौ हजार समर्थकलाई बिगत अाधा शताब्दी देखि शरण दिइरहेको भारतले तिब्बत मुद्दालाई चीन सितको 

आफ्नो सिमा बिबाद सुल्झाउने तथा वृहत द्धिपक्षिक सम्बन्ध सुधार्ने क्रममा सौदाबाजीको तुरुपका रुपमा खुलेरै देख्न थालेको आभास हुंदैछ। यस अवस्थामा दुई एशियाली महाशक्ति राष्ट्र बीच च्यापिएको तथा करिव २०,००० तिब्बती शरणार्थीका घर बनेको नेपाल अझै महत्वपूर्ण क्रिडास्थल बन्ने देखिन्छ।

कम्तिमा नेपालका परिप्रेक्षबाट तिब्बत मुद्दा एउटा भौगोलिक क्षेत्रको स्वतन्त्रता, एउटा संस्कृतिको मुक्ति, वा एउटा जीवनशैलीको सराहना भन्दा भिन्न कुरा रहेको छ। यस क्षेत्र बाह्य शक्तिहरुलाई आफ्ना बिभिन्न स्वार्थ सिद्ध गर्न् थलो रहि आएको यथार्थको साक्षी नेपाली इतिहास बसेको छ।

तिब्बत मुद्दाले नेपालमा एक बिशिष्ट मनोवैज्ञानिक आकार ग्रहण गरेको छ। दलाई लामा तथा उनको संघर्षलाई सबैभन्दा सहानुभूतिपूर्वक हेरिरहेका नेपालीहरुकै पंक्तिबाट तिब्बतमा चीनियां आधिपत्य कायमै रहोस भन्ने चाहना राख्ने धेरै मानिस भेटिन्छन्। कतिपय नेपालीहरुमा स्वतन्त्र तिब्बतका कारण आफ्नो मुलुकले चीन सँ‌गको प्रत्यक्ष सिमाना गुमाउने चिन्ता रहेको पाइन्छ। त्यस्तो अबस्थामा नेपालमा अहिले नै थेग्न नसकिने गरी भइरहेको प्रत्यक्ष र परोक्ष भारतीय हस्तक्षेप अझ बढ्ने डर धेरैमा  छ।

नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्धको केन्द्रमा तिब्बत रहिआए पनि यी दुई देश बीचको अन्तरक्रिया तिब्बतबाट प्रारम्भ भएको थिएन। यो सम्बन्ध चीनका भिक्षुहरुको मध्य एशियाली मार्ग हुँदै ब्यापक गंगा क्षेत्रमा बुद्ध धर्म सम्बन्धी दस्तावेज र विधि-संग्रहको गरिएको प्रत्यक्ष खोजी बाट सुरु भएको हो। इस्वी सातौ सताब्दीमा शक्तिशाली तिब्बती राजा स्रङ चङ गम्पोले ‛विवाह-द्धारा-शान्ति’ भन्ने कूटनीतिक सिद्धान्त बमोजिम नेपाली र चीनियां राजपरिवार बाट एक-एक रानी भित्राएका थिए। यी दुइ रानीहरु आ-आफ्ना माईतीबाट तिब्बतमा बुद्ध धर्म भित्राउन मद्दत गरे जसले गर्दा नेपाल र चीन बीच सिधा हिमाली बाटो खुल्ने आधार बन्यो।

धर्म र ब्यापार हिमाली नाकाबाट वारपार गर्दा गर्दै शान्ति र सद्भाव कमजोर पर्न गयो। भारत माथि बेलायती सूर्य चढ्दै जाँदा नेपालले तिब्बत संग दुइवटा युद्ध गर्यो जसले नेपाल माथि चीनियां सैनिक हमला निम्त्यायो। नेपालले शान्तिका लागि गरेको सन्धिका आधारमा चीनको पैत्रित्व स्वीकार गर्यो भने चीनले नेपाललाई तेश्रो शक्ति विरुद्ध सैनिक संरक्षत्व दिने बाचा गर्यो। नेपालले उक्त सन्धि अन्तर्गत पा‌ंचपांच बर्षमा चीनका सम्राट समक्ष अर्जी र सौगातयुक्त प्रतिनिधिमण्डल पठाउन थाल्यो। 

सन् १८१४-१६ को नेपाल-अङग्रेज युद्ध सम्म आइपुग्दा चीनले नेपाललाई सैनिक सहयोग गर्न अस्वीकार गर्यो। नेपाललाई पराजित गरि एकतिहाई भूमि खोसी सकेर पनि चीन-नेपाल सम्बन्धको प्रकृतिका बारेमा अङग्रेजहरु अलमलमै परिरहे। यसले गर्दा दक्षिण एशियामा बेलायती ‌उपनिवेशको जालो फैलिदा नेपालले आफ्नो स्वतन्त्रता कायम राख्न सफल भयो।

सन् १८५५-५६ मा तिब्बत संग तेश्रो युद्ध लडेको नेपालले १९०४ मा तिब्बतीहरुलाई अङग्रेजी ‌आक्रमण बिरुद्ध सहयोग गर्न इन्कार गर्यो। तत्पश्चात बेलायती सेनाको फिर्ती गराउनमा नेपालले महत्वपूर्ण कूटनीतिक योगदान गर्यो। तर त्यो कूटनीतिक सफलता धेरै दिन टिक्न सकेन किनकी जर्जर अबस्थामा पुगी सकेको चीङ साम्राज्यले नेपाल माथि आफ्नो आधिपत्य रहेको सूचना अङग्रेजहरुलाई पठायो। त्यसमा गम्भिर आपत्ति जनाउदै चन्द्र सम्सेर राणाले अङग्रेज सरकार संग सल्लाह गरि चीिनयां सम्राटलाई अर्जी र सौगात पठाउने प्रचलन नै बन्द गरिदिए। यसरी चीङ् सामराज्यको पैत्रित्व स्वीकारी सौगात बुझाउने विदेशी मुलुकहरुमा नेपाल अन्तिम हुन पुग्यो।

तिब्बतमा आफ्नो ब्यापारिक वर्चस्व कायम राख्न तथा आफ्नो स्वतन्त्र अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय अस्तित्वको परिचय दिन नेपालले सन् १९१२ मा बेइजिङ र ल्हासा बीच चीनियां फौजको फिर्तीका लागि सशक्त मध्यस्तकर्ताको भूमिका खेल्यो जस पश्चात् तिब्बतले करिब करिब स्वतन्त्रताको अनूभूति गर्न थाल्यो।

चीनियां राजतन्त्र संग तथा एकआपसमा गहिरो मतभेद भए पनि चीनका राष्ट्रबादी-गणतन्त्रबादी र साम्यबादी दुबै समूहले नेपाल माथि आफ्नो अाधिप्त्य रहेको दाबी कायम नै राखिरहे। सन् यात सेन र माओ जे डोङ दुबैले नेपाललाई चीनले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय साम्राज्यबाद समक्ष गुमाएका राज्यहरु मध्य भनेर चित्रण गरेका थिए।

तिब्बतमा १९५० मा भएको चीनियां सैनिक प्रवेश माझ भरखरै स्वतन्त्रता प्राप्त गरेको भारतको नयां नेतृत्व पंक्तिले हिमालयको दक्षिण तर्फ साम्यबादको अभ्युदय रोक्ने चुनौति देखे। त्यसै सिलसिलामा भारतले राजतन्त्र अन्तर्गत राणाहरु सहितको बहुदलीय ब्यबस्थाको निर्माण गरी आफ्नो सुरक्षात्मक छाता माझ नेपालको आन्तरिक स्थिति सुदृढ पार्ने प्रयत्न गरे। सन् १९५९ मा नेपालको पहिलो आम निर्वाचनको पूर्वसन्ध्यामा तिब्बतीहरुले चीन बिरुद्ध आन्दोलन सुरु गरे जसको बिफलता पछि १४अौ दलाई लामा भागेर भारतमा शरण लिन पुगे।

यस्तो पेचिलो भू-सामरिक बाताबरणमा नेपालका प्रथम जननिर्वाचित प्रधानमन्त्री बिपी कोइराला चीन र भारत दुबै संग मित्रता कायम राखी नेपालमा प्रजातन्त्र सुदृढ गर्ने अभियानमा लागे। तर उनी असफल भए। राजा महेन्द्रले बहुदलीय पद्धती माथि प्रहार गर्दा चरम राजकीय अहं वा महत्वाकांक्षा भन्दा पनि बदलिदो अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय र क्षेत्रिय राजनीतिक समिकरण कारक तत्व रह्यो। 

त्यस बखत नेपाल कयौ एशियाली‚ अफ्रिकी एवं लैटिन अमेरिकी मुलुकहरु जस्तै महाशक्ति राष्ट्र संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका र सोभियत संघ बीचको शीत युद्धको शिकार भइसकेको थियो। ‌‌उता भारत र चीन बीच पनि सीमा लिएर तनाव बढ्दै थियो। त्यसै बेला नेपाल चीन बिरोधी अमेरिका समर्थित तिब्बती खम्पा बिद्रोहीहरुको अखडा बन्न पुग्यो।

१९६० र १९७० का दशकहरुमा त प्रजातन्त्रका खम्बा मानिने अमेरिका र भारत कटुताको सम्बन्धमा लिप्त थिए। त्यस्तै प्रमुख साम्यबादी शक्तिहरु सोभियत संघ र चीन बीच शत्रुता बढ्दै गयो। १९७० को अागमन सगै अमेरिका र चीनको सम्बन्धमा नाटकीय सुधार भयो भने भारत र सोभियत संघ बीच सैनिक गठबन्धन सरहकै सम्बन्ध कायम हुन पुग्यो। यसको प्रभाव नेपाल लगायत ब्यापक दक्षिण एशियाली क्षेत्रमा १९७० र १९८० को दशक भर रह्यो।

१९८० को दशकको अन्त्य हुदा सम्म तिब्बतमा उत्पन्न राजनीतिक अस्थिरता तियनमिएन स्क्वेयरमा भएको बिद्यार्थी अान्दोलनमा समाहित हुन पुग्यो। त्यो आन्दोलन सरकारी दमन र रक्तपातमा परिणत हुंदा नेपालीहरु पूर्वी युरोपमा ब्याप्त प्रजातान्त्रिक लहरले उत्प्रेरित भइरहेका थिए। भारतले लगाएको अार्थिक नाकाबन्दीको छायाँमा संचालित जनअान्दोलन माझ निर्दलीय पञ्चायत व्यवस्थाको अवसान सं‍गै अाफ्नो मित्र शक्ति राजतन्त्रको प्रत्यक्ष शासन समाप्त हुदां समेत आन्तरिक राजनीति सुल्झाउन ब्यस्त चीन चुप लागेर बस्यो।

नेपालको प्रजातान्त्रिक अभ्यासको क्षयीकरण हुदा माअोका नेपाली अनुयायीहरुले जनयुद्धको थालनी गरे। दरबार हत्याकाण्ड पछि नयां राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रले सत्ता आफ्नो हातमा लिदा भारत‚ अमेरिका र पश्चिमा मुलुकहरुले शाही सरकारलाई एक्लाउन खोज्दा चीनले दरबारलाई सहयोग पुर्यायो। त्यसबाट राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रले चीनकै आडभरोसामा सत्ता हत्थाए भन्नेहरुको कथनलाई बल पुर्यायो। 

नेपाली बिद्रोहीहरुले माअोलाई बदनाम गरे भन्दै चीनले शाही सरकारलाई बिद्रोह दबाउन सैनिक सहयोग पनि गर्यो। तर एक बर्ष पछि शाही सरकार प्रति आन्तरिक राजनीतिक प्रतिरोध बढ्दै जादा चीन पछि हट्यो र अन्ततगोत्वा दरबारलाई त्याग्दै नेपाली माअोबादी समेत राजनीतिक दलहरुलाई समर्थन गर्यो।

चीनको नेपाल नीतिमा रहेको अस्प्ष्टता र संशयात्मक स्थितिबाट दुबै मुलुकले फाइदा पनि उठाएका छन्। एक थरिले अहिलेको बढ्दो चीनियां गतिबिधीलाई अस्वभाविक मान्दै अन्तत: चीनले आफ्नो सुविधा र अनुकुलताको परराष्ट्र नीतिका आधारमा नेपाललाई भारतकै प्रभाव क्षेत्रका रुपमा स्वीकार गर्नेमा ढुक्क देखिन्छन्। तर नेपालमा चीनको स्वार्थ तिब्बत मुद्दा भन्दा माथि उठेका कारण चीनको नेपाल प्रतिको रुचि उसको ब्यापक दक्षिण एशियाली नीतिमा समाहीत भई बढदै जाने देखिन्छ। 

ल्हासामा कुटनीतिक प्रतिनिधित्व रहेको नेपाल एक मात्र बिदेशी मुलुक हो भने बास्तविक्ता बाट उत्पन्न हुने नेपाली दायित्वको बोध चीनले बिभिन्न तरिकाले बारम्वार गराइरहने छ। तिब्बतमा आफूले गरिरहेको ब्यापक बिकास-निर्माण कार्यबाट हुन सक्ने लाभको स्मरण नेपाललाई गराउदै चीनले नेपाललाई नयां दीर्घकालीन राजनीतिक‚ सुरक्षा‚ अार्थिक र सास्कृतिक सम्झौता एवं समझदारी द्धारा द्धिपक्षिय सम्बन्ध विस्तार गर्दै लैजान उत्प्रेरित गरिहने देखिन्छ।

इतिहासलाई बर्तमान नीति र भविष्यको खाकाको आधारशिला बनाउदै गरेका चीनियांहरुले नेपालले चीनको पैत्रित्व मानेको बिगत र चीनलाई अन्तिम अर्जीयुक्त प्रतिनिधिमण्डल पठाएको मुलुकका रुपमा देख्ने क्रम बढ्न सक्छ। यसबाट नेपाललाई भारतको अप्रसन्नतायुक्त प्रभावको सामना गर्ने चूनौति त छंदै छ भने तेश्रो राष्ट्रहरु र तिनिहरु द्धारा स‌चालित गैरसरकारी स‌स्था तथा संयन्त्रका केही गतिबिधिले राजनीतिक अस्थिरतामा गांजिएको नेपाललाई भू-सामरिक सन्तुलन कायम राख्न कठीन पर्ने देखिन्छ।

(यो अालेख स‌‌ंजय उपाध्याय द्धारा लिखित तथा रट्लेजद्धारा लण्डन तथा न्युयोर्कबाट मार्च २०१२ मा प्रकाशित ‛नेपाल एण्ड द जियो-स्ट्रेटिजिक राइभल्री बिट्विइन चाईना एण्ड ईण्डिया’ पुस्तकको सम्पादित अं‌शको नेपाली रुपान्तर हो।)

Nepal Reels From Growing Virulence of Insurgency

 

Mainstream Parties Hard Put To Rescue Nepal From Crisis

 

Teaching Sanskrit: A Spiritual Exercise

 

Katmandu: The Image That Endures

 

H-Bomb: Slur Attributed to Bollywood Star Sets Kathmandu Afire

 

GROWING UP: How I Came To Books

Ke Ho Yo Jeevan – By Sanjay Upadhya

Lyrics, Music and Voice: Sanjay Upadhya

75 Years of India-Russia Relations: Five Questions

‘World Realities Give India and Russia Enough Space for Cooperation Amid New Challenge’

Foreign Policy Research Center Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya 

1. Does Russia continue to be a “time-tested partner of India”? If this is not so, what does it need to correct the ‘perceptions’, and re-strengthen the link?

I think the terms of the ongoing debate serve to cloud the contours of the bilateral relationship. Pithy slogans certainly help drive the news cycle. Yet, in nations’ lives, deliberation and discrimination will always remain central. The notion of a ‘reset’ in Indo-Russian ties tends to be equated with benchmarks and baselines of the past. Amid changing world realities, India and Russia are forced to reassess and readjust their immediate and near-term policies in conformity with their national interests. India and Russia may no longer face some of the objective conditions underpinning the 1971 Peace and Friendship Treaty. Nor may they confront the same realities that obtained during the transition from the tottering Soviet Union to the Russian Federation and India’s concurrent efforts to unshackle itself from socialist economic verities. 
Amid the robustness of the debate surrounding India’s international outlook and orientation, there is recognition that its policy of ‘strategic autonomy’ has stood the test of time; New Delhi is in no mood to bandwagon itself with the West. Moreover, the nationalist strain permeating India’s international outlook, the resurgence of nationalism in Russia and the two countries’ respective visions of the evolving world and their respective place in it create enough space for cooperation amid new challenges. Any quest to dwell on exclusively issue-based appraisals would certainly prove to be more depressing than the general direction India and Russia’s core interests would dictate in the future.

2. Balancing Russia and the United States is a challenge to India’s multi-alignment policy? 

Given that realpolitik remains the underlying driver of India’s attitudes and outlook, creating such a balance will remain an enduring endeavor not only because of the rapidity of change across the world but also the perceptions driven by social media et al. Realism in its offensive, defensive or any other connotation may not enjoy much public reputation. Still, those who theorize and practice international relations do recognize its centrality to nations’ behavior. Certain phases of history may have conferred different names to this balancing, such as ‘nonalignment’, but even then, core national interests impelled India and Soviet Union to move closer despite outward divergences such as their antithetical political systems.

3. How do you look at the apparent recent reset in Pakistani-Russian relations? What are its implications for India?

The virtual American abandonment of Pakistan amid that country’s centrality to the region’s peace and stability gave Moscow the incentive and opportunity to cultivate Islamabad. From outward appearances, it is understandable to view the development as a loss to India. Russia must have weighed all variables vis-à-vis its relations with India against those with China and come to certain conclusions. 
Viewed from the larger perspective of South and Central Asia’s search for a new equilibrium amid new global realities, the development would make far saner sense. I believe India’s strategic, diplomatic and political community has, over the past 70 years, accumulated the wisdom to see both the risks and opportunities inherent in such developments and make prudent adjustments.

4. How will India’s involvement in the Quad and the promotion of the Indo-Pacific strategy impact on Indo-Russian ties?

The exuberance surrounding the Quad owes much to the fact that advocates and adversaries alike are seeing whatever they want in the undertaking. The institutional, attitudinal and operational dynamics the Quad needs to become an instrument to prevent China’s rise or moderate its international behavior are sorely lacking. The contradictions among the partners are bound to become more pronounced as the details of the Quad, the Indo-Pacific policies are worked out. For now, perceptions of an emergent anti-China bloc help the members. Beijing, too, benefits from the ‘China under siege’ narrative as an extension of its ‘century of humiliation’ credo. 
Globalization was hyped as a cure-all in the post-Cold War era. Yet we cannot underestimate the effort nations placed in creating conducive structures and policies to further political, economic and other interactions across the globe. And the benefits have no doubt been immense. Yet the core realities of nations and nationalism that persisted long before the Covid-19 pandemic stripped the camouflage of contrived camaraderie. The world needs to be mindful of the risks of going overboard in the opposite direction. 

5. Moscow has increasingly leaned on China both for support as well as a way to undermine American power. How effective are Moscow’s efforts to facilitate contacts and dialogue between Delhi and Beijing? Does RIC—the Russia, India, and China grouping—stand for anything useful? 

The western commentariat has been obsessed with how close or distant Russia and China are and will be. As massive civilizational states with their own characteristics, coexistence poses its own challenges. For their part, Moscow, New Delhi and Beijing are aware of both the contradictions and complementarities inherent in the evolving trilateral dynamics. That Moscow and Beijing appear to coordinate their policies on the UN Security Council does not mean the two countries should remain sanguine about their economic, demographic and aspirational disparities. 
We can debate the extent to which Moscow played a role in containing the Sino-Indian border tensions. Still, the fact remains that such an effort could be made at all is because the three countries have a shared interest in not letting conflict undermine the extent of cooperation that has been possible through regional forums. How the multilateralism of the future will evolve remains an open question. The fact that Western definitions no longer dominate the debate suggests that we are in uncharted waters. Diplomacy and demagoguery will have to operate side by side, which certainly does heighten the challenge for all.

Sanjay Upadhya is a Nepalese journalist, author and analyst based in the United States. He has worked for the British Broadcasting Corporation, The Times of London, Inter Press Service, Khaleej Times and the United Nations. Upadhya is the author, most recently, of Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China (New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021). His previous books include Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry Between China and India (New York and London: Routledge, 2012) and The Raj Lives: India in Nepal (New Delhi: Vitasta, 2008).

Foreign Policy Research Center Journal (J-46) 2021 (2) 52-55

Sanjay Upadhya: ‘Question Your Assumptions, Play the Devil’s Advocate’

Sanjay Upadhya: ‘Question your assumptions, play the devil’s advocate’ - The Record: 

This week on Writing Journeys, US-based journalist and writer Sanjay Upadhya recounts his time working at The Rising Nepal under the Panchayat and the lessons he’s learned along the way.

Politics and Geopolitics Collide in Nepal

By Sanjay Upadhya

A ceremonial head of state is under fire for allegedly conspiring with a democratically elected prime minister to dismantle democracy, prompting an alliance of opposition parties to take to the streets amid widespread public apathy. Nepali politics today is back to where it was two decades ago.
The country abolished its monarchy and became a secular and federal republic today to avoid such crises, the prevailing narrative goes. As the Covid-19 pandemic and political instability feed on each other, a hitherto more obscure reality is becoming starker: Nepal's politics and geopolitics are at odds.
As I argue in my new book 'Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China', geopolitical dynamics drove Nepal's political change in 2006 as much as the popular clamor for change had. India had allied the mainstream democratic parties and Maoist rebels against an assertive monarchy in a grand vision of creating a 'new Nepal'. New Delhi's bet was bold but tentative, a product of prevailing geopolitical exigencies.
By the time Nepal's convoluted peace process culminated in a new constitution in 2015, the document was one India could not wholeheartedly welcome. Much of the international community, thatarrayed behind India, remains equally perturbed, on one account or another.
India has not publicly declared its 2005-2006 mediation as a mistake. But it continues to proffer signs of recalibrating its policy. Former Indian ambassadors in Kathmandu either continue to defend the 2005-2006 initiative or have called for fine-tuning it to new realities. In public, the Indian government maintains a hands-off approach. That posture has hardly assuaged Nepali public opinion, where perceived and actual instances of Indian meddling over the decades have created a momentum of their own.
The rupture in the ruling communist party, the current core malady, has been touted as a setback for Beijing, credited with uniting the Maoist and Unified Marxist-Leninists factions. True, China has withdrawn from an unnatural phase of political and diplomatic assertiveness. But, then, that pullback has been part of the general diminution of Beijing's 'wolf-warrior' diplomacy. Ostensibly confident of having sufficiently reined in Indian ambitions of band-wagoning onto the US-led containment of China, Beijing may have even reverted to some form of positive engagement with New Delhi on Nepal.
Political events in Nepal will continue to unfold as the Supreme Court rules on the second dissolution of parliament in six months. The principal external stakeholders – India, China and the United States-led West – have kept their cards close to their chests.
Five former prime ministers belonging to the opposition have issued a second statement in two weeks against what they call growing international interference. While the target is perceived as India, whose intelligence and security apparatus has stepped into the role hitherto played by politicians and diplomats, all the major foreign powers wield influence across the political spectrum. Thus, it would be foolhardy to anoint winners and losers based on this twist or that turn.
As the two immediate neighbors with the greatest stakes in Nepal's stability, India and China recognize the scale of their challenge. The Dalai Lama succession is emerging to be a potential source of conflict. China insists on its traditional right to ratify the successor, infuriating the India-based Tibetan government in exile.
The United States has asserted that China should have no role in the succession, but India recognizes the additional perils geographical proximity can bring. India's open border with Nepal, which has a large community of Tibetan exiles has long been a source of anxiety for China. And the Tibet issue is only part of the Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal.
Any understanding between the Asian giants on Nepal will have to overcome their history of animosity. Shared pragmatism – which New Delhi and Beijing have exhibited abundantly throughout their troubled relationship – could facilitate their task in Nepal, to the extent the country's boisterous internal politics would permit. 

Originally published on Vitasta Publishing’s Blog: https://www.vitastapublishing.com/blog/politics-and-geopolitics-collide-in-nepal?fbclid=IwAR1eODIBLgca37od0LGqjUlBafr7qSfd6VeqALDFip6_3tQFavi2UKILcKc

#BookTalk​​ with Sanjay Upadhya

DEVENDRA GAUTAM in conversation with SANJAY UPADHYA, a veteran journalist/international consultant and the author of ‘Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China’ (New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021) about the geopolitical/geostrategic mess that Nepal is in and how it can come out unscathed through national consensus, with a little help from neighbors and friends.

पुस्तक समीक्षा: अमेरिका, भारत र चीनको रणनीतिक चेपुवामा नेपाल

रमेश केसी 

बिहीबार, १९ चैत, २०७७

 

२००७ र २०४६ सालमा जस्तै २०६२/६३ को परिवर्तन पनि भारतको उत्प्रेरणामा आएको स्पष्ट छ। तर, ‘अमेरिकी साम्राज्यवाद’को भन्दा बढी ‘भारतीय विस्तारवाद’को विरोध गर्ने माओवादीलाई मूलधारमा ल्याएर भारतले के उपलब्धि हासिल गर्‍यो?

अमेरिकी राणनीतिकार रोबर्ट काप्लानले विश्व राजनीतिमा १९औँ शताब्दी जस्तै भूगोल महत्त्वपूणर् हुन थालेको आकलन गरेका छन्। ‘रिभेन्ज अफ जीयोग्राफी’ आलेखमा उनले एसियामा विश्व शक्तिहरूको प्रतिस्पर्धा शुरू भएको बताएका छन्। यसबाट नेपाल अछुतो नरहने निश्चित छ।

नेपाल दुई उदाउँदा शक्तिराष्ट्र चीन र भारतबीचमा छ। यी राष्ट्रबीच हुने शक्ति प्रतिस्पर्धाको प्रभाव नेपालको आन्तरिक राजनीति, वैदेशिक सम्बन्ध लगायत धेरै क्षेत्रमा पर्छ। पत्रकार सञ्जय उपाध्याको ‘ब्याकफायर इन नेपाल हाउ इन्डिया लस्ट द प्लट टु चाइना’ पुस्तकले भूराजनीतिको यही कथा भन्छ। विशेष गरेर २०६२/६३ को जनआन्दोलन, राजतन्त्रको उन्मूलन, धर्मनिरपेक्षताको घोषणा र संघीयता लागू भएसँगै नयाँ नेपालको परिवेशलाई पुस्तकले उजागर गर्छ।

के ‘भारतद्वारा पहल गरिएको’ १२ बुँदे सम्झौता उपलब्धिमूलक रह्यो? माओवादी विद्रोहको औचित्य अहिले स्थापित हुन्छ कि हुँदैन? नेपाल योजनामा भारत र चीनले के-के गरे? अमेरिका युरोपको मनसाय के थियो? आदि विषयमा परख गरिएको यो पुस्तक नेपाल मामिलामा जानकारी राख्ने सबैलाई रोचक लाग्नेछ।

२०४६ सालको परिवर्तनपछि नेपाल संवैधानिक राजतन्त्र र संसदीय व्यवस्थाको मार्गमा थियो। तर, यो परिवर्तनको ६ वर्षपछि तत्कालीन नेकपा माओवादीले युद्धको शुरूआत गर्‍यो। उक्त विद्रोह टुंगोमा पुर्‍याउन भारतले कडा मिहिनेत गरेको त्यहाँका पूर्वपरराष्ट्र सचिव एवं नेपालका लागि राजदूत श्याम शरणले स्वीकारेको पुस्तकमा उल्लेख छ। पूर्वराष्ट्रपति प्रणव मुखर्जीले पनि नेपालका माओवादीलाई शान्ति सम्झौतामा ल्याउन भारतको भूमिका रहेको अल जजीरा टेलिभिजनमा बताएका थिए।

शान्ति सम्झौतापछि उत्तरी छिमेकी चीनले नेपालमा खेलेको भूमिकाबारे पनि उनले पुस्तकमा सविस्तार व्याख्या गरेका छन्। चीनको नेपाल नीति राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थ र लामो योजनामा आधारित रहेको लेखकको ठम्याइ छ।

राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रले ढाका सार्क सम्मेलनमा चीनलाई सार्कको सदस्यमा ल्याउनुपर्ने धारणा राखेर  चाइना कार्ड खेलेका थिए। जसबाट भारत चिढियो। भारतको राजनीतिक नेतृत्व र गुप्तचर विभाग ‘रअ’ राजाप्रति कठोर भए पनि सेना र आन्तरिक खुफियाले नरम नीति लिएको पुस्तकमा खुलासा गरिएकाे छ।

२४० वर्ष लामो इतिहास भएको राजतन्त्र उन्मूलन गर्ने आन्दोलनमा जाने माओवादी प्रस्तावमा सबै दल सहमत भए पनि यो विषय विवादास्पद र रहस्यमय छ। भारतसँगको धार्मिक र सांस्कृतिक सम्बन्ध भएको हिन्दू राजतन्त्रले बेलाबेला भारतविरुद्ध ‘चिनियाँ कार्ड’ खेल्ने गरेको उनले उल्लेख गरेका छन्। राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रले ढाका सार्क सम्मेलनमा चीनलाई सार्कको सदस्यमा ल्याउनुपर्ने धारणा राखेर त्यस्तै कार्ड खेलेका थिए। जसबाट भारत चिढियो। भारतको राजनीतिक नेतृत्व र गुप्तचर विभाग ‘रअ’ राजाप्रति कठोर भए पनि सेना र आन्तरिक खुफियाले नरम नीति लिएको उनले खुलासा गरेका छन्। 

२००७ र २०४६ सालमा जस्तै २०६२/६३ को परिवर्तन पनि भारतको उत्प्रेरणामा आएको स्पष्ट छ। तर, ‘अमेरिकी साम्राज्यवाद’को भन्दा बढी ‘भारतीय विस्तारवाद’कोे विरोध गर्ने माओवादीलाई मूलधारमा ल्याएर भारतले के उपलब्धि हासिल गर्‍यो भन्ने लेखाजोखा पुस्तकमा छ।

भारत पनि माओवादी आन्दोलनले आक्रान्त थियो। अहिले पनि छिटपुट घटना हुने गरेका छन्। नेपालका माओवादीको सफलताले त्यहाँ पनि नकारात्मक सन्देश जाने थियो। तत्कालीन भारतीय प्रधानमन्त्री मनमोहन सिंहले भारतको माओवादी आन्दोलन राष्ट्रका लागि सबैभन्दा ठूलो सुरक्षा चुनौती भएको बताइसकेका थिए। भारतीय माओवादीको दमन गर्ने भारतीय संस्थापन पक्ष नेपालका माओवादीसँग सहकार्य गर्न पुगे। यसको पेचिलो भूराजनीतिलाई लेखक उपाध्याले सविस्तार व्याख्या गरेका छन्। 

प्रसिद्ध भारतीय पत्रकार एमजे अकबरले भनेका छन् कि तत्कालीन पाकिस्तानी राष्ट्रपति परवेज मुसरफ नेपालको प्रधानमन्त्री भए पनि उनी भारतपरस्त हुनुपर्छ। यसले नेपालको भूराजनीतिक बाध्यता र जटिलता प्रष्ट पार्छ।

२००७ सालअघि र पछि पनि भारतको प्रभाव नेपालमा रहिरह्यो। २०४६ सालको परिवर्तनपछि पनि त्यो कायम रह्यो। तर, भारतकै सहयोगमा भएको २०६२/०६३ को परिवर्तनपछि भने किन भारत नेपाल गुमेको महसूस गर्दै छ? नेपालविज्ञ अमेरिकी राजनीतिशास्त्री लियो रोजले नेपाल जहिले पनि ‘बाँच्नुको रणनीति’मा रहेको भन्दै ‘नेपाल स्ट्राटेजी फर सर्भाइभल’ पुस्तक नै लेखेका छन्। 

नेपालको कूटनीतिको प्राचीन कालदेखि आधुनिक कालसम्मको फेहरिस्त दिने यो पुस्तकका विषयवस्तु अहिले पनि सान्दर्भिक छन्। केपी ओलीको नेतृत्वमा सरकार बनेको अवस्थामा पार्टीभित्र आन्तरिक किचलो हुँदा किन वर्तमान चिनियाँ राजदूत सक्रिय भइन्? के चीन नेपालको माइक्रो म्यानेजमेन्टमा लागेको हो? यदि हो भने त्यसको कारण भारतले लगाएको नाकाबन्दी हुनसक्छ।

नेपालको कूटनीतिको प्राचीन कालदेखि आधुनिक कालसम्मको फेहरिस्त दिने यो पुस्तकका विषयवस्तु अहिले पनि सान्दर्भिक छन्। केपी ओलीको नेतृत्वमा सरकार बनेको अवस्थामा पार्टीभित्र आन्तरिक किचलो हुँदा किन वर्तमान चिनियाँ राजदूत सक्रिय भइन्? के चीन नेपालको माइक्रो म्यानेजमेन्टमा लागेको हो? यदि हो भने त्यसको कारण भारतले लगाएको नाकाबन्दी हुनसक्छ।

नयाँ संविधानको घोषणापछि भारतले गरेको नाकाबन्दी प्रत्युत्पादक रहेको र त्यहीकारण नेपाल चीनको पोल्टामा गएको भारतका विपक्षीहरूले पनि टिप्पणी गरे। भारतको नेपाल नीतिको कमजोर पक्ष यहाँको आन्तरिक मामलामा बढ्दो हस्तक्षेपलाई मान्नेहरू पनि छन्। 

चीनका लागि भने नेपालमा तिब्बत शरणार्थीको मामिला पेचिलो प्रश्न भएको छ। करीब १२ हजार तिब्बती शरणार्थीको मुद्दालाई नेपालमा जीवित राखेर पश्चिमाहरू चीनलाई घेर्ने रणनीतिमा छन्। अमेरिकी गुप्तचर संस्था सीआईएको सहयोगमा विगतमा नेपालको मुस्ताङबाट तिब्बत लक्षित खम्पा विद्रोह भएको थियो। त्यो चिनियाँहरूको स्मृतिमा ताजै छ। यसर्थ तिब्बती प्रश्नमा नेपाल हदैसम्मको संवेदनशील होओस् भन्ने चाहना छ।

नेकपामा विवाद चुलिएर विभाजन उन्मुख हुँदा मिलाउन चिनियाँ कम्युनिष्ट पार्टीको प्रतिनिधिमण्डल काठमाडौं उत्रियो। राजतन्त्रको बेला चीनले नेपालका राजालाई स्थायी मित्र ठान्थ्यो। तर, राजतन्त्र नरहेपछि नेकपालाई त्यस्तै मित्र बनाउन लागिपरेको देखिन्छ।

केपी ओली दोस्रो पटक प्रधानमन्त्री भएपछि सन् २०१२ मा चिनियाँ राष्ट्रपति सी चिनफिङले नेपाल भ्रमण गरे। २३ वर्षपछि चिनियाँ राष्ट्रपतिको नेपाल भ्रमण भएको थियो। भ्रमणका क्रममा चीनले नेपाल-चीन सम्बन्ध रणनीतिक भएको बतायो। उक्त भ्रमणपछि सत्तारूढ रहेको विघटित नेकपाका नेताहरू सी विचारधाराबाट प्रशिक्षित समेत भए।

नेकपामा विवाद चुलिएर विभाजन उन्मुख हुँदा मिलाउन चिनियाँ कम्युनिष्ट पार्टीको प्रतिनिधिमण्डल काठमाडौं उत्रियो। राजतन्त्रको बेला चीनले नेपालका राजालाई स्थायी मित्र ठान्थ्यो। तर, राजतन्त्र नरहेपछि नेकपालाई त्यस्तै मित्र बनाउन लागिपरेको देखिन्छ।

अमेरिकी परियोजना एमसीसी पारित गर्ने विषयमा तत्कालीन नेकपाभित्रै मतभेद देखियो। इन्डो-प्यासिफिक रणनीतिमा नेपाल संलग्न भएको विषय बहसमा आयो। यसैबीच कालापानी र लिपुलेकको भूभाग समेटेको नक्शा नेपालले संसद्बाट पारित गरेपछि भारतसँग ‘नक्शा युद्ध’ नै देखियो। 

नेपाल अब अमेरिका, चीन र भारतको रणनीतिक राडारमा प्रवेश गरिसकेको छ। त्यसैले नेपालको रणनीतिक चातुर्य यो चेपुवाबाट उम्कनु नै हुनेछ। यही रणनीतिक चेपुवा र आन्तरिक राजनीतिको उथलपुथललाई लेखक उपाध्याले राम्रोसँग केलाएका छन्।

सन् १९६० सम्म यो हिमालय क्षेत्रमा चार वटा राजतन्त्र थिए, भुटान। सिक्किम, तिब्बत र नेपाल। तीमध्ये तिब्बत सन् १९५९ मा चीनले कब्जा गर्‍यो। जनमतसंग्रहमार्फत सिक्किम भारतमा विलय भयो। सन् १९४९ को सम्झौता मार्फत भुटान भारतको अधीनस्थ राष्ट्र बन्यो। नेपाल राजतन्त्रको उन्मूलनसँगै गणतन्त्रमा प्रवेश गर्‍यो। हिमाली क्षेत्रका यी साना राष्ट्रहरूको कथा ‘हिमालय महाखेल’ले भरिएको छ। यही महाखेलको एउटा विवरण हो, यो पुस्तक। 

 

किताब: ब्याकफायर इन नेपाल 

लेखक: सञ्जय उपाध्याय

प्रकाशक: भीटास्टा मूल्य: ४९५ भा.रू. पृष्ठ: २७५

 

बिहीबार, १९ चैत, २०७७, १७:५६:०० मा प्रकाशित

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