Book Review: An Account of Nepal-India Relations With A Focus on China

Sanjay Upadhya’s “Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China” provides a detailed account of Nepal-India relations in the last fifteen years, focusing on China’s diplomatic and strategic success in Nepal.

China, India See Interests Converge in Upholding Nepal Stability

Sanjay Upadhya 

Traditionally competitors for influence in neighboring Nepal, China and India are now signaling readiness to join forces to pull the Himalayan nation out of its chronic political instability.

The contours of a formal cooperation framework are yet to emerge. But academic and media circles in China and India suggest a growing convergence of interest in preventing instability from spilling across Nepal’s borders. ...

Originally published on Wednesday, July 31, 2013

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13129/china-india-see-interests-converge-in-upholding-nepal-stability

BOOK REVIEW – Backfire In Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

US-based Nepali journalist Sanjay Upadhya helps find these answers

By RISHI GUPTA

In 2005, India facilitated the historic Peace Agreement between the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance in Nepal, ending a decade-long war waged against Nepal's centuries-old monarchy. A decade and a half later, Nepal and India hit the lowest point despite the two countries share close socio-cultural, political, economic, and strategic ties. Similarly, Karan Singh, who had successfully convinced King Gyanendra to accept the people’s demand and pave the way for democracy in 2006; visit by the Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankarto Kathmandu at the eleventh hour to convince the Nepal Government to accommodate the demands of Madhesis, was termed as the ‘wrong advice.’ What led Nepal to shift from ‘special relations’ with India to ‘conditional relations’ and forge strategic ties with China?

Many such questions seek an answer as one begins to unfurl the Roti-Beti relations between India and Nepal amidst the ongoing India-Nepal fiasco.

The book entitled The Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost Plot to China by US-based Nepali journalist Sanjay Upadhya helps find these answers. The book provides a detailed account of Nepal-India relations in the last fifteen years. In his previous books,Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry Between China and India from Routledge in 2012, and The Raj Lives: India in Nepalfrom Vitasta in 2008, Upadhya had carried ground-breaking works on India’s colonial past and its impact on Nepal, and Nepal’s geo-strategic location between two Asian giants. Unlike his previous research works, The Backfire in Nepal is a journalistic account of Nepal-India relations focusing on China’s diplomatic and strategic success in Nepal in recent years.

Divided into seven chapters, the book provides a timeline of events in India-Nepal relations beginning with the 2006 peace-building process in Nepal which was officially overlooked by the United Nations Mission in Nepal to facilitate inclusion of the former Maoist fighters into the Nepal Army, their arms surrender and peaceful conduct of first Constituent Assembly elections in 2008. In the second chapter Provisional Posturing, the author has beautifully portrayed the free-Tibet movement of 2008, which got China worried as it hosted world athletes for the Beijing Olympics. The unconditional support from a new Maoist Prime Minister Pushpa Kamala Dahal alias Prachanda in cracking down on the protesters and arrest of Tibetan refugees amidst global criticism was a beneficial ‘New Nepal’ China.

Between 2005 to 2020, Nepal has forged new transit, trade, security and strategic ties including Belt and Road Initiative and first-ever Joint-Military exercises with China. Chinese investment in Nepal accounts for more than sixty percent of the total Foreign Direct Investment in Nepal, which was once topped by India until 2014. China’s annual aid to Nepal had also reached USD 128 from a meager USD 20-24 million in the past decade. The number of high-level visits from China to Nepal including President Xi’s in October 2019 amidst border row between India and Nepal over Kalapani and Lipulekh, have provided China with an ultra-edge in the political and foreign affairs of Nepal. Most importantly, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal has direct hotlines with the President, Prime Minister, and Chief of the Nepal Army, allowing the former to make public appearances in these offices and advise on administrative and political matters. Millions of military assistance from China have helped Beijing buy diplomatic immunity to its citizens involved in scamming, phishing, and trafficking in Nepal.

While previous administrations in Nepal strike a balance between India and China including Prachanda who stood as a staunch critic of alleged Indian ‘expansionism’ since 1950, KP Oli has used India’s 2015 unofficial border blockade to his advantage in evoking ultra-nationalism based on anti-India maneuverings. Oli also holds India accountable for his ouster in 2016 from the Government, and with his present tenure, he continues to be revengeful. Meanwhile, post-December 13 dissolution of the Parliament, Oli was seen taking a moderate view of India. However, it changed very soon after he reiterated Kalapani, Lipulekh as Nepalese territories, and relocated Ayodhya in Nepal.

On the other hand, despite a turbulent relationship, India’s humanitarian assistance to Nepal helps ease the tensions. Noteworthy, India was the first country to reach on the ground after a major earthquake had hit Nepal in 2015. India has also supplied a million doses of the COVID-19 vaccine and other medical assistance including medicines, ambulances, and medical appliances. However, India continues to misread Nepal’s political developments.

Prime Minister Modi’s 2014 visit after seventeen years gap by an Indian Prime Minister to Nepal helped India “dispel many traditional Nepalese misgivings about India policy”, but the hidden push for a Hindu Rashtra in Nepal backfired on India. India cannot deny that its shortfalls are due to short-sighted strategic interests and the lack of promised deliveries to Nepal. For instance, in 2016, the Eminent Persons Group (EPG)was formed to revise the 1950 Treaty and smoothen border management. Still, five years since its formation, the final report of the EPG continues to dust in the Prime Minister’s Office. Nepal also waits for India to exchange the demonetized Indian currency stuck with the Nepal Rashtra Bank.

In contrast, the “Chinese have acted purely on national interest”. There has been no compromise on China’s security concerns looming from a critical border between Tibet and Nepal. From cracking down the 2008 free-Tibet movement to the signing of Mutual Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters in 2019, and Nepal’s unequivocal support to ‘One China Policy’, China has shown an uncompromised bargain in Nepal. On the other hand, India continues to misread how Beijing sees Nepal – both in terms of China’s visions of the past and the future. This complicates the core trilateral challenge: ensuring that Nepal is not sucked deeper into the Sino-Indian vortex, only to be scorned for aggravating the Asian giants’ rivalry.

As the events unfold between India and Nepal, the book could not have been timelier. The book becomes a must-read for policymakers, journalists, researchers intending to know recent developments in India-Nepal relations as it covers the history and the most recent events. That said, the book falls short on the analytical front. The author has also avoided dealing with dates which makes the reader seek digital support that breaks the rhythm. Overall, unlike history books, the books' language keeps the momentum for a reader until a few scattered pages of the last chapter- All in Mind, often repeating the arguments. The book is the most recent addition to the literature in India-Nepal relations with a focus on the China factor. While the book interests Indian readers, it is a must book for readers in Nepal too; though it may take some time to be available in the Nepalese book stores. Meanwhile, the Kindle version of the book shall be coming soon.

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost Plot to China
Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021, pp. 288, Rs. 495

Rishi Gupta is ICSSR Doctoral Fellow, Center for South Asian Studies, JNU, India; Senior Fellow, Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs, Kathmandu

(Courtesy: New Spotlight newsmagazine)

China Seeks to Secure its Role in Nepal

Sanjay Upadhya

Bereft of an ally since the collapse of monarchical rule in Nepal nearly four years ago, China has been struggling to secure its place in the buffer state, wedged between China's volatile Tibet region and its regional rival, India. Hardly a month goes by now without a high-level Chinese delegation arriving in Kathmandu seeking assurances on its security interests.

In February 2005, China offered then-King Gyanendra a lifeline by calling his seizure of power, which otherwise prompted widespread international condemnation, an internal matter. A year later, when the royal regime no longer seemed tenable, China scrambled to build ties with the mainstream opposition parties. When the monarchy finally capitulated in the face of massive popular protests, China began building ties with the country's Maoist rebels, despite having previously armed the royal government to crush the group. ...

Originally published on Wednesday, Jan. 13, 2010

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4936/china-seeks-to-secure-its-role-in-nepal

Tibet Unrest Squeezes an Unstable Nepal

Sanjay Upadhya 

From the TV footage coming out of Nepal these days, it is easy to forget that the Himalayan nation is struggling to build a viable democracy. Almost every day since mid-March, when anti-Chinese protests erupted in Tibet and other countries, images of Nepali police beating Tibetan demonstrators have been beamed around the world.

Nepal’s major political parties and former Maoist rebels have promised to build an open and inclusive state after years of turmoil. The people are preparing to vote April 10 for a new assembly that would write a new constitution embodying a federal democratic republic. Yet barely two years after having defied King Gyanendra’s direct rule, Nepali parties seem to have emulated the palace in cracking down on another group of pro-democracy protesters. ...

Originally published on Tuesday, April 1, 2008

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1876/tibet-unrest-squeezes-an-unstable-nepal

Excerpts: Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

“Burdened with micromanaging Nepalese affairs while studiously denying doing so, India had the additional responsibility of looking after American interests. When the United States veered too close to the interests of its European partners on social issues, India understandably felt uncomfortable. China had the freedom to act alone. Perhaps India considered the erosion of its influence temporary and reversible over the long run. But the run kept getting longer.” 

**********

“Privately, Nepalese leaders often voice exasperation with the conduct of their Chinese counterparts, but none match the public candour reserved for Indian politicians and bureaucrats. Should China’s public affirmations to uphold Nepalese sovereignty and independence become monotonous to the point of triteness, Nepalese scepticism could lead in the opposite direction. Admittedly, this will not be enough to counteract the far deeper distrust of India. Growing acknowledgement of Nepal’s strategic vulnerability, however, might make the Nepalese more understanding of their own interests.”

**********

“Beijing believes Nepal, like every sovereign and independent country, has the right to devise its own relationship with China. As part of that effort, China regularly pledges to bolster aid and trade to lift ties with Nepal to ‘a new high’. There are Nepalese who maintain China is asking too much from Nepal – i.e., subjecting itself to the full force of India’s political and economic wrath – for few tangible gains. Non-conditionality in Chinese assistance loses its meaning when Beijing eternally poses the Tibet litmus test on Kathmandu.”

**********

“Chinese acquiescence in India’s primacy in Nepal – if that is a correct characterisation of Beijing’s stand even when it professes it – would operate within the context of China’s interests. Yet Indian commentators and analysts have taken gleeful pride at instances where they saw Beijing discarding Kathmandu. In far subdued tones, however, Chinese analysts refused to acknowledge that phases of pullback represented a conscious decision by Beijing to recognise Indian paramountcy in Nepal. The logical extension of that contention would be a resumption of Chinese rivalry with India for influence in Nepal and wider South Asia when circumstances became more propitious for Beijing.”

**********

“Sustained disregard for Nepalese grievances fuelled perceptions over time that India was attempting to delegitimise them. As a result, the territory in dispute not only ballooned in size but became so etched in Nepal’s Constitution. The continued temptation to see the dispute as a Chinese-inspired ploy to weaken India on another key front is not only misguided. It is a misreading of reality, given that Nepal’s own relationship with China is not free from suspicion. The Nepalese still recall Beijing’s eagerness to sign the Lipulekh agreement without consulting Nepal when things were going its way.”

**********

“Some Indians suggest that since 1954 China and India have had an understanding on Nepal. India and China, this interpretation goes, would do nothing to undermine each other’s vital interests beyond the Himalayas. According to this understanding, India has been hosting the Dalai Lama’s government in exile without supporting its claims for independence or greater autonomy for Tibet. If there was such an arrangement on Nepal and it had survived the 1962 war, the Chinese gave little indication of its existence.” 

**********

“Nepal recognises that most pledges from China to ease the country’s dependence on India foresee the long term. Moreover, little of tangible consequence has even begun, a fact that has the potential to raise public impatience. Greater exposure to Chinese business tactics, the darker side of growing interactions such as crime, and the general Chinese perceptions of themselves and their place in the world risk bringing more Nepalese discontent to the fore. Dismissing Nepalese grievances with India as Chinese-instigated ploys could present New Delhi with stricter challenges from Beijing from Nepal. This assertion stems not from Nepalese arrogance but from anguish over the additional pain that might be inflicted upon the country.”

**********

“Although Beijing considers the situation in the Tibetan region more stable, it expects the region to continue to be a core factor in relations with Kathmandu. With the three external powers most active on the Tibet issue – India, the United States and the European Union – increasingly involved in Nepal’s peace process, Beijing’s concerns about renewed potential for destabilisation from that volatile frontier have grown. The inevitable passing of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and ensuing succession politics are certain to energise an increasingly restless exile community in Nepal and those living across the porous border in India.”

**********

“The Chinese have moved beyond Tibet in their engagement with Nepal, at least in the traditional sense. There is new recognition in China that, given its border disputes with India and absence of diplomatic relations with Bhutan, only Nepal could provide it physical connectivity to South Asia. Beijing has divided South Asia into western (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and eastern (India at the centre) components and sees Nepal the most viable bridge to the latter. Expressions of such benign motives are not going to impress India, which has long seen Chinese trans-Himalayan ambitions as growing from a desire to keep a check on India’s rising capabilities.”

**********

“[I]nstead of obsessing over why the Nepalese see China the way they do, India might want to delve deeper into how China sees Nepal. Although it might not advertise it, Beijing sees Tibet and Nepal as part of its integrated ‘peripheral policy’. Nepal’s northern border is an easy gateway to the Tibet Autonomous Region. China worries that political instability in Nepal could lead to enhanced anti-Chinese activities in Nepal. Every time India is tempted to wave the Tibet card to China, it is enough to wobble Nepal.”

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021, Rs. 495

Islamist-Communist Alliance in South Asia: Hyperbole or Hazard?

Sanjay Upadhya 

Patterns of a resurgence in cooperation between Islamic extremists and radical communists -- faint in some places, more pronounced in others -- are emerging. While much of the current focus is on parts of Europe, South Asia could emerge as the principal arena for a communist-jihadist alliance.

Depending on whom you talk to, an alliance between Islamic extremists and radical communists is either more sinister war-on-terror hyperbole or a clear and present danger. At the most basic level, the two groups are divided by their outlook on the supreme being. For Islamist extremists, killing in the name of and dying for God is an investment in the hereafter. But the communist's variety of death and destruction is motivated by a worldview rooted in materialism. ...

Originally published on Thursday, Nov. 1, 2007

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1295/islamist-communist-alliance-in-south-asia-hyperbole-or-hazard

Nepal is Early Test for China-India Efforts at Cooperation

Sanjay Upadhya 

While much of the region is busy analyzing the aftermath of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's high-profile visit to China this month, one fragile nation finds itself squeezed harder in the middle.

For nearly two years, leading political parties and former Maoist rebels in Nepal, sandwiched between the Asian giants, have been precariously following a New Delhi-brokered roadmap to peace. Amid the uncertainty, China has stepped up its role in the tiny landlocked Himalayan nation. The future of Nepal, including whether it becomes a republic or retains some form of monarchy, seems inextricably linked to its neighbors. ...

Originally published on Thursday, Jan. 24, 2008

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1533/nepal-is-early-test-for-china-india-efforts-at-cooperation

Excerpts: Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

“Burdened with micromanaging Nepalese affairs while studiously denying doing so, India had the additional responsibility of looking after American interests. When the United States veered too close to the interests of its European partners on social issues, India understandably felt uncomfortable. China had the freedom to act alone. Perhaps India considered the erosion of its influence temporary and reversible over the long run. But the run kept getting longer.” 

**********

“Privately, Nepalese leaders often voice exasperation with the conduct of their Chinese counterparts, but none match the public candour reserved for Indian politicians and bureaucrats. Should China’s public affirmations to uphold Nepalese sovereignty and independence become monotonous to the point of triteness, Nepalese scepticism could lead in the opposite direction. Admittedly, this will not be enough to counteract the far deeper distrust of India. Growing acknowledgement of Nepal’s strategic vulnerability, however, might make the Nepalese more understanding of their own interests.”

**********

“Beijing believes Nepal, like every sovereign and independent country, has the right to devise its own relationship with China. As part of that effort, China regularly pledges to bolster aid and trade to lift ties with Nepal to ‘a new high’. There are Nepalese who maintain China is asking too much from Nepal – i.e., subjecting itself to the full force of India’s political and economic wrath – for few tangible gains. Non-conditionality in Chinese assistance loses its meaning when Beijing eternally poses the Tibet litmus test on Kathmandu.”

**********

“Chinese acquiescence in India’s primacy in Nepal – if that is a correct characterisation of Beijing’s stand even when it professes it – would operate within the context of China’s interests. Yet Indian commentators and analysts have taken gleeful pride at instances where they saw Beijing discarding Kathmandu. In far subdued tones, however, Chinese analysts refused to acknowledge that phases of pullback represented a conscious decision by Beijing to recognise Indian paramountcy in Nepal. The logical extension of that contention would be a resumption of Chinese rivalry with India for influence in Nepal and wider South Asia when circumstances became more propitious for Beijing.”

**********

“Sustained disregard for Nepalese grievances fuelled perceptions over time that India was attempting to delegitimise them. As a result, the territory in dispute not only ballooned in size but became so etched in Nepal’s Constitution. The continued temptation to see the dispute as a Chinese-inspired ploy to weaken India on another key front is not only misguided. It is a misreading of reality, given that Nepal’s own relationship with China is not free from suspicion. The Nepalese still recall Beijing’s eagerness to sign the Lipulekh agreement without consulting Nepal when things were going its way.”

**********

“Some Indians suggest that since 1954 China and India have had an understanding on Nepal. India and China, this interpretation goes, would do nothing to undermine each other’s vital interests beyond the Himalayas. According to this understanding, India has been hosting the Dalai Lama’s government in exile without supporting its claims for independence or greater autonomy for Tibet. If there was such an arrangement on Nepal and it had survived the 1962 war, the Chinese gave little indication of its existence.” 

**********

“Nepal recognises that most pledges from China to ease the country’s dependence on India foresee the long term. Moreover, little of tangible consequence has even begun, a fact that has the potential to raise public impatience. Greater exposure to Chinese business tactics, the darker side of growing interactions such as crime, and the general Chinese perceptions of themselves and their place in the world risk bringing more Nepalese discontent to the fore. Dismissing Nepalese grievances with India as Chinese-instigated ploys could present New Delhi with stricter challenges from Beijing from Nepal. This assertion stems not from Nepalese arrogance but from anguish over the additional pain that might be inflicted upon the country.”

**********

“Although Beijing considers the situation in the Tibetan region more stable, it expects the region to continue to be a core factor in relations with Kathmandu. With the three external powers most active on the Tibet issue – India, the United States and the European Union – increasingly involved in Nepal’s peace process, Beijing’s concerns about renewed potential for destabilisation from that volatile frontier have grown. The inevitable passing of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and ensuing succession politics are certain to energise an increasingly restless exile community in Nepal and those living across the porous border in India.”

**********

“The Chinese have moved beyond Tibet in their engagement with Nepal, at least in the traditional sense. There is new recognition in China that, given its border disputes with India and absence of diplomatic relations with Bhutan, only Nepal could provide it physical connectivity to South Asia. Beijing has divided South Asia into western (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and eastern (India at the centre) components and sees Nepal the most viable bridge to the latter. Expressions of such benign motives are not going to impress India, which has long seen Chinese trans-Himalayan ambitions as growing from a desire to keep a check on India’s rising capabilities.”

**********

“[I]nstead of obsessing over why the Nepalese see China the way they do, India might want to delve deeper into how China sees Nepal. Although it might not advertise it, Beijing sees Tibet and Nepal as part of its integrated ‘peripheral policy’. Nepal’s northern border is an easy gateway to the Tibet Autonomous Region. China worries that political instability in Nepal could lead to enhanced anti-Chinese activities in Nepal. Every time India is tempted to wave the Tibet card to China, it is enough to wobble Nepal.”

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021, Rs. 495

China’s Fast-Track to South Asia

Sanjay Upadhya 

China’s new railroad linking the city of Golmud in Qinghai province with Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, is a $4.2 billion engineering feat. Stretching 710 miles at an average elevation of 13,000 ft, it is the highest railroad in the world.

Technological excellence was not the only reason why President Hu Jintao called the line a "magnificent feat" while flagging off the inaugural run on July 1. The railroad is a powerful instrument with which Beijing hopes to complete the full integration of Tibet with the mainland. ...

Originally published on Wednesday, July 19, 2006

To read more, visit https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/66/chinas-fast-track-to-south-asia

INTERVIEW - Sanjay Upadhya: Journey Through South Asia

Today, we have a renowned author and journalist, Mr. Sanjay Upadhya, joining us from Florida where he will be explaining his experiences in South Asia and revealing information about the true culture in the region.

INTERVIEW: India-Nepal Relations: Post-2014

Foreign Policy Research Center Journal interview with Sanjay Upadhya

1. How does Nepal look at India’s ‘Neighborhood First’ Policy post-2014?

Nepal welcomed Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s election in 2014 as a harbinger of change in bilateral relations. Over the months, Mr. Modi overtures – rhetorical as well as real – reinforced Nepali perceptions of the advent of a positive era. The economic blockade India imposed the following year changed all that. If India had any legitimate reservations on the content of Nepal’s new constitution as well as the nature and direction of Nepal’s growing relationship with China, New Delhi could have chosen to address them through proper diplomatic and political channels. To this day, the Nepali people do not know much about India’s grievances.
That India used an agitation launched by Nepali Madhesi leaders for greater internal autonomy to camouflage its imposition of a wholesale economic blockade for months on only served to validate Nepali perceptions of the enduring nature of the divide-and-rule policy India had inherited from the British Raj. Moreover, the fact that the blockade came merely months after Nepal suffered a devastating earthquake only hardened Nepali sentiments. The blockade has left Nepal in a cautious wait-and-see mood vis-à-vis any Indian initiatives such as ‘Neighborhood First’.

2. How does India look at Nepal’s foreign policy – From ‘looking at India’ to ‘backing up China’?

China’s growing assertiveness in Nepal is an undeniable reality. It is also true that Nepal continues to use its relations with China to balance India – sometimes too flagrantly. Today Nepal is ruled by a Communist Party formed recently by two factions sharing a pronounced Maoist legacy, which is new experience for the country. Nepali opposition parties regularly caution the government against tilting to the north out of sheer ideological fealty. It would be wrong, however, to view official Nepali policies and pronouncements as an outgrowth of some collective national strain of anti-Indianism.
In 2006, India played a major role in facilitating the alliance between mainstream democratic parties and the Maoist rebels to restore peace after a 10-year ‘people’s war’. Yet Chinese engagement in the economic, social and cultural spheres of Nepal has grown precipitously since 2006. While the causes and consequences of China’s expanding footprint in Nepal precisely during this period continues to be studied extensively in Nepal and India, there has been a natural political impact of Beijing’s active engagement. We cannot keep dwelling on the supposed ease with which Nepal flashes the China card against India at every opportunity without trying to understand the real compulsions that may lay behind Nepal’s recent policies and pronouncements.

3. Do you agree that India’s effort to revitalize BIMSTEC is signaling that its foreign policy is now shifting to address the reservations of its neighbours?

Nepal looks forward to the revitalization of BIMSTEC as a new dimension of regional cooperation for collective prosperity. The eastward shift of the locus to include new partners certainly brings new opportunities for Nepal. At the same time, there is a feeling in Nepal that BIMSTEC may be evolving in a way that would supplant the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Nepal is fully behind the notion that bilateral issues, such as those between India and Pakistan, must not be allowed to hold back regional cooperation. However, it also recognizes the limits that could be imposed by overtly exclusionary efforts. SAARC and BIMSTEC are antithetical entities and should not be considered as such.

4. Why did Nepal prefer to be neutral during the Doklam standoff in 2017?

From Nepal’s perspective, the Doklam standoff was a symptom of the larger border dispute between India and China. New Delhi and Beijing have wisely decided not to let their long-running border dispute prevent cooperation in other mutually beneficial areas. Yet Nepal cannot be oblivious to the possibility of periodic India-China border flare-ups pending a formal and final settlement between the two countries. More importantly, Nepal recognizes the direct and dire implications of such tensions given its own precarious position between the two giant neighbors. As such, Nepal needs to maintain extreme judiciousness in its approach so as to do no further harm. Neutrality on Doklam was guided by Nepal’s national interest.

5. India bashing is still a favorite sport with most Nepalis who blame New Delhi for most of the ills in their country little knowing the dynamics of relations between both countries. Do you subscribe to this viewpoint?

This has been a long-standing trait in Nepal because of the rich political value it produces domestically. However, a shift in Nepali public opinion is also becoming palpable in recent years. There is growing recognition that Nepal must engage more constructively with India on all contentious issues and shun grandstanding in order to sustain a mutually productive relationship. Over the last decade, increasing contacts with China in different areas have allowed Nepal to compare and contrast its relationship with each neighbor. There is growing appreciation of how geography, culture, politics and language bring Nepal closer to India as well as the advantages they offer. History and geography as well as the realities of the modern world have taught us that Nepal-India and Nepal-China relations cannot and need not be mutually exclusive.

6. Do you believe transforming the India-Nepal border from an ‘open border’ to a ‘closed border’ would severely damage the traditional socio-cultural ties?

I do. More than that, I am not sure Nepal can sustain the short-term costs closing the border would entail – or even whether the costs would be short. Nepalis recognize the benefits accruing from an open border with India very well because they are living it every day. In a spirit of true reciprocity, Nepal should address the political, security, economic and diplomatic concerns of India as far as practicable to maintain what I believe is a basic underpinning of our vital relationship.

7. What are the existing security relations and strategic perceptions of India and Nepal? What are the reasons for the erosion of mutuality and its impact on Indo-Nepal relationship?

Theoretically, at least, the key underpinnings of a robust security relationship between Nepal and India are in place. Concerns on both sides relate to implementation of those commitments. Each country has grievances over the safe haven criminals and questionable characters enjoy on the other side of the border. As far as Nepal is concerned, India may perhaps pause to consider whether lack of action on the part of Nepali authorities is deliberate or is rooted in administrative and police weaknesses. This is not to deny the existence of malicious motives behind certain cases.
On contentious cases, India could approach Nepal on a case-by-case basis. Definitional gaps relating to criminal activities need to be handled through legal and judicial institutions.

Similarly, the strategic perceptions of each country are defined by realities based on their sovereign existence. The erosion of mutuality is rooted in the tendency on both sides to attribute every instance of inaction, hesitation and deliberation to some deep-seated antipathy toward the other. However, I do see signs of change for the better on both sides. One is that India and China have become more aware of the potential of third countries engaged with Nepal to disrupt the stability of what is emerging as a vital triangular Sino-Indian-Nepali relationship. Of course, there is a vast distance between recognizing something and doing something about it. Still, this realization could provide a sound basis for positive action for all three countries to usher in a phase of peace and prosperity in the region.

8. Indian army chief General Bipin Rawat says Nepal and Bhutan cannot delink from India due to geography, cautions countries against China’s aid. Do you agree with this statement?

There is little to quibble with the first part of Gen. Rawat’s statement. The second part is problematic on at least two counts. First, any decision on whether to accept Chinese aid has to be made by Nepalis themselves. Second, Gen. Rawat’s caution comes from his specific and specialized vantage point, i.e., the Indian military, which is but one dimension of relations between states.
Nepali decision-makers and the public are aware enough of the global debate surrounding costs and benefits of Chinese assistance. Nepalis are equally aware that China, like India, is a sovereign and independent country that makes decisions based on its values, attitudes, needs and expectations. Based on a careful assessment of relevant considerations, Nepalis should be free to make decisions. Of course, Nepalis should listen to the views and perspectives of people like Gen. Rawat in a spirit of utmost goodwill.

9. The proposed China-Nepal railway is expected to be game-changer. Nepal’s hope is that apart from new trading opportunities, the railway will offer a crucial lifeline against potential Indian blockades. Do you agree?

The China-Nepal railway has been a promise dating back to the first meeting between King Birendra and Chairman Mao in the early 1970s, when it was a technical improbability. Even though the idea is becoming more feasible, Nepalis have gradually come around to realizing the futility of hyping it without at least gaining a vague idea of when it might eventually come into operation. From most accounts, the project is still in the technical feasibility phase. Then there are questions of funding. Furthermore, we need to know what those trains will carry into Nepal and how those commodities and products will eventually be priced and whether Nepalis can afford them as an alternative to supplies from India.
Yes, there are people who think the Chinese railway will offer a crucial lifeline against potential Indian blockades. Even if that were true, I think such a focus would be misplaced. We need to deploy our collective efforts to conduct Nepal-India relations in an atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill so as to preclude future blockades.

10. Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his May 2018 visit said India-Nepal relations are like those of a family and that misunderstandings were now over. However, India remained silent on exchanging banned Indian notes parked in various financial and banking institutions and held by general people. Any prospects of solution to this problem?

From media accounts and public pronouncement of key Indian political figures, it seems India has realized that the blockade was a mistake. Nepali leaders, too, while periodically raking up the issue of the blockade, recognize the imperative of turning a new page. On the issue of banned Indian notes, it looks like both governments have decided to address the issue quietly.
The political process facilitated by India in 2006 eventually abolished the monarchy two years later and ushered in a political order that – at least, theoretically – has broadened popular political participation and inclusion. Perhaps as an unintended consequence, it has also created strategic ambiguity as a multiplicity of actors such as the European Union and the United States are active alongside India and China, sometimes at cross-purposes. Amid growing disenchantment with the government and even the political order, many Nepalis are watching whether Prime Minister Modi’s second term will see any significant change in India’s Nepal policy.

FPRC Journal, 38-2019(2), Foreign Policy Research Center, New Delhi, 2019.

AUTHOR INTERVIEW: Sanjay Upadhya Speaks About His New Book ‘Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China’

Vitasta Books’ KANISHK SHEKHAR in conversation with author SANJAY UPADHYA on Nepal’s wider geopolitical dynamics

In Conversation: Sanjay Upadhya

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

Happy to announce that I will be speaking about my new book Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China with Kanishk Shekhar on Saturday, January 16. 

Please do join us if you can.

URL https://lnkd.in/eVbSG_u

How China Outsmarted India in Nepal

In Backfire in Nepal, SANJAY UPADHYA explores how China has become the ultimate beneficiary of India’s democracy-promotion agenda in the Himalayan state

New Delhi had made a bold bet in 2005, but one that contained two mutually fortifying flaws: the abolition of the monarchy and the empowerment of the former Maoist rebels. The world’s only Hindu monarch and kingdom were bound to India in a special relationship that neither country needed to define or assert. True, Indians had been put off by successive Nepalese monarchs playing New Delhi off against Beijing. In retrospect, a little more compassion for Nepal’s compulsions might have put things into sharper relief.

Nepalese Maoists, being communists first, were trained to denounce Indian ‘expansionism’ before American ‘imperialism’. Experience may have impelled the senior leadership to make practical compromises. It was a leap of faith for New Delhi to trust the leadership to rein in their cadres’ radicalism.

More broadly, since India had also enlisted Western democracies, it needed to address their often-contradictory concerns throughout Nepal’s turbulent transition. The Chinese could act purely on their national interests. India continues to misread how Beijing sees Nepal – both in terms of China’s visions of the past and the future. This complicates the core trilateral challenge: ensuring that Nepal is not sucked deeper into the Sino-Indian vortex, only to be scorned for aggravating the Asian giants’ rivalry.

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495

South Asia 101: Democracy And Geopolitics

By Sanjay Upadhya

Before he flew into Dhaka to attend the much-delayed summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh warned of the danger of failed states emerging in the region. Long before he left the Bangladeshi capital, Dr. Singh must have discovered the futility of India’s worry of having to bear the neighborhood’s burdens alone.

Without a seat at the conference table, China had already become part of regional deliberations. India’s “near abroad” had stepped out far ahead in time.

India’s proposal to include Afghanistan as SAARC’s eighth member was expected to sail through – until Nepal stepped in. The Nepalese delegation threatened to veto Afghanistan’s entry unless China was included in the organization as an observer or dialogue partner. The 13th summit of South Asia’s premier grouping already had its share of bad luck. Last year’s tsunami had forced Bangladesh to reschedule the conference for early February. In protest against King Gyanendra’s dismissal of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s multiparty government and takeover of full executive powers, India pulled out of the rescheduled summit.

New Delhi imposed an arms embargo on the Royal Nepalese Army battling a fierce Maoist insurgency in the kingdom. Over the months, India-Nepal relations have hit rock bottom. The Singh government’s handling of the Nepal crisis has revealed ruptures in the Indian political establishment as well.

Playing the gracious host, Bangladesh, where the organization was founded 20 years ago, urged the Indian and Nepalese delegations to sort out their differences. SAARC, which operates on the principle of consensus, eventually configured a compromise. Afghanistan would be invited to join immediately, while the SAARC council of ministers would decide the structure of China’s—and Japan’s—association at a meeting next July.

In asserting India’s equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine, Singh had the option of coming out explicitly against China’s inclusion in SAARC. It had geography on its side, although globalization has diminished the value of that attribute. Then reality set in. If India could see virtue in forging closer links with the Association of South East Asian Nations, could China be faulted for wanting to do the same with SAARC?

For some reason, Indian leaders, who can take on the sole surviving superpower with remarkable assurance, find themselves significantly restrained when it comes to China. Indian objections to China’s entry were couched in such terms as “modalities”, “precedence” and “memorandum of understanding”.

Officially, Pakistan supported Afghanistan’s membership – in one of the rare instances of cooperation between South Asia’s nuclear-armed rivals—so it could avoid India’s direct censure for having spoiled the party. In response to Indian concerns over where to draw the line once such a broad welcome mat were placed at the SAARC door, one Pakistani official urged everyone to look at the bright side: the organization’s popularity.

Amused, the other three members – Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives – joined the host in urging New Delhi and Kathmandu to resolve their differences in the interest of preserving what they had. Thirteen summits in 20 years was hardly a record to be proud of. China, for its part, remained studiously silent over the entire affair.

Much of India’s antagonism was heaped on Nepal and perhaps will continue to be. With Nepali Congress president Girija Prasad Koirala currently in New Delhi and United Marxist-Leninist general secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal just back from extensive consultations there, it was hardly surprising to see the seven-party anti-palace alliance criticize King Gyanendra for playing the so-called “China card”.

But was the issue really the surprise the Indians accused Nepal of springing at the last minute? On the eve of the summit, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reasserted his country’s desire to strengthen cooperation with South Asian countries to achieve common prosperity. In less official settings, the Chinese have been more candid in their desire to join the group.

More significantly, the Chinese spokesman’s remark came against the background of Beijing’s steady extension of its economic reach in South Asia. China’s trade volume with all South Asian nations is close to $20 billion a year, of which $13.6 billion is with India. Although they run trade deficits with Beijing, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal receive significant economic assistance from China.

In a clear display of China’s growing political influence in the region, all four nations affirm the “one-China” policy that views Taiwan as an inalienable part of the mainland. Similarly, they recognize Tibet as an integral part of China.

On the sidelines of the summit, Dr. Singh was anxious to re-educate King Gyanendra on the basic tenets of democracy. In the main sessions, the Indian prime minister got a crash course on geopolitics.

Originally published on November 14, 2005

The Unfolding ‘Great Game’ In South Asia

By Sanjay Upadhya

South Asia’s growing geo-strategic profile is being raised several notches by another global player. Japan plans to create a special South Asia department in its Foreign Ministry, designed to coordinate diplomacy with India and monitor China's regional influence, the Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun reported April 5. The new department will also be responsible for focusing greater attention on Pakistan and other South Asian nations, the newspaper said.

During the Cold War, ideological inhibitions and the insularity of South Asian economies had pushed the region to the margins of Japanese diplomacy. Although Tokyo saw South Asia as strategically important, especially in view of the sea-lanes vital to its oil imports from the Middle East, development cooperation with the region took precedence over everything else. As South Asian nations began liberalizing their economies and opening their doors to foreign investment in the early 1990s, Japan's economic involvement in the region grew substantially.

The timing of Japan’s latest effort to step up engagement with South Asia is significant; it comes weeks after the Bush administration merged the State Department’s South Asian and Central Asian bureaus into a single unit. Afghanistan, which is set to officially join the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a full member later this year, is seen as the vital bridge between the two volatile regions of Asia. The United States and South Korea have applied for observer status at SAARC, a position China and Japan have been granted.

Geopolitical Shift

The geopolitical locus of South Asia underwent a dramatic shift last November when Nepal successfully tied Afghanistan’s SAARC membership to observer status for China. New Delhi’s strong initial opposition to the linkage crumbled as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka backed Nepal.

Clearly, the simultaneous inclusion of Japan – a traditional rival of China to which India has been warming up in recent years -- was intended to mollify New Delhi. For Tokyo, a formal foothold in South Asia comes amid a resurgence of popular opinion in favor of a more vigorous international role.

A recent poll by the Yomiuri Shimbun found 71 percent of Japanese want the country's constitution to "clarify the existence of the Self-Defense Force." Fifty-six percent said the constitution should be modified to take the SDF into consideration. The poll also put the number of those who want the pacifist Article 9 of the constitution revised at 39 percent - the highest percent in five years.

Ever since coming to office in 2000, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has argued the need for Japan to come out of the humiliation of its defeat in the Second World War and consider itself as a regional, if not global, power. In Beijing’s view, Tokyo has already embarked on assertive internationalism, especially in view of its deployments in Iraq, joint development of anti-missile systems, in-air refueling capabilities and interoperability among the various branches of service. China, which opposes Japan’s and India’s bids to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, is anxious to offset a Tokyo-New Delhi alignment in South Asia.

Asian Giants’ Rivalry

To be sure, relations between India and China have come a long way since their brief but bitter border war in 1962. The upturn has been spurred in large part by the two Asian giants’ booming economic ties. China is set to replace the United States as India's leading trade partner in the near future. New Delhi and Beijing, which recently held their second "strategic dialogue," have declared 2006 as a friendship year. They have agreed to cooperate, rather than compete, for global energy resources vital to fueling their growing economies.

Overall relations, however, are still inherently fragile. Contrasting cultures, disparate international outlooks, divergent political systems, and competing geostrategic interests, among other things, have left India-China ties vulnerable to sudden deterioration.

The U.S.-India nuclear deal, which aims to recognize New Delhi as the sixth nuclear power as well as open up civilian nuclear supplies, despite India’s refusal sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is only one of several contentious areas. Beijing believes the deal, signed during President George W. Bush’s visit to India early last month, would have a negative impact on the global nuclear order. The official Chinese media have been less reticent in voicing their concern; editorial writers and opinion columnists warn that if Washington made a nuclear exception for New Delhi, other powers could do the same with their allies.

Two other developments have forced Indians to sit up and ponder. Last November, New Delhi was taken aback by the emergence of a pro-China bloc comprising Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh at the 13th SAARC summit in Dhaka. A month later, at the first East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur, China largely succeeded in confining India to the periphery of a future East Asia Community.

Chinese Strategic Contours

The strategic contours of China’s South Asia policy are becoming clearer. After Pakistan and Myanmar, Beijing is skillfully employing economic and military means to draw India’s other smaller neighbors into its own sphere of influence. The People’s Liberation Army’s recent incursions and road construction in Bhutanese territory are aimed at pressuring the tiny Himalayan kingdom to end its protectorate ties with India.

China has been steadily enhancing cooperation with Nepal, where King Gyanendra’s takeover of full executive powers last year prompted widespread international condemnation and arms embargos from traditional suppliers India, Britain and the United States. Spurning Indian pleas not to step into the vacuum, Beijing has supplied arms to King Gyanendra’s government, which – ironically enough -- is fighting a vicious Maoist insurgency.

Amid a downturn in India’s relations with Bangladesh, over such issues as illegal immigration, Islamist terrorism and trade, China has gained naval access to the Chittagong port. Through a road link with Bangladesh via Myanmar, China hopes to access Bangladesh’s vast natural gas reserves. China, the major arms supplier to Bangladesh, recently offered to provide Dhaka with nuclear reactor technology, heightening Indian anxieties.

China's growing regional assertiveness has had its impact on bilateral relations with India. During the last round of border talks in September, Indian analysts detected a hardening of Beijing stance on their long-running territorial dispute. Moreover, China, which finally seemed to have come around to recognizing India’s 1975 annexation of the former Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim, now appears to be going slow on formalizing that position.

U.S. Written All Over

Beijing’s fears that Washington was using New Delhi and Tokyo as part of a broader campaign to contain China were further enflamed in February by the publication of the U.S. Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized Washington for attempting to play up a “non-existent Chinese military threat.”

Chinese analysts see the QDR’s designation of their country as a “strategic threat,” along with the U.S. focus on enhancing its Pacific military assets and increasing its long-range strike capability, as clear preparations for a future conflict. The full implications of a U.S.-led China-containment strategy in South Asia are yet to emerge. In an already volatile region, perceptions have a dangerous way of defining reality.

Originally published on April 12 2006.

China’s Sore Spot in Nepal

Excerpt from Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China by Sanjay Upadhya

“Although Beijing considers the situation in the Tibetan region more stable, it expects the region to continue to be a core factor in relations with Kathmandu. With the three external powers most active on the Tibet issue – India, the United States and the European Union – increasingly involved in Nepal’s peace process, Beijing’s concerns about renewed potential for destabilisation from that volatile frontier have grown. The inevitable passing of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and ensuing succession politics are certain to energise an increasingly restless exile community in Nepal and those living across the porous border in India.”

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495

Chinese Acceptance of India’s Primacy in Nepal: How Real?

Excerpt from Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China by Sanjay Upadhya

“Chinese acquiescence in India’s primacy in Nepal – if that is a correct characterisation of Beijing’s stand even when it professes it – would operate within the context of China’s interests. Yet Indian commentators and analysts have taken gleeful pride at instances where they saw Beijing discarding Kathmandu. In far subdued tones, however, Chinese analysts refused to acknowledge that phases of pullback represented a conscious decision by Beijing to recognise Indian paramountcy in Nepal. The logical extension of that contention would be a resumption of Chinese rivalry with India for influence in Nepal and wider South Asia when circumstances became more propitious for Beijing.”

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China
By Sanjay Upadhya

New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495

Chinese Assertiveness Vs. Nepalese Impatience

Excerpt from Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China by Sanjay Upadhya

“Nepal recognises that most pledges from China to ease the country’s dependence on India foresee the long term. Moreover, little of tangible consequence has even begun, a fact that has the potential to raise public impatience. Greater exposure to Chinese business tactics, the darker side of growing interactions such as crime, and the general Chinese perceptions of themselves and their place in the world risk bringing more Nepalese discontent to the fore. Dismissing Nepalese grievances with India as Chinese-instigated ploys could present New Delhi with stricter challenges from Beijing from Nepal. This assertion stems not from Nepalese arrogance but from anguish over the additional pain that might be inflicted upon the country.”

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China

By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495

Counting the Cost of India’s Disregard of Nepalese Grievances

Excerpt from Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China by Sanjay Upadhya

“Sustained disregard for Nepalese grievances fuelled perceptions over time that India was attempting to delegitimise them. As a result, the territory in dispute not only ballooned in size but became so etched in Nepal’s Constitution. The continued temptation to see the dispute as a Chinese-inspired ploy to weaken India on another key front is not only misguided. It is a misreading of reality, given that Nepal’s own relationship with China is not free from suspicion. The Nepalese still recall Beijing’s eagerness to sign the Lipulekh agreement without consulting Nepal when things were going its way.”

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495

China’s Eternal Tibet Litmus Test On Nepal

Excerpt from Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China by Sanjay Upadhya

“Beijing believes Nepal, like every sovereign and independent country, has the right to devise its own relationship with China. As part of that effort, China regularly pledges to bolster aid and trade to lift ties with Nepal to ‘a new high’. There are Nepalese who maintain China is asking too much from Nepal – i.e., subjecting itself to the full force of India’s political and economic wrath – for few tangible gains. Non-conditionality in Chinese assistance loses its meaning when Beijing eternally poses the Tibet litmus test on Kathmandu.”

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495

An Inapt Obsession That Impairs Nepal-India Relations

By Sanjay Upadhya

The posthumous memoirs of Pranab Mukherjee, India’s 13th President, among other things, echoes the lament over how India lost an opportunity in 1950 to incorporate Nepal into the Indian union.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru dealt with Nepal very diplomatically, Mukherjee writes in ‘The Presidential Years: 2012-2017’ released on January 5, 2021.

“After the Rana rule was replaced by the monarchy in Nepal, he wished for democracy to take root. Interestingly, Nepal’s king, Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, had suggested to Nehru that Nepal be made a province of India. But Nehru rejected the offer on the grounds that Nepal was an independent nation and must remain so,” Mukherjee says.

“Had Indira Gandhi been in Nehru’s place, she would have perhaps seized upon the opportunity, like she did with Sikkim,” he adds.

Although not a new contention, what makes it significant this time is that it comes not only from a former Indian president but from someone who has dealt with Nepal under successive Nehru successors as foreign and defense minister over several decades.

In a memorable interview with Qatar-based Al Jazeera television in 2009, Mukherjee detailed how India had played a direct role in mainstreaming the former Maoist rebels in an alliance with leading Nepalese opposition parties against the monarchy. If there was anyone versed well enough on Nepal matters amid his own considerable vicissitudes, it was Poltu Da, as Mukherjee was affectionately known.

Far from daunting physically, Mukherjee’s amiable Bengali-tuned diction made him personally likeable. I was struck by his easy accessibility and remarkable openness in discussing a few Nepal-related issues in the corridors of the United Nations Headquarters in the mid-1990s.

It was hard to believe that this was a man who had the audacity to challenge Rajiv Gandhi for the leadership of the Congress Party in the immediate aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984.

At a broader level, however, Mukherjee remains emblematic of Indians who know Nepal well – but in their own way. The facts surrounding what really happened at Hyderabad House during King Tribhuvan’s exile in New Delhi in 1950-51 will remain in the realm of speculation. Indians like Mukherjee continue to see an independent Nepal as a product of Nehru’s misguided altruism.

From the Nepalese standpoint, admittedly one not widely known in the country, the situation was so dire that King Tribhuvan and Crown Prince Mahendra were said to routinely converse in Newari to evade their eavesdropping hosts.

This fixation with how Nehru, in rejecting Sardar Vallabh  Bhai Patel counsel of Nepal’s full and formal incorporation into the Indian union as a matter of national security, was bound to gain credence in India in subsequent decades amid the vagaries of bilateral relations. What must not be overlooked is that much of those difficulties stemmed from Nepal’s assertion of its identity as a sovereign and independent nation.

The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Nehru’s ambassador and the absolute ruler of a tottering oligarchy may have been one way India thought it could handle the largest of three disparate Himalayan states (the others being Bhutan and Sikkim) the British Raj had left behind.

Nepal came to the treaty table intending to assert and preserve its status as a sovereign nation. If Nehru’s notion of security expressed through the 1950 Treaty had resonance for Nepal, it was to the extent of ensuring an independent Nepal did not threaten India’s interests. It may be entirely fortuitous that the new treaty triggered a chain of events that would culminate in the grand Delhi Compromise. Still, the parties and palace that displaced the Ranas adhered to Nepal’s original expectation from the treaty. Only nine years later, when Nepal was under an elected government, would the reciprocity the Indians sought become public knowledge, when New Delhi revealed the confidential exchange of side letters to the treaty.

Those letters obliged Nepal to depend on India for its security. In case of any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor, the two governments would consult with each other and devise effective countermeasures. Nepal agreed that it would not import arms, ammunition and other military equipment except with India’s consent. Yet when Nepal and India agreed to joint manning of posts on the Nepal–Tibet border and set up an Indian Military Mission in Nepal, they did so when Nepal feared a Chinese threat, particularly after the Chinese occupation of Tibet. These steps were not Kathmandu’s confirmation of India’s invocation of any right to control Nepal’s political and economic life.

The security aspects lost their relevance as Nepal established diplomatic ties with China and concluded their boundary agreement, Nepal’s pursuit of a foreign policy intended to assert its independent identity no longer automatically provided India a second vote at the United Nations General Assembly. A landlocked country dependent on transit through India for trade with third countries went on to find new opportunities for economic diversification. Thus, adhering to international law, it considered transit to be a right but trade a matter of convenience.

Every time Nepal sought a review, India pointed to the provision for unilateral termination on a year’s notice. It was only after democratically elected leaders in the 1990s began pressing the case that New Delhi agreed to discuss the matter. Yet even some of the same Indians who acknowledge how the Indian government and public have never shown adequate sensitivity to Nepalese pride in their sovereignty and independence have difficulty in seeing Kathmandu’s assertion of its independence as more than skilful leveraging of its geographical contiguity with China. During the latest border dispute, many Indian experts and analysts have placed much faith in how the unique people-to-people relations would see the two countries through this crisis. While urging India to do everything it should to nurture the invaluable asset it has in the goodwill of the Nepalese people, some in this fraternity still counsel India to reject the Nepalese state’s ill-conceived territorial claims.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pledge in 2014 to see a revision done during his tenure and invitation to Nepal to present proposals was the clearest articulation of India’s change of heart. Yet Modi still has had the time to receive the report prepared by the bilateral Eminent Persons Group in 2018. How much are pledges worth if a set of nonbinding recommendations agreed together cannot merit sufficient official attention in New Delhi? Mukherjee may not be available to provide an answer. His acolytes must.

Based on the author’s forthcoming book, Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China (New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021).

The Run Keeps Getting Longer in Nepal

Excerpt from Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China by Sanjay Upadhya

“Burdened with micromanaging Nepalese affairs while studiously denying doing so, India had the additional responsibility of looking after American interests. When the United States veered too close to the interests of its European partners on social issues, India understandably felt uncomfortable. China had the freedom to act alone. Perhaps India considered the erosion of its influence temporary and reversible over the long run. But the run kept getting longer.” 

Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China
By Sanjay Upadhya
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495