Tuesday, October 07, 2008

क्रान्तिकारी भाषामा राजकीय शव्द

सञ्जय उपाध्याय

नयां नेपाललाई पुरानोले कति सम्म लखेटिरहेको छ भन्ने एउटा उदाहरण नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसका उपसभापति रामचन्द्र पौडेलले हालै पोखरामा दिन पुगे। प्रधानमन्त्री पुष्पकमल दाहालले अचेल प्रयोग गर्ने गरेको भाषामा पौडैलले तत्कालिन राजा महेन्द्रका शब्दहरु भेट्न थालेछन्।
आफ्नो संघर्षमय राजनीतिक जीवन राजा महेन्द्रकै शासनकालमा सुरु गरेका पौडेललाई उनको त्यस बखतको सम्झना बेला बेला कुनै न कुनै रुपले आइरहंदो हो। दाहालले खुलेरै नेपालले आफ्नै प्रकृतिको लोकतन्त्रको विकास गर्नु पर्ने कुरा गर्न थाले पछि पौडेललाई विगतले झन् सताएको होला।
दाहालको कथनका पछाडि जेजस्ता कारण रहे पनि केही त माओवादीहरु कै राजनीतिक आस्था, हाम्रो विगतको संसदीय अनुभव र समसामयिक राजनीति संग गासिएका छन्। मूलधारमा आइसके पछि नेकपा माओवादीले आफ्नो विशिष्ट क्रान्तिकारी छवि गुमाउदै गएको भन्ने कार्यकर्ताहरुमा बढ्दै गएको असन्तोष कसैबाट छिपेको छैन। जनयुद्ध राजतन्त्र र संसदीय व्यवस्था दुवै विरुद्ध सुरु भएको स्मरण गर्नेहरु मध्ये धेरैले त त्यो असन्तोष नै दाहालका लागि सबैभन्दा ठूलो समस्या बन्न सक्ने शान्ति प्रक्रियाको आरम्भ संगै ठम्याएका थिए।
उता नेपाली कम्युनिष्ट आन्दोलनको नेतृत्व सम्हाल्ने होडवाजीले पनि काम गरेको छ। अघिल्ला पुस्ताका उग्रबामपन्थीहरुको मूलधारिकरण गर्न सफल मदन भण्डारीको जनताको बहुदलीय जनवादका तत्कालिन बिरोधीहरु मध्येका एक वर्तमान एमाले महासचिव झलनाथ खनालले आफ्नो दललाई क्रान्तिकारी छवि दिने भरमग्दूर प्रयास गरिरहेका छन्। उनले पनि नेपालको अनुभव र आवश्यक्ता अनुरुप राजनीतिक व्यवस्थालाई परिमार्जन गर्नु पर्ने मनतव्य दिइरहेका छन्।
नयां संरचना सम्वन्धि स्पष्ट विवरण माओवादी वा एमाले कसैले दिन नसकेको सन्दर्भमा त्यस्ता भनाईहरुलाई लोकतन्त्र बिरोधी चरित्र दिन नेपाली कांग्रेसलाई सजिलो पर्यो। अनि राजा महेन्द्रद्धारा संसदीय प्रजातन्त्रको अन्त्य गरी प्रतिपादित निर्दलीय पञ्चायत व्यवस्था संग दाहाल र खनाललाई जोड्न पौडेललाई सजिलो भयो।
तर यहां अर्को खेल सुरु भएको आभाष हुन्छ। निश्चय पनि आधारभूत दलविहीन स्वरुपले नै पञ्चायत ब्यवस्थालाई अप्रजातान्त्रिक बनाएको थियो। जनताको राजनीतिक आस्थाका आधारमा संगठित हुने अधिकारलाई बर्गीय संगठन जस्ता अन्य बैकल्पिक माध्यमबाट सुनिश्चित गर्ने निर्दलीय अभियान ब्यर्थ रह्यो। आधारभूत निर्दलीय स्वरुपकै आयामहरुले राष्ट्रको समग्र जीवनलाई नियन्त्रण गर्यो।
तत्कालिन अन्तरराष्ट्रिय परिस्थिति माझ संसदीय प्रजातन्त्रको भविष्य कति सुरक्षित थियो भन्ने विवाद कहिले नटुंगेला। तर पनि फर्केर हेर्नु पर्नै हुन्छ। एकातिर परस्पर विपरित राजनीतिक प्रणाली बोकेका हाम्रा उतर र दक्षिण छिमेकी वीचको शत्रुता थियो भने अर्को तिर पूर्व र पश्चिम विश्व राजनीतिक आस्थाका आधारमा शितयुद्धमा लिप्त थिए। अनि दोश्रो विश्व युद्ध पछि एशिया, अफ्रिका र लेटिन अमेरिकामा उदाएका नेपाल जस्ता नवप्रजातन्त्रहरुले अन्तरराष्ट्रिय शक्ति संघर्ष माझ गुमाउनु परेको राजनीतिक स्वतन्त्रता फेरी हासिल गर्न शीत युद्धको अन्त्यको प्रतिक्षा गर्नु परेको यथार्थ थियो।
राजा महेन्द्रको राजनीतिक अनुदारता भित्र पनि उनको शासनकालमा नेपालले आफ्नो विशिष्ट अन्तरराष्ट्रिय पहिचान बनाउन सफल भएको स्वीकार्न कन्जुस्याइ गर्नु पर्ने कारण छैन। भारत संगको सम्वन्धलाई शान्त कूटनीति भित्र समेटेर नेपालले त्यतिवेला आफ्ना स्वतन्त्र र सार्वभौम आकांक्षा र अपेक्षाहरु विश्वव्यापी रुपमा सम्प्रेषण गर्न राजा महेन्द्र सफल भएका थिए।
हो, उनको कूटनीतिले छोडेको पिडादायी पक्षहरुमा कालापानी र १९६५को हतियार खरिद सम्वन्धि समझदारी जस्ता मुद्दा हाम्रा सामु अझै छन्। राजा महेन्द्रलाई जति दोष दिए पनि विर्सन नहुने कुरा चाहीं के हो भने कालापानी र १९६५को समझदारीले वोकेको आधारभूत अन्यायलाई उनको अप्रजातान्त्रिक पक्ष संग जोडेर भारत मूल विषयबाट उम्कन सफल भएको छ।
नेपाल राज्यको उदय, बिकास र वर्तमान स्वरुपका आलोचकहरु राजा महेन्द्रलाई आन्तरिक रुपमा कृतिम नेपालीत्व लादेकोमा दोषी ठान्छन्। तर नेपाली नेपाली वीच भावनात्मक एकता बन्न नसकेको एवं एउटा वर्ग, समुदाय र तप्काले समग्र मुलुकलाई शोषण गरेको भन्नेहरुले पनि नेपाललाई दर्जनौ सूक्ष्म राष्ट्रहरुको पुंजका रुपमा परिकल्पना गरेका छैनन्। जे जति न्यायपूर्ण प्रतिनिधित्व, समावेशिकरण र सम्वन्वय बढाउनु पर्ने हो अहिलेकै हाम्रा भौगोलिक यथार्थ र अन्तरराष्ट्रिय पहिचानकै परिधि भित्र गर्नु पर्ने हुन्छ।
यो आकांक्षालाई बुझेको अभाष नेकपा माओवादीले जनयुद्ध सुरु गरे देखि नै औपचारिक दस्तावेज, नेतृत्व पंक्तिका सार्वजनिक भनाई र लेख रचना मार्फत दिएको हो। प्रधानमन्त्रीका रुपमा दाहालले त्यसो गर्न सफल होलान् वा राष्ट्रियता सम्वन्धि मुद्दाहरुलाई सत्तारोहणको मार्गमा सीमित राख्लान् त्यो त भविष्यले नै बताउला। तर प्रधानमन्त्री भएको महिना दिन जसो भित्र दाहालले नेपालमा प्रभावशाली तीनवटै शक्तिशाली मुलुकका सर्वोच्च नेतृत्वलाई भेटी नेपालीहरुको स्वतन्त्र र सवल भई वाच्ने आकांक्षा सम्प्रेषित गर्न सफल भए जस्तो देखिन्छन्। साथै उनले ती सरकारहरुको अपेक्षा बुझेका पनि होलान्।
तिनको समायोजन गर्न सक्नुमा नै नेपालको भविष्य निर्भर हुने कुरामा दुईमत नहोला। अहिले नै नयां नेपालको सम्भावित सम्वन्धि दाहालको एउटा अस्पष्ट अवधारणालाई राजा महेन्द्रको एउटा अप्रीय पक्ष संग जोड्न खोज्नु मुलुकका लागि कतिको हितकर होला?

Thursday, October 02, 2008

Balancing Tact

The Maoists must shed their strong-arm approach for subtlety every step of the way

By Sanjay Upadhya
The nation has attained a semblance of post-monarchy equilibrium, now that the four largest parties have divided up the top leadership positions. Ordinary Nepalis, however, are realistic enough to expect continued squabbling among the Maoists, Nepali Congress, Unified Marxists-Leninists and the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum as the peace process traverses the next phase.
Part of the realism stems from the political machinations the nation witnessed during its last experience with democracy. Some of that shadiness returned during the presidential and prime ministerial elections. Yet there is a palpable sense of anticipation rooted in the fact that the people had given their mandate in April primarily for the creation of a new constitution. Despite the anticipated bumpiness, moving ahead on the journey that began with the 12-point accord is obligatory as well as inevitable.
The idea that Nepal’s failure to acquire a constitution drafted and endorsed by elected representatives is responsible for its decades-long political instability has taken firm hold. The principal protagonists have no excuses for delaying a course correction. The political class may find it expedient to bemoan the rise and fall of alliances in a hung assembly. The people recognize that the flipside of a doomed alliance is the creation of a new one. They are firmly focused on performance.
The national mood is also conditioned by common sense. Parties united by a commitment to overthrow the monarchy were bound to go their separate ways once Nepal became a republic. Furthermore, when almost every party remains divided along the lines of regional, class and generational representation vis-à-vis the contours of a new Nepal, can much value really be placed on persistent calls for a broader consensus? Consensus, more importantly, can be a desirable outcome in a political system based on competition, but not a precondition.
The Maoists, during their tenure in the interim government, could not create an image distinct from the parties and practices they had so ferociously risen up against. The programs and policies of the new government are bound to spark great interest. No less attention will focus on how the Maoists, which have not entirely shed their militant posture after joining the peace process, behave at the helm of affairs. Would a strong administrative hand, buttressed by an assertive security apparatus, indicate their readiness to bolster law and order as a prerequisite for enduring peace? Or would such firmness be perceived as a harbinger of authoritarianism?
Maoist leaders can be expected to reiterate their ultimate commitment to establishing a people’s republic in an effort to appease the more militant constituencies within the party. The implications of merging the People’s Liberation Army into the state military have gained greater clarity and seriousness since its desirability became part of the peace process. In the absence of gainful employment or other means of sustenance, Maoist cadres could become a great challenge to the leadership. Doubtless, the rest of the country would be asked to understand such militant rhetoric as part of the Maoists’ transition to democracy rather than a prelude to one-party authoritarianism. In the absence of good governance, the frequency of both affirmations could only vitiate public opinion.
The Maoists long characterized the Nepali state as being, among other things, semi-feudal and semi-colonial. They have now inherited the responsibility of identifying and promoting Nepal’s alternatives within those limitations. It takes time to transform a proven ability to erode and undermine the state into one that revitalizes it. The people’s patience, on the other hand, is notoriously thin. Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal may find it easy to resort to economically unsustainable but politically attractive policies to boost the government’s popularity. Yet the Maoists recognize they can no longer enjoy the luxury of shifting blame for failures on other parties.
The former rebels also would have to contend with the pressures coalition partners start exerting. The UML comes with its own baggage full of posturing and intrigue from the last stint with the democracy. The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, untested in power, has enough familiar personalities in top positions to negate any advantage novelty might have conferred. The junior coalition partners would be tempted to weigh down the Maoists on vital issues, especially if the Nepali Congress and others provide the slightest instigation. Still, they must recognize the possible consequences of defensive measures from a besieged group with a history of violence.
The Nepali Congress, sitting in the opposition, seems to believe it has a better understanding of the Maoists’ real motives and intentions. But it would be futile for the party to bemoan its exclusion from political power. Constitutionally and legally, President Ram Baran Yadav may have severed his ties to the Nepali Congress. The country cannot overlook the fact that he was a strong and active member of the party. In that capacity, he had developed definite views on the monarchy and other parties. In many instances, he had expressed them candidly in public. Yadav, moreover, filed his candidacy as general secretary of the Nepali Congress.
In established republics, such political antecedents may matter less. In Nepal, however, all public offices – elected as appointed – have tended to become politicized. Furthermore, our peace process has been driven primarily by political dynamics shaped by and responding to the imperatives of the moment. Most importantly, perhaps, Nepal has no experience with an elected head of state, whose values, attitudes, needs and expectations differ wildly with those of the erstwhile kings. How the presidency interacts with the other elected institution, the premiership, would depend not only on constitutionally defined parameters but also on the nation’s infamously erratic political environment.
Nepali Congress leaders readily acknowledge that their party faces an almost existential crisis. They may try hard to camouflage self-interested maneuvers in the garb of political principle. The people, on the other hand, have reached their own conclusions about a party that has steadfastly held on to its ideals while in opposition only to become its worst enemy once in power. The Nepali Congress’ claim that it is the sole guardian of democracy is not without value in the wider context of international legitimacy. But for the purposes of the current elected assembly, at least, Nepali voters have made a different judgment.
The fact that the Nepali Congress remains out of the government by choice in no way diminishes its obligation to put a check on potential government highhandedness. Unwarranted zeal in this role could easily be construed as a lust for power, an allegation the party has never been able to ward off. Instead of hunting for proxies among the smaller parties and purporting to prophesize the life of the Maoist-led government, the Nepali Congress would do a far greater service to the nation by nudging everyone toward drafting the new constitution.
Geopolitically, Nepal has moved into a far more volatile phase. After becoming the world’s first democratically elected Maoist leader, Prime Minister Dahal has moved swiftly to demonstrate how it would no longer be business as usual for the country. Hours after taking the oath of office, Dahal announced he would visit China for the closing ceremonies of the Olympic Games. By breaking tradition and visiting Nepal’s northern neighbor first, the premier has riled New Delhi. When President Ram Baran Yadav cancelled plans to attend the opening ceremonies, citing domestic preoccupation, many Nepalis were quick to see New Delhi’s hand. Some Indian newspapers characterized the cancellation as a snub to China. The reverse analogy may not be accurate, but perceptions do have endurance across the southern border.
Nepal anticipated renewed geopolitical pressures ever since the Maoists surprised pundits and pollsters by their electoral surge. Ever since, Nepal’s international partners have been scrambling to calibrate their policies. The United States, which still considers the Maoists a terrorist organization, has softened somewhat. After the election results were announced, U.S. Ambassador Nancy Powell met with Dahal, opening Washington’s formal contact with the ex-rebels. The Bush administration subsequently clarified that the Maoists were on a separate list of terrorist organizations, implying they could not be equated with, say, Al Qaeda. The United States congratulated Dahal’s election as premier, but left room for speculation over whether it had actually greeted the person or the Nepali people.
Withdrawal of the terrorist tag, according to Washington, would depend on the Maoists’ behavior in power. Quietly, the Maoists seem to be listening. The Young Communist League remained virtually silent in the context of the pro-Tibet demonstrations in Kathmandu, after making a loaded threat to crush anti-Chinese activities several months before the protests began in March.
India, which once considered the Maoists terrorists but also continued to offer them sanctuary, still has mixed feelings. The Congress party government, which helped to create the alliance between mainstream parties and the Maoists, under its erstwhile leftist allies’ prodding, that toppled royal rule two years ago, hopes Nepal’s experience would encourage its own Naxalite insurgents to renounce violence and enter the mainstream. With few signs of that happening, media organizations close to New Delhi officialdom continue to highlight alleged links between the Maoists and Naxalites.
The opposition Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, tipped to win the general elections expected next year, remains virulently anti-Maoist. One leader “proposed” that Nepal recognize Hindi as the country’s second language, close on the heels of protests against Vice-President Parmananda Jha’s decision to take the oath in that language. The BJP leader clearly ratcheted up pressure on the Maoist-led government on a sensitive front before the floods in Koshi reignited the contentious debate over water resources cooperation.
On the wider gamut of issues, including security and trade and transit, the Congress and the BJP have a general convergence of views. Both are apprehensive of the Maoists’ growing ties with China since the collapse of the royal regime. Several senior Maoist leaders have visited Beijing, while Chinese delegations continue to arrive in Nepal. The Free Tibet movement has ostensibly heightened Beijing’s sensitivities on what it has long considered a volatile frontier. But matters have moved far beyond Tibet.
Washington’s growing influence in Nepal in the name of containing the Maoists was bound to irk Beijing, which sees New Delhi as a pivotal element of a U.S.-led attempt to contain China’s peaceful rise. Professor Wang Hong-wei, who is perhaps the most prominent Chinese expert on Nepal, has been candid in his opinions. Months after claiming that the June 1, 2001 royal palace massacre was part of an international conspiracy, Wang stated that India was attempting to turn Nepal into another Sikkim or Bhutan. Considering Wang’s affiliation with the top government think tank in Beijing as well as the Chinese system of government, there is reason to believe he is speaking for his country.
India, which has long asserted its own version of the Monroe Doctrine in South Asia, remains apprehensive of Chinese motives against the wider backdrop of their dispute dating from the 1962 war. Leading Indian analysts close to the government tend to see Beijing’s activity in Nepal, as well as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, as part of a long-term strategy to encircle their country and limit its influence. India, despite its much-vaunted convergence of views with the United States on Nepal, remains committed to guarding its traditional predominance in Nepal.
Caught in the complexities of the India-China relationship, Nepal is bound to feel jolts as elements of cooperation, competition and confrontation between the two Asian giants emerge and recede individually. While Beijing may be sympathetic to New Delhi’s deeper ties with Nepal, variables outside the Sino-Indian partnership could impel the Chinese to become more assertive. Deb Mukharji, India’s ambassador to Nepal during the escalation of the Maoist insurgency and the royal palace massacre, told a seminar in New Delhi in May that China could feel compelled to play a proactive a role in Nepal in the face of U.S. “games.”
Even if he were a seasoned chief executive, Prime Minister Dahal would be hard-pressed to handle this triangular conundrum. After the elections, he diluted his party’s earlier threats to abrogate a controversial peace and friendship treaty with India, ban Indian films and stop recruitment of Gurkha soldiers into the Indian and British armies. C.P. Gajurel, chief of the party’s international division, said the ex-insurgents would stop calling the Americans “imperialists” and the Indians “expansionists”.
In a clear overture to Beijing, Dahal insists he wants to maintain “equidistance” between China and India. But how far does Beijing trust the Maoists as steadfast allies? Speculation of a broader communist front continues to swirl despite the frostiness between the UML and the Maoists. Rumors of a broad nationalist front by including former royalists and non-communist constituencies, persist with equal fervor. Both proposals are viewed within the context of Beijing’s desire for stability after the abolition of its traditional ally. Dahal’s return from China could provide pointers to how the Maoists hope to engage with the rest of the world.
What the nation also needs to find out is whether the Maoists are capable of resisting undue external pressure. Throughout the insurgency, Maoist leaders – and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai specifically through his writings – demonstrated their grasp of this geopolitical choppiness. Much will depend on whether they also contemplated ways of steadying the ship of state.

(A version of this article appeared in the September 2008 issue of Global Nepali)