By Sanjay Upadhya
During her recent three-day ‘goodwill’ visit, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao assured Nepalese leaders that New Delhi would support any government in Kathmandu. That the top Indian foreign policy bureaucrat spelled out in words what ordinarily is a given in state-to-state relations was telling enough. More so was the fact that important sections in Nepal, including outspoken critics of Indian ‘high-handedness’, accepted the remark as innocuous.
To be fair, Rao had arrived to allay apprehensions New Delhi itself had attributed to Ambassador Rakesh Sood’s diplomatic robustness, which has often climbed several notches above his pay grade. So Rao’s comment on Nepal’s new government could have been taken in the spirit of goodwill. But that became difficult considering the general obscurity of Madan Kumar Bhattarai, her official host.
Still, Rao’s visit served to embody a deeper message: behind India’s triumphalism over the exit of UNMIN lies a palpable ambivalence on the path ahead. New Delhi has deployed its ambiguity with daunting creativity. India is not meddling in Nepal. It is merely responding to requests by Nepalese players in the true of spirit of good-neighborliness. The throwback to the 1950s is unmistakable. But the perils to Nepal are far greater. India may still exert the dominant foreign influence in Nepal, but it does not enjoy the monopoly of the early Nehruvian era.
The advent of the new year, coinciding with New Delhi’s entry into the United Nations Security Council for a two-year term, saw a surge in Indian diplomatic reportage on how Nepal would figure higher on South Block’s neighborhood agenda. Then came that high-profile conference in the Indian capital, which, according to a top Indian expert, whose purpose was to allow Nepalese parties and players a candor deemed impossible inside their country.
How far such an exchange was achieved remains unclear. But the official Indian establishment took full advantage of the event by projecting Maoist leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai as a leading contender for power whom New Delhi could do business with. Regardless of whether Dr. Bhattarai actually becomes premier, the boost he received will have proved instrumental in the taming the Maoists, a key unfulfilled objective of the 12-Point Agreement.
The message got through. During his meeting with Rao, Maoist chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal was compelled to explain that he was not anti-Indian. For a variety of complex reasons – all not entirely sinister – Nepal’s quest for survival has conflicted with India’s notions of its national interest. The assertion of ‘Nepaliness’ had been long equated with anti-Indianism, the ultimate beneficiary of which has been New Delhi. Dahal could have made a greater contribution by not conceding the premise.
In the vicious power game, New Delhi does not lack perceived favorites. Key contenders, in varying degrees, have been eager to project themselves in that light. This would have been a moment of unrestrained delight for New Delhi had it not had to contend with post-UNMIN ambiguity.
How the United Nations entered Nepal over the evident discomfiture of India and China remains in the realm of continuing inquiry. The Maoists wanted the United Nations in as an insurance policy, and both neighbors grudgingly went along despite the likely precedents for places like Kashmir and Tibet. From a narrow and targeted mission, UNMIN evolved in different ways for the diverse internal and external constituents and stakeholders. So when UMNIN chief Karin Landgren asserted that Nepal stood on the crossroads between a military takeover and Maoist revolt, carefully attributing her view to prevailing popular perception, few saw that as an abdication by UNMIN of its responsibility.
Publicly, New Delhi feigns happiness that Beijing did not oppose UNMIN’s withdrawal. But India recognizes the advantages China gained through the internationalization of the peace process. These past four years have coincided with a surge in the influence of the hawkish People’s Liberation Army and the Ministry of State Security on Chinese foreign policy. The growing advocacy of Maoist norms by key allies of Xi Jinping, the presumptive successor to President Hu Jintao, suggests a further surge of nationalism in Beijing’s regional outlook and attitudes.
The ‘hyperrealist’ school in India, on the other hand, has become more candid about using the Tibet issue to bolster India’s leverage with China. The absence of New Delhi’s affirmation that Tibet remains an integral part of China from the joint communiqué issued after Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent visit was indicative of the influence of hawks in Indian foreign policy.
The diverse fault lines between India and China – security, territory, trade, energy, natural resources, etc. – are embodied in the issue of Tibet, into which Nepal is being increasingly sucked deeper. And through the Tibet issue, other governments, organizations and interests have the capacity to influence India-China bilateralism. Particularly relevant for Nepal is the fact that many members of India’s hyperrealist school are convinced that the United States will hedge its bets in any Sino-Indian conflict, notwithstanding the upswing in Washington-New Delhi relations.
In addition to leaving politicians from all parties vying for its patronage, New Delhi has exhibited clear enough signals that it may be amenable to a variety of outcomes in Nepal. Even on the issue of reinstatement of the 1990 constitution, some Indian sources have envisaged the possibility of dropping the monarchy, an ‘unchangeable’ feature of that document. If anything, the roots of this tentativeness lay in India’s wider geopolitical ambivalence.
