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“Privately, Nepalese leaders often voice exasperation with the conduct of their Chinese counterparts, but none match the public candour reserved for Indian politicians and bureaucrats. Should China’s public affirmations to uphold Nepalese sovereignty and independence become monotonous to the point of triteness, Nepalese scepticism could lead in the opposite direction. Admittedly, this will not be enough to counteract the far deeper distrust of India. Growing acknowledgement of Nepal’s strategic vulnerability, however, might make the Nepalese more understanding of their own interests.”
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“Beijing believes Nepal, like every sovereign and independent country, has the right to devise its own relationship with China. As part of that effort, China regularly pledges to bolster aid and trade to lift ties with Nepal to ‘a new high’. There are Nepalese who maintain China is asking too much from Nepal – i.e., subjecting itself to the full force of India’s political and economic wrath – for few tangible gains. Non-conditionality in Chinese assistance loses its meaning when Beijing eternally poses the Tibet litmus test on Kathmandu.”
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“Chinese acquiescence in India’s primacy in Nepal – if that is a correct characterisation of Beijing’s stand even when it professes it – would operate within the context of China’s interests. Yet Indian commentators and analysts have taken gleeful pride at instances where they saw Beijing discarding Kathmandu. In far subdued tones, however, Chinese analysts refused to acknowledge that phases of pullback represented a conscious decision by Beijing to recognise Indian paramountcy in Nepal. The logical extension of that contention would be a resumption of Chinese rivalry with India for influence in Nepal and wider South Asia when circumstances became more propitious for Beijing.”
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“Sustained disregard for Nepalese grievances fuelled perceptions over time that India was attempting to delegitimise them. As a result, the territory in dispute not only ballooned in size but became so etched in Nepal’s Constitution. The continued temptation to see the dispute as a Chinese-inspired ploy to weaken India on another key front is not only misguided. It is a misreading of reality, given that Nepal’s own relationship with China is not free from suspicion. The Nepalese still recall Beijing’s eagerness to sign the Lipulekh agreement without consulting Nepal when things were going its way.”
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“Some Indians suggest that since 1954 China and India have had an understanding on Nepal. India and China, this interpretation goes, would do nothing to undermine each other’s vital interests beyond the Himalayas. According to this understanding, India has been hosting the Dalai Lama’s government in exile without supporting its claims for independence or greater autonomy for Tibet. If there was such an arrangement on Nepal and it had survived the 1962 war, the Chinese gave little indication of its existence.”
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“Nepal recognises that most pledges from China to ease the country’s dependence on India foresee the long term. Moreover, little of tangible consequence has even begun, a fact that has the potential to raise public impatience. Greater exposure to Chinese business tactics, the darker side of growing interactions such as crime, and the general Chinese perceptions of themselves and their place in the world risk bringing more Nepalese discontent to the fore. Dismissing Nepalese grievances with India as Chinese-instigated ploys could present New Delhi with stricter challenges from Beijing from Nepal. This assertion stems not from Nepalese arrogance but from anguish over the additional pain that might be inflicted upon the country.”
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“Although Beijing considers the situation in the Tibetan region more stable, it expects the region to continue to be a core factor in relations with Kathmandu. With the three external powers most active on the Tibet issue – India, the United States and the European Union – increasingly involved in Nepal’s peace process, Beijing’s concerns about renewed potential for destabilisation from that volatile frontier have grown. The inevitable passing of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama and ensuing succession politics are certain to energise an increasingly restless exile community in Nepal and those living across the porous border in India.”
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“The Chinese have moved beyond Tibet in their engagement with Nepal, at least in the traditional sense. There is new recognition in China that, given its border disputes with India and absence of diplomatic relations with Bhutan, only Nepal could provide it physical connectivity to South Asia. Beijing has divided South Asia into western (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and eastern (India at the centre) components and sees Nepal the most viable bridge to the latter. Expressions of such benign motives are not going to impress India, which has long seen Chinese trans-Himalayan ambitions as growing from a desire to keep a check on India’s rising capabilities.”
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“[I]nstead of obsessing over why the Nepalese see China the way they do, India might want to delve deeper into how China sees Nepal. Although it might not advertise it, Beijing sees Tibet and Nepal as part of its integrated ‘peripheral policy’. Nepal’s northern border is an easy gateway to the Tibet Autonomous Region. China worries that political instability in Nepal could lead to enhanced anti-Chinese activities in Nepal. Every time India is tempted to wave the Tibet card to China, it is enough to wobble Nepal.”
New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021 (forthcoming), Rs. 495
