By Sanjay Upadhya
May 18, 2008
Presumptuous as it may seem, the Nepali Congress’ posture after the Constituent Assembly elections is quite understandable. The imperative of handing power to the Maoists, who won the largest bloc of seats, as well as the reluctance to cede the political field to the former rebels both stem from the party’s unique position in the country’s politics.
The Nepali Congress’ predilection for equating itself with democracy must be unnerving to its rivals. Still, there is an element of truth in the claim. If non-Nepali Congress parties – meaning communists in Nepal’s context – had spearheaded the democratic movements of 1950-51, 1990 and 2006, it is debatable whether they would have won the same level of international support, more so in view of Nepal’s sensitive geopolitical realities. Moreover, the government of the day would have found it far easier to resist the challenge.
Then there is that other bitter truth. The Nepali Congress was at the center of the political accidents of 1960 and 2002 (which set the stage for the 2005 royal takeover). No matter how much you berate the palace’s “autocratic tendencies”, the sequence of events does not absolve the Nepali Congress. A party that could endure profound odds to ensure the triumph of democracy was simply ineffective when it came to preserving it. The Nepali Congress’ visceral ability to alienate its political rivals, compounded by bitter internal feuds, eventually subverted democracy on both occasions.
In an organization where ideology has served more as an adhesive for disparate factions rather than a living ideal, you would expect leaders to be more vigilant. Instead, the party always equated the triumph of democracy with its eternalness, forcing the country to pay the price.
Despite winning the second largest number of seats in the Constituent Assembly elections, many Nepali Congress leaders are still smarting from what they consider a humiliation. The party’s failure to benefit from the split in the communist vote must have been painful enough. The fact that the Maoists surged despite the fact that the Nepali Congress controlled the premiership as well as the principal ministries must have exacerbated the soreness.
During previous setbacks, Nepali Congress members have routinely faulted, among other things, extreme nepotism and favoritism, allegations of corruption swirling around senior leaders and the party’s tendency to forget the tenets of democracy once in power for its woes. This time the party was mired in a deeper mess.
In the name of preserving the peace process at all costs, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala systematically rebuffed party members to accommodate the Maoists. Within the Koirala family, rival claimants to the leadership mantle veered closer to the palace and the Maoists respectively. Senior party leaders effortlessly conceded that reunification had not really brought the two factions closer emotionally.
In their quest to reinterpret B.P. Koirala’s national reconciliation policy, the dominant faction discredited people like former premier Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and former speaker Taranath Ranabhat as “royalists”. The post-election hand-wringing over how the royalist vote could go to the Maoists became meaningless.
The Constituent Assembly, republic, an inclusive state structure and other major slogans of contemporary Nepal clearly belonged to the Maoists. Despite having broken with the monarchy, the Nepali Congress could still have built a platform based on religious, social and cultural coexistence. By outlook, temperament and record, Nepali Congress leaders were ill suited for challenging the status quo. There was no way the party could have outdone its rivals in the race for the most revolutionary visage.
The major parties worked hard to project the Constituent Assembly elections as one-in-an-epoch opportunity. Still the people turned out in number barely larger than in the three parliamentary elections after the 1990 change. If the Maoists really triumphed solely on intimidation, as their rivals continue to claim, then the ex-rebels were sophisticated enough to have perpetrated fear under the gaze of international observers. Surely, the Maoists cannot be expected to take responsibility for the Nepali Congress’ failure to recognize that.
The imperative of ceding power to the largest bloc in the new assembly is inherently democratic. Yet it is hard to describe as undemocratic the reluctance to do so to a party that has done precious little to assure the people of its democratic intentions. If any other party had refused to respect the people’s mandate in such a way, the international community would have been outraged long ago.
Whatever the reasons for the Nepali Congress’ setback, it is far from fatal. The party will continue to monopolize the halo of democracy until, at least, the Unified Marxist-Leninists change their name and flag. This is reality is something the Nepal Congress can approach with either humility or haughtiness. The choice will determine its future.
Saturday, May 24, 2008
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Maoists Confront The Price Of Power
By Sanjay Upadhya
Electoral success has begun to soften Nepal’s former Maoist rebels. The leader of the once-feared organization, Pushpa Kamal Dahal – who still goes by his nom de guerre “Prachanda” (The Fierce One) – is calling for political consensus as the Himalayan nation prepares to abolish the monarchy and write a new constitution.
On foreign policy, too, Prachanda has diluted his party’s earlier threats to abrogate a controversial treaty with India, ban Indian films and stop recruitment of Gurkha soldiers into the Indian and British armies. C.P. Gajurel, chief of the party’s international division, has said the ex-insurgents would stop calling the Americans “imperialists” and the Indians “expansionists”.
Even on the question of the monarchy, the Maoists have been speaking of a “graceful exit” for King Gyanendra. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the party’s chief ideologue, had broached the idea of keeping a “cultural king” who would preside over the predominantly Hindu nation’s myriad festivals and rituals, before coming under criticism from the party. Still, Prachanda has sought a meeting with the monarch to ask him personally to leave the royal palace. The Maoists have said that Gyanendra, as a commoner, could run his businesses and perhaps even enter politics.
At one level, this mellowing stems from sheer expediency. Defying most predictions, the Maoists emerged as the principal force in the April 10 elections. Still, they lack a majority in the 600-plus assembly. The Nepali Congress and the other main communist faction, the Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML), are still licking their electoral wounds. Both are divided on whether to join a Maoist-led government.
Prachanda has said he would give Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala a “respectable” position in a new government. Some have taken this to mean the presidency, after King Gyanendra is formally ousted by the assembly. Dr. Bhattarai, however, insists that Koirala must join the monarch in exiting the national stage.
Koirala, for his part, has come under growing criticism from his Nepali Congress for ceding too much to the Maoists in the name of boosting the peace process that formally ended the decade-long insurgency that claimed at least 13,000 lives. The prime minister, who had said he would resign after the elections, is holding consultations with other political parties on forming the next government.
Some Maoist leaders suspect something sinister behind the maneuvering. They believe the Nepali Congress and the UML are colluding with the Nepali Army and “foreign power centers” to prevent the ex-rebels from heading the new government. And not without reason. Nepali Congress leaders insist the Maoists must first disband their fighting force, currently sequestered in U.N.-supervised camps. The UML, like the Nepali Congress, wants the former rebels to stop attacks on political rivals, end their kangaroo courts and return property confiscated during the insurgency.
The three major external stakeholders, too, are adjusting to the Maoists’ unexpected triumph. The United States, which still considers the Maoists a terrorist organization, has softened its stance after the election. U.S. Ambassador Nancy Powell met with Prachanda, opening Washington’s formal contact with the ex-rebels, before flying to Washington for consultations. It is unclear, though, whether the U.S. government would immediately withdraw the terrorist tag from the Maoists.
India, Nepal’s traditionally influential neighbor to the south, organized a conference on strengthening bilateral relations. The Maoists’ call to renegotiate the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, a demand enjoying wider political support in Nepal, received a patient hearing. Still, India has its own priority and a new ambassador has assumed charge. New Delhi hopes the election in Nepal would encourage its own Maoist insurgents to renounce violence and enter the mainstream. The Indian Maoists, however, seem to be in defiant mood. In a statement, they described Nepalis’ electoral verdict as a defeat for “Indian expansionism.”
Nepal’s northern neighbor China, which had opposed the Maoist insurgency, has steadily built ties with the former rebels. The regularity of pro-Tibet demonstrations in Kathmandu over the past two months has heightened Beijing’s sensitivities on what it has long considered a volatile frontier. Prachanda’s assertion that his party would maintain “equidistance” between Nepal’s two giant neighbors will have placated Beijing somewhat. In New Delhi, it has intensified concern, especially among sections skeptical of the Maoists’ real motives. One veteran analyst, B. Raman, recently wrote that India may have no alternative to backing a military takeover to prevent the Maoists from gaining strength.
Surely, those offering such an extreme prescription have an eye on the turmoil within the Maoist party. Before the election, the former rebels had projected Prachanda as their presidential candidate. Now they have nominated him as the next prime minister, effectively edging out the more articulate Dr. Bhattarai. Although the change has not resulted in any public split in Maoist ranks, the two men do share a history of rivalry.
Immediately, though, the Maoists must contend with the expectations of the rank and file. The Maoists put 23,500 fighters into the camps. As part of the peace agreement, they are to be integrated into the national army. However, the generals do not want to accept the fighters right away, saying they are still politically indoctrinated.
The Maoists have sent women and members of traditionally marginalized groups to the assembly in numbers unprecedented for Nepal. Still, there are rumblings of discontent. Last week, Prachanda faced the first organized protest from within the party over the choice of legislators under the proportional representation category.
Such discord is not new in Nepali politics. The Nepali Congress and the UML suffered damaging splits after having failed to reconcile internal differences. Unlike the Maoists, however, they had already led the government.
Electoral success has begun to soften Nepal’s former Maoist rebels. The leader of the once-feared organization, Pushpa Kamal Dahal – who still goes by his nom de guerre “Prachanda” (The Fierce One) – is calling for political consensus as the Himalayan nation prepares to abolish the monarchy and write a new constitution.
On foreign policy, too, Prachanda has diluted his party’s earlier threats to abrogate a controversial treaty with India, ban Indian films and stop recruitment of Gurkha soldiers into the Indian and British armies. C.P. Gajurel, chief of the party’s international division, has said the ex-insurgents would stop calling the Americans “imperialists” and the Indians “expansionists”.
Even on the question of the monarchy, the Maoists have been speaking of a “graceful exit” for King Gyanendra. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the party’s chief ideologue, had broached the idea of keeping a “cultural king” who would preside over the predominantly Hindu nation’s myriad festivals and rituals, before coming under criticism from the party. Still, Prachanda has sought a meeting with the monarch to ask him personally to leave the royal palace. The Maoists have said that Gyanendra, as a commoner, could run his businesses and perhaps even enter politics.
At one level, this mellowing stems from sheer expediency. Defying most predictions, the Maoists emerged as the principal force in the April 10 elections. Still, they lack a majority in the 600-plus assembly. The Nepali Congress and the other main communist faction, the Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML), are still licking their electoral wounds. Both are divided on whether to join a Maoist-led government.
Prachanda has said he would give Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala a “respectable” position in a new government. Some have taken this to mean the presidency, after King Gyanendra is formally ousted by the assembly. Dr. Bhattarai, however, insists that Koirala must join the monarch in exiting the national stage.
Koirala, for his part, has come under growing criticism from his Nepali Congress for ceding too much to the Maoists in the name of boosting the peace process that formally ended the decade-long insurgency that claimed at least 13,000 lives. The prime minister, who had said he would resign after the elections, is holding consultations with other political parties on forming the next government.
Some Maoist leaders suspect something sinister behind the maneuvering. They believe the Nepali Congress and the UML are colluding with the Nepali Army and “foreign power centers” to prevent the ex-rebels from heading the new government. And not without reason. Nepali Congress leaders insist the Maoists must first disband their fighting force, currently sequestered in U.N.-supervised camps. The UML, like the Nepali Congress, wants the former rebels to stop attacks on political rivals, end their kangaroo courts and return property confiscated during the insurgency.
The three major external stakeholders, too, are adjusting to the Maoists’ unexpected triumph. The United States, which still considers the Maoists a terrorist organization, has softened its stance after the election. U.S. Ambassador Nancy Powell met with Prachanda, opening Washington’s formal contact with the ex-rebels, before flying to Washington for consultations. It is unclear, though, whether the U.S. government would immediately withdraw the terrorist tag from the Maoists.
India, Nepal’s traditionally influential neighbor to the south, organized a conference on strengthening bilateral relations. The Maoists’ call to renegotiate the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, a demand enjoying wider political support in Nepal, received a patient hearing. Still, India has its own priority and a new ambassador has assumed charge. New Delhi hopes the election in Nepal would encourage its own Maoist insurgents to renounce violence and enter the mainstream. The Indian Maoists, however, seem to be in defiant mood. In a statement, they described Nepalis’ electoral verdict as a defeat for “Indian expansionism.”
Nepal’s northern neighbor China, which had opposed the Maoist insurgency, has steadily built ties with the former rebels. The regularity of pro-Tibet demonstrations in Kathmandu over the past two months has heightened Beijing’s sensitivities on what it has long considered a volatile frontier. Prachanda’s assertion that his party would maintain “equidistance” between Nepal’s two giant neighbors will have placated Beijing somewhat. In New Delhi, it has intensified concern, especially among sections skeptical of the Maoists’ real motives. One veteran analyst, B. Raman, recently wrote that India may have no alternative to backing a military takeover to prevent the Maoists from gaining strength.
Surely, those offering such an extreme prescription have an eye on the turmoil within the Maoist party. Before the election, the former rebels had projected Prachanda as their presidential candidate. Now they have nominated him as the next prime minister, effectively edging out the more articulate Dr. Bhattarai. Although the change has not resulted in any public split in Maoist ranks, the two men do share a history of rivalry.
Immediately, though, the Maoists must contend with the expectations of the rank and file. The Maoists put 23,500 fighters into the camps. As part of the peace agreement, they are to be integrated into the national army. However, the generals do not want to accept the fighters right away, saying they are still politically indoctrinated.
The Maoists have sent women and members of traditionally marginalized groups to the assembly in numbers unprecedented for Nepal. Still, there are rumblings of discontent. Last week, Prachanda faced the first organized protest from within the party over the choice of legislators under the proportional representation category.
Such discord is not new in Nepali politics. The Nepali Congress and the UML suffered damaging splits after having failed to reconcile internal differences. Unlike the Maoists, however, they had already led the government.
Tuesday, May 06, 2008
आफ्नै कांधको भार
सञ्जय उपाध्याय
संविधानसभामा सबैभन्दा ठूलो दल बनेको नेकपा माओवादीलाई सरकारको नेतृत्व नसुम्पनका लागि केही पक्षले अघि सारेका तर्कहरू वैदेशिक आडमा लोकतन्त्रका आधारभूत मान्यतामाथिको ठाडो अतिक्रमण हुन् वा शक्ति बांडफाटका लागि एउटा दबाबसूत्र मात्र, त्यो त प्रस्टिदै जाला । समग्र बहसको स्तरले भने राजनीतिक असमझदारी गहिरिदै जाने पूर्वाभास भएको छ ।
प्रबुद्ध अन्तर्राष्ट्रय पर्यवेक्षकहरूले निर्वाचन सामान्यतः स्वतन्त्र र निष्पक्ष भएको ठोकुवा उत्तिखेरी नगरिदिएका भए सायद सडकमा अहिले टायर जलिरहेका हुन्थे र ढुङ्गामुढा बर्सिरहेका हुन्थे । भित्रभित्रै भने आगो सल्किरहेकै छ । मतदाताद्वारा निर्दिष्ट आ-आफ्नो हैसियत अनुसार नयां संविधान बनाउन तर्फ कसरी लाग्ने भन्नुको साटो अन्य दलका केही नेताहरू माओवादीलाई कसरी अर्को चुनावमा तह लगाउने भन्नेमै तल्लीन देखिन्छन् ।
यहां २०५२ सालको त्रिशङ्कु संसद्को अनुभव सम्झनुको कुनै तुक रहेन । उतिबेलाको संयुक्त वा अल्पमत सरकार बनाउने प्रस्ट संवैधानिक प्रावधान एवम् त्यसलाई क्रियाशील बनाउन प्रत्यक्ष राजनीतिभन्दा माथि रहेका राष्ट्राध्यक्ष छैनन् । असाधारण परिस्थितिले असाधारण प्रयोजन खोज्ने नै भयो ।
चुनावभन्दा धेरैअघि नै सत्तासीन दलहरूले आफूहरूबीचकै सहमतिका आधारमा राज्यव्यवस्था चलाउने प्रतिबद्धता अन्तरिम संविधानमै जनाइसकेका थिए । नयां शक्तिका रूपमा उदाएको मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमका साथै सभामा उपस्थित अन्य साना दलहरूलाई कसरी प्रभावकारी संयन्त्रमा समावेश गर्ने भन्ने कुराले प्रमुखता पाउनुपर्ने थियो । प्राथमिक विद्यालयको चौरमा सुनिने धमास र घुर्र्कीको स्तरमा पो त बहस झर्यो ।
माओवादी अध्यक्ष प्रचण्डले आफूलाई राष्ट्राध्यक्ष पदको उम्मेदवारका रूपमा प्रस्तुत गर्दा र उनलाई 'भित्ते राष्ट्रपति' भनेर अन्य दलका नेताहरूले ठट्टा गर्दा अन्तरिम संविधान सबैका छेउमै थियो । जनताले त्यसमा अन्तरमि राष्ट्रपतिको प्रावधान नभएको कुरा बुझ्न फुर्ुसद पाएनन् होला । नेता र दलहरूले उनीहरूलाई बुझाउन नखोज्नु वा नसक्नुको परिणाम मुलुकले कतिसम्म भोग्दै जाने। प्रचण्डको सैनिक ओहदा र वाईसीएलको उद्दण्डतालाई उनको प्रधानमन्त्री बन्ने अभियानको बाटोमा तगारो देख्नेहरू चुनावअघि दृष्टिविहीन पक्कै थिएनन् । उता वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई शान्ति प्रक्रिया यहां सम्म पुर्याएकै आधारमा निरन्तरता दिनु वाञ्छनीय हुने हो भने किन उनलाई आजीवन सरकारप्रमुखको पदवीले विभूषित नगर्ने।
सुरुबाटै शान्ति प्रक्रियालाई जसरी पनि कायम राखिनुपर्ने बाध्यताले आफ्नै प्रकारका तनावहरू सिर्जना गरेको थियो । असहमतिहरूको समायोजन गर्नका लागि सहभागीहरूले पनि आफ्नै नियम बनाए । कहिले राजनीतिक त कहिले संवैधानिक अनि कहिले व्यावहारकि अनिवार्यताद्वारा निर्देशित प्रक्रियामा हचुवा र हल्का निर्णयहरूसमेत अनिवार्य बन्न पुगे । पुराना प्रतिबद्धताहरू नै सबैतिर अलपत्र पररिहेका बेला तिनको पुनःव्याख्या गर्नु सजिलो जुक्ति थियो । सङ्घात्मक गणतन्त्रको ऐनामा नयां नेपालको अनुहार देखियो ।
नयां समस्या र र्सत आइलाग्नासाथ अन्तरिम संविधान संशोधन गरिहाले पुग्ने परम्परालाई अहिले आएर तोड्न सजिलो हुने कुरै भएन । सरकार बनाउन र खसाउन यदि दुइतिहाइ समर्थनको सर्त समस्या बनेको हो भने त्यो फेर्न खोज्नु नै प्राथमिकता भयो । तर, सहमतिका नाममा अस्थायी प्रकृतिको विधान आफू अनुकूल संशोधन मात्र गररिहने हो भने मूल काममा कसले, कहिले र कसरी ध्यान दिने।
विदेशी अनुगमनकर्ताहरू ल्याप्चे लगाएर गइहाले पनि नेपालले उनीहरूको सदासय पाइरहला । भूतपूर्व अमेरिकी राष्ट्रपति जिम्मी कार्टर माओवादीमाथि आफ्नो देशले लगाएको आतङ्ककारीको बिल्ला उतार्न सफल हुन् भन्ने कामना गरौला । तर, यथार्थपरक रहनु नै श्रेयस्कर होला । नेपालपछि सिरिया पुगेर कार्टर वासिङ्टनद्वारा आतङ्ककारी घोषित अर्को सङ्गठन हमासका नेतालाई भेटेर विवादमा परे । अमेरिका फर्केपछि कार्टरले लेखेका र बोलेका शब्दहरू केलाउदा त उनले माओवादी र हमासलाई वर्तमान अमेरिकी विदेश नीतिविरुद्ध उनको बृहत् अभियानमा समाहित गरेको देखियो । यस्तो समायोजनले राख्न सक्ने अर्थका बारेमा माओवादीहरू नै सबभन्दा पहिले चनाखो बनेका होलान् ।
अनमिनमा रहेका विदेशी शुभचिन्तकहरू नेपालले शान्ति प्रक्रियाको अहम् खुड्किलो पार गरेकामा खुसी छन् । हामीकहां विशिष्ट र सीमित राजनीतिक लक्ष्य लिएर संयुक्त राष्ट्रसङ्घ आउनुमा हाम्रै अनुरोधका साथै हाम्रा दुइ विशाल छिमेकीहरूका संवेदनशीलताले काम गरेका थिए । अनमिन राष्ट्रसङ्घ मुख्यालयमा राजनीतिक विभागले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय स्तरमै द्वन्द्व निरोध र व्यवस्थापनमा लिन खोजेको बढ्दो भूमिकाकै उपज पनि थियो । यस प्रसङ्गलाई निश्चय पनि गौण मान्न सकिन्न ।
हाम्रो शान्ति प्रयासमा संलग्न अन्य अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सङ्घसंस्थाहरू पछिसम्म पनि नेपालबारे र्सतर्क रहिरहलान् । उनीहरूलाई संसारभर कार्यक्षेत्रको कुनै कमी रहने छैन । समय र स्रोतका अभावले उनीहरूको उत्सुकतालाई सीमाङ्कन गर्नेछ । जहां सम्म हाम्रा पारस्परकि अविश्वासकै कारण विदेशीहरूलाई निम्त्याइएको यथार्थ छ, त्यसको पर्याप्त सुनुवाइ त चुनावअघि नै हुनसकेको थिएन । कमजोरै भए पनि समझदारी बढाउने अभिभारा हाम्रै कांधमा रहिरहनेछ ।
(नेपाल राष्ट्रिय साप्ताहिक, बैशाख २२, २०६५)
संविधानसभामा सबैभन्दा ठूलो दल बनेको नेकपा माओवादीलाई सरकारको नेतृत्व नसुम्पनका लागि केही पक्षले अघि सारेका तर्कहरू वैदेशिक आडमा लोकतन्त्रका आधारभूत मान्यतामाथिको ठाडो अतिक्रमण हुन् वा शक्ति बांडफाटका लागि एउटा दबाबसूत्र मात्र, त्यो त प्रस्टिदै जाला । समग्र बहसको स्तरले भने राजनीतिक असमझदारी गहिरिदै जाने पूर्वाभास भएको छ ।
प्रबुद्ध अन्तर्राष्ट्रय पर्यवेक्षकहरूले निर्वाचन सामान्यतः स्वतन्त्र र निष्पक्ष भएको ठोकुवा उत्तिखेरी नगरिदिएका भए सायद सडकमा अहिले टायर जलिरहेका हुन्थे र ढुङ्गामुढा बर्सिरहेका हुन्थे । भित्रभित्रै भने आगो सल्किरहेकै छ । मतदाताद्वारा निर्दिष्ट आ-आफ्नो हैसियत अनुसार नयां संविधान बनाउन तर्फ कसरी लाग्ने भन्नुको साटो अन्य दलका केही नेताहरू माओवादीलाई कसरी अर्को चुनावमा तह लगाउने भन्नेमै तल्लीन देखिन्छन् ।
यहां २०५२ सालको त्रिशङ्कु संसद्को अनुभव सम्झनुको कुनै तुक रहेन । उतिबेलाको संयुक्त वा अल्पमत सरकार बनाउने प्रस्ट संवैधानिक प्रावधान एवम् त्यसलाई क्रियाशील बनाउन प्रत्यक्ष राजनीतिभन्दा माथि रहेका राष्ट्राध्यक्ष छैनन् । असाधारण परिस्थितिले असाधारण प्रयोजन खोज्ने नै भयो ।
चुनावभन्दा धेरैअघि नै सत्तासीन दलहरूले आफूहरूबीचकै सहमतिका आधारमा राज्यव्यवस्था चलाउने प्रतिबद्धता अन्तरिम संविधानमै जनाइसकेका थिए । नयां शक्तिका रूपमा उदाएको मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमका साथै सभामा उपस्थित अन्य साना दलहरूलाई कसरी प्रभावकारी संयन्त्रमा समावेश गर्ने भन्ने कुराले प्रमुखता पाउनुपर्ने थियो । प्राथमिक विद्यालयको चौरमा सुनिने धमास र घुर्र्कीको स्तरमा पो त बहस झर्यो ।
माओवादी अध्यक्ष प्रचण्डले आफूलाई राष्ट्राध्यक्ष पदको उम्मेदवारका रूपमा प्रस्तुत गर्दा र उनलाई 'भित्ते राष्ट्रपति' भनेर अन्य दलका नेताहरूले ठट्टा गर्दा अन्तरिम संविधान सबैका छेउमै थियो । जनताले त्यसमा अन्तरमि राष्ट्रपतिको प्रावधान नभएको कुरा बुझ्न फुर्ुसद पाएनन् होला । नेता र दलहरूले उनीहरूलाई बुझाउन नखोज्नु वा नसक्नुको परिणाम मुलुकले कतिसम्म भोग्दै जाने। प्रचण्डको सैनिक ओहदा र वाईसीएलको उद्दण्डतालाई उनको प्रधानमन्त्री बन्ने अभियानको बाटोमा तगारो देख्नेहरू चुनावअघि दृष्टिविहीन पक्कै थिएनन् । उता वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई शान्ति प्रक्रिया यहां सम्म पुर्याएकै आधारमा निरन्तरता दिनु वाञ्छनीय हुने हो भने किन उनलाई आजीवन सरकारप्रमुखको पदवीले विभूषित नगर्ने।
सुरुबाटै शान्ति प्रक्रियालाई जसरी पनि कायम राखिनुपर्ने बाध्यताले आफ्नै प्रकारका तनावहरू सिर्जना गरेको थियो । असहमतिहरूको समायोजन गर्नका लागि सहभागीहरूले पनि आफ्नै नियम बनाए । कहिले राजनीतिक त कहिले संवैधानिक अनि कहिले व्यावहारकि अनिवार्यताद्वारा निर्देशित प्रक्रियामा हचुवा र हल्का निर्णयहरूसमेत अनिवार्य बन्न पुगे । पुराना प्रतिबद्धताहरू नै सबैतिर अलपत्र पररिहेका बेला तिनको पुनःव्याख्या गर्नु सजिलो जुक्ति थियो । सङ्घात्मक गणतन्त्रको ऐनामा नयां नेपालको अनुहार देखियो ।
नयां समस्या र र्सत आइलाग्नासाथ अन्तरिम संविधान संशोधन गरिहाले पुग्ने परम्परालाई अहिले आएर तोड्न सजिलो हुने कुरै भएन । सरकार बनाउन र खसाउन यदि दुइतिहाइ समर्थनको सर्त समस्या बनेको हो भने त्यो फेर्न खोज्नु नै प्राथमिकता भयो । तर, सहमतिका नाममा अस्थायी प्रकृतिको विधान आफू अनुकूल संशोधन मात्र गररिहने हो भने मूल काममा कसले, कहिले र कसरी ध्यान दिने।
विदेशी अनुगमनकर्ताहरू ल्याप्चे लगाएर गइहाले पनि नेपालले उनीहरूको सदासय पाइरहला । भूतपूर्व अमेरिकी राष्ट्रपति जिम्मी कार्टर माओवादीमाथि आफ्नो देशले लगाएको आतङ्ककारीको बिल्ला उतार्न सफल हुन् भन्ने कामना गरौला । तर, यथार्थपरक रहनु नै श्रेयस्कर होला । नेपालपछि सिरिया पुगेर कार्टर वासिङ्टनद्वारा आतङ्ककारी घोषित अर्को सङ्गठन हमासका नेतालाई भेटेर विवादमा परे । अमेरिका फर्केपछि कार्टरले लेखेका र बोलेका शब्दहरू केलाउदा त उनले माओवादी र हमासलाई वर्तमान अमेरिकी विदेश नीतिविरुद्ध उनको बृहत् अभियानमा समाहित गरेको देखियो । यस्तो समायोजनले राख्न सक्ने अर्थका बारेमा माओवादीहरू नै सबभन्दा पहिले चनाखो बनेका होलान् ।
अनमिनमा रहेका विदेशी शुभचिन्तकहरू नेपालले शान्ति प्रक्रियाको अहम् खुड्किलो पार गरेकामा खुसी छन् । हामीकहां विशिष्ट र सीमित राजनीतिक लक्ष्य लिएर संयुक्त राष्ट्रसङ्घ आउनुमा हाम्रै अनुरोधका साथै हाम्रा दुइ विशाल छिमेकीहरूका संवेदनशीलताले काम गरेका थिए । अनमिन राष्ट्रसङ्घ मुख्यालयमा राजनीतिक विभागले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय स्तरमै द्वन्द्व निरोध र व्यवस्थापनमा लिन खोजेको बढ्दो भूमिकाकै उपज पनि थियो । यस प्रसङ्गलाई निश्चय पनि गौण मान्न सकिन्न ।
हाम्रो शान्ति प्रयासमा संलग्न अन्य अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सङ्घसंस्थाहरू पछिसम्म पनि नेपालबारे र्सतर्क रहिरहलान् । उनीहरूलाई संसारभर कार्यक्षेत्रको कुनै कमी रहने छैन । समय र स्रोतका अभावले उनीहरूको उत्सुकतालाई सीमाङ्कन गर्नेछ । जहां सम्म हाम्रा पारस्परकि अविश्वासकै कारण विदेशीहरूलाई निम्त्याइएको यथार्थ छ, त्यसको पर्याप्त सुनुवाइ त चुनावअघि नै हुनसकेको थिएन । कमजोरै भए पनि समझदारी बढाउने अभिभारा हाम्रै कांधमा रहिरहनेछ ।
(नेपाल राष्ट्रिय साप्ताहिक, बैशाख २२, २०६५)
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