By Sanjay Upadhya
May 18, 2008
Presumptuous as it may seem, the Nepali Congress’ posture after the Constituent Assembly elections is quite understandable. The imperative of handing power to the Maoists, who won the largest bloc of seats, as well as the reluctance to cede the political field to the former rebels both stem from the party’s unique position in the country’s politics.
The Nepali Congress’ predilection for equating itself with democracy must be unnerving to its rivals. Still, there is an element of truth in the claim. If non-Nepali Congress parties – meaning communists in Nepal’s context – had spearheaded the democratic movements of 1950-51, 1990 and 2006, it is debatable whether they would have won the same level of international support, more so in view of Nepal’s sensitive geopolitical realities. Moreover, the government of the day would have found it far easier to resist the challenge.
Then there is that other bitter truth. The Nepali Congress was at the center of the political accidents of 1960 and 2002 (which set the stage for the 2005 royal takeover). No matter how much you berate the palace’s “autocratic tendencies”, the sequence of events does not absolve the Nepali Congress. A party that could endure profound odds to ensure the triumph of democracy was simply ineffective when it came to preserving it. The Nepali Congress’ visceral ability to alienate its political rivals, compounded by bitter internal feuds, eventually subverted democracy on both occasions.
In an organization where ideology has served more as an adhesive for disparate factions rather than a living ideal, you would expect leaders to be more vigilant. Instead, the party always equated the triumph of democracy with its eternalness, forcing the country to pay the price.
Despite winning the second largest number of seats in the Constituent Assembly elections, many Nepali Congress leaders are still smarting from what they consider a humiliation. The party’s failure to benefit from the split in the communist vote must have been painful enough. The fact that the Maoists surged despite the fact that the Nepali Congress controlled the premiership as well as the principal ministries must have exacerbated the soreness.
During previous setbacks, Nepali Congress members have routinely faulted, among other things, extreme nepotism and favoritism, allegations of corruption swirling around senior leaders and the party’s tendency to forget the tenets of democracy once in power for its woes. This time the party was mired in a deeper mess.
In the name of preserving the peace process at all costs, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala systematically rebuffed party members to accommodate the Maoists. Within the Koirala family, rival claimants to the leadership mantle veered closer to the palace and the Maoists respectively. Senior party leaders effortlessly conceded that reunification had not really brought the two factions closer emotionally.
In their quest to reinterpret B.P. Koirala’s national reconciliation policy, the dominant faction discredited people like former premier Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and former speaker Taranath Ranabhat as “royalists”. The post-election hand-wringing over how the royalist vote could go to the Maoists became meaningless.
The Constituent Assembly, republic, an inclusive state structure and other major slogans of contemporary Nepal clearly belonged to the Maoists. Despite having broken with the monarchy, the Nepali Congress could still have built a platform based on religious, social and cultural coexistence. By outlook, temperament and record, Nepali Congress leaders were ill suited for challenging the status quo. There was no way the party could have outdone its rivals in the race for the most revolutionary visage.
The major parties worked hard to project the Constituent Assembly elections as one-in-an-epoch opportunity. Still the people turned out in number barely larger than in the three parliamentary elections after the 1990 change. If the Maoists really triumphed solely on intimidation, as their rivals continue to claim, then the ex-rebels were sophisticated enough to have perpetrated fear under the gaze of international observers. Surely, the Maoists cannot be expected to take responsibility for the Nepali Congress’ failure to recognize that.
The imperative of ceding power to the largest bloc in the new assembly is inherently democratic. Yet it is hard to describe as undemocratic the reluctance to do so to a party that has done precious little to assure the people of its democratic intentions. If any other party had refused to respect the people’s mandate in such a way, the international community would have been outraged long ago.
Whatever the reasons for the Nepali Congress’ setback, it is far from fatal. The party will continue to monopolize the halo of democracy until, at least, the Unified Marxist-Leninists change their name and flag. This is reality is something the Nepal Congress can approach with either humility or haughtiness. The choice will determine its future.
